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Over the last forty years, legal theory and policy advice have come to draw heavily from 
an ‘evolutionary’ jurisprudence that explains legal transformation by drawing inspiration 
from the theoretical successes of Darwinian natural selection. This project seeks to enrich 
and critique this tradition using an analytical perspective that emphasizes the material 
consequences of concepts and ideas. Existing theories of legal evolution depend on a 
positivist epistemology that strictly distinguishes the objects of social life—interests, 
institutions, systems—from knowledge about those objects. My dissertation explores 
how knowledge, and especially non-legal expertise, acts as an independent site and locus 
of transformation, mediating the interaction between law and social phenomena and 
acting as a catalyst of legal innovation. Prior work by Simon Deakin has integrated 
insights from systems theory to show how the interaction between law and economic 
institutions can only be properly understood by attending to the epistemic frame law uses 
to interpret economic practice. Using a case study on the impact of ‘law and finance’ 
literature on World Bank policy advice and, consequentially, on legal reforms adopted by 
many developing countries between 2000 and the present, I show that such attention to 
legal knowledge is inadequate. The case points, first, to the contingency of the intellectual 
tools used to understand legal institutions. Rather than deploying a determinate 
rationality, private and public actors address legal, economic, and ethical problems using 
a variety of paradigms: viewpoints are not determined by realities. More fundamentally, 
the cases suggest that successful paradigms, rather than economic or political realities 
alone, shape the dynamics of socio-legal change. My conclusions address some normative 
questions that arise when researchers in a social scientific mode are implicated in the 
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How does law change? Simple: the law changes when an appeal court revisits a 
contentious doctrine, or when a regulator publishes a new rule, or when new legislation 
comes into force, or when a constitution is successfully amended. Actually, this answer is 
beyond simple. Once one adopts a certain conception of law, it becomes tautological.3  
Legal scholars have long been dissatisfied with this answer. Any effort to account for 
processes of legal change, regardless of object or methodology, demands some attention 
to events of this kind. But the answer may still miss something. Might the significance and 
connotations of legal concepts shift over time to accommodate alterations, additions, and 
subtractions from the body of rules that rely on them? Might the gradual accumulation of 
these conceptual transformations eventually become an independent source of legal 
change? Can we really be so confident that, in the face of significant social changes, law 
remains steadfast until the moment that a legislature, court, or regulator pronounces a 
                                                        
1 Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law [1897]’ (1997) 110 Harv L Rev 991.  
2 E Donald Elliott, ‘The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence’ (1985) 85 Colum L Rev 38, 38. 
3 The idea that law is delimited by the commands of the sovereign is often identified with the nineteenth-
century legal theorist John Austin. John Austin, The	Province	of	Jurisprudence	Determined (Wilfrid E Rumble 
ed, Cambridge University Press 1995). The idea is traceable at least as far back as Hobbes: ‘The law of such 
a society thus consisted of the commands of whoever was sovereign in that society. If law is the product of 
the human will, the process of legal change is simple. The sovereign decides to issue a new rule to replace 
the old rule; he has changed his mind.’ Peter Stein, Legal	Evolution:	The	 Story	 of	 an	 Idea (Cambridge 
University Press 1980) 2. The modern inheritor of this strain of thinking about law, at least in the Anglo-
American legal tradition, is HLA Hart. Hart’s account of law is richer than Austin’s. He does not traffic in the 
fiction that valid law can be identified with the will of a sovereign. He does nonetheless identify law with 
valid norms issued by a state-backed law-making authority, from which it follows that changes to law are 
definable as changes to those norms. Hart’s seminal contribution to the positivist tradition is HLA Hart, The	
Concept	of	Law (Clarendon Press 1972). 
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new rule or amends a preexisting one?4 If there is a change in the justification for a 
doctrine or procedure, but not in the doctrine or procedure itself, has there been a change 
in the law?5 Does the publication of an influential volume of doctrine by a highly-regarded 
professor change the law, or does the law change only when an interpretation expressed 
in that volume is adopted by a court? How does law change in settings in which custom 
is much more prominent than the law adjudicated by the courts, or contexts in which 
courts play a minimal role?6 Those who take a more ecumenical view of what counts as 
law will argue that an account of legal change focused on valid rules omits much that strict 
legal positivists would ignore, or that the positivists would at best admit as relevant yet 
not describe as legal change.  
Frustrations with the minimalist account of legal change, however, need not arise from 
disagreements over fundamental questions of legal theory. Those who seek to describe 
or explain legal change are generally seeking more than just a standard by which to 
measure whether law has changed. Their inquiry into how law changes is often much 
nearer to the question of why	 law changes. 7  Even those who imagine law as an 
ascertainable body of rules flowing from the pens of a determinate body of authorized 
law-makers may ask, ‘what shapes the output of the law-maker?’ 8  Courts implicitly 
pursue such a line of inquiry all the time whenever they invoke the purported ‘intention 
of the legislator’ as an interpretive aid in the application of a given statutory provision or 
regulatory regime.9  
                                                        
4 Consider Holmes’ famous dissent in Lochner	v	New	York 198 US 45 (United States Supreme Court 1905). 
Does any part of the dissent currently form part of the law of the United States today? Was it part of the law 
before Lochner was substantively overturned in West	Coast	Hotel	Co	v	Parrish 300 US 379 (United States 
Supreme Court 1937)?  
5 Ellen E Sward, ‘Justification and Doctrinal Evolution’ (2004–05) 37 Conn L Rev 389, 390. 
6 Relevant themes for such contexts include ‘custom,’ ‘legal pluralism,’ and ‘soft law.’ Jeremy Webber, ‘The 
Grammar of Customary Law’ (2009) 54 McGill LJ 579; Harry W Arthurs, ‘Understanding Labour Law: The 
Debate Over “Industrial Pluralism”’ (1985) 38 Current Legal Problems 83; Sally Engle Merry, ‘Legal 
Pluralism’ (1988) 22 Law & Society Review 869; Sally Falk Moore, ‘Law and Social Change: The Semi-
Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study’ (1973) 7 Law & Society Review 719. 
7 The legal positivism of someone like Austin ‘…helps to explain the working of the machinery by which the 
legislative power puts the rules decreed into operation … It does not solve the problems of the origin of 
legal rules.’ Paul Vinogradoff, Outlines	of	Historical	Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press 1920) vol 1, 123. 
8 For positivists in the mould of Hart (above, n 3), no more is necessary. Law, understood as a system of 
rules, changes when and only when changes are made in accordance with a second order set of rules which 
render those changes valid. In Austin’s terms, the law changes whenever the sovereign changes its mind 
and acts accordingly. We may still then ask when and why the sovereign might change his/its/our mind.  




The instrumental inquiry of a judge or other legal actor into legislative intentions departs 
in two ways from the accounts of legal evolution that are the subject of this dissertation. 
For one, the latter aspire to provide an account of legal change that covers multiple cases, 
not just single episodes. Beyond identifying the factors that led to the repeal, reform, or 
establishment of a particular rule or that shaped a particular concept, their aim is to 
explain legal change per se. 10  Whether the resulting account is intended to serve 
practical, normative, or purely scientific ends, achieving those ends is thought to require 
not only an account of ‘what led to …’ (the rule, the concept, the regime, the doctrine) in 
a particular case, but also ‘what leads to …’ in general.11  
Moreover, accounts of legal evolution are generally averse to explanations rooted in any 
unified intention. Evolutionary accounts might attend to ‘the intention of the legislator,’ 
but only as	a	fiction that is but one factor among many that ultimately contributes to the 
dynamics of legal change and (this will be important) to legal stability.12 Evolutionary 
accounts work to understand the entire range of motivations and intentions that drive 
the churn of legal norms, acts, and meanings, and to grasp the mechanisms through which 
those drives are consolidated.  
I. Motivation,	Methodology,	Structure	
Let me take a step back. The intuition driving this project is that accounts of legal 
evolution have so far inadequately accounted for the role played by concepts, paradigms, 
                                                        
There is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire 
context in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously	with	the	scheme	of	the	Act,	the	object	
of	the	Act,	and	the	intention	of	Parliament. (emphasis added) 
The standard, first adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court in Rizzo	&	Rizzo	Shoes	Ltd	(Re) 1 SCR 27, para 
21 (Canada SC 1998) was taken verbatim from; Elmer A Driedger, The	 Construction	 of	 Statutes 
(Butterworths 1983) 83  
10 Those who understand the content of the law as a function of some set of characteristics found in its 
social context (e.g. of needs, interests, or values, whether of society as a whole or of some particular group) 
will in effect get a theory of social change at no extra charge: under such an approach, changes in content 
follow changes in context. Landes and Posner, for example, apply this reasoning to the positive economic 
theory of the common law, whereby rules are primarily shaped by the principle of wealth maximization. 
William M Landes and Richard A Posner, ‘Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction 
Change in the Common Law’ (1980) 9 J Legal Stud 367, 367. Such functionalist explanations of legal change 
are explored and critiqued in Chapters 3 & 4 below. 
11 The agendas or purposes that drive such accounts, and how those agendas might matter is explored in 
the conclusions in Chapter 6.  
12 Luhmann captures a sense of the dynamic by noting, in the legal argumentation that ‘[n]ot all “motives” 
of the legislator can be turned into law. One will never find written in the reasons of a judgment the 
statement that a legislative act was due to the manoeuvring of a political party or to the circumstance that 
it is now politically correct to take an anti-big-business position.’ Niklas Luhmann, Law	as	a	Social	System 
(Fatima Kastner and others eds, Klaus A Ziegert tr, Oxford University Press 2004) 115. 
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theories, models—the role played, in a word, by knowledge. Structurally, the dissertation 
proceeds toward a vindication of that intuition. The claim I ultimately confront is that 
once the role of knowledge is sufficiently integrated, the jurisprudential ambition to 
construct an evolutionary account of legal change may be impossible to fulfil.  
Neither legal evolution nor knowledge were the project’s starting point. Explaining how 
I ended up there will help illuminate the structure and agenda of the resulting 
dissertation. The first part of this introduction combines three tasks. It recounts the 
inspiration and genesis of the project, motivates the structure of the argument, and 
elaborates on key concepts which are explored and/or deployed over the course of the 
text.  
A. From	Measuring	Law’s	Effects	to	Theorizing	Causes	of	Law	
The seeds of this project lie in a confrontation with an influential strain of legal 
scholarship, commonly labelled as Law & Finance or Legal Origins Theory.13 There is 
something curious about the contrast between its profound intellectual influence and its 
apparent analytical weaknesses. For a jurist, reading the founding texts of the field raises 
conflicting sensations. On the one hand, the methods introduced by its authors—large 
scale, quantitative comparative law—were undeniably ground-breaking, and the 
conclusions promised to add a significant dose of empirical rigour to the half-century old 
field of Law & Development.  
Yet as a scholar familiar with comparative law, the studies seemed … wrong. The studies 
predicted that certain effects would follow from identifiable changes to labour 
regulations and, as an erstwhile labour lawyer, I was sympathetic to the argument that 
the promised effects would not justify making the reforms that might produce them.14 
                                                        
13 The seminal texts are Rafael La Porta and others, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) 52 
Journal of Finance 1131; Rafael La Porta and others, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political 
Economy 1113. For the identification of the relevant strands of thinking with Andrei Shleifer, and 
commentary on distinctions between Law & Finance and Legal Origins, see Chapter 5. 
14 A 2004 study by the team behind the original Law & Finance project found a correlation between an 
index of employment regulations and some labour market indicators, including unemployment rates and 
economic informality. The resulting Employing Workers Index (EWI) was integrated into the World Bank’s 
Doing	Business project and specifically aggregated into the Ease of Doing Business index which ranks 
countries using a composite of legal indicators. The EWI was attacked by advocates of labour market 
institutions for its inadequate conception of labour market functions and by jurists who emphasized the 
incompatibility of the policy advice implicit in the rankings with international labour standards (countries 
could earn a higher score by acting in violation of international labour standards). Perhaps most 
importantly, funding for the Doing Business project was threatened by US Congress, which directly led to 
the removal of the Employing Workers Indicator from country rankings, although the data is still collected 
annually. See Juan C Botero and others, ‘The Regulation of Labor’ (2004) 119 The Quarterly Journal of 
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More fundamentally, however, careful consideration of the way these studies constructed 
their data, the methods they used to analyse those data, and the conclusions they drew 
from those analyses gave rise to growing scepticism, and eventually frustration.15 I was 
not just resistant to the implications drawn from the findings of these studies, but 
sceptical about the methods on which their conclusions were based.  
My scepticism joins with and draws on a chorus of criticisms that have been levelled 
against Law & Finance over the last twenty years. The critical challenge to the credibility 
of Law & Finance turns on a set of questionable premises the project advances about the 
nature of legal change and its relationships to economic development and political action. 
The reliance that these studies place on claims about the nature of legal change is not 
immediately obvious. It is possible to make convincing, credible claims about the likely 
instrumental consequences of changing a legal rule, or to compare the hypothetical 
consequences of alternative rules or regimes, without a nuanced account of how or why 
legal change happens. So long as the argument is analytical, all that is required is a good 
warrant for believing that the rule as legislated will bear enough similarity to the rule as 
analysed, and that practice under the rule will bear enough similarity to the behaviour 
that the analysis predicts under the rule. A logical argument about the causal relation 
between the two can suffice. Under ideal circumstances, these conditions would be 
sufficient to predict the consequences of changing a legal rule, or indeed, of introducing a 
set of new ones. You don’t need to think about how such a change might be brought about 
or even know whether it will be, to say something about what may occur if it is.16 
                                                        
Economics 1339; Janine Berg and Sandrine Cazes, ‘Policymaking Gone Awry: The Labor Market Regulations 
of the Doing Business Indicators’ (2008) 29 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 349; John Ohnesorge, ‘Legal Origins and 
the Tasks of Corporate Law in Economic Development: A Preliminary Exploration’ [2009] BYU L Rev 1619, 
1626–27; Ralf Michaels, ‘Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and 
the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law’ (2009) 57 Am J Comp L 765, 773; Amanda Perry-Kessaris, ‘The 
Re-Co-Construction of Legitimacy of/Through the Doing Business Indicators’ (2017) 13 Int JLC 498, 506–
07. 
15 In the face of a positive argument that certain change in labour laws will produce an indicated set of 
labour market outcomes, one reasonable normative critique is that changing the rules in question would 
violate certain rights at work guaranteed by international law, and that, if there is a trade-off between the 
two, it would be a normative/legal/moral misstep for countries to violate labour rights to achieve those 
labour market outcomes. My point is that this normative argument is distinct from the question concerning 
the validity of the positive claim concerning whether the legal measures actually have the indicated 
economic effects.  
16  That being said, scholars who continue to write about the salutary effects of rules, regimes, and 
interpretations, even in the face of evidence that those proposals have little chance of being realized, should 
at least be aware that they are engaged in a fruitless enterprise. Pierre Schlag, ‘Spam Jurisprudence, Air 
Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A Report on the State of the Art)’ (2009) 97 Geo L J 803. 
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Arguments that draw conclusions about law’s effects from statistical analysis of empirical 
data, however, depend on complex thinking about the causal relationships among legal, 
social, political, and economic variables. Unless the economic and political factors shaped 
by law—productive institutions or relations of production, income distributions or class 
stratification, market structure or coalitions of interests—have no effect on what law gets 
made, credible conclusions about law’s effects depend on a robust theory regarding the 
directions and strengths of all the causal arrows, including the effect of these other factors 
on the law that gets made. Credibility, in other words, requires a theory of socio-legal 
change. Absent such a theory, the findings of the Law & Finance studies dissolve into no 
more than a series of notable but unsurprising correlations between legal variables and 
economic ones.17 That stipulation was already implicit in the original Law & Finance 
studies, which conditions their findings on a theoretical link between a country’s legal 
rules and the historical origins of its legal system. It was made explicit when the authors 
of the original studies developed their Legal Origins Theory to buttress the theoretical 
underpinnings of their initial findings against the attacks on their original theoretical 
premises.18  
B. From	Critique	to	(Incomplete)	Reconstruction		
Though inspired by bemusement about the success of Law & Finance, this dissertation is 
driven by scepticism of a much wider scope. Research projects in the social sciences 
broadly understood will generally be sparked by curiosity about how a process works, 
frustration over the wrongness of someone’s argument, or a desire to fix some problem.19 
Academic fads aside, unfortunately, researchers generally draw from the same pool of 
motivations in choosing their sites and episodes of research. Except in studies of very 
novel phenomena, one researcher’s fascination with a subject will be a good sign that the 
subject has already been combed over.20 So it goes with Law & Finance. My scepticism 
                                                        
17 Subsequent studies showed that for the early results even some of the correlations were spurious. In 
some cases, the correlations seemed to have been based on miscoded data, in others, they were an artefact 
of an overly narrow sampling across space and time. The critiques are given a summary review in Chapter 
5.  
18 Edward L Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Legal Origins’ (2002) 117 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
1193; Simeon Djankov and others, ‘The New Comparative Economics’ (2003) 31 Journal of Comparative 
Economics 595; Rafael La Porta and others, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (2008) 46 
Journal of Economic Literature 285. 
19 Kristin Luker, Salsa	Dancing	into	the	Social	Sciences:	Research	in	an	Age	of	Info‐Glut (Harvard University 
Press 2008). 
20 This brings to mind an old joke about an economics professor who is out walking with a friend. The friend 
spots a $50 bill and reaches down to take it. ‘Don’t bother,’ says the economist, laying a hand on his friend’s 
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about the foundations of the Law & Finance project led into well-trodden territory. 
Collating and reviewing the arguments against the validity of Law & Finance could fill out 
a book. I momentarily suspected that nothing of use remained to be said on the subject, 
though as discussed below there is much to discuss beyond the validity of its arguments. 
The large body of scholarship that had critically engaged with Law & Finance, moreover, 
offered a useful bridge from ‘the wrongness of an argument’ to ‘curiosity about how a 
process works.’ While some attacks on Law & Finance were no more than external 
critique,21 founded on a fundamental opposition to the jurisprudential project fuelling 
Law & Finance, 22  the majority of criticisms drew from a shared methodological 
orientation, similar epistemological coordinates, and the same theoretical ambitions.23 
Such responses, in other words, embraced the same objectives as Law & Finance, but felt 
those objectives could be pursued more effectively. 
The preliminary reading for this project focused on debates catalysed by Law & Finance, 
but it did not stop there. Many of the most strident critiques of Law & Finance were 
assimilated into broader arguments that sought to develop an affirmative, substantive 
theory of legal change. Though much of the discussion was originally sparked by the 
intellectual upheavals instigated by Law & Finance, it is best to see the literature engaging 
with Law & Finance as part of a larger project engaged in the reconstruction of a theory 
of legal change.  
C. Legal	Evolution	as	Epistemological	Ambition	
Sometimes in a research project, once one has sifted through the relevant literature, a 
niggling sensation will remain, like a buried splinter. The fascination will no longer take 
the same shape as it did at first. The result is no longer a puzzle—like wondering of a 
                                                        
arm, ‘If it was real, somebody would have already picked it up.’ The joke is often used to illustrate the 
strange logic of the efficient capital markets hypothesis. Andrew W Lo, ‘Efficient Markets Hypothesis’ in 
Steven N Durlauf and Lawrence E Blume (eds), The	New	Palgrave	Dictionary	of	Economics (2nd edn, Nature 
Publishing Group 2008). 
21 'An internal critique is one made from within the premises of the system under examination. External 
critique is made from some point outside the system; historical or sociological or economic standpoints 
come easily to mind.' John Henry Schlegel, ‘Of Duncan, Peter, and Thomas Kuhn’ (2000) 22 Cardozo L Rev 
1061, 1061, n 4. 
22 I have in mind studies that argued Law & Finance 'misunderstood' law. Pierre Legrand, ‘Econocentrism’ 
(2009) 59 U Toronto LJ 215; Vivian Grosswald Curran, ‘Comparative Law and the Legal Origins Thesis: 
[N]on	Scholae	Sed	Vitae	Discimus’ (2009) 57 Am J Comp L 863. The question of understanding is irrelevant; 
Law & Finance is concerned with explanation, which is something else entirely. 
23 I am not just speaking of work that cited the original studies: the data underlying the studies was the 
source of literally hundreds of subsequent studies, and for a long time, any work operating in large-scale 
quantitative comparative law noted Law & Finance as a precedent. 
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flying bee ‘how does it do that?’—but a mystery.24 What fascination remains is no longer 
a naïve desire to describe how a practice works, explain the causes of some phenomena, 
or show why an argument fails. Curiosity turns instead towards the nature of the gap in 
existing accounts. There is something missing in the melody. But what is it? 
As intimated above, the gap in the literature has to do with the role of knowledge in the 
dynamics of social and legal phenomena. Before elaborating on the nature of that gap, I 
need to more clearly delimit the literature I engage with. That is, I need to more precisely 
identify the type of theory being reconstructed in the shadow of Law & Finance. The 
critique I develop over the course of the dissertation certainly applies to Law & Finance 
itself. It certainly does not apply to all existing accounts of legal change. 
The theme of legal evolution works to bring order to and set boundaries on a broad 
category of thought about legal change. Legal evolution appears in particular as a 
recurrent theme in debates with and against Law & Finance. Andrei Shleifer, primary 
author on the Law & Finance studies, has developed his arguments under the 
evolutionary idiom.25 Others have embraced evolution as an apt category to capture the 
vision driving legal origins theory. 26  These references to evolution are not just 
serendipity: the evolutionary idiom gives pithy expression to the epistemological 
ambition shared by Law & Finance, its critics, and their broader intellectual milieu. 
Evolution is an appropriate and often-invoked label for accounts that seek to develop 
objective, general, empirical claims about law, which understand law’s origins to lay 
beyond legal reasons alone, and that aim to explain the continuing transformation of legal 
rules and regimes as a cumulative, emergent outcome of the interplay between a variety 
of forces—economic, political, and above all, legal. 
                                                        
24 Gregory Treverton’s distinction between mysteries and puzzles was popularized in Malcolm Gladwell, 
‘Enron’s Open Secrets’, The	New	Yorker (8 January 2007) 
<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/08/open-secrets-3> accessed 29 November 2018. 
There is a common myth that ‘science cannot explain’ how bees fly, a myth with no hint of truth to it. See 
eg M Sun, ‘Dynamic Flight Stability of a Hovering Bumblebee’ (2005) 208 Journal of Experimental Biology 
447. 
25 Shleifer’s contributions to the ‘Coasean’ tradition include Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer, ‘The 
Evolution of Common Law’ (2007) 115 Journal of Political Economy 43; Anthony Niblett and others, ‘The 
Evolution of a Legal Rule’ (2010) 39 JLS 325. I address the nature of Shleifer’s contributions to Law & 
Finance and Legal Origins in Chapter 5. 
26  For a good indication of the thematic and conceptual links between legal origins theory and legal 
evolution, see the table of contents and introduction in Simon Deakin and Katharina Pistor (eds), Legal	
Origin	Theory (Edward Elgar 2012). 
9 
 
The use of the concept has both advantages and disadvantages. The key added value of 
the concept is that it draws attention to and brings together a broader tradition of 
literature that has tackled questions in much the same ways as Law & Finance. The 
positivist tradition of law and economics, for example, contains an expressly 
‘evolutionary’ strain that has sought to explain legal change as an unguided interplay of 
economic interests and preexisting law.27  
The downsides are two-fold. The first is the threat of analytical confusion caused by 
interdependencies between more and less substantive senses of evolution. While some 
have used evolution loosely, to indicate a shared commitment to capture a scientific view 
of law as a partially unplanned outcome of factors internal and external to the legal 
system, others have understood evolution as a more substantive concept, whose 
structure provides a map for constructing such accounts. In particular, many take 
evolution to be an appropriate label only for theorizing about law that draws from 
Darwin-inspired evolutionary theory. The second downside is the interplay between the 
scientific sense I have foregrounded here and an older, developmentalist meaning tied to 
a tradition of Victorian historicism and faith in progress. These complexities meant that 
wrestling with the concept entailed a delicate trade-off. Evaluating the arguments of 
authors who relied expressly on evolutionary concepts required vigilance to avoid 
reifying the concept’s associations with fitness, efficiency, or development toward 
optimal forms.  
D. The	Mysterious	Success	of	Law	&	Finance	
Despite the strengths of the broad literature on legal evolution, that missing note in the 
melody remains. On one level, sophisticated accounts of legal evolution provide a 
theoretical account of legal change that transcends the shortcomings of Law & Finance. 
Yet they are ill-equipped to wrestle with the implications of Law & Finance as an 
intellectual project. For as much as it may be true that Law & Finance does not ‘work,’ in 
the sense of putting forward arguments grounded in a convincing theoretical baseline, it 
has done a great deal of ‘work’ in driving legal reform. Law & Finance may be incomplete 
or inaccurate, but it is also important.28  
                                                        
27 This Coasean approach to explaining legal change is addressed in Chapter 2.  
28 Ruth V Aguilera and Cynthia A Williams, ‘Law and Finance: Inaccurate, Incomplete, and Important’ [2009] 
BYU L Rev 1413. 
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For some purposes, faulting evolutionary theories for failing to explain the success of Law 
& Finance would commit a category error. The question of what makes a theoretical 
framework more or less successful belongs to the sociology of knowledge, broadly 
understood.29 Theories of legal change can hardly be faulted, so the argument might go, 
for failing to answer questions that belong to another subfield or, indeed, to an entirely 
distinct discipline. The problem is that the success of Law & Finance seems to far exceed 
its uptake as a scientific paradigm. Indeed, as will become clear when its ramifications 
are mapped out more extensively, Law & Finance has had substantial success as a legal 
reform project across dozens of countries.  
This state of affairs suggests that questions on the side of jurisprudence or sociology of 
law, like asking how law changes, may not be so easy to untangle from questions arising 
out of sociology of knowledge, like asking what makes a theory successful. An 
engagement with Law & Finance was not so easily obviated.  
Law & Finance thus serves double duty in this dissertation. On the one hand, it stands as 
a workable example of a project committed to capturing the dynamic relation between 
law, economics, and politics in positive, scientific terms. For reasons that will become 
clear, Law & Finance serves as more illustrative than exemplary, relevant only insofar as 
it inspired my interest in this broad tradition of historiography. In its role as a historical 
object, on the other hand, Law & Finance offers a striking case study in the apparent limits 
of that historiographical tradition.30 In particular, the practical legacy of Law & Finance 
forces into view a relationship that the study of law usually takes for granted, namely the 
nature of the relationships between law as an object (i.e. as a practice, discourse, 
institution, or body of norms), law as a form of knowledge in particular, and other forms 
of knowledge about social and economic life.  
E. Complications	of	Law’s	Relation	to	(Legal)	Knowledge?	
Traditional legal scholarship is generally predicated on anticipated practical effects.31 It 
is sometimes structured as a prescriptive argument about how certain norms should be 
                                                        
29 The classic of the field seized upon by an earlier generation of legal scholars was Thomas S Kuhn, The	
Structure	of	Scientific	Revolutions (3rd edn, University of Chicago Press 1996), first published 1962. 
30  I owe the distinction between engaging with an argument as a contribution to historiography and 
analysing an intellectual project as a historical object to Knox Peden, ‘The Abstractions of History’ [2014] 
Sydney Review of Books.  
31  Justice Edwards’ classic lament that ‘many law schools, especially the so-called “elite” ones, have 
abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship’ in a 
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applied or interpreted. In other cases, it takes the form of an attempt to detail the ‘proper,’ 
objective answer to some legal question. In the latter case, the register of the inquiry is 
positive rather than normative: it nominally addresses what the law is, rather than what 
it should be. In either case, however, the argument is likely to be motivated by an 
aspiration that someone will do something with the findings.32 Even where inquiry aims 
to empirically capture the content of the law, the conduct of that inquiry is often shaped 
by a conception, or at least a vague intuition, about the ways in which legally-empowered 
actors might respond to the argument and its conclusions. At first glance, this gives rise 
to a contradiction between explicit task and implicit motive, a contradiction which does 
not generally arise for work in the explicitly prescriptive register. It is perfectly valid to 
develop an argument about what the law should be in the hopes that a judge or regulator 
will follow your reasons in their decisions. Yet from the perspective of positive social 
science, there is something anomalous about offering an account of phenomena whose 
accordance with fact is currently weak, but which may become stronger in the future—
as when the contradictions between an analysis of a doctrine and existing judicial 
decisions is attenuated by the possibility that future decisions will more closely emulate 
it. It is stranger still for the validity of an account to depend in part on whether or not 
certain actors are swayed by it. Nonetheless, so long as you are willing to distinguish an 
object called ‘the law’ from what judges actually do and have actually done—an object 
that may be determined by conceptual predicate, legislative intention, normative 
coherence or otherwise—it is perfectly valid to argue against existing jurisprudence on a 
purportedly legal basis, in the hopes that empowered actors, informed by the quality and 
content of your reasoning, will bring administered legal fact back into conformity with 
putative legal norm. There may be some misdirection involved where scholars clothe 
what they know to be a normative, ‘should be’ argument in an analytical, ‘actually is’ form, 
but such pretense does not affect the validity of the argument as mounted. There is in a 
sense no empirical test for whether the description of the law developed is correct or not. 
No matter what judges do in the long term, an argument about the ‘actual’ law can prevail, 
awaiting some future recognition by a sufficiently canny court.33 
                                                        
sense illustrates the point by counterexample. Harry T Edwards, ‘The Growing Disjunction between Legal 
Education and the Legal Profession’ (1992) 91 Mich L Rev 34. 
32 The stereotype I have in mind is the doctoral candidate in law who hopes above all that the arguments 
from her dissertation will be adopted by the Supreme Court.  
33 My argument, in sum, is that such forms of legal scholarship accord with a conception of practical reason 
concerned with methods of developing beliefs that are neither subjective or capricious, nor verifiable by 
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When it comes to evolutionary accounts, however, the form of reasoning about law is a 
different creature. The motivating idea behind such research is that law-makers will 
create a regime, adjust a standard, or adopt an interpretation based on the effects that 
the researcher claims those reforms will have on the world beyond the legal field. Again, 
on its own, a claim about the salutary or perverse effects of a legal norm on behaviour, 
and on the social variables that aggregate over behaviour, need not be troubled by the 
social salience of the argument itself. The legal literature is rife with a priori speculation 
about how people’s actions will vary in response to different norms, and with 
instrumental reasoning on that basis about what norms should therefore be; so is the case 
law of most legal systems. Socio-legal research by contrast (including empirical law-and-
economics research) is defined by its dependence on an empirical foundation. The 
intention is not simply to offer a plausible causal account, but to back up that reasoning 
with data drawn from actual laws and actual behaviour. And in the case of evolutionary 
accounts in particular, the reasoning combines claims about the effect of law on the world 
with claims about the effect of the world on law. The conclusions to be extracted from 
these accounts are contingent on a chain of causal reasoning whose credibility hinges on 
an empirical reckoning with the factors that actually made a difference. 
Given the avowed aspiration of legal scholarship to operate as a cause of legal change, 
such a reckoning needs to either integrate the causal salience of scholarship, or explain 
why such scholarship can be safely ignored. A few possibilities present themselves. One 
answer might be that scholarship, for all its pretense and ambition, has no meaningful 
effect on law.34 One permutation of this premise would be that scholarship matters, but 
to such a small degree that accounts can safely approximate its relevance by ignoring it 
entirely. 35  Another variation, similar in form to arguments from economics used to 
                                                        
precise logic or direct observation. Such a conception is embraced inter alia by Richard A Posner, The	
Problems	of	 Jurisprudence (Harvard University Press 1990) 71–72. My point, more emphatically, is that 
such arguments cannot be empirically or logically falsified.  
34 Pierre Schlag has a well-honed critique that American legal scholars are over-invested in producing legal 
analysis for an audience of judges who are no longer listening. Pierre Schlag, ‘Normative and Nowhere to 
Go’ (1990) 43 Stan L Rev 167, 167–68; Schlag (n 16). Judge Posner, making a related point, has suggested 
that legal scholarship per se, at least, again, in the American case, significantly declined during the last half 
of the twentieth century. Richard A Posner, ‘The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987’ 
(1987) 100 Harv L Rev 761.  
35 The idea I have in mind here is that the relation between legal scholarship and law might be like the 
relation between Pluto and other planets in the solar system. A slight wobble in the orbit of Neptune was 
in part responsible for the discovery of Pluto: William Graves Hoyt, ‘W. H. Pickering’s Planetary Predictions 
and the Discovery of Pluto’ (1976) 67 Isis 551, 552–53. Despite the wobble, however, for most purposes 
the behaviour of the rest of the solar system can be modelled without accounting for Pluto’s presence.  
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reconcile the efficient market hypothesis with the presence of individual irrationality, is 
that the contributions of scholarship ‘come out in the wash.’36  
This version bleeds into a very different claim mooted by the German sociologist Niklas 
Luhmann that at least some forms of legal scholarship, such as jurisprudence, are both 
part of law, broadly understood, and constitutive of law as a social system. Luhmann 
might say we need to distinguish between internal observations of law, which are part of 
the processes through which the legal system reproduces itself, and external 
observations. 37 In a sense, Luhmann collapses the boundary between ‘law’ and (internal) 
‘knowledge of law.’ If this is right, it would be a mistake to think of the relation between 
law and jurisprudence in familiar causal terms.  
One of the perspectives developed through the dissertation is that evolutionary accounts 
of legal change cannot be expressed through claims about law alone. The distinction 
between internal and external observations of law is not as stable or as determinate as 
Luhmann posits. The Law & Finance episode, in particular, suggests both that scholarship 
enters into the causal dynamics of law-making to a non-negligible degree and that its 
relevance cannot be reduced to a dynamic or process internal to ‘law.’38  
Even if law’s relation to knowledge cannot be reduced to a wholly internal relation 
between law and legal knowledge, another approach might settle the challenge to 
evolutionary accounts posed by the relationship between law and social knowledge. It is 
possible that claims about law’s relation to its environment, of the kind typified by Law 
& Finance, might be reducible in some way to an effect of economic or political action on 
law. This possibility needs some elaboration. It requires thinking beyond scholarship 
                                                        
36 cf Gilson and Kraakman, who suggest that the mystique of the efficient capital markets hypothesis lies in 
the putative capacity of the market to act rationally—as if all participants had immediate and costless 
access to information—even though many do not. Ronald J Gilson and Reinier H Kraakman, ‘The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’ (1984) 70 Va L Rev 549, 552–53.  
37 Systems theory approaches to law, and the nature of these distinctions, are given greater attention in 
Chapter 4.  
38 In systems theory terms, such scholarship may be received by the legal system as no more than an 
irritation. Its observation by the legal system may be constituted entirely through legal discourse. My 
argument would then be that scholarship of this sort is an important part of the environment, whose 
relevance must be specifically addressed. Luhmann certainly understood his scholarship as part of a 
‘scientific’ social system. Peter Kennealy, ‘Talking About Autopoiesis—Order from Noise?’ in Gunther 
Teubner (ed), Autopoietic	Law:	A	New	Approach	to	Law	and	Society (W de Gruyter 1988) 353–54. He does 




proper, and engaging more broadly with knowledge, both of law and of the world beyond 
it.  
F. Varieties	of	Knowledge	
 ‘Knowledge’ is an imperfect concept for the dimensions of social life I am trying to 
capture, but no better terminology comes to mind. I am particularly wary of evoking the 
folk conception of knowledge, i.e. justified true belief. My usage is not limited to beliefs at 
all. 39  It is intended instead to capture an eclectic and diverse collection of epistemic	
objects.40 But even that category may be inadequate. I operate in the shadow of Polanyi’s 
distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge.41 In some cases, knowledge can best be 
captured with the verb ‘to have’: to know the names of individual constellations is to have 
something. But a great deal of knowledge is a matter of ability or capacity, better 
understood with the verbs ‘to do’ or ‘to be able to.’42 Being able to ride a bike is something 
one knows how to do, and knowing how to do it is not the same as knowing the list of 
steps, like: ‘left pedal, right pedal, stay balanced! But don’t let go of the handle! Left pedal 
…’ It is something that the body knows how to do or, better, something that the brain and 
the body know how to do together. Interventions of the deliberate or the conscious into 
attempts to do it will not help, and will often, in fact, be hindrances.  
I will hazard that most knowledge lies between these extremes. Knowing a language, for 
example, depends on the possession of a certain vocabulary. But words are not like slips 
of paper pulled out of a hat. Knowing a word is entangled with a sense of grammar, both 
in the narrow sense of having a sense of the syntactic structures that limit how it can be 
combined with others in sentences, and in the broader sense, due to Wittgenstein, of 
understanding what the word, in combination with other words and drawing on a given 
                                                        
39 The folk epistemology that understands knowledge as roughly coincident with justified true belief is 
older than Plato. Gettier is famous for criticizing this definition. While Plantinga argues that this was not a 
very common position among philosophers before Gettier, he admits that may have been widespread as 
folk epistemology. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Matthias Steup, ‘The Analysis of Knowledge’ in Edward 
N Zalta (ed), The	 Stanford	 Encyclopedia	 of	 Philosophy (Summer 2018 edn, Metaphysics Research Lab, 
Stanford University 2018); Alvin Plantinga, Warrant:	The	Current	Debate (Oxford University Press 1993). 
40 Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Toward	a	History	of	Epistemic	Things:	Synthesizing	Proteins	 in	 the	Test	Tube 
(Stanford University Press 1997); Lorraine Daston (ed), Biographies	of	Scientific	Objects (University of 
Chicago Press 2000). 
41 Michael Polanyi, The	Tacit	Dimension (The University of Chicago Press 1966). 
42  Wittgenstein, for example, notably insisted that understanding the meaning of a word is not like 
possessing a something, ‘as if the meaning were an aura the word brings along with it,’ Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Philosophische	 Untersuchungen	 /	 Philosophical	 Investigations (PMS Hacker and Joachim 
Schulte eds, GEM Anscombe and others trs, 4th edn, Wiley-Blackwell 2009) para 117. 
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context, can be used to do.43 The category I have in mind thus includes predicates that 
can be the object of belief (‘there is a country called Canada’), concepts and categories 
(‘Canada’; ‘countries’),44 models (‘the world is divided into countries’),45 postures and 
orientations (‘what body of domestic law is under discussion here?’),46 and routines and 
techniques (how to construct a sentence in English).47 
G. Forget	Nuance	
It is always possible to add more nuance to an account of social dynamics. As memorably 
argued by Kieran Healy, however, it is not always beneficial to do so.48 Knowledge is 
omnipresent in social life, but that does not mean we need to include it as a salient 
category in our accounts of legal change.  
It is a now hoary conclusion of social constructivism that many of the phenomena that 
structure our day-to-day reality cannot be divorced from, and are in fact actively 
maintained by, our shared belief in them.49 Canada might continue existing if I stopped 
believing in it, but its place in our reality would shrivel up in a snap if everyone did.50 This 
is not equivalent to saying that Canada exists only because of, or only through, a shared 
                                                        
43 Constantin Fasolt, ‘Respect for the Word: What Calvin and Wittgenstein Had against Images’ in Amy 
Nelson Burnett (ed), John	Calvin,	Myth	and	Reality:	Images	and	Impact	of	Geneva’s	Reformer (Cascade Books 
2011). 
44 Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Temporalization of Concepts’ in Finnish	Yearbook	of	Political	Thought (University of 
Jyväskylä 1997) vol 1; George Lakoff, Women,	Fire,	and	Dangerous	Things:	What	Categories	Reveal	About	
the	Mind (University of Chicago Press 1990); Giovanni Sartor, ‘Legal Concepts as Inferential Nodes and 
Ontological Categories’ (2009) 17 Artif Intellig & L 217; Giovanni Sartori, ‘Concept Misformation in 
Comparative Politics’ (1970) 64 The American Political Science Review 1033; Geoffrey C Bowker and Susan 
Leigh Star, Sorting	Things	Out:	Classification	and	Its	Consequences (MIT Press 1999). 
45 Mary S Morgan, ‘Models’ in Steven N Durlauf and Lawrence E Blume (eds), The	New	Palgrave	Dictionary	
of	Economics (2nd edn, Nature Publishing Group 2008). 
46 Pierre Lamaison and Pierre Bourdieu, ‘From Rules to Strategies: An Interview with Pierre Bourdieu’ 
(1986) 1 Cultural Anthropology 110; Fleur Johns, Non‐Legality	 in	 International	 Law:	 Unruly	 Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2013) ch 1. 
47 Annelise Riles, ‘A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities’ (2005) 53 Buff 
L Rev 973; Alain Pottage, ‘Law after Anthropology: Object and Technique in Roman Law’ (2014) 31 Theory 
Culture Society 147. 
48  Kieran Healy, ‘Fuck Nuance’ (2017) 35 Sociological Theory 118 (‘Nuance is not a virtue of good 
sociological theory’). 
49 Classic investigations of the premise that our shared experience, including not only our knowledge of the 
world, but the shape and structure of that world is constructed through social action, include Peter L Berger 
and Thomas Luckman, The	Social	Construction	of	Reality:	A	Treatise	in	the	Sociology	of	Knowledge. (Penguin 
Books 1967); John R Searle, The	Construction	of	Social	Reality (Allen Lane 1995). Ian Hacking, The	Social	
Construction	 of	What? (Harvard University Press 1999) offers a particularly lucid investigation of the 
concept. 




belief in its existence.51 But belief in its existence, and more broadly, a widely-shared 
practice of acting as if Canada exists, is a but-for cause of its existence. 52  
In a pedestrian sense, then, knowledge is an indelible dimension of processes of socio-
legal change. What does not necessarily follow is that knowledge needs to be integrated 
into accounts of those processes. Latour reminds us that it is perfectly reasonable to treat 
aspects of the world as black boxes, even though they may be maintained by a network 
of more complicated factors, operating as it were ‘under the hood.’ We can drive quite 
well without having to think about how a car engine works; the perspective of the car as 
a driving machine rather than an assemblage of parts is only shattered when the car stops 
working.53  
It is easy to come up with legal contexts in which Canada is a relevant factor, not just 
legally, but economically and politically as well. One example would be litigation over 
economic losses occasioned by a government policy decision.54 Canada will be implicated 
in multiple ways: as an agent whose actions are being challenged, as the jurisdiction from 
which the applicable law is drawn, as the origin of a political culture that might factor into 
the outcome, and as a political community whose policy choices are at stake. For each of 
these dimensions, we could provide a thick description of how the relevant factor is 
mediated or constituted by knowledge, or even replace that element with an epistemic 
account. Canada is the relevant agent: everyone takes for granted that Canada is the 
                                                        
51 Bruno Latour and his erstwhile collaborator Michel Callon have pointed in a number of cases to the ways 
in which social realities are constructed not only out of the belief and actions of persons, but through an 
interaction between human agents and a wide array of material ‘stuff,’ from office buildings, computer 
databases, uniforms and insignia, or rules and schedules. Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, ‘Unscrewing the 
Big Leviathan: How Actors Macrostructure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them to Do So’ in AV Cicourel 
and K (Karin) Knorr-Cetina (eds), Advances	 in	Social	Theory	and	Methodology:	Toward	an	 Integration	of	
Micro‐	and	Macro‐Sociologies (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1981); Bruno Latour, ‘Visualisation and Cognition: 
Drawing Things Together’ in Knowledge	and	Society:	Studies	in	the	Sociology	of	Culture	Past	and	Present (Jai 
Press no date). 
52 The state has been a central preoccupation of studies, identifiable above all with Foucault, into the 
interaction between epistemic practices that take the existence of a certain entity as given and governance 
practices which depend on the establishment and maintenance of certain forms of social and political order. 
Useful entrees into this line of inquiry include Timothy Mitchell, ‘Society, Economy, and the State Effect’ in 
George Steinmetz (ed), State/Culture:	State‐Formation	After	 the	Cultural	Turn (Cornell University Press 
1999); Andrew Lang, ‘Governing “As If”: Global Subsidies Regulation and the Benchmark Problem’ (2014) 
67 Current Legal Problems 135. 
53  Bruno Latour, Science	 in	 Action:	 How	 to	 Follow	 Scientists	 and	 Engineers	 Through	 Society (Harvard 
University Press, 1987) 106–07; Bruno Latour, An	Inquiry	into	Modes	of	Existence:	An	Anthropology	of	the	
Moderns (Harvard University Press 2013) 217. 
54 A good example is Antrim	Truck	Centre	Ltd	v	Ontario	(Transportation) 1 SCR 594 (Canada SCC 2013). In 
Antrim, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the government of Ontario, used here as a proxy for 
‘Canada’, was liable for economic harm when it built a new highway that resulted in traffic being diverted 
away from a service centre owned by the plaintiff.  
17 
 
relevant actor. Canada is the relevant jurisdiction: lawyers are trained in a Canadian legal 
tradition that is partially expressed as explicit knowledge of Canadian law. Canada wants 
to defend its policy decisions: government lawyers are motivated by an idea of the 
public’s preference or of the preferable policy outcome. The judge has policy preferences 
that may bear on outcomes: he or she has an idea of what social relations are at play in a 
case, as well as beliefs about what policy options are preferred by the general public. 
We can do this, and we will learn something by doing so. But if our purpose is to explain 
the outcome of a case, or to understand its effect on the legal order or economic relations, 
it is far from obvious that making inquiries into epistemic questions would advance our 
work. By the same token, we have to take seriously the possibility that attending to 
knowledge will only add unnecessary complexity to a project of predicting legal change, 
identifying the factors that shape it, or describing the processes through which it occurs. 
We do not need to think about fundamental physical forces or the atomic makeup of 
materials when trying to understand why a boat floats on water. It is enough to have an 
account of the relationship between the mass, buoyancy, and density of an object and its 
surrounding fluid.  
Consider an example. There is obviously some difference between economic actors’ 
interests and their understanding of how those interests are best pursued in a given 
context. It might nonetheless be possible to construct an account of the economy in terms 
of economic context and economic action that comprises facts, preferences and values, 
and epistemic elements.55 A more complicated claim is that, even if there is an ontological 
difference between the interests pursued by particular groups of economic actors and the 
premises and ideas they use to pursue them, their ideas nevertheless might be 
determined in some way by those interests. Some Marxist approaches to ‘ideology’ seem 
to have in mind just such a relationship between ideas and interests.56  
                                                        
55 Herbert Gintis is among those who have done ground-breaking work to show that even the simplest game 
theory models rely on surprisingly thick assumptions about the epistemic capacities and shared 
substantive knowledge of the participants. Herbert Gintis, The	Bounds	of	Reason:	Game	Theory	and	 the	
Unification	of	the	Behavioral	Sciences (Princeton University Press 2009). Gintis’ work, especially as applied 
by Simon Deakin, is given further attention in Chapter 4.  
56 See e.g. David Harvey, A	Brief	History	of	Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press 2005). Gramsci is often 





I close these preliminaries by integrating a discussion of the dissertation’s organization 
and methodology with a roadmap of the chapters to follow. Structurally, the 
dissertation’s argument works in the spirit of the mathematical argument by 
contradiction. I start with models and approaches that give no explicit account of 
knowledge, then examine their tacit and explicit epistemic assumptions, and then 
examine whether those assumptions conflict in any relevant, significant way with the 
operation and salience of knowledge in real-world contexts. The intent is to allow 
evolutionary approaches to put their best foot forward and give them a chance to show 
that reality can be captured, or at least adequately approximated, without having to give 
knowledge explicit attention. The thinness of any account of knowledge, even an 
unrealistic account, is no proof of its inadequacy. What is important is whether that 
unreality threatens the validity of the model.  
Methodologically, then, the dissertation’s key chapters draw on methods that sit between 
critical legal studies and intellectual history. Drawing on what Riles and Johns call ‘quasi-
ethnography,’57 the preliminary task in each chapter is to provide a thick description of 
how the literature understands legal evolution, and then to elicit or reconstruct how 
epistemic issues are dealt with in those accounts. 
Chapter	1 uses an inductive method rooted in intellectual history to develop a set of 
criteria that distinguish ‘evolutionary accounts of legal change’ from other 
jurisprudential agendas.  
Drawing on a genealogy of the concept of evolution, I identify a nineteenth-century 
connotation of evolution that continues to have resonance in theories that imagine law's 
path of development as an intrinsically salutary process, or that use the concept of 
evolution to distinguish between beneficial and harmful modes of legal change. I 
distinguish that conception from a more recent usage that is used to express and invoke 
an epistemological ambition to describe legal change, using positivist methods, as an 
emergent, rather than designed, outcome of enumerated forces working through 
                                                        
57 Riles (n 47); Leila Kawar, ‘Making the Machine Work: Technocratic Engineering of Rights for Domestic 




specified mechanisms. I close the chapter by addressing the role played in some of this 
literature by evolutionary theory. 
The passage through Chapters 2 to 5 is intended to capture successive demonstrations 
that knowledge does matter to accounts that aspire to be ‘evolutionary.’  
Chapter	 2 begins the investigation of such evolutionary approaches by examining a 
‘Coasean’ approach that attributes processes of legal change to a continual interplay of 
self-interested motives under institutional constraints. A central sub-tradition, 
identifiable with Richard Posner's well-known hypothesis about the efficiency of judge-
made law, was developed expressly under the evolutionary idiom. By drawing out the 
analytical pedigree of this literature and, specifically, by tying it to seminal contributions 
from Ronald Coase and Mancur Olson, I am able to develop a broader tradition that is 
evolutionary in the sense set out in Chapter 1 (if not always in name) and that roots legal 
change, under the idioms of efficiency and rent-seeking, in the actions of self-interested 
individuals. 
The chapter concludes with two observations. I first suggest that contingency and path 
dependency, rather than predictable development pathways, are the only credible 
generalizations that can be drawn from accounts of this type about the relationship 
between law-making institutions and legal outcomes. I also suggest that, so long as the 
basic coordinates of the underlying model are sufficiently robust, the resulting analytic 
could provide a powerful toolkit to understand the fortunes of particular legal norms 
under the action of particular law-making institutions.  
The next chapter places the basic structure of those models under significant strain, by 
inquiring into the validity of their implicit suppositions about knowledge. Chapter	3 
serves two purposes. First of all, in anticipation of the discussion in Chapter 4, it makes 
an initial foray into possible contributions of evolutionary theory to robust accounts of 
legal change. In conversation with Robert Gordon's conception of functionalism and MBW 
Sinclair's conception of adaptationism, I explore whether the Darwinian algorithm of 
variation, selection, and inheritance can be used to understand the weaknesses in the 
Coasean approach to legal change. 
While the failure to provide an account of evolutionary inheritance dooms some of the 
earliest contributions to the Coasean paradigm, later examples did include accounts of 
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how norms are reproduced over time. Closer attention to evolutionary theory, however, 
suggests that an account of an evolutionary process that can combine change with stasis 
needs to more than account for mechanisms of variation, selection, and inheritance. It 
must address the relationship between the three. 
Inspired by that perspective, I return to the Coasean models, working through a close 
reading of a strong example developed by William Landes and Richard Posner. My key 
intervention is to inquire into the mechanisms that allow shared knowledge about the 
contexts in which rules are applied to be reproduced over time, given the incentives 
individuals have to contest what would otherwise be a shared understanding. The answer 
to that question is rather simple: the legal system itself reproduces that knowledge. Yet 
considering law’s role in stabilizing a shared field of meaning requires identifying key 
categories of social life, and law’s management of those categories, as another facet of 
legal change that needs to be integrated into any analysis of the transformation of norms. 
Chapter	4 engages with a theory of socio-legal change that has taken up this challenge to 
the Coasean approaches in earnest, namely Simon Deakin's theory of legal-economic co-
evolution. Deakin's approach draws on the systems theory of Luhmann and Teubner to 
address law's reproduction of a relatively consistent conceptualization of economic 
contexts. To a significant extent, his approach synthesizes this systems-theoretical, 
internal account of law and legal change with an economic approach that, like the Coasean 
paradigm, understands legal rules through their external shaping of incentives for actors 
in the economic system. These views are synthesized into an account of legal-economic 
co-evolution that draws from accounts of legal evolution in the work of Luhmann and 
Teubner, from epistemic evolutionary game theory, and from a broader tradition of 
cultural evolution crystallized by Donald Campbell.58  
The second half of Chapter 4 once again takes up questions related to the salience and 
relevance of knowledge in relation to Deakin's account. My strategy involves a close 
reading of an extended application of his approach to craft a genealogy of the contract of 
employment in the UK. My examination reveals ways in which knowledge, in terms of 
ideology, expertise, and design, is not just present, but also exercises some agency in the 
                                                        
58 Donald T Campbell, ‘Variation and Selective Retention in Socio-Cultural Evolution’ in Herbert R Barringer 
and others (eds), Social	Change	in	Developing	Areas:	A	Reinterpretation	of	Evolutionary	Theory (Schenkman 
Publishing Company 1965). 
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processes he depicts. While I address the possibility that this conclusion applies only to 
'social' issues that are bound up with government policy and legislative action, I close by 
raising questions about the place of economic knowledge in his accounts of more 
traditional areas of private and economic law. 
The strongest conclusion that can be drawn from Chapter 4 is that opinion, planning, and 
forms of representation about economic life—that is, knowledge beyond legal 
discourse—seem to play a role in the medium-term development in some areas of law; 
possibly only those areas of law that have an indelible social dimension. Chapter	 5 
engages in an extended case study, tracing the effect that the Law & Finance project has 
had on legal reforms in a number of countries, suggesting not only that ideas about the 
economy can shape law, but that ideas about law's relation with the economy can shape 
law as well.  
The bulk of Chapter 5 however, is not given over to showing that Law & Finance matters, 
but rather to trying to motivate the claim that its effect is not reducible to factors that can 
be described as ‘legal,’ 'political' or 'economic.' To that end, the chapter is primarily 
devoted to accounting for the influence of Law & Finance, rather than demonstrating that 
influence. The first half illuminates the conceptual structure underlying the methodology 
of the Law & Finance studies, exposing the shortcomings of the theory applied in these 
studies to make causal inferences from the data and to draw policy conclusions from 
those causal claims. After providing a short review of the affinities between Law & 
Finance studies and the World Bank's Doing	 Business project, and then providing 
evidence of how influential the Doing	 Business project has been for legal reform in 
developing countries, the second half of the chapter turns to explanation. Though I focus 
on what made the studies attractive to actors at the World Bank, my reflections draw on 
thinking about policymaker motivations more generally. To summarize, I suggest that 
while thin accounts of international political economy, national context, causation, and 
agency all weaken the ostensible scientific validity of the Law & Finance studies, each of 
these factors also makes their methodology more attractive to an organization with the 
World Bank's particular agenda and to policymakers engaging in symbolic politics and a 
competition for international investment dollars. 
The concluding reflections in Chapter	6	pursue three lines of inquiry flowing out the 
investigations in the dissertation. After examining a recent case study on the power of 
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economic thought to shape American judging, I turn from the question of whether 
knowledge needs to be given attention in models of legal evolution to how knowledge 
might matter. I provide an initial typology of the channels by which both vernacular 
understandings and models developed by experts might come to matter, through explicit 
communication during litigation and legislation, but also passively through the training 
of lawyers and the lived experience of a shared culture. I emphasize, however, that what 
scholars should do with any awareness of the salience of knowledge ultimately turns, not 
on an absolute standard of scientific validity, but on an evaluation of what legal 
scholarship, including scholarship about law’s causes and effects, is intended to do. If 
scholarship is intended to pursue an intrinsically normative agenda, then this knowledge 
does not require any change to existing practices. On the other hand, if we cleave to the 
positivist posture underlying the evolutionary ambition, we are stuck in a catch-22 
because our work either remains irrelevant, or implicates us in the processes that we are 
















This chapter constructs a list of criteria that can discriminate evolutionary accounts from 
other accounts of legal change, and which together provide a metric which distinguishes 
better from worse evolutionary accounts. To cut to the chase, the payoff of this chapter is 
that most contemporary references to ‘evolution’ in discussions of legal change are linked 
above all to an epistemological ambition to construct a positivist account of law as an 
emergent, rather than designed, outcome of enumerated forces working through 
specified mechanisms, and of legal change as a reflection of the operation of those 
mechanisms. The ideal of legal change entailed by the appeal to legal evolution, is a 
natural, emergent process capturable using the tools of modern, positivist social science. 
The more an account integrates telos or purpose, the poorer the claim to being 
evolutionary. The weaker an account’s coherence with empirical realities, the less 
successful it is as an evolutionary theory. The success of the evolutionary ambition is also 
undermined by a lack of generality, or by opaque articulation of mechanisms.  
This phrasing puts things in a somewhat awkward and unfamiliar way. The typical listing 
of definitions in the beginning of any research project is usually articulated in terms of 
                                                        
1 Daniel J Boorstin, The	Mysterious	Science	of	the	Law:	An	Essay	on	Blackstone’s	Commentaries (University of 
Chicago Press 1941) 5. 
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what the research object is, not what it is associated with. I have put things this way for 
the same reason that I have spent an entire chapter defining a single key term. It has been 
motivated by a desire to let my interlocutors define their own project, informed by 
scepticism that this project can be fulfilled. Let me elaborate.  
The overall task of this dissertation is to showcase, reflect on and critique a broad mode 
of accounting for legal change. My goal is either to show how existing evolutionary 
theories of legal change might be improved with a more careful appreciation of the role 
of knowledge practices, or to demonstrate how attention to knowledge challenges the 
validity of applying the evolutionary idiom to law. As with any task of analysis, however, 
saying anything meaningful about evolutionary theories of legal change requires careful 
identification of the class of phenomena under examination. Likewise, to critique or 
evaluate, we must first possess a standard against which to evaluate particular examples. 
The goal of this chapter is thus to address a pair of interrelated questions: how might we 
distinguish evolutionary accounts from other ways of comprehending legal change? And 
on what basis might we say that any such account is superior to another?  
Identifying appropriate criteria has been no easy task. A definition of legal evolution that 
was tied to my own caprices and biases would mean any weaknesses or failures I might 
identify in existing accounts could turn out to be no more than a second-order effect of 
my own misperceptions and misconceptions.2 Those who have attempted to bring order 
to the literature on legal evolution have pointed in multiple, sometimes conflicting, 
directions. 3 Rather than focusing my attention on prior efforts to explicitly delineate the 
meaning of the concept or delimit the boundaries of its application, then, I threw my net 
wide, sampling from the considerable body of legal scholarship that has found evolution 
to be an appropriate concept with which to frame for their respective inquiries into a 
variety of phenomena.4  
                                                        
2 That is, to the degree that I wanted to critique evolutionary approaches I wanted to ensure that I was not 
critiquing a straw man that has no correspondence to what anyone believed. 
3 Robert C Clark, ‘The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution’ (1981) 90 Yale LJ 1238; E Donald Elliott, 
‘The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence’ (1985) 85 Colum L Rev 38; Herbert Hovenkamp, 
‘Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence’ (1985) 64 Tex L Rev 645; MBW Sinclair, ‘The Use of Evolution 
Theory in Law’ (1987) 67 U Det L Rev 451; Simon Deakin, ‘Evolution for Our Time: A Theory of Legal 
Memetics’ (2002) 55 CLP 1. 
4 Between 1980 and 1997, nearly 400 articles listed in American law reviews were published with evolve 
or evolution in the title. Jeff L Lewin, ‘The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty about Reasonable 
Medical Certainty’ (1998) 57 Md L Rev 380, 390, n 37. A similar search on HeinOnline today reveals over 
3,300 articles, notes, and reviews with evolve or evolution in the title.  
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My investigations yielded a list of criteria that work both to qualify an account as more or 
less evolutionary in its ambitions, and to quantify how well a given account succeeds in 
meeting those ambitions. The results of what follows will, firstly, be a stipulative 
definition of an ‘evolutionary account of legal change.’5 For lawyers who are used to 
definitions that simply re-express a key term using a longer descriptive phrase, the result 
may not look like a definition at all. It may look more like the tests used to decide, for 
example, whether a working relationship counts as a contract of employment.6 Unlike the 
legal test for whether a worker is an employee, however, I do not hope that the criteria 
which determine the use of evolution will definitively or predictably produce an either-
or answer when applied to a particular case. My definition does not function like a sign 
that says ‘you must be this tall to ride.’ The result is however intended to be more than 
just an indication of what I am talking about in this dissertation. My purpose in using an 
inductive method has been to give clear expression to a category that has informed the 
work of many scholars in their efforts to understand legal change. My hope is that the 
result would be recognizable to those who have sought to construct evolutionary 
accounts, as well as among those who have acknowledged but ultimately rejected the 
feasibility or propriety of an evolutionary jurisprudence. In accordance with 
Wittgenstein’s maxim that ‘the meaning of a word is in its use,’ the proposed criteria draw 
from examples of how ‘evolution’ is used: what it is associated with and ascribed to, and 
what determines the appropriateness of referring to or drawing on it in certain contexts. 
The method bears meaningful resemblance to the approach adopted by Hart, himself 
inspired by Wittgenstein, as he developed his concept of law. I too am engaged, as Hart 
put it, in a kind of ‘descriptive sociology.’7 
Fulfilling this agenda, however, has forced me to overcome a number of obstacles. The 
first is the risk of hypostatization or reification. Evolution’s current identification with a 
putatively objective referent, namely the process that guides the origin, transformation 
and propagation of biological species, endows the concept with a durable ‘thing’-ness. 
                                                        
5 A stipulative definition, in the sense I am using it here, is a definition that is stipulated, as in the phrase 
‘by which I mean…’ It serves as an instruction of how a key term should be understood for a specific 
purpose, rather than making a claim to general conventionality or rectitude. Anil Gupta, ‘Definitions’ in 
Edward N Zalta (ed), The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy (Summer 2015 edn, 2015). 
6 Davidov has provided a useful review of debates regarding these tests. Guy Davidov, ‘The Three Axes of 
Employment Relationships: A Characterization of Workers in Need of Protection’ (2002) 52 U Toronto LJ 
357.  
7 HLA Hart, The	Concept	of	Law (Clarendon Press 1972) v. 
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Legal scholars frequently endorse the belief that while ‘[e]volution, natural selection and 
adaptation are theories … the processes to which they refer also are facts.’8 Whether 
evolution, as used in biological contexts, names a real process with clearly identifiable 
cases is a question whose metaphysical complications need not be addressed here. For 
those willing to accept that the evolution of biological phenomena describes an objective 
phenomenon, ‘out there’ in the world and empirically distinguishable, debates over 
evolution no longer turn on the ambiguity of a word but are disagreements about the 
nature of a process discoverable through scientific inquiry. When it comes to legal 
evolution, by contrast, the existence or reality of the underlying concept is very much in 
play. Hart in the pursuit of his project had a distinct advantage over mine: he had at his 
disposal a set of empirical phenomena that could be definitively identified (at least by 
some imputed ‘we’) as ‘legal.’ People may have criticized Hart for various things: seeking 
answers in the wrong places, or using the wrong means, or generalizing too broadly, but 
few have criticized his conclusions on the basis that ‘law’ as such does not exist. With 
accounts of legal evolution however, it is broadly if tacitly acknowledged that recognizing 
or establishing the reality of legal evolution would be a product of the inquiry, not its 
starting point. The sources that I have canvassed have taken legal evolution less as a 
phenomenon in need of proper description, than as a jurisprudential ambition. The goal 
is not a theory of legal evolution, but an evolutionary theory of legal change.  
The second issue is that legal evolution, unlike law, is only one offshoot of a broader 
concept. As mentioned in Part I below, the use of ‘evolve’ and ‘evolution’ to describe 
various forms of movement is traceable to the sixteenth century. Those usages could be 
and occasionally were applied to legal materials. But evolution became a full-throated 
concept only in the nineteenth century, under the combined influence of Charles Darwin 
and Herbert Spencer. The original idea of law’s evolution was not cut from whole cloth, 
but was substantially derived from that nineteenth-century innovation. One cannot make 
sense of what scholars are trying to do when they speak of law’s evolution without having 
a sense of evolution’s broader usages and connotations. Scholarship often takes for 
granted that the reader will understand why evolution is the right word, or will make 
claims that are tied to its meaning. Recovering a clear sense of legal evolution is bound 
up with the task of understanding what evolution per se is taken to stand for.  
                                                        
8  William H Rodgers Jr, ‘Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of Pandas’ Thumbs, Statutory 
Sleepers, and Effective Law’ (1993) 65 U Colo L Rev 25, 35. 
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Even when methodological perspectives are expanded to account for evolution proper, 
there is yet another source of error: the assumption that evolution itself has a unitary, 
stable, or self-evident meaning. The discussions below reveal just how incorrect this 
position is. ‘Evolve’ and its derivatives (‘evolution,’ ‘evolutionary’) carry an array of 
implications that are wide enough to encompass completely contradictory tendencies. As 
will be clarified in Part I, evolution is a Janus-faced word whose core meanings range from 
orderly development to capricious mutation, and whose connotations draw together 
unilineal optimization with relentless diversification. Law, much more than biology, 
retains both of these major valences.  
As such, the method I have followed is genealogical. The chapter’s structure reflects the 
result: the first part after this introduction provides a historical narrative of evolution’s 
semantic transformations, offering a picture that is roughly divided into two distinct 
periods, the first fifty years following the publication of Darwin’s Origin	of	Species in 1859, 
the second in the twentieth-century rise of the neo-Darwinian synthesis. Part II traces a 
first meaning of ‘legal evolution,’ noting its ties to a nineteenth-century concept of 
evolution identifiable above all with the work of Spencer. In Part III, I drill down on a 
more scientific sense of legal evolution, connected to the full blossoming of Darwinism in 
the twentieth century, upon which the criteria are based.  
Here, I elaborate some of the key findings this chapter in broader strokes:  
i. The Victorian-era concept of evolution, occasionally associated with Darwin but 
primarily attributable to Spencer, sought to express a universal law of progress, in 
which wholly material causes, knowable through positive science, moved various 
phenomena from worse toward better forms, under the purgative pressures of an 
unforgiving environment. Into the early twentieth century, discussions of legal 
evolution were, under this concept’s influence, concerned with tracing the 
implicitly unitary pathway of law’s ‘normal’ development and identifying factors 
that could lead law away from this ‘natural’ trajectory.  
ii. The ascendance of the Darwinian synthesis in evolutionary biology during the 
twentieth century led to the consolidation of today’s most familiar concept of 
evolution. The contemporary concept disclaims the earlier connotation of a world 
arranged into a hierarchy of forms, turns primarily on the operation of natural 
selection, and calls off the search for normal trends and narratives of progress. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, this reinvigorated concept of evolution influenced the social 
and the behavioural sciences and inspired a renaissance of self-styled 
evolutionary thought in law starting in the late 1970s.  
iii. An increasingly influential tradition of legal scholarship has sought to re-found 
explanations of legal form, critiques of law’s effectiveness, and practical guidance 
for law-making in biologically-rooted models of human cognitive capacities and 
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behavioural tendencies. The appeal to evolution in such accounts provides an 
origin story for what is ultimately a static, naturalistic model of human 
psychological traits. Owen Jones, for example, has suggested that the ‘deep 
structure’ of law, including family law, contracts and property, is a functional 
reflection of the ‘signature of the human brain.’ 9  Although such accounts 
sometimes seek to explain aspects of normative orders that reoccur across 
multiple contexts, they do not invoke evolution to explain or account for legal 
change. As such, this tradition is not explored in depth in this chapter. 
iv. Finally, a rich body of scholarship has sought to use the findings of evolutionary 
biology not to make claims about the biological development of human organisms 
and its consequences for social relations, but rather ‘by analogy.’ Evolution in such 
accounts is something that happens to law, rather than being a biological process 
that shapes humanity’s legal needs or limits law’s functions. In large part, 
however, the analogy is a loose one. It is not universally, or even generally, the 
case that accounts of legal evolution use the Darwinian synthesis as a universal 
index that will capture laws, their environment, and interactions between them 
just as easily as it does biological change, so long as the right mapping between 
elements can be identified. Instead, such appeals to evolution in jurisprudence 
operate at a higher level of abstraction. A close reading from a broad cross-section 
of examples shows that, roughly speaking, evolution is invoked where jurists want 
to promote a universally valid, naturalistic, empirically tested, rule-based account 
of legal changes as a cumulative, emergent outcome of the operation of given 
mechanisms.  
Two important themes are collected in Parts IV and V. Though the use of evolutionary 
theory, Darwinian or otherwise, is not a sine qua non of evolutionary accounts of legal 
change, a significant number of scholars do believe that reliance on evolutionary theory 
is either a defining feature of evolutionary accounts or, more commonly, that 
evolutionary theory is essential to vindicate the ambition of creating an evolutionary 
account. In light of the contributions made by evolutionary theory to the arguments 
explored and developed in later chapters, Part IV describes the parts of evolutionary 
theory that these scholars borrow, explains how such theory is applied by these scholars, 
and warns against some of the missteps that are made when drawing on ideas with 
widespread vernacular meanings.  
Part V, by contrast, discusses some of the reasons that it is useful to be aware of the 
fraught history of the concept of evolution as reflected in current usage. In particular, I 
point out that the common conflation and blending of the two meanings leads to faulty 
conclusions about whether evolutionary processes are associated with progress.  
                                                        
9 Owen D Jones, ‘Proprioception, Non-Law, and Biolegal History’ (2001) 53 Fla L Rev 831, 859, 874. 
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I. Evolution’s	Meaning	 and	 Significance	beyond	 Law:	Origins	 and	
Key	Distinctions		
A. Two	Meanings	of	Evolution:	A	Quick	Overview		
Evolution is not just a complicated, semantically overburdened concept but is, even more 
sharply, a contranym: at certain levels of generality, some of its meanings contradict one 
another. In its more precise, biological sense, evolution references a process that is messy, 
indifferent, and ruled by chance. Yet in a vernacular sense, it is identified with processes 
that are structured, salutary, and guided toward an end. Ironically, these two meanings 
have a shared origin, which ties together the biological theories of Charles Darwin and 
the social philosophy of Herbert Spencer.  
In the remainder of this part, I use a genealogical method, filling out and contrasting these 
two meanings by exploring their interconnected historical origins. The key results of 
those explorations are two-fold. First, the older meaning of evolution, tied to a Victorian 
‘evolutionary social theory’ most identifiable with the work of Herbert Spencer, is rooted 
in a concept that sought to combine two contradictory tendencies. Evolution, in this 
Victorian usage, shared with ‘progress’ the sense of an inevitable, eventual movement 
from the inferior toward the superior, of the worse toward the better and, more 
specifically, invoked a cosmology containing a continuum of forms that are related to each 
other by descent and produced through adaptation to environmental conditions. The 
core contradiction in the Victorian meaning is that this sense of inevitable progress is 
linked with a wholly scientific, materialist mindset that not only disclaims any reliance 
on a higher power or immanent purpose but, especially in human affairs, generally denies 
a role for reason in the process as well.  
The other concept, associated with the neo-Darwinian synthesis in evolutionary biology, 
is rather different. The processes it refers to generate and support a diversity a forms, not 
just an increase in complexity; the forms that result from evolution cannot be linearly 
ordered; the variations that are successful are never a perfect fit for their niche; and the 
central principle of action is serendipity.  
B. A	Genealogy	of	‘Evolution’	since	1750	
The word evolution is etymologically rooted in the Latin for ‘an unfolding’ or ‘an 
unrolling,’ as in the unfurling of a text written onto a scroll, and almost since its first entry 
into English, it has been used to express a range of meanings that apply this sense 
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metaphorically. Even in contemporary usage it can refer to any internal movement from 
one shape to another, with a particular emphasis on a series of intermediate steps, or to 
the release or emission of something from a container, or, in a small number of cases, to 
any kind of motion at all.10  
By the early seventeenth century, this unrolling notion was being adapted to describe 
processes of realization, perfection, or completion. This early modern sense could denote 
an already-present potentiality being realized, an actuality being revealed, or processes 
coming to a prefigured culmination.11 In the ‘sciences of the spirit,’ what we might today 
call the human sciences, such a usage was rare before the nineteenth century.12 Once it 
made its way into thinking about human societies and their histories, evolution could 
describe a movement through a series of preordained epochs, successive iterations of a 
single design, or the gradual elaboration and extension of one or more principles into a 
whole system of knowledge.13  None of these grand visions were described (or even 
describable) as evolutionary, however. Evolution	simply	referenced the elaboration of an 
immanent logic of change or movement, or the manifestation of that logic in historical 
time.14  
The most striking contrast between this early modern meaning and today’s dominant 
usage occurs in the what we now call embryology, but was then a part of natural history. 
The great irony of evolution coming to label Darwin’s theory of the transmutation of 
species is that, until the middle of the nineteenth century, the dominant use of evolution 
in natural history excluded the possibility of the kinds of fundamental transformation 
that Darwin’s theory seeks to explain.15 In particular, at the end of the eighteenth century, 
many natural historians understood the growth of an organism from an embryo to its 
mature form in terms that closely tracked evolution’s root meaning, namely as a process 
in which an already-present whole expanded to take on a prefigured form, with any 
                                                        
10  See senses 1.a, 2.a, 4.a, 4.b 11 in ‘evolution, n.’ (OED	 Online, December 2018) 
<www.oed.com/view/Entry/65447> accessed 7 February 2019.  
11 Raymond Williams, Keywords:	A	Vocabulary	of	Culture	and	Society (New Revised, Oxford University Press 
2015) 78–79; Peter J Bowler, ‘The Changing Meaning of “Evolution”’ (1975) 36 Journal of the History of 
Ideas 95, 95–96. 
12 Contra Williams (n 11) 78–79. 
13 See quotations from More, Cudworth, Johnson, Coleridge and Wyvill in senses 3.a, 6.a, 6.b and 7 of 
‘evolution, n’ (n 10).  
14 Figurative uses also included reference to the procession of events through time. As Bowler points out, 
this usage was generally informed by an implicit notion of some organizing principle guiding that sequence. 
Bowler, ‘The Changing Meaning of “Evolution”’ (n 11) 99. 
15 Williams (n 11) 79–80. 
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changes in outward appearance occurring despite a fundamental immutability of 
inherent structure.16 ‘Evolve’ was originally no more than a verb that seemed appropriate 
to describe that process.17 That being said, by the early nineteenth century, ‘evolution’ 
and ‘development’ had both come to serve as labels for any process, no matter how 
conceived, by which an individual organism starting as a simple, homogenous mass 
becomes an articulated, differentiated, and complex form.18 In embryology, however, 
evolutionists continued to refer almost exclusively to those who subscribed to a 
perspective that is totally incompatible with present understandings.19 Their account of 
embryological evolution was developed so as to square with a worldview that was 
stridently opposed to the possibility of species-level change and especially with the 
premise that new species might come into being. 20  Instead, such evolutionists 
understood the mature organism and the ‘germ’ from which it grew as instances of a 
single species-form in different degrees of compaction, a form that is both divinely 
ordained and incapable of change.21  
Contemporary senses of evolution are by contrast bound up with theories of how 
biological species are created, propagated, and above all transformed through processes 
of natural selection. The influence of neo-Darwinism on uses of evolution cannot easily 
be overstated. As evolution gradually came to be identified with the theory of natural 
selection, use of the term in biology lost its association with the realization of an intrinsic 
nature or the fulfilment of a prior design, 22  leaving the primary forms of action or 
movement expressed by evolution completely at odds with its root meaning. To say a 
thing evolves is to evoke either a continuous and, in the long term, potentially total 
transformation of that thing’s character, or a thing’s emergence from an inchoate and 
amorphous assemblage into a more definite form.23  
More fundamentally, evolution after Darwin ceased to be just the noun form of an action 
(as in, ‘the evolution of her argument’) or a step in a process (as in, ‘this television is an 
                                                        
16 ibid 79; Bowler, ‘The Changing Meaning of “Evolution”’ (n 11) 96–97.  
17 Bowler, ‘The Changing Meaning of “Evolution”’ (n 11) 97. 
18 ibid 97–100. 
19 See eg CO Whitman, ‘Bonnet’s Theory of Evolution’ (1895) 5 The Monist 412. 
20 Peter J Bowler, Evolution:	The	History	of	an	Idea (25th anniversary edn, University of California Press 
2009) 45–47. 
21 ibid 40–43, 63–65. 
22 Williams (n 11) 79–80.  
23 Senses 7.a & 9 in ‘evolution, n’ (n 10).  
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evolution in home entertainment’). 24  It now served primarily as an abstract noun 
denoting a free-standing concept. In biology in particular, the use of evolution to denote 
a kind of action has been almost entirely abandoned. Though there are controversies over 
the details, advocates and critics of the modern synthesis agree that species emerge, 
transform, diverge, and disappear primarily via the transmission of genetic material 
across generations, by the introduction of variations in that genetic material through 
random mutation, and through the differential reproduction of organisms with different 
genotypes under prevailing environmental constraints. 25  And rather than just 
referencing the unfolding of this process, evolution now names	that process, that is to say, 
the process described by the theory. 26 
Left unexplained by this chronology is how that concept came to be called evolution. The 
widespread use of evolution to discuss theories of modification with descent and the 
transmutation of species did not occur until the latter half of the nineteenth century.27 
Indeed, Darwin did not use the term in the Origin	of	Species.28 From the perspective of the 
1850s, this is completely unsurprising, given that the dominant association of the term in 
biological circles was with theorists who denied the possibility that species could change 
at all, as noted above.29  
Although the details of that reversal are not a direct aim of this chapter, the broad outlines 
have important ramifications for contemporary usages outside of biology, especially in 
jurisprudence. The key is that Darwin’s theories only came to be called evolution via the 
mediation of a third, and by today’s standards rather alien, meaning, which had its heyday 
in Victorian-era evolutionary social theory identifiable above all with Herbert Spencer.  
                                                        
24 Sense 7.b in ibid. 
25  For pithy accounts of the modern synthesis, combining Darwinian natural selection and Mendelian 
genetics, and of the criticisms of that paradigm, especially Steven Jay Gould’s criticisms of strong 
adaptationism, see Bowler, Evolution (n 20) chs 9–10.  
26 One species is not ‘an evolution’ of another, but its descendant. Evolution is the process by which one 
descends from another.  
27 Bowler, ‘The Changing Meaning of “Evolution”’ (n 11) 100.  
28 Though ‘evolve’ is the last word of The	Origin	of	Species, evolution appears nowhere in the original text 
and did not figure in the initial debates over the book. Bajema & Carneiro in Derek Freeman and others, 
‘The Evolutionary Theories of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer [and Comments and Replies]’ (1974) 
15 Current Anthropology 211, 221, 223; Bowler, ‘The Changing Meaning of “Evolution”’ (n 11) 103–05.  
29 To get a sense of how odd it is that evolution came to be the name for Darwin’s ideas, we might imagine 
a counterfactual present in which the modern, post-realist legal consciousness of today’s United States 
continued to be called ‘formalism,’ in continuity with the jurisprudential orientation it overcame in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
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Spencer’s understanding of evolution certainly resonated with the teleological uses of the 
term in the eighteenth-century human sciences.30 But it was not inspired by them. It was 
instead an expansive adaptation of a meaning borrowed from the embryological uses 
discussed above.31 At root, his usage is attributable to the naturalist Karl Ernst von Baer, 
who characterized the growth of the embryo as a tendency from the homogenous toward 
the heterogeneous. 32  Drawing from Carpenter’s interpretation of von Baer, Spencer 
developed the idea that this concept could also characterize the progression of organisms 
up ‘the scale of creation’ observable in the fossil record. 33  Spencer’s understanding 
radically expanded Carpenter’s homology between embryological development and the 
phylogeny of species, describing the movement from homogenous to heterogeneous as a 
universal law of progress,34 one applicable at every scale: individual organisms, the entire 
order of species, human societies, or indeed the entire solar system.35 As early as 1857, 
Spencer began using evolution to refer to the unfolding of progress, as he had defined it, 
at any scale and in every domain.36 As he developed his synthetic philosophy, Spencer 
further characterized this ‘law’ by assimilating Coleridge’s idea that the ‘progress’ of 
species involved an increasing degree of integration and interdependence of parts.37 
More relevantly, its name changed. Rather than describing the manifestation of 
‘progress,’ defined as a movement from ‘the simple into the complex,’38 evolution became 
a synonym for progress preferred by Spencer both for its closer connection with the 
idiosyncrasies of his own theories and for its weaker associations with social change 
alone. 39  The core principle of his doctrine, the notion of ‘change from an indefinite, 
incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; through continuous 
                                                        
30 Above, text to nn 11–13. 
31 Above, text to n 18. 
32 Note that Von Baer was not an evolutionist in the sense discussed above, text to nn 19–21.  
33 Peter J Bowler, ‘Herbert Spencer and “Evolution”—An Additional Note’ (1975) 36 Journal of the History 
of Ideas 367; William Benjamin Carpenter, Principles	of	Physiology,	General	and	Comparative (3rd edn, J 
Churchill 1851) 574–83. Spencer himself attributed his approach directly to von Baer, but he likely 
borrowed his interpretation from Carpenter. Valerie A Haines, ‘Is Spencer’s Theory an Evolutionary 
Theory?’ (1988) 93 American Journal of Sociology 1200, 1208; Bowler, ‘The Changing Meaning of 
“Evolution”’ (n 11) 107–08. 
34 Spencer used the term ‘generic.’ Fred Wilson, ‘Review of The	Philosophy	of	Herbert	Spencer’ [2008] Notre 
Dame Philosophical Reviews. 
35 Herbert Spencer, Progress :	Its	Law	and	Cause :	With	Other	Disquisitions,	Viz. :	The	Physiology	of	Laughter :	
Origin	and	Function	of	Music :	The	Social	Organism :	Use	and	Beauty :	The	Use	of	Anthropomorphism (New 
York : J Fitzgerald & co 1881). 
36 ibid. 
37 Michael Taylor, The	Philosophy	of	Herbert	Spencer (Bloomsbury Publishing 2010) 61–63. 
38 Spencer (n 35) 234. 
39 Bowler, ‘The Changing Meaning of “Evolution”’ (n 11) 108–09. 
34 
 
differentiations and integrations,’ became not only the proper characterization of 
progress, but also the ‘law of evolution.’40 
This sequence of lateral borrowings tells only half the story of how the modern concept 
of evolution was fabricated, however. The remainder lies not in the structure of Spencer’s 
philosophy but more in the ideas he was attempting to synthesize. Spencer’s 
philosophizing ended up shaping the meaning of evolution in modern biology because his 
writing during the late 1850s and 1860s consistently described the transmutation of 
species through environmental adaptation as an example of his ‘law of evolution.’ 
Spencer’s advocacy for the transmutation-through-adaptation position was no 
innovation. Like Darwin, Spencer was a late entry to a lineage of thinkers who believed 
that the tree of life had been produced through modification with descent.41. Neither was 
Spencer’s understanding of transmutation superior to Darwin’s: to the contrary, his 
Lamarckian account of its underlying mechanisms was largely refuted near the turn of 
the twentieth century.42 Nonetheless, through much of the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, Spencer was not just the philosopher of evolution par excellence but possibly the 
leading intellectual on both sides of the Atlantic.43 His renown crested during a moment 
when the transmutation hypothesis was slowly gaining acceptance but the nature of the 
mechanisms driving the process were much more up for debate than they are today.44 
Whether because of their partiality for the kind of progressivism that was central to 
Spencer's account, but mostly absent from Darwin’s, 45  or simply because Spencer’s 
eminence made his usage so well-known, by the 1870s biologists had almost universally 
adopted Spencer’s category as a synonym for the transmutation hypothesis.46 
                                                        
40 Taylor (n 37) 63, citing Spencer’s First	Principles. 
41 Contrary to received wisdom, Darwin was not the first to introduce that position. Nisbet laments that it 
seems ‘scholarship will never rid the world of this gross misconception.’ Robert A Nisbet, History	of	the	Idea	
of	Progress (Heinemann 1980) 174. On the array of precursors who supported modification with descent, 
including most famously Lamarck but also Darwin’s grandfather Erasmus, see Bowler, Evolution (n 20) chs 
3–4. Hovenkamp is thus correct, but only in this narrow sense,	that ‘[t]here were prominent evolutionists 
a century before Darwin.’ Hovenkamp, ‘Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence’ (n 3) 645–46. Among those 
familiar with the history, Darwin is nonetheless acknowledged as the author of ‘the theory of evolution’ for 
having identified the mechanism, natural selection, by which transmutation of species could occur. Though 
Alfred Russel Wallace published an account that mirrored Darwin’s key claims concurrently with the 
publication of The Origins	of	Species, Bowler argues that fair credit for our modern conception of natural 
selection nonetheless lies with Darwin. Bowler, Evolution (n 20) 173–75. 
42 Freeman and others (n 28) 216–17; Bowler, Evolution (n 20) 251–73. 
43 Thomas Hylland Eriksen and Finn Sivert Nielsen, A	History	of	Anthropology (Pluto Press 2001) 37. 
44 On the relative ‘eclipse of Darwin’ between the 1860s and the opening of the twentieth century, see 
Bowler, Evolution (n 20) ch 7. 
45 Freeman and others (n 28) 213–15, 218–19. 
46 Bowler, ‘The Changing Meaning of “Evolution”’ (n 11) 109–10, 111–12. 
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This may be enough to explain contemporary use among biologists. We might conjecture 
that all that matters for usage in biology was the ascendance of the view that the 
phylogenetic tree has been produced through gradual adaptations and that modification 
with descent occurs through natural selection. It is possible that the name which is 
attached to that view is irrelevant. It may be that scientists are less liable to be misled by 
semantics, so that what matters is never the name of concepts, but only ever the 
correspondence of their meanings, narrowly conceived, with the world that they are 
supposed to capture. Among professionals, it could be that the history of evolution’s 
meaning can be set aside because scientific understandings of evolution have since 
expelled any sense of progress.47 Perhaps.48  
On leaving the relatively tight confines of academic biology, however, a different picture 
emerges.49 Spencer’s eminence during the genesis of Darwinism means that his ideas 
continue to be consequential for how evolution is used and understood today. However, 
it is no accident that Spencer’s writings have not stood the test of time, and it is important 
not to get trapped in the troughs and trenches of his system.50 Consider a typical quote: 
Evolution does not imply a latent tendency to improve, everywhere in operation. There is 
no uniform ascent from lower to higher, but only an occasional production of a form 
which, in virtue of greater fitness for more complex conditions, becomes capable of a 
longer life of a more varied kind. And while such higher type begins to dominate over 
lower types and to spread at their expense, the lower types survive in habitats or modes 
of life that are not usurped, or are thrust into inferior habitats or modes of life in which 
they retrogress. What thus holds with organic types must also hold with types of 
societies.51 
                                                        
47 Michael Ruse, Monad	to	Man:	The	Concept	of	Progress	in	Evolutionary	Biology (Harvard University Press 
2009). 
48 However accurate this account may be today, things had not yet become quite so clear as late as 1975. 
Bowler, ‘The Changing Meaning of “Evolution”’ (n 11) 112–13. 
49 As Ruse concludes from a broad survey of pop science books and museum exhibits on evolutionary 
biology: ‘let there be no mistake that at the popular level, which for most people is the beginning and the 
end of their acquaintance with evolution, Progress continues to ride high.’ Ruse (n 47) 526–30. 
50 The rhetorical structure of Crane Brinton’s infamous question ‘Who now reads Spencer?’ showed in 1933 
how far Spencer’s star had already fallen. Parsons’ infamous quotation of Brinton in his 1941 The Structure	
of	Social	Action renders his own addition, that ‘Spencer is dead,’ rather redundant. See Taylor (n 37) 147; 
JW Burrow, Evolution	and	Society:	A	Study	in	Victorian	Social	Theory (Cambridge University Press 1966) xii. 




The confusion evident here is typical of Spencer: the indicia of superiority quietly slips 
from fitness in a specific environment to overall fitness; fitness with a particular 
environment is equated with the capacity to inhabit any environment; increased fitness 
is cavalierly identified with longer life; and he places analytical emphasis on the 
complexity of the environment, rather than on the complexity of form emphasized by his 
own definition of evolution. 
Nevertheless, this same quotation contains nearly everything that the concept of 
evolution absorbed under Spencer’s influence. It casually associates an overarching 
process of advancement with a ranking of forms on some intrinsic but unarticulated 
standard of value, and with the struggle for existence under environmental pressures. It 
embraces the inevitability of progress, while dissociating that tendency from any latent 
design, external guidance, or immanent teleology. Put differently, it fuses a conviction 
that there will be a general development from inferior to superior with an account of 
adaptive processes that is wholly expressible in terms of natural, mechanistic causes.52 It 
characterizes advancement through adaptation as a universal law, applicable both to the 
order of species and to the organization of human societies. 
Modern usage has not retained everything in Spencer’s concept. Indeed, some of the 
implications of his system are very odd. 53  In accordance with the prevailing 
interpretation of nineteenth-century positivism, Spencer was fixated on providing an 
account of social processes and human experiences that could be directly traced to 
ultimate, ‘necessary’ causes.54 He sought to account for the law of evolution, regardless of 
its level of operation, through deductions from the same simple physical laws.55 From the 
perspective of modern biology, natural selection gains nothing from this grand 
theorizing, and none of Spencer’s reasoning on this account has been meaningfully 
inherited by modern usage. Another look at the above quote lays bare the Social 
Darwinism of which Spencer has long been identified as the archetype.56 In identifying a 
form’s success in the struggle for existence with some intrinsic (moral) superiority, he 
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echoes his position, articulated a decade before the publication of the Origin	of	Species, 
that a challenging environment is necessary to generate a continuous sequence of 
salutary adaptations, both in organisms and in societies.57 On its own, a broad faith that 
the fits and starts of social change divulge an overall tendency to progress delivered 
through adaptive mechanisms yields very few fixed conclusions about how social or 
political institutions should be organized.58 Today, Social Darwinism is for the most part 
considered to be only one (mis)application of the evolutionary principle to social 
organization.59  
Nonetheless, at an appropriate level of abstraction, the combination of connotations and 
premises that Spencer brought together constitute a distinct understanding of evolution 
that continues to mark contemporary usages. It is not quite the case today, as Ruse has 
proposed, that ‘at a popular level, Progress and evolution are synonyms.’ 60  People 
generally mean something slightly more specific and less capacious when they talk about 
evolution. There is, as with progress, the sense of an inevitable, eventual movement from 
the inferior toward the superior, of the worse toward the better. Yet, evolution fuses this 
sense of progression or advancement with a cosmology containing a continuum of forms 
that are related to each other genealogically and produced through adaptation to 
environmental conditions.  
This conception can be expressed even more abstractly, in terms of the attempt to 
reconcile countervailing metaphysical convictions. The power of Darwin’s account of 
natural selection lay in its capacity to explain both the succession of species that were 
divulged by the fossil record and the continuing divergence of species observable today, 
thereby shining a light on change in species over time and accounting for their present-
day diversity. Darwin may have vacillated in his belief that natural selection had a 
progressive tendency, especially in the case of humanity,61 but his work was largely 
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concerned with how organisms find their ecological niche, not where they lie on the great 
chain of being.62 Natural selection can generate stable forms that are more complex than 
their predecessors, where ‘more complex’ has the sense of integrating a larger diversity 
of interdependent parts, and it has a long record of doing so.63 But there is no logical 
reason to believe that more complex forms, in this sense, should have a tendency to 
succeed over others. In fact, the data suggest otherwise.64  
Whatever the focus of Darwin’s work, and whatever import it may have for modern 
biological science, his ideas and the credence they lent to the transmutation hypothesis 
were received in an era dominated by an ideology of progress that placed humanity at 
the top echelon of life, and cast Europe as the apotheosis of social development.65 Though 
those who counted themselves as evolutionists did not subscribe to the whole of 
Spencer’s philosophy, his accounts were nonetheless the most popular and well-known 
interpretation of Darwin’s findings. 66  Contra Darwin, Spencer’s focus was not on 
accounting for diversity or the stability of ‘inferior’ forms, but rather on the process 
purported to move forms ceaselessly ‘up the ladder’ from the inferior to the superior.67 
In his doctrine of evolution, Spencer believed he had discovered a set of wholly 
naturalistic, materialist mechanisms driving that process, of which Darwin’s account was 
only an aspect. Evolution, for Spencer, characterized a course of progress reached 
through natural, adaptive processes and not, emphatically, involving any exercise or 
application of reason.  
In Spencer’s day, the implications of this were great. If the doctrine of evolution were 
correct, it would mean that progress could be vindicated without relying on theological 
intervention, without the presence of a preexisting design to be realized, and without the 
operation of any immanent principle. If Progress had been a secularization of divine 
Providence, evolution promised to finally shed Progress’s metaphysical residues.68 In 
Spencer’s hands, evolution depicted a universe that possessed a general tendency toward 
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the perfection of forms, but did so without having to rely on Aristotelian teleology or any 
direct, unilinear pathway.  
Like many of his contemporaries, Spencer may have relied on an underdeveloped 
conflation of the relative complexity of forms with their intrinsic superiority. The alternate 
name he bestowed on natural selection, the ‘survival of the fittest,’ may have confused the 
search for appropriate niches in the economy of life with a never-ending increase in 
vigour and excellence.69 He may have, paradoxically, found it necessary to ultimately 
anchor his whole system in the operation of some metaphysical unknowable. 70 
Nonetheless, Spencer’s doctrine gave his contemporaries warrant to maintain their 
certainty of Man’s pre-eminence among other species, European superiority over their 
colonial subjects, and the inevitability of a future better than the present, all while 
professing to adopt a wholly scientific, positivist, naturalistic, and anti-metaphysical 
mindset. In the shadow of Spencer’s philosophy, evolution became the name of any 
doctrine that promised to reconcile that conviction with that mindset via the magic of 
‘adaptation.’ We might safely say, within a margin of error, that no one today reads 
Spencer.71 But those who think of evolution not just as an engine for the production of 
stable diversity of life, but as a crane that has lifted man to the top of the tower of time, 
have inherited a usage that embodies Spencer’s conviction that such a promise could be 
redeemed.72  
II. Victorian‐Age	 Legal	 Evolution:	 Revelation,	 Development	 and	
Progress	
What have the various jurisprudential ambitions expressed by legal evolution got to do 
with this genealogy of evolution itself? There have been various efforts over the past forty 
years in jurisprudence, economics, and the social sciences to replicate neo-Darwinism’s 
successes in biology, often by borrowing from Darwin and his intellectual descendants. 
Those efforts receive more direct attention in Part III. However, because contemporary 
invocations of evolution in legal theory only partially escaped the legacies of Spencer’s 
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usage, it is important to begin by reviewing an earlier tradition of legal evolution more 
directly influenced by Victorian-era evolutionary social theory.  
To make sense of this late nineteenth-century tradition, I begin by noting the various 
traditions of progressive jurisprudence that emerged out of the Enlightenment. Lord 
Mansfield’s oft-referenced description of the common law ‘work[ing] itself pure by rules 
drawn from the fountain of justice’ is only the most famous.73 Natural law thinking at least 
as far back as Thomas Aquinas had emphasized the existence of norms discoverable and 
determined by reasoned contemplation of the nature of Man, 74  with perdurable 
controversies about how such norms related to civil laws and the law of nations.75 After 
the German idealists, though, an increased emphasis was placed on the idea that the 
gradual discovery of such norms through reason worked as an immanent historical 
process.76 The German historical school, identified with Savigny, Gierke, and Jhering, 
understood the development of a society’s laws as an organic emanation of the spirit of 
its people and an immanent product of their shared history.77 In an very different vein, 
Adam Smith is only the best-remembered of eighteenth-century social theorists who 
sought to frame law’s development primarily in terms of the movement of societies 
through a predetermined series of economic stages. 78  Informed by clashes between 
English adherents to the German historical school and the analytical jurisprudence of 
Bentham and Austin, JF McLennan and Henry Sumner Maine proposed that, in spite of 
dissimilar origins and persistent differences between specific bodies of law, law as such, 
at least law in ‘advanced’ societies, develops toward a single apotheosis.79  
Some of these theories of law and legal change were embedded in a broader 
understanding of history and historical knowledge that might be described as 
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historicist.80 Are they evolutionary? Hovenkamp has suggested, with reference to many of 
these Enlightenment-era thinkers, that ‘jurisprudence was “evolutionary” long before 
Darwin.’81 As much as the early modern meaning of evolution might suffice to describe 
the principle of movement in these accounts, using evolution to gather them together 
entails some lexical anachronism that risks conceptual confusion. ‘Evolve’ and ‘evolution’ 
appear neither in Smith’s Lectures nor in Blackstone’s Commentaries. Hegel’s Philosophy	
of	Right does not employ the Latinate evolutio, and his uses of the German Entwicklung, 
occasionally translated in the past as evolution, bear no resemblance to any modern 
incarnation of the concept. 82  Jhering’s Struggle	 for	 Law	 echoes the German title of 
Darwin’s Origin	of	Species, but the text has little to say about processes of legal change.83 
It is possible that these authors might have found it convenient to use ‘evolve’ to describe 
the gradual expansion of legal knowledge or movement through stages of legal 
development, in accordance with its meaning as a synonym for ‘develop.’ Yet, describing 
their theories or the processes they seek to capture as evolutionary would have been 
nonsense to any of these thinkers.84 None of them would have, or even could have, spoken 
of ‘legal evolution.’  
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The critiques of such anachronism that are the hallmark of the Cambridge school of 
contextualism in intellectual history have had a variety of justifications, not all of which 
matter to my project.85 The critique that does concern me here, articulated in the later 
work of the doyen of the Cambridge school, Quentin Skinner, is that if we are careless 
about the language that historical figures used, we risk misunderstanding what it was 
they were doing with that language and thus misconstruing what they were doing more 
broadly.86 
Hovenkamp, for instance, falls victim to this hazard by writing as if evolution has a static 
and self-evident meaning that can be applied from the birth of the Enlightenment to the 
present. He portrays one long tradition of ‘evolutionary’ legal change, distinct in detail 
but unified in theoretical ambition. He locates the only significant milestone in the march 
of these theories with Darwin, who provided the account that finally made the underlying 
idea credible.87 The name of the idea may have changed in the late nineteenth century 
but, in Hovenkamp’s account, that name change is immaterial. He is hardly alone in these 
claims.88 
The error here is that the appearance of the concept of evolution also marked a qualitative 
turn in legal thinking. It is insufficient to claim, as Hovenkamp suggests, that Darwin 
simply bolstered the credibility of an already-existing theory of evolution by providing 
an explanation for it that depended in no way on God, Geist, or any other metaphysical 
substance.89 Rather, the genesis of evolution united a preexisting doctrine of progress 
with a commitment to a radical empiricism that, in the human sciences, more or less 
embraced Auguste Comte’s account of the passage from metaphysical to positivist forms 
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of knowledge.90 As with Comte, admittedly, the aspiration to displace the metaphysical 
element in human knowledge was undermined in practice by the invocation of a 
hierarchical ordering of forms of social life tied to a developmental model of (human) 
history.91 Nonetheless, embracing evolution meant rejecting prior doctrines, like Natural 
Law, German idealism, or German romanticism, that had framed legal change as the 
discovery of a rational design, the development of an immanent telos, or any sort of 
‘progress of the consciousness.’92  
Henry Maine presents an illuminating transitional case. Although ‘evolution’ does not 
appear in his classic Ancient	Law, Maine did eventually come to describe his theories in 
terms of a ‘law of evolution.’93 The relevant point here lies not in understanding what 
Maine did with evolution, but in what evolution allowed people to do with Maine. Maine’s 
historical method embodied the same reconciliation of commitments advanced by 
Spencer. Ancient	Law echoed the German historical school’s premise that law developed 
organically as an outgrowth of its host society, but tempered that view with a healthy 
dose of nineteenth-century positivism favouring a scientific, empirically-based study of 
law.94 It thus easily accorded with Spencer’s concept of evolution, uniting a conviction in 
the inevitability of social progress and Europe’s ‘progressive’ (viz ‘advanced’) character, 
with an epistemological commitment to attribute any claims about society and social 
change to temporal, material, and natural laws (but not Natural Law per se). The 
particular phrasing of Maine’s well-known maxim, that ‘the movement of the progressive 
societies has been a movement from Status	to	Contract,’95 captures the ambiguity of his 
project. In using a historical analysis of Roman law to construct an account of law’s 
‘typical’ developmental path, he seemed on the one hand to be documenting a pattern or 
a tendency that was discernible in his very small research sample. 96  Yet his own 
convictions were clear: the development of Roman law should be studied alongside 
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modern law, ‘not because our own jurisprudence and that of Rome were once alike—it is 
because they will	be alike.’97 
Maine’s ex-post adoption of evolution was part of the construction of Victorian-era 
‘evolutionary social thought’ in anthropology, sociology and beyond.98 As Pollock put it, 
‘[t]he doctrine of evolution is nothing else than the historical method applied to the facts 
of nature; the historical method is nothing else than the doctrine of evolution applied to 
known societies and institutions.’ 99  Uses of evolution mirroring Maine’s historical 
method persisted into the early twentieth century. I mention three notable examples. 
In their introductory preface to their 1912 edited collection on the evolution of law, 
Wigmore and Kocourek focused on the diversity of social environments in which law is 
created and developed and on the diversity of factors that might shape its contents. They 
emphasized the need to test and verify on the basis of a large corpus of materials, yet their 
ultimate interest rested in identifying a ‘natural law of development of legal ideas.’ They 
considered their inquiry into legal diversity and exceptions to the regular movement 
through stages germane only insofar as it allowed for the identification of ‘extreme 
discordances which hamper the flow of progress.’100  
Keller, one of the last champions of Victorian-era social evolution, summarized evolution, 
whether in law or in nature, in terms of a series of forms connected through descent and 
generated through adaptation to environment; he notably reduced the mechanism of 
Darwinian evolution to the formula of variation, selection, and inheritance; 101  he 
furthermore dismissed the ‘explanatory subterfuge’ of ascribing causes to unobservables, 
whether they be Natural law, natural right, or any kind of higher cause; and, finally, he 
insisted that he was not confusing evolution with progress. And yet, in accordance with 
his belief that Spencer, rather than Darwin, was the preeminent philosopher of evolution, 
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both generally and in the analysis of societies, he took legal evolution to imply growth, a 
‘cosmic tendency,’ and orderly development.102  
Paul Vinogradoff, Maine’s successor as Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford,103 nominally 
identified the doctrine of evolution with Darwin. Yet he ascribed its legal application to 
the anthropological effort to formulate ‘normal sequences of development or … empirical 
laws of jurisprudence,’ as well as with the sociological perspectives of Comte, Jhering, and 
Spencer. In his unfinished Outlines	of	a	Historical	Jurisprudence, he sought to construct 
the foundations of an account that would transcend or vindicate the work done by these 
earlier ‘evolutionists.’ Yet in his attempt to travel a middle way between accounts 
portraying legal change as the unfolding of a project to achieve social purposes, and those 
that identified particular laws as reflection of their social context, he too foundered.104 
As will be elaborated in the next section, over the past forty years, the connotations given 
to evolution in legal scholarship have come to express a scientific ambition modelled on 
the successes of Darwinian accounts of biological evolution. While it would be wrong to 
say that all such usages secretly or subconsciously embrace a social teleology, there are 
often signs that the teleological worldview lying behind Spencer’s usage continues to 
haunt today’s more explicitly Darwinian accounts.  
III. A	Scientific	Turn	for	Legal	Evolution:	Naturalism,	Mechanism	and	
Emergence	
Was legal evolution, then, an ‘essentially a nineteenth century phenomenon,’ as Peter 
Stein suggested in his oft-cited 1980 monograph?105 If we were to be generous with the 
boundaries of the nineteenth century, and to limit our attention only to legal theory that 
echoed Maine’s synthesis of progress and positivism, we could grant Stein his point. For 
much of the period stretching from the 1920s to the 1970s, legal theory in the United 
States and the United Kingdom moved away from explicit invocations of ‘evolution’ and 
from historical methods more broadly.106 Indeed, self-styled evolutionary approaches to 
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socio-cultural change not only became outmoded but were explicitly rejected by many 
social scientists during the same period.107 There were important exceptions, however. 
Research in legal sociology and law and society continued to invoke evolution in efforts 
to construct reliable indices, legal or otherwise, in the ontogeny of ‘society,’ with 
individual societies understood as instances of a single kind of entity in different stages 
of development. 108  Habermas’s social theory likewise provided an account of social 
evolution that subsumed continuous changes in both social structure and worldview into 
a developmental logic with a built-in sense of normative progress, thereby rehashing 
Spencer’s historicism while seeking to vindicate a breed of Kantian historical 
rationalism.109 For the most part, though, ‘evolution’ was little more than a minor theme 
in legal scholarship. From Stein’s vantage point, evolution seemed to have passed out of 
view. 
Yet starting in the 1980s, ‘evolution’ began to make a gradual comeback in jurisprudence 
and legal analysis, and it bore little resemblance to Stein’s ‘nineteenth century 
phenomenon.’ This revival had a complex pedigree.  
Broadly speaking, it was likely fuelled by a growing public enthusiasm for evolutionary 
thinking, epitomized by Dawkins’ The Selfish	Gene, whose breakout success provided the 
public with a lucid, accessible account of Darwinian evolution via genetic natural 
selection.110  
This revival also drew from a number of antecedent intellectual traditions that had 
themselves been shaped by careful adaptations of Darwinian models. It was traceable, for 
one, to two sets of theories in economics. The first, identifiable with an argument first 
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made by Armen Alchian, sought to characterize the prevailing structure of business 
organizations as an evolutionary outcome of market competition.111 The other, traceable 
to Friedrich Hayek, attributed the fundamental underpinnings of market order as the 
output of cultural evolution via group selection.112  
The revival of evolutionary approaches to law also had links to a revamped interest in the 
evolutionary bases of behaviour, especially human behaviour, which had made headway 
in the 1960s and 1970s.113 Hamilton, for instance, provided the first plausible arguments 
for the genetic sources of pro-social, including altruistic, behaviour in animals. 114 
Maynard Smith used game theory to explain the evolution of behaviours. 115  By his 
coinage of ‘sociobiology,’ EO Wilson gave a conspicuous label and a unified theme to 
previously disparate strands of research, helping to synthesize a field whose ‘central 
problem’ was to explain how altruistic behaviour can arise through natural selection 
operating at the level of the genotype, but whose tools he extended to explain various 
common features of human behaviour. 116  Wilson’s Pulitzer-prize winning book, On	
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Human	Nature,	attempted to cast human behaviours and social structures as outcomes of 
evolutionary dynamics at the genetic level.117  
Finally, starting in the mid-1960s, social scientists began to subject cultural phenomena 
to independent analysis using analytical tools drawn from neo-Darwinism.118 At least 
some of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century social evolutionists had 
identified variation, selection, and retention as the elements of an abstract ‘formula’ or 
‘recipe’ for natural selection. 119  Their accounts, however, generally modelled social 
evolution in terms of interactions between prevailing social practices and the biological 
inheritance of humanity or of particular social groups.120 The touchstone for this new 
Darwinian social theory, a 1965 paper by Donald Campbell, suggested by contrast that 
‘variation and selective retention’ might be used as general model, of which the evolution 
of biological species and the propagation of cultural forms were parallel instances.121 A 
separate, but similar, strand of scholarship developing Richard Dawkins’s concept of a 
‘meme,’ was rooted in an extended metaphor in which competition between genes 
became a map for competition between individual ‘units’ of cultural phenomena.122 
A. Evolutionary	as	an	Appeal	to	Science	
Starting around 1980, this congeries of influences led to acute shifts in the uses of 
evolution in legal scholarship. Certainly, some analyses used evolutionary biology as a 
direct source of analytical inspiration, much as the antecedents noted above had done. In 
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this category of theory, ‘evolution’ or ‘evolutionary’ is self-consciously used as an 
application of or borrowing from a broader body of ‘evolutionary’ knowledge. 123 
However, these trends in psychological, economic, and social analysis also provided a 
precursor for more general uses of evolution, to express a discrete theoretical, that is to 
say jurisprudential ambition. Those who speak of the evolution of law today are often 
doing no more than invoking certain high-level features of Darwin’s account of change, 
and evoking Darwin’s account as a model to be emulated.  
The most obvious way in which evolutionary biology appears as a model worth emulating 
finds expression in the implicit hope that accounts of legal evolution will deserve the 
prestige and credibility of being ‘scientific.’124 Modern evolutionary biology is scientific, 
and many seem to take for granted that one cannot call an account of legal change 
evolutionary unless it is scientific as well. 125  The relation between the use of 
‘evolutionary’ as a label and the scientific ambitions of the theories it labels works in two 
directions. In sociology of knowledge terms, invoking the prestige of evolutionary theory 
may be motivated by a desire to reproduce some of Darwin’s impact and influence.126 
Simply calling an account of legal change evolutionary may work to lend it a veneer of 
credibility. On the other hand, it is not as if the word is cynically deployed to provide 
cachet to just any account of legal change, no matter the project informing it. Rather, the 
invocation of scientific credibility entailed by the use of the word is underwritten by the 
pursuit of the same epistemic ends that undergirded the (eventual) success of Darwin’s 
theory. For example, an account of legal evolution will primarily be intended as a form of 
explanation rather than a project of evaluation or prescription,127 though that is different 
from the corresponding accounts having no normative relevance.128 
Beyond the goal of explanation, however, an abstract aim of scientific validity yields little 
guidance about how one should go about their research, nor any clear standards for the 
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accounts that such conduct should produce. Even with the hard sciences treated as a gold 
standard to emulate, the ‘scientific’ label still lacks precise enough meaning to distinguish 
valid from invalid accounts. One effect of using evolution in ways that resonate with neo-
Darwinian thinking is to give the scientific ambition some specific content.  
B. Minimal	Criteria	for	Legal	Evolution	
Below, I set out seven criteria that distinguish legal evolution from other sorts of accounts 
of legal change. Evolution seems to be deployed in the context of efforts to develop 
naturalistic, empirically	robust, general, nomothetic explanations that understand change 
as mechanistic, iterative, and emergent. This list is intended to be neither exhaustive nor 
universal. Indeed, many of the features I identify overlap and are interrelated with one 
another. There may be other, possibly more parsimonious ways to organize the same 
features. Nevertheless, taken together they set out a methodological apparatus that 
shares a certain family resemblance. Finally, my use of inevitably contested terms to label 
these criteria is wholly stipulative, and is intended only to provide a convenient 
shorthand. I do not intend to weigh in on the real or correct meaning of the terms I use.  
Before turning to an elaboration of these features, let me note that I have deliberately 
described these eight features as ‘criteria.’129 As criteria, they are intended as descriptive 
adjectives that can distinguish accounts that could be fairly described as ‘evolutionary’ 
from those that cannot, but also as appraisive adjectives that can distinguish the relative 
quality and success of accounts that aspire or claim to be ‘evolutionary.’130 
1. Naturalistic	
Evolutionary accounts in the contemporary register are distinguished above all by their 
commitment to naturalism. What marked Darwin’s theory as ‘scientific’ was not only that 
he provided a plausible explanation for otherwise puzzling phenomena,131 but that his 
explanation eschewed any reliance on metaphysical substance. His account posited no 
‘first cause’ driving the process, no Power determining its progression, and no telos to 
which things inherently tend.132 The eventual validation of Darwin’s theory had to await 
the identification of the mechanisms that introduce variations among individual 
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members of a species, and that allow those variations to be inherited across 
generations.133 Nonetheless, his account was presented entirely in terms of observables: 
the continual introduction of diversity among members of a species, inheritance of 
distinguishing features, and differential rates of survival under environmental constraint.  
References to evolution tend to import this implicit naturalism into accounts of legal 
change, as well.134 Accounts of legal change that are cast as evolutionary take account for 
the objects of change—generally legal norms, legal institutions, or legal discourse—as 
well as the factors engendering legal change entirely in terms of (social) facts. Evolution’s 
naturalism favours the temporal. Evolutionary explanations are accounts of relations 
between phenomena that are in the world and of the world. They eschew any kind of 
dependence on transcendentals or the divine. 
This commitment, however, also disqualifies historicist accounts of legal change, as 
described in Part II, from being evolutionary in the modern scientific sense. Savigny, with 
his reliance on ‘silently-operating powers’ is certainly not included. 135  If the only 
evidence for the explicans is the explicandum, then the naturalist perspective does not 
admit the account as an explanation at all, but only as a rationalization. In much the same 
way, Mansfield’s vision of the common law working itself pure does not fit either. The 
gradual uncovering or revealing of a reality that is hidden fails the test of naturalism not 
only because it posits as causal some factor whose observation is always delayed to some 
future moment, but because it seems to deny the reality that law changes at all. I should 
specify as well that there is no room for natural law in naturalistic accounts of legal 
change, save insofar as what jurists say about natural law may form part of the legal 
discourse and thereby contribute to changes in effective norms.  
This connects well to a different point, which is that the restriction of evolutionary 
accounts to those expressed in terms of observables does not mean limiting them entirely 
to external factors, although this was an approach championed by earlier enthusiasts of 
legal evolution.136 Court decisions, constitutional texts, and adopted legislation; deeds, 
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certificates, and contracts; legal commentary and scholarship, and even the advice that 
lawyers give to their clients—these are all observables, as well. Each forms part of the 
law that is changing, but may also works to enable, spur, and condition legal change.  
2. Empirically	Robust		
The aim of an evolutionary account should not just be to rely solely on observable factors, 
but to accord with what has actually been observed. Such an account should, for example, 
not only be expressed in terms of judicial decisions and political interests, but fit in some 
way with a record of actual decisions, behaviours and actions. Evolutionary accounts, that 
is, are distinguished by empirical rigor.137 They must, it is said, ‘be grounded in actual 
historical data, observed as dispassionately as possible.’138  
If the nature of the empiricism involved is clear, the ‘robustness’ can be understood in 
two possible ways. On the one hand, it might be thought that evolutionary accounts 
should be evaluated against empirical data. On the other hand, the aim of robustness 
could also be described as a matter of seeking coherence or triangulation between the 
theory and the data alone. All theories of law and legal change necessarily pursue some 
form of coherence, but the appeal to the empirical works primarily by excluding the ideal 
and the speculative. Thus, judicial decisions are to be taken as law, not as evidence of a 
coherent whole called law that exists behind or before or above those decisions.  
What is excluded, then, are explanations of law that focus on the normative or logical 
coherence of rules, judgements, principles, and the like. Whatever value may lie in 
accounts that seek to identify the immanent logic of a legal concept or doctrine, they 
would not count as explanations that meet this standard if in so doing they conflict with 
actual judicial, legislative, or administrative behaviour.139 
Some have stressed that evolutionary accounts of law, as avowedly scientific accounts, 
should be falsifiable. 140  The influence of Popper’s famous criterion for knowledge to 
count as scientific, namely that it be capable of falsification, should not be overstated.141 
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The characterization of good science in terms of verifiability is just as common.142 It is 
thus debatable that this should be taken as an additional criterion or count as a sub-factor 
or variation on the criteria of naturalism and robustness.  
3. General	
The search for explanations of legal change, expressed in terms of observables and 
measured against empirical data, has often been conducted within the bounds of single 
episodes or single legal contexts.143  Some scholars have noticed what seems like an 
evolutionary process in one context, and limited their ambition to testing that intuition. 
Often, however, even studies that are silent on the nature of legal change per se embody 
a tacit attitude that whatever episode is to be explained is only a particular example of a 
more general type of process. This is to be expected. The power of the Darwinian 
synthesis lies not just in its capacity to explain the genealogy of any particular species, 
but in its explanation for the peculiarities of the entire diversity of life. In explanatory 
terms, Darwin works as a kind of universal solvent. It is thus reasonable to expect that 
legal scholars might be tempted to also take evolution as a model for all legal change, not 
just a single episode.144  
The broader goal, therefore, beyond generating individual accounts that meet these 
standards, has been to fit those cases into a broader ‘theory’ of legal evolution.145 Often, 
such ‘generalizations … [are] more than mere descriptions or recountings of what has 
happened.’146 For some at least, the goal is a ‘general view of the nature of legal change 
which is independent of time and place,’ something that squares with processes 
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undergone in ‘mature systems, underdeveloped systems, and in legal systems … that 
come into powerful contact.’147  
Even where authors are after less elusive quarry, they still tend to limit the evolutionary 
hallmark by dint of how well an account explains both the present diversity of legal 
systems and the myriad transformations that each undergoes over time.  
4. Nomothetic		
These first three criteria—naturalism, empirical robustness, and generality—might be 
satisfied by an exhaustive list of the factors that have mattered in shaping law and its 
development through time.148 An evolutionary account of legal change is expected to 
have an internal structure that beyond identifying relevant causal factors also addresses 
how they interact to produce change. Indeed, most uses of ‘explanation’ in the social 
science would demand this degree of structure. Elliot suggests that evolutionary models 
are a useful starting point for identifying high-level patterns of legal change: ‘writers in 
the evolutionary legal tradition…aspire to describe global patterns of change in the 
law.’149  
The goal of these arguments is to identify law-like rules—to prevent confusion, we may 
refer to them as nomothetic claims—about processes of legal change.  
5. Mechanistic		
Some may gather these four criteria together under the rubric of social scientific 
‘positivism,’150 an epistemological stance which casts a wide net in the social sciences.151 
It is thus primarily in the next three criteria that the evolutionary vision is distinguishable 
from other modes of jurisprudence.  
The first of these three criteria is a concern with ‘mechanisms.’ An evolutionary 
perspective addresses the detailed inner working of change processes. 152  Here, a 
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comparison with Newtonian physics and modern medical research will be instructive. 
Newton’s theory of gravity posited the existence of a mathematical relationship that 
governs the forces which masses exercise on each other, a claim with impressive 
predictive power. His account was nomothetic, whence the very apt name ‘law of gravity.’ 
Yet neither the law nor Newton have anything to say about why masses attract one 
another. He did not know, and we are still trying to make sense of the ‘mechanism’ at play 
behind his theory. In modern medicine, we are often more concerned with whether a 
drug works than with how. The epidemiological paradigm that dominates the field is 
dedicated precisely to capturing effects that can be identified.153 A smaller portion of the 
field, though, is concerned with studying why drugs or treatments have the effects they 
do on the body: the mechanisms by which those drugs work. Of course, an account of 
mechanisms can help to generate hypotheses and enrich our understanding of the 
relationship between cause and effect in the body’s functioning. Nonetheless, the point is 
that the projects are distinct.  
I have carefully used the term ‘mechanistic,’ indicating a relation to mechanisms, rather 
than ‘mechanical.’ The latter term has connotations of determinism, universality, and 
mathematical order that are specifically and explicitly excluded from what many people 
mean by evolution. Indeed, many understand evolutionary processes by definition as 
contrasts to mechanical processes in this latter sense.154 Hayek’s rejection of what he 
called ‘nomothetic’ explanations of social outcomes was anti-mechanical in this sense. He 
was sceptical above all about our capacity to set out clear mathematical relations 
between variables.155 In searching for mechanisms of change, most modern references to 
evolution have the same exclusion in mind. They are looking for something like an 
account of how gravity works, not for a mathematical formula that describes how bodies 
under its power will develop through time.  
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Perhaps primarily due to evolution’s earlier connotations of some prefigured design 
being realized, the concept has long been contrasted with ‘revolution.’ Where the latter is 
violent, radical, sudden, and upsets the existing order of things, the former is organic, 
gradual, and orderly.156 Today, it is easy to find examples of legal analysis that, while only 
minimally cognizant of the distinction between the two concepts, nonetheless supports 
evolutionary change over ‘revolutionary’ legal change characterized by rupture or 
crisis.157 
As Williams has stressed, however, the distinction between ‘evolution’ and ‘revolution’ 
fits poorly with modern understandings of change in the domain of life. Species go extinct, 
sometimes through competition with others, but also as a result of larger climactic 
changes that drive mass extinction.158 The end of the dinosaurs and the rise of mammals 
was a revolution in the animal kingdom but still a process wholly mediated by evolution. 
Moreover, there is more controversy than there once was in biological circles about how 
slow evolution actually is. Debates between strict Darwinians like Richard Dawkins, and 
advocates of punctuated equilibrium, most notably Stephen Jay Gould, have upset past 
associations of evolution with smooth, gradual processes.159  
Despite this ongoing debate, some legal scholars continue to interpret evolution as 
defined by slowness, continuity, and gradation, rather than speed, intermittence, or 
abruptness.160 If evolution need not be gradual in the sense of being slow or smooth, there 
is one way in which the biological reference point accords with a bias in favour of small 
or slow changes over large or fast ones. One of Darwin’s central principles, after all, is 
‘Nature does not make jumps.’161 The possibility of ‘revolution’ in the transformation of 
ecologies may suggest that great, fast leaps are possible: we travelled the great distance 
from a world with the dodo bird to one without it in a very short time. Nonetheless, 
evolution accords with our sense that it would take a very long time and many 
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intermediate steps to travel that distance in the opposite direction. 162  Accordingly, 
beyond expressions in terms of speed or rhythm, evolutionary processes are taken to be 
iterative, incremental, or cumulative.163 This association manifests in a number of ways. 
There is, first of all, a generalized perception of path dependence, that history matters. 
What is possible tomorrow is conditioned by current states of affairs as well as by the 
whole series of events that preceded today’s forms. Grass cannot sprout hair, even if 
doing so would increase its environmental fitness.164 Likewise, some feel that speaking of 
legal evolution makes sense only inasmuch as current forms work as attractors and new 
forms do not depart from them too drastically.165 There is, finally, a related sense that 
what is brought into being all at once or from a single source cannot be characterized as 
evolutionary, a sentiment that draws us into our next criterion.  
7. Emergent		
Though it is widely debated by theorists, one of the central operative premises of 
practicing lawyers is that law is created by actors who have been granted law-making 
powers by an ultimate law-making authority. The central doctrine of statutory 
interpretation, across its variants, is to read legal texts first and foremost so as to accord 
with the intentions of the legislator. Similar premises are influential, though more 
controversial, in constitutional interpretation.166 Interpretive reliance on the intention of 
the legislator, however, logically presupposes that the content of the law is informed by 
some plan, design or pattern, behind which can be discerned a legislator imaginable as 
some kind of unified, or at least joint, author who had that design ‘in mind’ when the law 
came into being. The conceit is not just that a rule or regime has a logic of action, but that 
this logic reflects a prior, coherent reasoning process about how to achieve ends through 
means.  
One of the hallmarks of evolutionary thinking about legal change is its rejection of, or 
even hostility toward, this line of reasoning about law’s genesis. As far back as 1919 the 
evolutionary ambition was derided for its incompatibility with a cornerstone of legal 
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positivism, namely that law is authored by human agents.167 As Gager put it, ‘law as law 
has no “tendency” whatever, any more than a quantity of bricks has a tendency to become 
a house. Strictly it never changes, but it is changed from without; it does not develop, but 
it is developed.’168  
Gager’s position entails a subtle but crucial fallacy. It may be that the actions of the 
legislature provide the index of law’s validity, but that does not necessarily make the 
content or structure of law the product of any legislator’s intention. It is possible for 
human actions to produce phenomena that do not implement any one agent’s plan; they 
may give rise to patterns that are not deliberately designed, or even consciously put in 
place.  
The twentieth century’s eminent theorist of this ‘middle realm’ between the natural and 
the artificial was Friedrich Hayek.169 A central theme of Hayek’s work was that many 
social phenomena, though they may seem the products of deliberate action or a 
preexisting plan, are in fact emergent, or in Hayek’s preferred terminology, ‘spontaneous.’ 
Hayek is associated with his dictum that there is much in social life that is ‘the result of 
human action, but not of human design.’170 Social facts could, as per the original sense of 
‘fact,’ be artefacts made through the actions of persons without having to be the products 
of artifice. Hayek was hardly the original author of this idea. He explicitly recognized his 
intellectual debts to the Scottish Enlightenment.171 Nevertheless, he has since become its 
most noted champion.  
There is some controversy about whether the effort to explain the existence and origin of 
apparently complex, highly patterned, relatively functional entities as something other 
than the product of a reasoning mind or an active will was first applied to social life or to 
the natural world. Certainly, Darwin’s explanation for the complexity and relative 
functionality of organisms as the outcome of anonymous, unguided processes was 
                                                        
167 Edwin Gager, ‘Review of Formative	 Influences	of	Legal	Development, Evolution of Law Series, Vol 3. 
Compiled by Albert Kocourek and John H Wigmore. Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1918.’ (1919) 28 Yale LJ 
617. 
168 ibid 617–18. 
169 See especially ‘The Results of Human Action but not of Human Design,’ Hayek (n 112) ch 6. On Hayek’s 
work as an effort to carve out a ‘middle realm’ between the natural and the artificial, see Edna Ullmann-
Margalit, ‘Invisible-Hand Explanations’ (1978) 39 Synthese 263, 263. 
170 See especially ‘The Results of Human Action but not of Human Design,’ Hayek (n 112) ch 6.  
171 In particular, Hayek borrowed ‘human action but not human design’ from one of Adam Smith’s Scottish 
contemporary, Adam Ferguson. ibid 96, n 1.  
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preceded in strict temporal terms by the application of this idea to social phenomena by 
eighteenth-century Scottish philosophy. Hayek took emergent complexity to be the more 
general concept, and understood Darwin’s theory to be no more than a borrowing of that 
concept from the Scots. While Hayek may have been wrong about Darwin’s actual 
inspirations, Darwin admittedly may not have invented the idea of emergent complexity 
in the natural world.172  
The question of origins and precedence takes me into questions of the history of science 
that are best left to other scholars. What I do want to draw out and connect to modern 
invocations of evolution, however, is the affinity between the concept of evolution, and 
this broader concept of emergent complexity. At least in popular understandings, the 
strongest association that is typically made with the Darwinian doctrine of evolution is 
its contrast with the principle of design. Evolutionary doctrine understands that no 
matter how well-suited an organism or species is to its environment, its form is 
nonetheless the outcome of a series of episodes where random variation supported the 
survival of one strain over another, rather than the product of a purposive intelligence. 
The emphasis here is not just on a specific feature being the aggregate of a series of small 
changes, but on observable changes being the result of structured interactions between 
a variety of factors—never the intervention of a single actor.  
While being careful not to ascribe their position to Hayek’s influence, we can say that 
jurists who speak of legal evolution have in mind some form of ‘invisible-hand 
explanation,’ a concept coined after Hayek by the political philosopher Robert Nozick.173 
(Though its origins in Adam Smith’s notorious image for the market provide some insight 
into its intended meaning, the term is maladroit on its face, given its evocation of a hidden 
agent behind seemingly contingent outcomes.174 But given its currency, it will have to do.) 
We might differentiate between strong- and weak-type of invisible-hand arguments, and 
equivalently between strong- and weak-type invisible-hand processes, a distinction 
which maps onto palpable differences of opinion about how the concept might apply to 
the origins and transformation of law. In the strong type, the phenomena of interest 
                                                        
172 Beck (n 112) 50. 
173 Robert Nozick, Anarchy,	State,	and	Utopia (Basic Books 1974) 18–22; see also Ullmann-Margalit (n 169). 
Though Nozick can take credit for the term, he is clear that his thinking about the concept is largely due to 
Hayek: Nozick 20, n 13. 
174 The deficiencies of the term are emphasized by its similarity to ‘hidden hand’ explanations, which Nozick 
used to indicate its inverse. Nozick (n 173) 19. 
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would not only have to be a bottom up aggregation of component actions, but of 
component actions that are simple, narrow, or naïve. The component actions must not, in 
other words, be informed by a motivation or intention concerning higher-level, emergent 
structures or patterns. Darwin’s theory of natural selection therefore counts as a strong-
type argument since organism behaviour is driven by immediate reproduction, or by 
even simpler drives, rather than by any specific intention related to the evolutionary 
process itself or its transformative outputs. As applied to social phenomena, the 
archetype of this strong-type argument can be found in models of the emergence of prices 
in a competitive market: by construction, individual actors in such a market are uniquely 
motivated by the maximization of utility or profits, not by any intention to shape prices. 
Prices nonetheless arise through the interaction of that maximizing behaviour with an 
exogenous supply of basic resources and production technologies. Prices are not the 
result of anyone’s desire for relative prices to have a certain structure, or even of any 
intention for prices to exist at all.  
The weak type of invisible-hand explanations are only possible in processes that involve 
strategic or intentional actors. Whereas with strong-type explanations, the component 
motivations or actions are uninformed by the aggregate or emergent outcome, the 
component actions of weak-type invisible-hand processes may include some awareness 
of, or reference to, an aggregate result or higher-level outcome. Weak-type explanations 
provide a possible corrective to Gager’s position.175 In modern legislative processes, legal 
regimes are often built in response to actors who advance extensive, sometimes complex 
visions for its content. Yet, there are a number of ways in which the results can still be 
understood to arise from an invisible hand-like process. For one, law seldom reflects the 
vision of a single actor. Rather, a legislative scheme or reform will often reflect a process 
of compromise and accommodation involving many players. Beyond offering a quid pro 
quo where costs and benefits reflect the balance of power and prevailing standards of 
fairness, the result will often merge and mingle visions of what the law should be in ways 
that are not always rational or coherent. Second, a legislative text once promulgated 
serves only as the seed of that law as it will be administered and enforced in practice by 
the courts and other legal actors. So even if the law on the books was the product of a 
clear, coherent, and comprehensive design by legislators, the law in action might not 
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correspond to the intentions, motivations, or plans of any single actor. Third, law is never 
drafted anew from whole cloth. In the legislative process, drafters must balance a reliance 
on preexisting norms and categories with semantic novelty. A legislative text that is rife 
with new concepts will ultimately hand the courts a great deal of discretion over the 
scope and operation of the law, while one that leans too heavily on preexisting legal 
concepts risks being distorted and bound up with the jurisprudence in which those 
concepts are entangled. In any event, most law ends up being a hybrid (if not a 
Frankenstein’s monster!) with neither its largest parts nor its smallest details 
corresponding to what anyone in particular wanted it to be, nor a fortiori how anyone 
would have otherwise designed or planned it. 176  
IV. What	Significance	for	Evolutionary	Theory	in	Legal	Evolution?	
The end of Part III offered a list of criteria necessary for any account of legal change to 
count as evolutionary, in the contemporary sense. Especially for those scholars who make 
only vague reference to evolution in their work, these criteria would likely seem to be a 
sufficient, if pedantic, account of what they have in mind when they label their accounts 
of law as ‘evolutionary.’177 When I stated in the introduction that my definition would be 
wholly stipulative, I could have simply stopped there.  
In line with the neo-Darwinian inspiration behind the criteria explored above, a rich vein 
of scholarship has been motivated by a belief that accounts of legal change must draw 
from the broader field of evolutionary theory either to count as evolutionary, or to be 
successful in their evolutionary ambitions.178 It will be useful in the following chapters to 
give a clearer sense both of the body of knowledge from which these scholars are 
drawing, and the way in which they seek to apply those insights.  
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It is common to describe the resulting accounts which draw from evolutionary theory as 
the product of a metaphor of or analogy with biological evolution. 179  Doing so risks 
mischaracterizing what these scholars are doing with evolutionary theory when they 
work to craft 'evolutionary accounts of law.' First, it could give the mistaken impression 
that these scholars are engaged in something like a one-to-one mapping between law and 
the elements of the modern synthesis.180 Creating a fruitful account of legal evolution 
need not depend on finding a direct correspondence in the legal realm for genes, 
organisms and species, species’ interactions with their environments and with each 
other, genetic mutation and reproductive success, etc. As I elaborate below, most scholars 
understand that the evolutionary principle needs to be applied at a higher level of 
abstraction.  
Second, the language of metaphor is an awkward fit for some accounts that have brought 
legal thought into contact with evolutionary theory. Notably, the majority of such 
literature has sought to illuminate legal questions by drawing on claims about human 
behavioural and psychological traits, rooted in accounts of humanity’s shared genetic—
and thus ‘evolutionary’—heritage. Whatever light these accounts may shed on law’s 
current form, 181  they have little to nothing to say about legal change itself. 182  Such 
approaches nonetheless provide a point of comparison. The calling approaches that 
explain law as an expression of human evolutionary biology ‘direct,’ others are 
encouraged to describe more sociological approaches as ‘metaphorical.’ The distinction 
between the two modes of application, however, is not as sharp as the 
direct/metaphorical dichotomy would imply. A non-negligible portion of scholarship on 
legal evolution fails to clearly draw a line between the modes and registers of application. 
                                                        
179  Zamboni expressly distinguishes a tradition of ‘evolutionary theory and law’ on this basis. Mauro 
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180 For ‘modern synthesis’ see above, n 25. 
181 There are good reasons to remain sceptical of the evidence in this body of work. Brian Leiter and Michael 
Weisberg, ‘Why Evolutionary Biology Is (So Far) Irrelevant to Legal Regulation’ (2010) 29 Law and 
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659, 670–73; Deakin, ‘Evolution for Our Time’ (n 3) 1–3.	
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For example, is an account that frames law’s development as a result of spontaneous 
cultural innovation and the differential survival rates of human groups a direct 
application of evolutionary theory or a metaphorical one?183  
The systems theorist Niklas Luhmann has offered an alternative framing for the 
relationship between legal theorizing and evolutionary theory. References to 
evolutionary theory, he argues, ‘should not be taken as an argument by analogy but as a 
pointer to a general evolutionary theory, which can have many different applications.’184 
Luhmann argues that the relationship between accounts in evolutionary biology and 
accounts of legal evolution should be understood as a matter of a single abstract schema 
or algorithm being applied to two different domains, or simply to different combinations 
of elements.185 
At first glance this seems to be a distinction without a difference. What difference is there 
between drawing by analogy from evolutionary biology, or drawing on an abstract theory 
that was constructed on the basis of evolutionary biology? Metaphor always involves a 
combination of abstraction and translation. An analogy between two settings does not 
preclude the existence of elements shared across the two domains. It is possible to draw 
analogies between chess and checkers, even though they are different games played on 
the same board. Nonetheless, the distinction does make a difference, inasmuch as the 
language of analogy risks concealing the selective borrowing, and implication in more 
fundamental theoretical controversies that legal scholars are engaged in. Let me 
elaborate.  
B. Natural	 Selection,	 the	 Darwinian	 Algorithm,	 and	 Selective,	
Controversial	Borrowing	
One way in which the register of ‘application’ may make more sense than ‘analogy’ is that 
legal scholars who invoke evolutionary theory draw electively from that body of 
knowledge, rather than trying to draw a parallel between every element of the two 
domains. This is perfectly illustrated by Luhmann’s posture, which reduces the concept 
                                                        
183 Such group selection was the basic structure of Hayek’s account of the evolutionary origins of the market 
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of evolution to Darwin’s theory, and Darwin’s theory to a single schema. Whether 
scholars describe what they are doing as an ‘analogy’ to or an ‘application’ of evolutionary 
theory, almost all of them, Luhmann included, follow Campbell in identifying natural 
selection with the Darwinian algorithm, and in treating that conception of natural 
selection as a proxy for the whole of evolutionary theory.186 Despite variant terminology, 
the common idea is that what makes an account ‘evolutionary’ is its articulation in terms 
of the combined operation of mechanisms of variation, selection, and descent.187 The 
resulting challenge, and chief source of disagreement, accordingly lies in properly 
identifying the nature of descent, the sources of variation, and the mechanisms of 
selection.188  
Let me stipulate that there is nothing intrinsically wrong-headed with such partial, 
granular borrowing, provided we remain clear about what advocates of an evolutionary 
jurisprudence are actually doing. Yet it is important to keep in mind that it is an 
incomplete and biased mapping, not only in reducing natural selection to a three-element 
schema, but in focusing on natural selection alone.189 Natural selection captures only a 
portion of the processes involved in the evolution of species. The ‘Darwinian algorithm’ 
is somewhat of a misnomer, since Darwin himself identified sexual selection as a distinct 
channel shaping the evolution of species.190 Since the birth of the modern synthesis, 
moreover, an expanding repertoire of factors has been recognized as having a role in 
shaping the evolution of species.191 Genetic drift can lead to an increase in the frequency 
of a given trait in a population, even though those traits have no interaction with the 
reproductive success of the individuals which possess it. 'Hitch-hiker' traits can persist 
despite having no impact on an organism’s overall reproductive success.192 There may 
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be, in some species at least, occasional horizontal transmission of genetic material that 
radically contradicts the image of 'modification with descent.’193  
In sum, the processes studied by evolutionary biology are more complicated and much 
weirder than the operation of adaptation via natural selection alone. Of course, 
evolutionary theory cannot be reduced to theory about evolutionary biology. At least 
some works in legal evolution, for example, are framed as contributions to a more general 
body of evolutionary knowledge that can shed light on evolution in other domains, even 
biology.194 Nonetheless, the diversity of dynamics that do mark biotic evolution shows 
that most legal scholarship is only attending to a portion of a broad field of concepts, ideas 
and precedents. The application of the evolution metaphor, model, or schema is thus 
entangled with choices about what parts of evolutionary theory should be borrowed 
from.  
The other misunderstanding that might be propagated by the characterization of theory 
development in evolutionary jurisprudence as a matter of ‘analogy’ with evolutionary 
theory is an overestimation of the objectivity and concreteness of the comparator. 
Controversies concerning how to apply evolutionary theory to processes of legal 
transformation are attributable not only to questions of how to interpret evolutionary 
concepts in the legal domain, but are tied as well to persistent, serious controversies 
within evolutionary theory itself.195 Legal scholars are particularly fond of the ideas of 
Stephen Jay Gould, for instance, yet Gould is generally treated as a marginal or at best 
controversial figure by highly respected historians and philosophers of evolutionary 
thought.196  
C. A	Note	on	Adaptation		
There are some who would argue that no theory can be properly called an evolutionary 
theory unless it can be expressed in terms of entities adapting	to their environment. It is 
certainly true that adaptation plays a key role in Darwinian evolutionary theory. 
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Nonetheless, there are two reasons why adaptation cannot be included in a list of criteria 
aspiring to be minimalist and non-controversial. The first is that modern evolutionary 
theory has identified other factors which play a role in the transformation of species as 
they interact with their environments. Because of pleiotropy and polygeny, some evolved 
traits express a successful gene but do not themselves confer any advantage. Instead, like 
hitch-hikers, they tag along with some advantageous trait coded for by the same genes.197 
Through genetic drift, a trait can come to dominate a population, or it can disappear 
completely, entirely through chance rather than as the result of selective pressure.198 
Because of differences between the pace of evolution and the pace of species migration 
and environmental change, traits can be holdovers from past adaptations rather than 
offering any evident current advantage.199  
The broader point here is that the language of adaptation can engender serious confusion 
about the relations among current form, transformation process, and environmental 
constraints. ‘Survival of the fittest,’ together with the sense of adaptation it embodies, 
invokes a situation like water taking the shape of whatever cup it is poured into. Species 
by contrast do not ‘fit’ perfectly into their ecological niche. Environmental pressures are 
not so exacting. Rather, the responses of species to environmental change are shaped by 
niche, constrained by history, dependent on context, and inflected with serendipity. 
Spencer’s coinage, as a metonym for Darwin’s theory, thus did a sizeable disservice to 
public understandings of that theory and its implications.200 Adaptation, if limited to 
notions of making do, getting through, muddling along, or persevering under new 
circumstances, might not contradict the relation between process and product that 
scholars have in mind when they talk about law’s evolution. But the term, ‘survival of the 
fittest,’ is nonetheless an acute source of potential error. 
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I end this chapter with a note of caution. The 150-year history of the concept of evolution 
above sharpens our view of the shades of meaning expressed under the idiom of legal 
evolution. In particular, it allows us to distinguish between modes of argument that we 
might otherwise lump together, thereby avoiding a potential source of analytical 
confusion. Cleaving to this distinction, however, pulls us toward a different hazard, of 
overestimating the degree to which actual uses respect the distinct boundaries I have 
drawn on the map of the concept's semantic territory. The emphasis I placed in Part III 
on the utility of a modern, scientific, neo-Darwinian concept of evolution for theorizing 
socio-legal change risks leaving the reader with the impression that the older concept of 
evolution has since lost its relevance in legal circles.201 
Though many treat evolution as a unitary concept, there are precedents in scholarship on 
legal change, and on cultural change more broadly, which carefully distinguish between 
two the concepts. Marion Blute differentiates between evolutionism and 
developmentalism. Gunther Teubner, in defending his own theories of legal 
transformation, emphasizes a distinction between natural selection-based evolutionary 
approaches and an evolutionism that carries ‘connotations of unilinearity, necessity, 
directedness and progress.’ Zamboni makes a similar distinction between evolutionary 
and evolutionist. 202 There are differences between the binary schemes these authors 
have used, and not all of them track the distinctions mapped above. Campbell, one of the 
key contributors to a tradition that studies cultural evolution as an autonomous 
process,203 distinguished his influential approach to socio-cultural evolution, rooted in 
the Darwinian algorithm, from a class of approaches that sought to trace the possibly 
diverse ‘normal’ pathways of development, not just with unitary progress of societies per 
se.204  
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Despite these examples, there continues to a conspicuous tendency in modern usages to 
merge attention to mechanism and emergence with an assumption of progressive 
development. In some cases, this mingling of the two seems to reflect a fusion of the two 
concepts.205 As Ruse pointed out, vernacular understandings of even biological evolution 
continue to be rife with a sense that evolution is a teleological, salutary process.206 In fact, 
in the view of some who have used evolution imprecisely, this connotation of progress is 
the sine qua non of the term's pertinence. The clearest example here is a broad tradition 
of legal explanation rooted in neoclassical economics, the 'Coasean' approach explored in 
Chapters 2 and 3. The work I bring together in those chapters is universally informed by 
the criteria that mark off what I call the ‘scientific’ sense of legal evolution. Yet the vast 
majority of those scholars assume that theories of legal change worked out in accordance 
with those criteria can be qualified as evolutionary only if they seek to explain or describe 
the generation of a beneficial, in their case efficiency-promoting, outcome.207 
These associations are stronger and more consequential in Hayek's social theory. To say 
an institution or cultural practice is ‘evolved,’ in Hayek's parlance, is to do more than 
indicate that its benefits and functions are the result of an invisible-hand process. It also 
implies that a surfeit of deliberate intervention in those institutions threatens to destroy 
what makes them valuable. In Hayek's view, evolution is not just a categorically salutary 
process. It is also, in some domains, the exclusive salutary process. Given these claims, 
some have accused Hayek and his intellectual heirs of falling into the naturalistic fallacy, 
ascribing value to outcomes on the basis of whether or not they occurred ‘naturally.’ The 
accusations that Hayek traffics in the fallacy may not hit their mark. Hayek’s point is that 
the virtues of many social institutions are causally attributable to the kind of process that 
generated them, not that they are virtuous because of how they came about, or that such 
processes always create virtuous outcomes. 208  Nonetheless, lodged within Hayek’s 
understanding of evolution is a continuation of Spencer’s conviction that progress, or at 
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least resilience, is born from of a natural process that is discernible through reason, but 
whose unfolding is necessarily untrammelled by an excess of reason or purpose.  
To close this discussion, let me offer some ruminations on the related concepts of 
function, fitness, and progress by drawing from the philosopher of evolution Daniel 
Dennett. Dennett uses the example of sleep to show how easily we are misled about what 
matters in evolutionary processes when we draw on the important and meaningful in our 
own experience.209 Wakefulness and consciousness seem completely normal to us, as 
well as eminently useful. Our waking time is when we achieve everything that matters to 
us and is the part of our day when we pursue the activities that seem most central to 
evolutionary success, namely eating and sex. Sleep serves no obvious biological function, 
thus making it a puzzle from an evolutionary standpoint. Dennett argues, though, that it 
is not sleep which requires an explanation, but rather wakefulness and consciousness. 
Being awake, mobile, and conscious are energy-intensive activities, and many organisms 
engage in them sparingly. Think of hibernation. More pointedly, think of trees. Given how 
little time it takes to feed ourselves or to have reproductive sex, the question is why we 
spend so much energy ‘having adventures and completing projects.’210 The amount we 
sleep might be explicable as an optimum balance between the reproductive benefits of 
wakefulness and the energy savings of sleep. Dennett was not interested however in the 
conundrum of why we sleep but in our cognitive delusion that sleep per se requires 
explanation. 
VI. Conclusion	
Natural selection may not always choose the fittest forms, but it does cut off very 
maladaptive forms and, when scarcity makes competition ruthless, selects from between 
similar forms those that do a better job of reproducing. How easy it is for us, whether 
through the polysemy of ‘fitness’ or otherwise, to slip, like Spencer, from natural 
selection’s bias for forms that are better at surviving to the idea that it chooses better 
forms. As Dennett’s sleep example shows us, moreover, how easy it is to think that natural 
selection will choose the forms that accord with our preferences or, better yet, with what 
we take to be good for us.  
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The point extends beyond our biological inheritance, however, to the evolution of cultural 















By placing the canonical contributions to an economic approach to legal evolution in 
contact with two classic arguments concerning the perversity of law-making processes, 
this chapter reconstructs a generalized, Coasean approach to legal evolution rooted in the 
interplay of economic interests, legal rules, and behaviour. In the last chapter, I developed 
some criteria that can be used to distinguish and evaluate accounts of legal evolution, and 
offered warnings against common analytical pitfalls that bedevil the development of such 
accounts. This chapter provides a case study in the ways this ambition has been pursued, 
while showcasing the continuing persistence of a belief in the capacity of ‘unguided’ 
forces to produce socially beneficial outcomes.  
Through the 1970s and 1980s, law-and-economics scholars developed a string of 
arguments applying economics tools to validate Richard Posner’s notorious claim 
concerning the efficiency of judge-made law. Their accounts were not only evolutionary 
in ambition, but were generally described as evolutionary because they were thought to 
describe decentralized means for achieving salutary outcomes.  
                                                        
1 Vilfredo Pareto, Manuale	di	economia	politica, 444-45, as translated in Arthur Cecil Pigou, The	Economics	
of	Welfare (Transaction, Transaction Publishers 2009) 128.  
2 Paul H Rubin, ‘Common Law and Statute Law’ (1982) 11 J Legal Stud 205, 213. 
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Those arguments suffered from fundamental structural flaws that have never been 
satisfyingly articulated.3 Part II of this chapter exposes the nature of those flaws through 
a sequence of comparisons with other well-known accounts of legal change. First, the 
Posnerian accounts are contrasted with George Stigler’s famous argument that rent-
seeking is the most important force in democratic law-making, an argument which 
Posner himself had adopted in contrasting judicial and legislative law-making. The 
exegesis of Stigler’s argument brings two important points to the surface. First, where the 
Posnerians had drawn from the work of Ronald Coase to suggest that efficient laws will 
go unchallenged, Stigler emphasized that, under Coase’s analytic frame, economic actors 
will actually have an incentive to move the law away from efficiency if the resulting 
allocation of rights would benefit them in absolute terms. Where the Posnerians had built 
their model around a two-person economy, Stigler drew on the work of Mancur Olson to 
think through how law-making was different when it involved broad classes of economic 
actors with an interest in legal rules.  
On closer inspection, Stigler’s pessimism about how the legislative process shapes legal 
outcomes extends only to contexts where very diffuse interests confront very 
concentrated ones, as is the case where common consumer goods like gasoline are 
provided through a small number of firms. One by-product of the argument that led to 
those conclusions, however, was a general framework for thinking about the interaction 
between groups with countervailing interests in the content of the law, their relative 
capacity to organize in service of their interests, and the law actually generated through 
the actions of individual members.  
On the face of it, Stigler’s general framework applies only to the legislative context, where 
collective action in pursuit of joint interests finds familiar expression through partisan 
coalitions and public lobbying. It is not immediately clear that it applies to the 
adjudicative context that had been of interest to the Posnerians. A second comparison, 
between Stigler’s argument and Marc’s Galanter’s classic analysis of anti-social trends in 
judicial law-making, shows that the differences between the contexts are much smaller 
than they first appear. Indeed, it turns out to be quite easy to translate Galanter’s 
                                                        
3 Paul Rubin, one of the authors of the original studies, did as indicated in the epigraph above eventually 
come to conclusions similar to those developed in this chapter. But he did not make clear where the earlier 
theories had gone wrong. Rubin, ‘Common Law and Statute Law’ (n 2); Martin J Bailey and Paul H Rubin, ‘A 
Positive Theory of Legal Change’ (1994) 14 Int’l Rev L & Econ 467. 
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argument into the conceptual repertoire Stigler deployed, in no small part because they 
drew on similar conceptual precursors. What the confrontations between the two 
arguments reveals is a general premise, and a general framework. Law-making in any 
context is best understood as a confrontation between groups whose primary interest 
will lie in procuring an allocation of use-rights that advantages them, not necessarily laws 
whose efficiency generates some aggregate benefit for the public. The actual direction of 
legal change will be determined by the collective action problems faced by each group, by 
the ways in which institutions (including law-making institutions) facilitate or impede 
collective action, and by how those institutions aggregate the actions undertaken by each 
group.  
Parts III and IV review the literature that has since drawn on economic reasoning to 
predict and model the direction of legal change through either legislative or adjudicative 
channels. Published scholarship continues to purport to show the efficiency of judge-
made law, the primacy of rent-seeking in legislation, or vice versa. In Part III, I argue that 
the diversity of conclusions in this literature actually vindicates the conclusions implicit 
in the conclusions of Part II: it is not the high-level mode of law-making (judge-made 
versus legislative) that determines whether a change in a doctrine or body of law will 
tend toward efficiency, some narrow interest, or otherwise. Rather, we can conclude from 
the tight correlation between the conclusions of these arguments and the specifications 
of the underlying models that real outcomes are dependent on small details as well. The 
macro-direction of legal change is contingent on micro-features of available legal 
processes and the nature of the rights at issue. Anyone drawing strong conclusions about 
the efficiency of judicial or legislative law-making in general is failing to account for these 
important structural factors. 
Part IV reflects on key issues identified in literature on the economic drivers of legal 
change, which were not directly addressed in any of the key texts given close reading in 
this chapter. Galanter, Stigler, and the Posnerians all set out to analyse how incentives 
and institutions would shape a single legal change, and they drew their conclusions about 
general trends from there. Subsequent literature has made clear that trends are not 
deducible from repeated applications of the reasoning about the one-off case. Rather, this 
literature suggests that, even with relatively uncomplicated accounts of institutional 
constraint and party interests, the long-term behaviour of a legal rule can be cyclical, can 
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depend strongly on initial conditions, or can even exhibit chaotic, unpredictable 
dynamics.  
A key subtext of the discussion in Part II is that the Posnerians had consistently 
misconstrued Coase’s analytic framework, essentially drawing on Coase’s conclusions 
without understanding the limited contexts to which they can be applied. Engagements 
with the Coasean framework for understanding the economic consequences of law are 
also interwoven into the explication of Stigler and Galanter’s argument. Thus, for the sake 
of convenience, Part I explains Coase’s framework by explicitly setting it against both the 
neoclassical market model that he built on, and Arthur Pigou’s analysis of externalities 
that Coase deployed as a foil for his own approach.  
This chapter makes a direct intervention in discussions about how economic dynamics, 
rooted in the confrontation of rival interests, will tend to shape the output of different 
law-making processes. Though they may be insufficient, accounts based on the interplay 
of economic forces are not irrelevant to understanding legal change and stasis. The 
chapter also adds to a growing chorus of criticism against continuing orthodoxies which 
believe judge-made law superior to legislation, and more broadly that common law 
systems are superior to civil law systems.  
The chapter’s contribution to the dissertation is to provide a simple model that works as 
a stand-in for a broader set of theories which understand legal change as an emergent 
outcome of interactions between actors with conflicting interests in the content of the 
law, behaviours that seek to change the law according to their preferences, and 
institutions which aggregate their behaviours in complex ways. More importantly, it is a 
strongly formalized, or at least formalized model of emergent, iterative legal change that 
offers a plausible account without having to account for the knowledge or beliefs of the 
actors. These implications are elaborated in Part V.  
I. Coase	and	the	Economic	Consequences	of	Law:	A	Restatement		
One of the keys to understanding prevailing economic approaches to legal evolution is 
Ron Coase’s foundational work concerning mutually exclusive uses of resources, the 
impact that transaction costs have on actual uses, and the attendant consequences of law 
for allocative and distributive outcomes. There are a few takeaways from the discussion 
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in this part. First, Coase offers a way to analyse the relationship between the use of 
resources and aggregate output against which the relative efficiency of laws can be 
measured. Though his approach is compatible with the approaches to law-making and 
legal change in this chapter, it is not universal. Second, it is useful to keep in mind that the 
concept of efficiency he deploys is one that measures aggregate welfare against an ideal 
of the world made up of universally commodifiable and commodified goods, allocated in 
accordance with exclusively selfish and wholly material preferences. The third point is 
that the concept of ‘social cost’ so prominent in discussion of Coase’s analysis can easily 
lead analysis astray. The cost concept is more apposite to the views of Coase’s analytical 
rival Arthur Pigou than to Coase’s own analysis. Coase’s perspective is not about ‘costs’ 
but about the social losses that arise when mutually exclusive uses of the same resources 
are held by multiple parties who cannot come to some agreement that would allocate 
those resources to the most productive use. Finally, I emphasize that Coase’s framework 
offers a framework to understand how laws can impact the scale and content of 
productive output, and to understand how law distributes income between economic 
actors. This last point will be key if his ideas are to be used correctly in analysing 
processes of legal change.  
A. The	Neoclassical	Market	Model	
I begin by contextualizing Coase's contribution against the neoclassical market model, as 
expressed through Arrow and Debreu's seminal 1954 existence proof.4 At the origins of 
the modern project of economics, especially the neoclassical tradition, is Adam Smith's 
contention that unfettered market exchange is not only intrinsically right, because it 
results wholly from voluntary actions, but is also instrumentally valuable, insofar as it 
maximizes the amount of wealth a society produces.5 Until Arrow and Debreu, however, 
this position was maintained by a combination of inconclusive evidence and professional 
faith rather than by rigorous investigation.6  
                                                        
4 Kenneth J Arrow and Gerard Debreu, ‘Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy’ (1954) 22 
Econometrica 265. 
5  ‘The laissez-faire theory of classical economics was very much concerned with demonstrating the 
optimality of the competitive market system, or, more generally, the harmony between individual and 
social interests.’ Steven G Medema, ‘Of Pangloss, Pigouvians and Pragmatism: Ronald Coase and Social Cost 
Analysis’ (1996) 18 Journal of the History of Economic Thought 96, 96.  
6 Among Anglo-American economists, the Cold War and the rise of marginalism made the task of justifying 
Smith’s account all the more urgent, since the Soviet example and a growing trend of industrial planning 
suggested that rational, top-down calculation might be the superior approach for the generation of wealth. 
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Validating Smith's proposition depended on two distinct analytical tasks. For one, Smith’s 
claim could not be tested without some adequate account of ‘the market,’ namely a 
representation of the whole economy as an aggregate of self-interested, wholly voluntary 
actions undertaken by individual producers and consumers. Such a picture was first 
formalized by Walras’ model of competitive equilibrium, depicting the market process as 
akin to a single mega-transaction in which all exchange and production occurs 
simultaneously. 7  On the other hand, sustaining Smith’s claim required a rigorous, 
putatively objective account of what it would mean to maximize welfare, given inevitable 
differences in subjective judgments about the best allocation of scarce resources. Pareto's 
conception of welfare maximization, now often called Pareto optimality or Pareto 
efficiency, offered an ingenious solution. Though Pareto-optimality is a single 
characteristic of an economy, it is a function of all bilateral combinations of individual 
subjective judgments about possible alternatives. 8  The only downside of Pareto’s 
definition is that it does not identify a unique allocation; to the contrary, there are 
infinitely many Pareto-optimal allocations of a given collection of goods.  
With those two formalizations in hand, Smith's proposition could be reduced to the claim 
that a competitive equilibrium arising from an arbitrary initial allocation of goods will be 
Pareto-optimal: this premise is now referred to as the first fundamental theorem of 
welfare economics. Arrow and Debreu made contributions to the proof of the 
fundamental theorem in the 1950s. Yet those proofs and to some degree the whole edifice 
suffered from a critical weakness, namely the possibility that a competitive equilibrium 
might not exist. That possibility threatened both the adequacy of Walrasian equilibrium 
as a model of market economies and the validity of the welfare theorem as an evaluation 
of an economy arranged according to that model. 9  This was the troubling prospect	
                                                        
7 Donald A Walker, ‘Early General Equilibrium Economics: Walras, Pareto, and Cassel’ in Warren J Samuels 
and others (eds), A	Companion	to	the	History	of	Economic	Thought (Blackwell 2003).  
8 Formally, an allocation of goods among a set of agents is Pareto‐optimal—neoclassical economists prefer 
Pareto-efficient or simply ‘efficient’—if no one could be given an alternate, preferred combination of goods 
without someone else being moved to a less preferable combination. B Lockwood, ‘Pareto Efficiency’ in The	
New	 Palgrave	 Dictionary	 of	 Economics (Palgrave Macmillan, London 2018). Pareto efficiency is a 
deceptively weak normative concept. For instance, if everyone has a positive desire for all available goods, 
then it could be satisfied by a situation in which one person holds all goods. For a particularly striking 
illustration of its normative limitations, see Michele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein, ‘Equilibrium in the 
Jungle’ (2007) 117 The Economic Journal 883.  
9 Non-existence was not a far-fetched possibility. Arrow himself had analytically demonstrated only a few 
years earlier that it was impossible to construct a voting system for a group to choose between alternative 
policies that accorded with basic intuitions about what a fair, democratic outcome would require. Kenneth 
J Arrow, ‘A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare’ (1950) 58 Journal of Political Economy 328.  
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exploded by Arrow and Debreu in 1954. Methodologically, their achievement lay in 
providing a mathematical idiom sufficiently precise to prove the existence of a 
competitive equilibrium in a model that included production, exchange, and 
consumption, but without being so restrictive in its assumptions as to completely exclude 
the possibility of that model’s real-world relevance. Substantively, however, their result 
was the keystone for a vindication of the twin values of the market system. Their result 
meant that, as an analytical starting point, neoclassical economists could eat their cake 
and have it, too. At least under certain ideal conditions and within the bounds of a specific 
formalization, the laudable goal of facilitating voluntary interactions between individuals 
could be reconciled with the social good of maximizing aggregate welfare. 
Coase's paper did not explicitly rely on Arrow and Debreu's results, nor did any of his 
conclusions follow from or depend on their formalizations. Nonetheless, his 
contributions and his influence only make sense against the background of the world 
proven to be formally possible by Arrow and Debreu: the neoclassical market model, in 
which rational individuals possess, exchange and consume divisible commodities to 
achieve selfish, material ends, in which voluntary market processes coordinate the 
production and consumption of goods, and in which the operation of the price system 
maximizes aggregate welfare. Arrow and Debreu had put the lynchpin in a model of the 
world that unified procedural justice and utilitarian welfare. Coase had no interest in 
challenging that paradigm or the ends it valorised. He instead sought to shine light on 
how economic realities undermined the achievement of those ends, and how gaps 
between the model and reality might be righted.  
B. Deficient	Commodification	and	the	Problem	of	Externalities		
There are a host of ways in which this abstracted account of market efficiency fails to map 
happily onto the actualities of possession, production, and exchange. Two gaps between 
the model and the actualities are key to understanding Coase’s intervention. First, many 
goods cannot be, or for good reasons generally will not be, arbitrarily divided and 
exclusively administered in the mode of idealized commodities.10 Breathable air is a 
                                                        
10  On the technique, action and perspective necessarily involved in the transformation of goods into 
commodities, see eg Karl Marx, Capital:	A	Critique	of	Political	Economy	Volume	1 (Ben Fowkes tr, Penguin 
1976) chs 1, section 4 ('Fetishism of the Commodity’); Wendy Nelson Espeland and Mitchell L Stevens, 
‘Commensuration as a Social Process’ (1998) 24 Annual Review of Sociology 313; cf Bruce G Carruthers 
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universal good, but it would be extremely difficult (to say nothing of the inevitable 
normative objections) to divide, distribute, and administer it as set of market-
exchangeable possessions as we do with jelly beans or jalopies.11 Second, even for goods 
that are possessed and exchanged in ways that are amenable to the market ideal, both the 
legal guarantee of control over goods and the actual capacity to control them fall short. A 
mine of examples of these shortfalls can be unearthed in the property law doctrines of 
nuisance, adversarial possession, and easement, along with those that regulate partition 
and the divisibility of mineral rights from underlying title. Together, those doctrines 
cover only a fraction of the areas in which law concerning the disposition of land seeks to 
manage the technical challenges and unavoidable injustices that hamper the realization 
of a real property regime in which the use of goods would be entirely conditioned on prior 
possession or on subsequent appropriation through negotiated, fully-compensated 
exchange. Other areas of private law treat the difficulties of doing so with other kinds of 
goods, beyond land.  
If we think from a baseline in which individuals ‘have’ all of the goods to which they enjoy 
even nominal access, then deficient commodification of this sort will necessarily give rise 
to situations in which the actions of some individuals can add to or subtract from the 
goods available to others—and critically, without the consent of those others. Private law, 
by presuming that a given actor or type of actor is the legitimate bearer of a good (and of 
dominium over its uses), has traditionally dealt with such situations as a harm or 
deprivation occasioned by another’s wrong. This tradition has generally been concerned 
with maintenance and approximate restoration of an ex ante allotment of goods, given 
that we live in a world where it is possible for actual conduct to come into conflict with 
the normative baseline of the commodity model.12 
                                                        
and Arthur L Stinchcombe, ‘The Social Structure of Liquidity: Flexibility, Markets, and States’ (1999) 28 
Theory and Society 353. 
11 On the downsides of commodifying certain goods, whether by subjecting them to market distribution, 
making them available for purchase, or allocating them by negotiation, see eg Michael J Sandel, What	Money	
Can’t	Buy:	The	Moral	Limits	of	Markets (Allen Lane 2012); Debra Satz, Why	Some	Things	Should	Not	Be	for	
Sale	the	Moral	Limits	of	Markets (Oxford University Press 2010); Guido Calabresi, The	Future	of	Law	and	
Economics:	Essays	in	Reform	and	Recollection (Yale University Press 2016). 
12 The locus	classicus is Ernest J Weinrib, The	 Idea	of	Private	Law (OUP 2014); on the corrective justice 
tradition in private law, see generally Steve Hedley, ‘Corrective Justice: An Idea Whose Time Has Gone?’ in 
Maksymilian Del Mar and Michael Lobban (eds), Law	 in	Theory	and	History:	New	Essays	on	a	Neglected	
Dialogue (Hart 2016). 
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Economists like Coase have generally been concerned instead with the effect that such 
situations have on aggregate welfare. In the presence of such infelicities of the commodity 
paradigm, the efficiency of market allocations is no longer guaranteed. Coase’s 
understanding of the relationship between law and welfare has been notoriously easy to 
misconstrue. Paradoxically, the best way to understand it may be to contrast his view 
with the older tradition of economic analysis of law, identified with Pigou13 and framed 
using the concept of externalities.14  
Pigou’s treatment of the externalities problem emerges from his production-side, top-
down version of the neoclassical market model. His analysis was, in particular, situated 
in a picture of the economy comprising i. a fixed collection of resources ii. being employed 
across an array of production units iii. each generating some collection of outputs.15 A 
highly reductive illustration would be an economy composed entirely of a mine and a 
railroad, a planner with $100 to spend between them, and a productive output dependent 
on how the money is divided between them.16  
                                                        
13 My account of Pigou’s analysis draws heavily from RH Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 JLE 1, 
28–43. Whether Coase was fair or accurate in his characterization of Pigou’s views has been a source of 
enduring controversy. See eg Nahid Aslanbeigui and Steven Medema, ‘Beyond the Dark Clouds: Pigou and 
Coase on Social Cost’ (1998) 30 History of Political Economy 601; AW Brian Simpson, ‘“Coase v. Pigou” 
Reexamined’ (1996) 25 JLS 53; Herbert J Hovenkamp, ‘The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou’ (2009) 
51 Ariz L Rev 633. Coase himself was equivocal about how well he had captured Pigou’s views, finding the 
exposition in Economics	of	Welfare too muddled to confidently say whether he had accurately captured 
Pigou’s position. Coase’s target was not just Pigou, however, but a Pigo(u)vian tradition based on received 
knowledge about what Pigou had said. See Coase, ‘Social Cost’ 39–40. Notably, contemporary articulations 
of the Pigouvian approach to externalities accord well with Coase’s account. Eg Agnar Sandmo, ‘Pigouvian 
Taxes’ in The	New	Palgrave	Dictionary	of	Economics (3rd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2018). 
14 Although it is common to discuss both Pigou’s approach and Coase’s in terms of ‘externalities,’ neither 
author used that term. While the concept is a good fit with the Pigouvian tradition, Coase deliberately 
avoided using the term in ‘Social Cost,’ because he considered the concept to be incompatible with his own 
view of the structure of the problem. RH Coase, The	Firm,	the	Market,	and	the	Law (University of Chicago 
Press 1988) 26–27. 
15 Pigou discusses the problem in terms of alternative allocations of resources among ‘uses’ or ‘places.’ 
Arthur Cecil Pigou, The	Economics	of	Welfare (Transaction edn, Routledge 2017) 131–35. The text and page 
references in this edition remain unchanged from the 4th edition (published 1932), which Coase and Stigler 
both relied on. See Nahid Aslanbeigui, ‘Introduction to the Transaction Edition’ in Arthur Cecil Pigou, The	
Economics	of	Welfare (Transaction end, Routledge 2017) xxxiv–xxxv. To avoid confusion with the meaning 
Coase ascribes to the ‘use’ of goods, I have borrowed the term ‘production unit’ from Arrow and Debreu, 
which fits well enough with Pigou’s meaning for my purposes.  
16 One simplification involved here is that the analysis ignores that the mine and railroad are themselves 
among the resources to be allocated. Pigou tried to deal with these issues by distinguishing between capital 
and other resources. For current purposes, however, we can simply treat the production units abstractly, 
as machines for turning resources into other resources. 
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Though the optimum against which externality problems was measured was the 
maximum of national income,17 the analysis focused on the amount being allocated to a 
particular productive unit.18 For the individual productive unit, the operative concept 
was the net	product, the output of both positive and negative elements, or services and 
disservices resulting from the investment of resources in a given enterprise. 19 The value 
of the net product was accordingly conceived of as a difference (hence net product), with 
the lost value from the negative elements deducted from the gain of the positive ones.20 
Roughly speaking, the national income could then be imagined as the total net product, 
summed across all production units. Maximizing welfare became a matter of allocating 
resources among the production units in the optimal way.21 If every asset had a fixed rate 
of return, then the ideal strategy would involve investing everything in one asset. Making 
the reasonable assumption that assets are subject to diminishing marginal returns, 
however, meant that the optimal strategy would involve spreading the available 
resources among the assets. And because the average productivity of each investment 
was different, an optimal allocation would involve each unit being allocated a different 
amount. Nonetheless, in the optimal allocation, each undertaking would be allocated 
precisely the amount that ensures that no greater amount could be earned by moving 
some of its allocated resources elsewhere.22  
The trouble starts because in a market society, the allocation of resources among 
production units is not made by a single actor, but results from the decentralized action 
                                                        
17 Pigou was cognizant of the differences between national income, as a dollar-denominated measurement 
of economic output, and aggregate welfare. He believed however that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the 
former would result in an improvement to the latter. Pigou (n 15) ch VII. Notably, he subscribed to a 
tradition which believed, contrary both to Pareto and to today’s neoclassical mainstream, that aggregate 
welfare could be increased simply by changing the distribution of national income. ibid ch VIII. Pigou 
primarily referred to national income as the ‘national dividend,’ 
18 Coase, ‘Social Cost’ (n 13) 40. For examples, see Pigou (n 15) 134 ,172, 183, 185–86.  
19 Pigou (n 15) 131–34, 174, 183. Pigou actually discussed marginal net products. The difference made by 
that adjective to his analysis is not relevant to my account. 
20 ibid 134–35. 
21 I note that this abstraction departs from the Arrow-Debreu framing of relative efficiency. Contrary to the 
Paretian analysis, Pigou imagines the optimum as the maximization of a unitary, cardinal variable. All 
allocations, that is, can be ordered along a single dimension. The difficulty of reconciling these two frames 
probably matters for the validity of the Pigouvian view, but I do not try to untangle it here. This issue is 
related to the controversies surrounding alternate interpretation of the Coase theory, discussed below, n 
43. 
22 If moving a small amount of resources from one unit to another could produce a higher aggregate output, 
then the allocation is by definition not the maximum. A short chain of logic shows that the maximum 
corresponds to the allocation in which the marginal return of investing in a production unit is equalized 
across all units. Pigou (n 15) 136. 
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of owners, managers and/or producers.23 Pigou fully embraced the idea that the private 
interests of producers would shift resources among production units so as to maximize 
the total net product, so long as there was full commodification, with each producer 
allotted all the positive and negative outputs from the assets over which they had 
control. 24  Critically, however, deficient commodification means that the services and 
disservices produced by an asset may not all flow to the person who decides how much 
to invest in it. Pigou thus found it useful to distinguish the ‘social net product,’ 
representing the entire output of goods resulting from the resources employed in a 
productive unit, from the ‘private net product,’ comprising only the outputs attributable 
to the actor deciding how much to employ.25  
According to Pigou, then, the externalities problem arises from something like a 
mismatch between balance sheet entries for the producer and society as a whole. In the 
absence of full commodification, an increment in resources allotted to a given enterprise 
that augments the positive side of the producer’s ledger might ‘throw’ some of the 
negatives onto third parties.26 The producer, motivated by an effort to bring the net 
private product of an investment in line with other opportunities, will push the net social 
product of the investment out of line, leaving national income lower than it could be 
otherwise.27 In a seminal example, in which sparks from passing trains cause fire damage 
to neighbouring woods, the decision of the railway company to invest in an additional 
train may be privately profitable to the train company, but ultimately decrease the value 
of the total social product.28  
C. Alternative	Uses,	Rights	 and	 the	 So‐Called	 ‘Problem	 of	 Social	
Cost’		
Coase offered a sharply different way to make economic sense of market-model 
infelicities and the welfare shortfalls they can engender. Coase’s entrée to his view was 
the ‘reciprocal nature of the problem,’ and many have made the ‘symmetry of harms’ the 
                                                        
23 Pigou spoke, variously, in terms of ‘the person who invests’ in a given production unit, ‘producers,’ and 
‘industrialists.’ ibid 135, 172, 174. 
24 ibid 142–43. 
25 ibid 134–35. 
26 The problem was contrasted with a world in which producers would have to pay for negative elements 
imposed on third parties. ibid 134, 183.  
27 ibid 172. 
28 Coase, ‘Social Cost’ (n 13) 28–32. 
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crux of his model.29 Yet the keystone of Coase’s analysis, and its determinative difference 
from the Pigouvian tradition, is his framing of the problem in terms of disjointed control 
over alternative uses of goods, not the misallocation of outputs from a particular 
productive use of those goods. 
Coase’s first departure from the Pigouvian tradition was to think of various contexts, from 
conflicts between neighbours to large-scale industrial pollution, entirely in terms of 
alternative uses of goods.30 Alternative uses are central to the neoclassical market model, 
not just in the sense that different individuals may end up consuming particular goods, 
but also inasmuch as they may end up used for consumption or as inputs in the 
production of other goods. Corn can be eaten by the farmer, used as feed for his pigs, or 
sold to make syrup. We may be predisposed to think of trampled crops, a noisy 
examination room, or a factory’s contribution to London smog as harms. Even Coase was 
willing to provisionally characterize them this way. 31 His own conceptual starting point, 
however, was to treat these situations as no more and no less than competing, 
incompatible uses of goods. A factory that dumps toxic effluents into a river ‘uses’ the 
river for one purpose. Villagers who draw from it for clean drinking water use it for 
another. When a rancher’s cattle trample a neighbouring farmer’s crops, that is one use 
of the field; the farmer eating or marketing untrampled crops is another.  
The potential source of the problem as posed by Coase lay in the partitioning of the 
powers, or ‘rights’ to pursue and benefit from those rival uses, and their distribution 
among multiple actors. The factory can discharge effluents into the river but cannot 
charge people to use it for drinking and bathing; the population downriver could drink 
                                                        
29  ibid 2; Nahid Aslanbeigui and Guy Oakes, ‘On Coaseana: Critique of a Political Economy’ [2015] 
Œconomia History, Methodology, Philosophy 271; Aslanbeigui and Medema (n 13) 603. 
30 Pollution that is produced by or affecting a large number of actors raises numerous issues that are not 
encountered when analysing or responding to ‘nuisances,’ which only implicate the interests of two parties. 
Notably, Coase’s examples each addressed a scenario with a fundamentally bilateral (Coase uses 
‘reciprocal’) structure. An increase in the number of actors whose use-rights are at stake will both affect 
the complexity of analysing the situation using Coase’s toolkit and, by exponentially increasing transaction 
costs (see below, n 41) eliminate otherwise-preferable policy options. Some scholars have nonetheless 
maintained that the structure of the analysis remains fundamentally unchanged, no matter how many 
individuals’ use-rights are at stake. There are, however, reasons to believe that these situations are 
different not only in degree but in kind. Robin Hahnel and Kristen A Sheeran, ‘Misinterpreting the Coase 
Theorem’ (2009) 43 Journal of Economic Issues 215, 229–31; Stanislaw Wellisz, ‘On External Diseconomies 
and the Government-Assisted Invisible Hand’ (1964) 31 Economica 345, 353–54. Though the critique in 
this chapter of some of the applications of Coase’s reasoning resonates with the latter position, I take his 
interpretation of the problem in terms of a multiplicity of use-rights as a useful basis for the analysis of the 
law-making context. 
31 Coase, ‘Social Cost’ (n 13) 2–10; Pigou (n 15) 184. 
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the water if it were clean but cannot stop the factory from making the water undrinkable. 
The rancher can use the neighbouring field as a buffer zone for his cattle but cannot plant 
his own crops there; the farmer can plant crops but cannot stop the rancher’s cattle from 
trampling them. 
A layperson, drawing on a common-sense conflation of property with perfected 
possession, might ascribe the problem to a legal misalignment of rights or simply to the 
commission of a wrong. The rancher’s cattle should not trample the farmer’s crops, nor a 
fortiori should the rancher have a right for the cattle to trample the crops: that would, per 
this view, be inconsistent with the very idea of property. A jurist might inquire into 
whether allowing the trampling is fair or prudent given prevailing expectations, 
industrial practice, or the history of interactions between the parties. Yet, as an economist 
concerned with efficiency qua maximizing productive output, what concerned Coase 
about this situation was the possibility that an actor might have the power to use a good 
in some way, yet lack the capacity to apply it to its highest-value use. 
George Stigler, in a text that recast part of Coase’s argument as a ‘theorem,’ 32 
characterized the resulting misalignment of incentives in terms of a divergence between 
private costs and social costs.33 I say Stigler characterized the problem in terms of private 
costs and social costs because, despite the title, ‘social cost’ appears nowhere in the body 
of Coase’s famous text. 34  Coase’s conceptual shift from harms to alternative uses 
corresponded to a sharp departure from Pigou’s understanding of costs, as well. Pigou 
portrayed costs as amounts on the negative side of a balance sheet, to be deducted from 
any positive receipts of using resources in a productive process. Coase instead had in 
mind a concept closer to opportunity cost, defined as the maximum value of forgone 
opportunities to use those resources in an alternative way. 35  The dangers of this 
ambiguous terminology aside, Stigler’s usage can be temporarily adopted for the 
purposes of understanding Coase’s views.  
                                                        
32 George J Stigler, The	Theory	of	Price (4th edn, Macmillan 1966) 120. On Stigler’s invention of the Coase 
theorem and his important role in the reception of Coase’s work, see eg Steven G Medema, ‘A Case of 
Mistaken Identity: George Stigler, “The Problem of Social Cost,” and the Coase Theorem’ (2011) 31 Eur J 
Law Econ 11. 
33 Stigler (n 32) 110–14. Oddly, Stigler attributed the concepts of social cost and private cost to Pigou! 
34 It is interesting to ask, given this fact, whether the ‘Problem of Social Cost’ in the title is a double entendre, 
intended to cast the use of ‘social cost’ as a problem with proper understanding of the policy contexts he 
was interested in, as well as offering a proper understanding of ‘the’ problem.  
35 Coase, ‘Social Cost’ (n 13) 39–40. A clear articulation of the opportunity cost concept and an explanation 
of Coase’s reasoning that stresses this dimension appears in Stigler (n 32) 104–14. 
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To illustrate this approach, let me turn again to the farmer and the rancher, in the absence 
of any liability for trampling damage. 36  The private cost to the rancher of using the 
farmer’s field as a buffer zone for his cattle is zero. From his perspective, there is no 
alternative use whose value needs to be accounted for. Yet from the perspective of 
society—that is to say, in terms of aggregate output measured in terms of market prices—
the social cost of using the field for cattle trampling is the value of the foregone 
alternative, namely whatever price the field’s output would have yielded if the crops were 
not trampled.37  
The mismatch between private and social costs is not sufficient on its own to negate the 
efficiency of the ex post allocation. As Coase emphasized, ‘The comparison of private and 
social products is neither here nor there’; what matters is whether ‘arrangements’ are 
such that the goods will be used in ways that maximize the social product.38 There may 
be many situations where the best alternative use available to an owner of a resource 
differs from the best alternative use. Where the value of the unaccounted-for alternative 
use is large enough, however, the goods risk being misallocated to an inefficient use. That 
is, if and only if the social cost was greater than the actual private gain, then the output 
would not be maximized. If the output from the untrampled crops would have been 
greater than the rancher would earn from the extra grazing room, then barring some 
additional arrangement, the allocation of resources will fail to maximize output.  
D. The	 Market	 for	 Use‐rights,	 the	 ‘Coase	 Theorem,’	 and	 the	
Distributive	and	Allocative	Consequences	of	Law	
Having established these conceptual preliminaries, I can articulate a ‘Coasean’ 
perspective regarding the consequences of legal rules for both allocative and distributive 
outcomes.  
For a long period after ‘Social Cost' was published, the primary interpretation of this 
analytic framework—the so-called ‘Coase theorem’—was that law does not matter for 
                                                        
36 In this paragraph, I have assumed that the field in question can be used exclusively either for cattle-
grazing or for crop cultivation. Coase and Stigler both develop the illustration on the basis that the field can 
be used for various combinations of the two uses, with aggregate returns depending on the particular mix 
of uses. This difference does not impact the argument, except, I would suggest, by clarifying its fundamental 
structure.  
37 Without any loss of generality, I still assume here that using the field for crops is the highest-valued 
alternative use. 
38 Coase, ‘Social Cost’ (n 13) 34. 
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allocative outcomes.39 Some have suggested, under the hypothetical conditions under 
which the Coase theorem applies, that this theorem is no more than a trivial corollary of 
Smith’s claim about the efficiency of markets.40 Not so. Coase’s understanding of the 
problems raised by deficient commodification allowed him to add a subtle nuance to the 
market model. His innovation was not simply to expand the category of exchangeable 
goods to include activities previously regarded as bads. Rather, he allowed that there 
could be a market in the rights to enjoy particular uses of goods, even though some of 
those uses would necessarily trump others in practice. The townspeople could pay the 
factory not to dump toxins in their river. The rancher could sell, and the farmer could buy, 
the former’s right to trample the latter’s field (that is, the farmer could pay the rancher 
not to let his cattle trample her field). And if the social product would be maximized by 
using the field for crops, then, so long as the rancher and farmer did not have to expend 
any resources on gathering relevant information, conducting negotiations, effecting the 
transfer, or enforcing the terms of the bargain (if there were, that is, no ‘transaction 
costs’), it would be to both of their advantages for them to do just that.41 
The remarkable upshot of Coase’s reasoning was that, from the perspective of allocative 
efficiency (the net market value of the goods produced), it would not matter how the use-
rights were initially distributed, any more than efficiency would depend, in a world of 
fully commodified goods, on how those goods were initially distributed. 42 In a world 
                                                        
39 Deirdre McCloskey, ‘The So-Called Coase Theorem’ (1998) 24 Eastern Economic Journal 367. 
40 ibid 368. 
41 Coase referred to these expenditures as ‘the costs of carrying out market transactions,’ not ‘transaction 
costs.’ Coase, ‘Social Cost’ (n 13) 15. Folk histories of economics generally treat Coase’s earlier work on the 
firm as the seminal contribution to transaction cost analysis, and the use of the concept in ‘Social Cost’	as a	
turning point in its usage. The actual story of the concept and its conceptualizations is more complicated, 
though. Matthias Klaes, ‘The History of the Concept of Transaction Costs: Neglected Aspects’ (2000) 22 
Journal of the History of Economic Thought 191. 
42 Unfortunately for Coase’s conclusion, it turns out that the existence of multiple mutually advantageous 
bargains actually decreases the chance of a successfully bargained outcome. Coase’s key premise is that 
reallocating the use-right from the less productive to the more productive user will create a surplus. Against 
the background of the neoclassical market model, the terms of an exchange of goods is disciplined by the 
existence of alternative suppliers; this is the function of the ‘competitive’ predicate in the market model. 
Both parties are price-takers. Unfortunately, the allocation of a use-right between two parties is not 
disciplined by the market in this way. Hahnel and Sheeran (n 30) 219–23. Rather, the negotiation over the 
allocation of the use-right and resulting surplus should be treated as a bargaining game, or a game of ‘divide 
the pie,’ which game-theoretical analysis suggests may ‘have noncooperative outcomes even when the 
bargaining process is costless.’ This pessimistic conclusion is backed up by experimental findings. Robert 
Cooter, ‘The Cost of Coase’ (1982) 11 JLS 1, 14ff; Hahnel and Sheeran (n 30) 223–24. Coase himself 
suggested that the actual division of the surplus from an efficient reallocation would depend on the 
‘shrewdness’ of the parties to the bargain. Coase, ‘Social Cost’ (n 13) 5. These later discussions have, 
however, suggested that the shrewdness of the parties can actually be an obstacle to the achievement of an 
efficient allocation.  
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without transaction costs, efficiency is insensitive to changes in the law.43 As noted above, 
Stigler would soon christen this result ‘the Coase Theorem.’44 
Yet Coase did not aspire to use this result as a model of the real world. Quite the opposite. 
He was chiefly concerned with clarifying and ultimately correcting the analytical task 
facing law reformers operating on the basis of cost-benefit analysis.45 He was painfully 
aware that our world is one in which transaction costs are relevant. The costs of 
identifying the appropriate counterparties, engaging in negotiation, and monitoring and 
enforcing agreements often make the exchange of use-rights—and indeed, the exchange 
of goods more generally—prohibitively expensive.46 In our world, the legal allocation of 
use-rights often makes a difference to aggregate outcomes. And the goal of law-makers, 
Coase believed, should be to craft laws that allow total output to be maximized, given the 
costs of the market or non-market transactions that could be expected to occur under 
those laws.  
One aspect of Coase’s analysis that is generally down-played in the literature is that 
alternative legal rules will always have distributive consequences, even in the idealized, 
transaction cost-free world underlying the Coase theorem. This is however central to his 
characterization of the issues surrounding the legal management of deficient 
commodification in terms of ‘symmetry of harms.’ 47  The difference between one 
allocation of a use-right over a resource and another will often amount to a difference in 
the beneficiary of its productive output as well. The allocation of use-rights among a 
                                                        
43  Competing interpretations of the Coase Theorem can be divided into two varieties. Coase’s central 
argument has sometimes been interpreted to be that the actual use of goods and, equivalently, the final 
allocation of rights, is invariant to how those rights are originally delimited. Cooter suggests that this 
‘invariance’ interpretation has been universally discredited. Cooter (n 42) 15. The redistribution of rights 
between the farmer and the rancher, for example, would likely have knock-on effects on the overall demand 
schedule. This would in turn reshape the relative market demand for, and prices of, all goods, thus at least 
potentially shifting what counts as the highest-valued use of the field. Because of such income effects, the 
eventual allocation of goods is not invariant under different original allocations of rights. All that can be 
said is that the eventual allocation will be efficient in either case (ie Pareto optimal and ‘voluntary’). On 
these caveats, see eg Richard A Posner, Economic	Analysis	of	Law (1st edn, Little, Brown 1972) 17–18, n 1.  
44 n 32. 
45 The point of exploring the transaction-cost free world was ‘to show the emptiness of the Pigouvian 
analytical system.’ Medema (n 32) 16–17 quoting; RH Coase, ‘Law and Economics at Chicago’ (1993) 36 JL 
& Econ 239. 
46 Coase had already emphasized the costs of market exchange and their importance in explaining the 
existence of firms in his then-obscure but now-classic text on the nature of the firm. RH Coase, ‘The Nature 
of the Firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 386. 
47 n 29. 
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population has just as much impact on final consumption as does the initial allocation of 
goods in the neoclassical market model.48  
Coase was perfectly aware that the assignment of rights would have distributive 
consequences for economic actors;49 but he considered those distributive concerns to be 
distinct and wholly separable from what he called ‘the economic problem.’50 Indeed, one 
pithy articulation of the Coase theorem would be that the allocative question, concerning 
how resources are used, is independent of the distributive question concerning who gets 
what.51  
Even if this was the case, it is important to distinguish the distributive consequences of 
law from other distributive questions in the market. In the neoclassical market model, 
the exchange of commodities between market participants is productive, in the sense that 
it leads to an increase for all participants in the subjective value of all goods possessed or 
consumed. But it is also redistributive, in the sense that the relative market value of the 
goods possessed by each participant before market exchange occurs are unlikely to be 
proportional to those which are obtained afterwards. Neoclassical economists have 
generally been willing to countenance those distributive effects, partially because 
everyone enjoys absolute gains, and partially because those effects result entirely from 
the voluntary actions of the participants. 52  Unlike either the exchange of goods 
contemplated by the neoclassical market model or the negotiated rearrangement of 
rights underlying the Coase theorem, a legal change will often (though not always) shift 
risk, goods, or power over resources among those under its jurisdiction without the 
                                                        
48 The common practice of describing the Coase theoorm using phrasing like ‘In the absence of transaction 
costs, the allocation of resources is independent of the initial assignment of property rights,’ likely tends to 
misconstrue this reality. See WE Shuggart II, WF Chappell and RL Cottle, Modern	Managerial	Economics:	
Managerial	Theory	for	Business	Decisions (South-Western 1994), cited in McCloskey (n 39) 367. Those who 
speak in such terms will generally mean only that resources will be allocated to their most productive uses, 
not that the distribution of the resulting income or final goods will be unimpacted. Yet the failure to 
carefully appreciate the distinction between an allocation of resources and a distribution of goods is a 
foreseeable source of confusion about Coase’s argument. 
49 Coase, ‘Social Cost’ (n 13) 5, 15. In an important sense, Coase provided one of the earliest mathematically 
rigorous formulations of the distributional consequences of legal change that had been emphasized by an 
earlier generation of law and economics scholars. See eg Robert L Hale, ‘Coercion and Distribution in a 
Supposedly Non-Coercive State’ (1923) 38 Political Science Quarterly 470; Morris Cohen, ‘Property and 
Sovereignty’ (1927) 13 Cornell L Rev 8. 
50 Coase, ‘Social Cost’ (n 13) 15. 
51  This would be true if the invariance interpretation of the Coase theorem were correct. Under the 
efficiency interpretation, distribution does matter for the content of the ex ante output, but not to its 
efficiency. On these competing interpretations of the Coase theorem, see above n 43.  
52 Through the market process, ‘[r]edistributions occur, but purely as incidents to voluntary transactions.’ 
Posner, Economic	Analysis	of	Law (n 43) 329. 
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universal consent of those affected.53 Changes in the law are not only redistributive but 




Among the scholarship now treated as canonical in the circa-1980 revival of legal 
evolution is a set of papers that used tools from the burgeoning economic analysis of law 
to model trends in judge-made law. Those papers found their inspiration in Richard 
Posner’s notorious claim that the common law is efficient (or at least that it ‘tends to 
promote efficiency’). 55  As Posner later made explicit, this claim necessarily entails a 
theory of legal change: if a common law rule presently embodies some efficient allocation 
of risk, goods, or control over resources, then there not only must have been some event 
or series of events that generated ‘the’ efficient rule but there must be some historical 
process that allows prevailing rules to be responsive to shifting economic conditions.56 If 
the claim that common law rules and doctrines are efficient is to be credible, therefore, 
there must be some plausible account of how those rules and doctrines might have gotten 
that way. On the nature of that process, however, Posner initially provided little useful 
guidance. He drew some loose parallels between the market and the litigation of private 
rights, by noting a shared dependence of (re)allocation through private initiative, 
mapping the judge’s decision between alternative rules onto ‘competition’ based on 
consumer choices, and describing the judge’s impartiality as somehow akin to the 
invisible hand of the market.57 Those parallels could have been used to suggest a mode 
                                                        
53 Stigler spoke of the ‘compelled universality’ of legal change. George J Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic 
Regulation’ (1971) 2 The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 3, 10.  
54 ibid 4. 
55 Posner, Economic	Analysis	of	Law (n 43) ch 5; Richard Posner, ‘Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in 
Law’ (1979) 46 U Chi L Rev, 285. The analysis of legal rules in terms of their capacity to shape both the 
market and non-market behaviour of self-interested actors stretches at least as far back as Bentham. 
Though Coase’s seminal article, ‘Social Cost’ (n 13), provided a framework for analysing the net output/cost 
consequences of alternative legal rules under the presence of transaction costs, Posner seems to have been 
the first to suggest that the preponderance of existing common law rules were optimal, or at least quasi-
optimal, by that metric. For a rough outline of this history, see Posner, ‘Some Uses and Abuses of Economics 
in Law’ 283–86. 
56 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, ‘Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction 
Change in the Common Law’ (1980) 9 J Legal Stud 367, 367. 
57 Posner, Economic	Analysis	of	Law (n 43) 320–25. 
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by which legal rules moved toward efficiency, in a process akin to Armen Alchian’s 
account of institutional evolution under market competition.58 But Posner did not pursue 
this analogy. Instead, he seemed to think of these loose parallels as sufficient to earn the 
common law process the same dint of efficiency he ascribed to the market.59 
Given the explanatory gap Posner had left open, his thesis spawned a host of attempts by 
law-and-economics scholars to account for the mechanisms that might produce his 
hypothesized outcome. One postulate was that judges might simply choose the most 
efficient rule by applying their reasoning faculties to available information.60 Several 
scholars pursued models of this sort.61 This explanation had a number of disadvantages, 
however. The first was its incompatibility with the extensive evidence about how judges 
actually make their decisions, provided in centuries of published legal judgments not 
expressed in terms of economic efficiency.62 The second was the difficulty that judges 
would face in choosing the economically efficient rules, were they actually motivated to 
do so. 63  The third issue was methodological: such arguments relied on unverifiable 
suppositions about the judicial reasoning process.64 Perhaps the most important problem 
with this explanatory move was its violation of an admitted partiality among economists 
of a certain stripe for invisible-hand explanations of social phenomena, especially for 
explanations rooted in aggregates of self-interested behaviour.65  
                                                        
58 Armen A Alchian, ‘Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory’ (1950) 58 Journal of Political Economy 
211. 
59 See for example his reference to ‘the market-common law process,’ and his intuition that common law 
rules emulate the outcomes that would be produced by market competition. Posner, Economic	Analysis	of	
Law (n 43) 329; Posner, ‘Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law’ (n 55) 288–89.  
60 Posner’s primary account of the link between common law decision-making and economic efficiency is 
that the judge’s common sense or intuition would usually lead to the efficient standard. See Posner, 
Economic	Analysis	of	Law (n 43) 99, 327. 
61 Obviously, if judges prefer the most efficient rules, and have the capacity to correctly select those rules 
from among the available alternatives, then their decisions will tend to produce de	 jure efficient rules. 
Cooter, Kornhauser and Lane, however, also showed how a series of litigations before judges with only 
partial information about the marginal effect of different rules on costs for various parties could still 
gradually produce a liability rule that minimizes the combined resources expended on accidents and 
spending on avoidance. Robert Cooter and others, ‘Liability Rules, Limited Information, and the Role of 
Precedent’ (1979) 10 The Bell Journal of Economics 366. 
62 Robert Cooter and Lewis Kornhauser, ‘Can Litigation Improve the Law without the Help of Judges’ (1980) 
9 JLS 139, 139–40. 
63 George L Priest, ‘The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules’ (1977) 6 JLS 65, 66. 
64 ibid; John C Goodman, ‘An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law’ (1978) 7 J Legal Stud 393, 
393. 
65 Paul H Rubin, ‘Why is the Common Law Efficient’ (1977) 6 J Legal Stud 51, 51; Cooter and Kornhauser (n 
62) 140. Invisible-hand explanations and their relation to evolutionary thought are discussed in Chapter 1.  
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Most attempts to explain Posner’s hypothesis thus undertook to show how efficient rules 
could be produced by broader characteristics of the legal process, rather than resulting 
from judicial behaviour alone. The goal was to illuminate how rules seemingly designed 
to distribute resources efficiently could arise from a series of legal disputes in which 
judges chose the applicable standard in adjudicated cases at random—that is, according 
to some probabilistic, rather than reasoned, standard.66 One family of models, starting 
with a paper by Paul Rubin, rooted the mechanism in selective	litigation: the key to the 
process in such models is that disputes associated with higher costs are more likely to be 
litigated (and existing rules challenged) than settled (leaving existing rules in place), 
meaning inefficient rules will be challenged in court more often than efficient ones.67 
Other models turned on the differential expenditures of the litigants: the premise in these 
papers was that more money will be spent on trying to overturn inefficient rules than on 
trying to overturn efficient ones, increasing the chance that more efficient rules will be 
favoured over time.68  
These Posnerian accounts of legal change through private dispute resolution were also 
Coasean in two related senses. First of all, they followed Posner in identifying the 
relationship between law and efficiency in Coasean terms. As Posner put it in describing 
his approach to both contract and property, ‘the economic test … is whether the 
imposition of liability will create incentives for value-maximizing conduct.’ 69 Second, 
their arguments took advantage of Coase’s idea that private parties could in some 
contexts privately negotiate the exchange of use-rights. As will be shown, however, their 
                                                        
66 Given inconsistent usage in practice, there is some risk of confusion in what follows about the meaning 
of the terms ‘legal dispute,’ ‘litigation,’ and ‘adjudication.’ Galanter, whose work on the implications of 
common law dispute resolution for trends in doctrine is discussed below, text to nn 112–134, distinguishes 
litigation of disputes, which can include claim-making, negotiation, abandonment and settlement of those 
claims, as well as resolution of the dispute through trial, from adjudication, which refers narrowly to the 
resolution of the dispute via a judge’s decision. Priest and Klein, by contrast, use dispute to name all 
situations where a legal claim has been made by one actor against another, and identify litigation only with 
resolution through trial. George L Priest and Benjamin Klein, ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’ 
(1984) 13 JLS 1. For the sake of consistency, this chapter and Chapter 3 use ‘legal dispute’ or ‘dispute’ to 
discuss claims that have been made, ‘litigation’ to discuss the resolution of disputes through a trial, and 
‘adjudication’ to refer narrowly to the judge’s application of legal reasoning to the facts and arguments to 
render a judgment. I have furthermore used ‘case’ only to discuss disputes resolved through the trial 
process.  
67 Rubin, ‘Why is the Common Law Efficient’ (n 65); Priest (n 63); Cooter and Kornhauser (n 62). 
68 Goodman (n 64); Arthur Denzau, ‘Litigation Expenditures as Private Determinants of Judicial Decisions: 
A Comment’ (1979) 8 JLS 295. 
69 Posner, Economic	Analysis	of	Law (n 43) 43–44. Though allocating use-rights to address prima facie 
inefficiencies not amenable to private resolution because of transaction costs was Posner’s primary mode, 
many of his examples dealt with a different strategy that Coase had never considered: to use law to reduce 
transaction costs and thereby allow the efficient allocation to arise through private arrangement.  
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arguments were founded on a fundamental misunderstanding of the implications and 
limitations of Coase’s reasoning in the analysis of law-making. I will have more to say, 
below, about the limited capacity of these arguments to account for the purported 
efficiency of common law rules and, eventually, about their adequacy as accounts of legal 
change more broadly. But both of these points will be easier to make once these accounts 
of the processes that fix and reshape common law rules—that is, judge-made law—are 
contextualized against kindred accounts of the processes that produce legislation.  
B. Rent‐seeking	and	Collective	Action	Problems	 in	 the	Making	of	
Statutes	and	Regulations	
Posner expressly contrasted his claim about the efficiency of rules produced through the 
common law process with his gloomier conclusions about the factors that shape the rules 
produced by legislators and administrative bodies.70 In part, he sought to explain that 
contrast by reference to possible differences between the acceptable modes and objects 
of reasoning in the two settings: it might be that judges are simply constrained to consider 
different issues than are legislatures.71 Primarily, though, he drew his arguments about 
the putative inefficiency of legislation directly from a foundational contribution to public 
choice theory, Stigler’s ‘Theory of Economic Regulation.’72  
At a high level of abstraction, Stigler also framed law-making as a sort of market, with the 
amount and type of regulation representing an equilibrium of regulatory supply and 
demand.73 In practice, the market metaphor provided him with little analytical mileage;74 
his paper was at base an effort to develop and lend credibility to an invisible-hand 
explanation of legislative law-making. 75  In particular, Stigler wanted to explain laws 
                                                        
70 ibid 327–32. 
71 ibid 328–29. 
72 ibid 329–32; Stigler (n 53). 
73 Both the abstract of the paper and its overall structure suggest that the value of regulation to industry 
players can be understood as the source of demand for regulation, while the processes that produce 
regulation condition its supply. The novel terminology he associated with his theory, ‘acquired regulation,’ 
likewise suggests that regulation is ‘purchased’ by industry. See especially Stigler (n 53) 3, 11. In addition 
to the problems that Stigler’s model ultimately raised for the ‘efficiency of the common law’ arguments, 
elaborated in what follows, his use of a loose market metaphor to outline the deleterious effects of the 
regulatory process demonstrates Posner’s naiveté in treating the existence of a rough homology with 
market processes as sufficient to draw any conclusions about the nature or desirability of the outputs of 
that process.  
74 Despite the frame of the paper, Stigler admitted that ‘the political decision…is fundamentally different 
from that of the market.’ ibid 10. 
75 See Chapter 1 on invisible-hand explanations. 
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entirely as an emergent outcome of interactions between rational, self-interested actors 
behaving strategically under exogenous constraint. 
Now we need to be careful in following the route Stigler laid out from this starting point, 
because ‘emergent outcomes of interactions between rational self-interested actors’ is 
also the foundation of the neoclassical market model. Whence Stigler’s pessimism about 
the inefficiency of the outcome in the ‘market’ for legislation? The key difference lies in 
the contrast between the interests and incentives that arise in the context of establishing 
ex ante rights and those that are relevant when parties seek to rearrange rights ex post.  
The Coase theorem suggests that economic actors, in a way that parallels the market 
exchange of goods, will reallocate use-rights so as to maximize output, so long as 
conditions favour them doing so. Beyond this result being limited to contexts with 
sufficiently low transaction costs, the argument that parties could bargain for an efficient 
ex post distribution of goods depended on the prior delineation of a clearly-defined and 
mutually understood allocation of rights in those goods.76 Coase addressed neither the 
capacity of economic actors to bargain efficiently in contexts where the original rights 
were uncertain, under threat, or incomplete, nor—and this is absolutely key—the 
agencies, interests, or processes by which the ‘initial’ rights might be shifted or 
transformed. 77 This critical point was regrettably obscured by his imprecise language 
regarding the distinctions between legally-established rights, actual control over uses, 
and the hypothetical ex post arrangements to be put in place through bargaining between 
the parties who start with some prior allocation of rights. Whether it was (1) discussing 
the result of bargaining between the parties about how resources are to be used (and the 
resulting income distributed) as a ‘rearrangement of rights,’78 (2) suggesting that it was 
possible to ‘change the legal delimitation of rights through market transactions,’79 or (3) 
invoking a ‘legal system of rights which can be modified by transactions on the market,’80 
Coase’s exposition muddled the distinction between the ex ante distribution of rights 
universally assigned by courts to classes of actors in a given type of fact-situation on the 
                                                        
76 Coase, ‘Social Cost’ (n 13) 8. 
77 As Coase himself later emphasized, ‘Social Cost’ was concerned only with what he called ‘the study of the 
influences of the legal system on the working of the economic system’ and not at all with ‘the economic 
analysis of law’ which addresses how economic factors might shape the legal system. RH Coase, ‘Law and 
Economics and A. W. Brian Simpson’ (1996) 25 JLS 103, 103–05. 
78 Coase, ‘Social Cost’ (n 13) 10. 
79 ibid 9, 15, 19. 
80 ibid 15, 17. 
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one hand and, on the other, the particular ex post arrangement of activities and benefits 
that individual actors might negotiate in situations where those legally-defined rights 
were relevant. 
The difference between these two contexts is profound. The possibility to effect coercive 
redistribution has neither certain nor direct implications for efficiency, but its indirect 
consequences are potentially severe.81 And because they approached the question with 
acutely different goals in mind, Stigler and Coase came to nearly opposite conclusions 
about what those consequences might be.  
Whether it came to dealing with externalities or regulating radio frequencies, Coase was 
concerned with the normative question of how to maximize allocative efficiency.82 As 
noted above, he understood that the (re)allocation of use-rights would also entail a 
(re)distribution of income among the population, but thought that these distributive 
questions could be ignored for the purposes of thinking about how to maximize output. 
In a world in which productivity-maximizing allocations of resources might not come 
about because of the high costs of conducting the relevant bargains, Coase believed that 
the redistribution of rights, including by judges, would often be the preferable policy 
response to the economic problem—certainly superior to solutions using non-
compensatory taxes endorsed under the Pigouvian tradition. 83  In particular, he 
understood the shortfall in actual aggregate production as a shared problem whose 
optimal solution could take many forms and would ultimately depend on the context in 
which it arose. And he saw ‘economists and policy-makers’ as part of a unitary ‘we’ 
charged with designing and implementing solutions to that problem, and lacking only the 
knowledge to do so correctly.84  
The primary goal of Stigler’s model, by contrast, was analytical, not normative. Yet the 
dichotomy between analytical and normative does not reduce down to a gap between 
how some group should conduct themselves and how they actually do. Stigler’s argument, 
and Posner’s by proxy, about the origins and nature of democratic legislation was not 
                                                        
81 Above, text to nn 52-54 
82  On Coase’s approach to radio frequencies and property rights, see Ronald Coase, ‘The Federal 
Communications Commission’ (1959) 2 JLE 1.  
83 Coase, ‘Social Cost’ (n 13) 19–28, 39–42. 
84 ibid 18, 43; Aslanbeigui and Medema (n 13) 605 quoting Ronald Coase, ‘Social Cost and Public Policy’ in 
George A Edwards Exploring	 the	 Frontiers	of	Administration:	 Six	Essays	 for	Managers (York University 
Faculty of Administration Studies, Bureau of Research, 1970). 
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concerned with how beneficent policymakers select laws best suited to addressing a 
pressing social need, be it efficiency or otherwise.85 Rather, Stigler expressly constructed 
his model, like the evolutionary accounts of the common law’s efficiency, in 
contradistinction to accounts of law as a product of deliberative, public-spirited 
reasoning.86 
In the place of Coase’s benevolent, welfare-focused policymakers, the centrepiece of 
Stigler’s model was a decision-making mechanism whose output, roughly speaking, was 
a function of the interests of various economic agents in the state of the law, weighted by 
their power. Economic actors would seek to shape the law in their own interest, not in 
the public interest.87 Policymakers in Stigler’s model were no more than midwives of that 
process; the will of the sovereign, no more than its rubber stamp.  
In Coase’s model, each actor is constrained by their initial allocation of goods, resources, 
and rights, but also limited to a repertoire of strategies that includes variations on 
‘exchange with other actors’ using those allocations. The opportunity to shift ex ante legal 
entitlements by contrast creates the possibility of engaging in another strategy that might 
best be described as expropriation.88 This distinction requires some clarification. It is 
possible to imagine the conduct of law-making as something like a mutually consensual, 
universally beneficial bargain, with the legislator merely granting the resulting 
arrangement the status of law. Take as an example a world of ranchers and farmers like 
those in Coase’s paradigmatic example, subject to an inefficient regime of strict liability 
for crop trampling. If all the farmers and all the ranchers could bargain together regarding 
the allocation of liability, then they might shift from a prior regime of strict liability to one 
in which ranchers were no longer liable, with farmers being compensated for the 
corresponding loss of the use of their marginal land.89 Of course, in a world without 
                                                        
85 As indicated by the title of the paper, Stigler’s nominal subject was regulation rather than legislation per 
se. The intended targets of his critique were four kinds of economic policy he considered to be generally, if 
not universally, inefficient: subsidies to producers, control over competitive entry, regulation of product 
substitutes or complements, and the direct fixing of prices. Stigler (n 53) 4–6. Nonetheless, section two of 
his paper is explicitly entitled ‘the costs of	obtaining legislation’ and the model set out in that section is 
concerned with what he sees as shortcomings intrinsic to law-making through democratically-elected 
lawmakers, rather than with the perverse outcomes that stem from particular areas or modes of policy. 
ibid 10–13. 
86 Stigler (n 53) 3–4, 17–18. 
87 ibid 4. 
88 Like ‘harm’ or ‘cost,’ expropriation is a morally freighted word that is hard to invoke without suggesting 
that the incident redistribution of rights, wealth or control over resources is in some sense wrongful. 
Nonetheless, I use the word here only for its distinctive sense of a non-consensual transfer.  
89 cf Coase, ‘Social Cost’ (n 13) 4–5. 
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transaction costs, there would be no interest in trying to change the law in this way; 
individual farmers and their neighbouring ranchers could simply bargain to reallocate 
the rights themselves. Yet in a world with transaction costs, bargaining for such a large 
scale, legislative reallocation of rights might save enough on costs, compared to 
conducting the individual bargains, to make available an efficient but otherwise 
impracticable use of the land. As Coase himself put it, ‘[e]ven when it is possible to change 
the legal delimitation of rights through market transactions, it is obviously desirable to 
reduce the need for such transactions and thus reduce the employment of resources in 
carrying them out.’90  
Though this is a plausible scenario, the legislative process does not generally place the 
same structural constraints on reallocations that market exchanges do. As with the 
market process, the ranchers in my example will have an incentive to change the law to 
the more efficient allocation. But they will only have an incentive to compensate the 
farmers for that change if doing so is somehow made a condition of effecting that 
reallocation. And, unlike in the market context, whether compensation to the farmers 
becomes an effective precondition is a contingent function of the effective power of the 
farmers, ranchers, and others over the state of the law. The greater issue is that, without 
the gratuitous assumption that a legislative reallocation of rights will require the 
beneficiaries to compensate the losers, it will also be in each party’s interests to shift the 
law away from any efficient allocation, so long as doing so allows them to enjoy a larger 
absolute portion of the resulting smaller pie. Indeed, even under an assumption of no 
transaction costs, in which Coase’s reasoning suggests either arrangement will be 
efficient, each group will still have an interest in shifting the law in their favour. 91 In more 
contemporary terms, Stigler’s first premise was thus that the law-making process gives 
economic actors an incentive to engage not only in productive bargaining, but in 
counterproductive rent‐seeking.92 
                                                        
90 ibid 19. 
91  To see this, we can imagine the law moving from an efficient initial allocation to an inefficient 
reallocation. If we maintain the assumption that cattle grazing is the more efficient use, that would mean 
the use-right moving from ranchers to farmers. The individual farmers could still subsequently bargain to 
transfer the use-rights to the ranchers, in which case, they would get paid for a right they did not possess 
before the law was changed.  
92 The term ‘rent seeking’ is due to Krueger, though the concept is generally attributed to earlier work by 
Tullock. The concept has been used with a variety of meanings, only some of which correspond to Tullock’s 
original analyses. It is broad enough to include any effort to obtain benefits through political channels that 
entails uncompensated costs for other actors, though there is in particular inconsistency about whether it 
necessarily implies some net social loss. It may not be entirely appropriate here, since the emphasis per 
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The analytical consequence for legislative law-making is that a legal change may 
represent first, a coercive, redistributive, but ultimately productivity-improving 
reallocation of a use-right from a less to a more productive right-holder; or, second, a 
coercive, redistributive, and ultimately inefficient allocation from a more to a less 
productive right-holder; or, third, a quasi-consensual quid pro quo in which rights move 
from less to more productive users, in return for some appropriate compensation. If the 
analysis were to stop there, determining which category captures a particular legal 
change would remain an empirical question whose answer depends on the balance of 
effective power between self-interested groups. But Stigler’s analysis did not stop there. 
It instead traced an analysis of effective power all the way through to his pessimistic 
conclusions.  
To understand this other leg of Stigler’s argument, it is useful to translate his account of 
rent-seeking into the language of collective goods and collective action developed by 
Mancur Olson. 93  Collective goods are distinguished from private goods by non-
excludability: once produced, they allow a whole class of beneficiaries to gain, rather than 
just the parties that helped to produce or procure them. 94 While non-excludability is also 
at the heart of the earlier concept of a public good, for a collective good the shared 
benefits are limited to members of some group, and in some cases may be procured only 
to the detriment of non-members or the general public.95 Olson’s key claim is that pursuit 
of a collective good presents a collective action problem for the group that will benefit 
from it. At least in general, the larger the group, the more severe those problems.  
                                                        
Tullock’s approach is on the wasted resources spent on competition over the transfers occasioned by state 
action (process losses), rather than, per Stigler, on the inefficiencies attributable to the outcomes of those 
competitions (substantial losses). Nevertheless, we can proceed with this difference of emphasis in mind. 
Gordon Tullock, ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft’ (1967) 5 Economic Inquiry 224; Anne 
O Krueger, ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’ (1974) 64 American Economic Review 291; 
see generally Robert D Tollison, ‘The Economic Theory of Rent Seeking’ (2012) 152 Public Choice 73. 
93 Mancur Olson, The	Logic	of	Collective	Action:	Public	Goods	and	the	Theory	of	Groups (Harvard University 
Press 1971). Stigler’s paper cited Olson, and the structure of his argument maps tidily onto Olson’s 
analytical frame. Laffont and Tirole interpret Stigler’s argument as a direct application of Olson’s. Jean-
Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, ‘The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory 
Capture’ (1991) 106 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1089, 1089–90. Posner’s version of Stigler’s 
argument is also more obvious in its intellectual debts to Olson’s analytical toolkit.  
94 Earlier work used ‘public goods’ primarily to emphasize goods with non-excludability of consumption,	
that is to say, goods that, once produced, could be enjoyed by any member of the public. In introducing his 
alternative, ‘collective goods,’ Olson stressed that the production of certain goods might provide a mutual, 
non-excludable benefit to some delimited group not available to outsiders. He also used the term more 
expansively, to include the satisfaction of any mutual interest rather than just the provision of consumable 
goods. Olson (n 93) 14–15. 
95 ibid 15, n 22.  
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Groups face two kinds of problems in the pursuit of collective goods.96 The first is the 
challenge of distributing net benefits, given the costs of ‘production.’ Like private goods, 
the production of collective goods has direct costs. Lighthouses must be built, roads must 
be maintained, politicians must be lobbied, and members of the public ‘educated.’ 97 
Whether members of the group benefit equally from the production of a good, or 
proportionally based on variation in some characteristic,98 members of the group will be 
interested in minimizing their own contribution to those costs. Where the minimal outlay 
of costs required to produce some amount of the good outweighs the marginal benefit to 
individual members, no one would have the incentive, acting independently, to expend 
the resources necessary to produce the collective good.99 But even where the direct costs 
are low enough that an individual can pay the entire cost and still enjoy a net benefit, the 
group could face a situation captured by the theory of non-cooperative games. Absent 
some coordination between the members, the result predicted by traditional game theory 
would be for each individual member, acting rationally, to contribute nothing toward the 
cost, since this would leave them better off regardless of the actions taken by the other 
members.100 Even though any positive distribution of the costs between the members 
would generate a preferable outcome for all members, the aggregate result would be for 
no one to contribute anything toward the cost. As the size of the group grows, the less an 
individual can expect their contribution to make a difference to whether a good is 
established or to how much of it they can expect to receive.  
Of course, it would be in the interest of all members of the group to come to some sort of 
prior agreement to divide these direct costs amongst themselves. Indeed, even a 
sufficiently large subgroup would benefit if they agreed to share the costs of creating a 
good for the broader class. Olson’s key intervention was to underscore that such 
arrangements do not come for free. Discovering possible goods, identifying members of 
the group, convincing individuals of the benefit, bargaining about how costs will be 
distributed, and, where necessary, monitoring and enforcing cost-sharing agreements: all 
                                                        
96 Though Olson distinguishes between three difficulties facing the group, the first two are somewhat hard 
to distinguish. Recast in probabilistic terms, the point is that an individual member’s expected returns from 
an investment in a collective good decrease with group size, so that, without some coordinating mechanism, 
it can quickly become negative as the group size surpasses one. Compare ibid 48. 
97 cf Stigler (n 53) 12. 
98 As would be the case, for example, with a subsidy given to corn producers proportional to the total value 
of the corn each produced.  
99 Olson (n 93) 11–12. 
100 ibid 43–44, 50 n 70.  
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of these tasks entail what Olson called organization	 costs. 101  Because the costs of 
coordination will generally rise with group size, larger groups, relative to smaller groups, 
would again be disadvantaged in pursuing their joint interest.  
Olson’s overall conclusion not only exposed the fallacies of theories that derived 
predictions about group behaviour solely from an analysis of the members’ shared 
interests, but pointed specifically to the negative correlation between a group’s size and 
its capacity to pursue those interests.102  
Structurally, Stigler’s theory was thus an application of Olson’s theory to the 
confrontation between two groups with directly opposing interests. 103  The 
establishment of a given legal rule, subsidy, or regime will often amount to the creation 
of a collective good. Under the right conditions, a given norm may be a public good in the 
more traditional sense that, once established, it provides a benefit to everyone under its 
jurisdiction.104 But as discussed above, laws that allocate rights, duties, liabilities, and 
powers will generally have coercive, distributive effects that disadvantage some group 
even while they benefit others. The selection between any two states of a law, like the 
existence or non-existence of liability on ranchers for trampling their neighbours’ crops, 
thus becomes a contest over which of two mutually exclusive collective goods will be 
established, and thus a conflict of interest between the groups who are the potential 
beneficiaries of each alternative. Though there may be some external indicator about 
which state of the law is preferable—say, because it is more efficient—from the 
perspective of the two groups, the problem is symmetrical. In one state of the law, one 
group wins and the other loses; in the other state, vice versa.105  
                                                        
101 ibid 46–47. 
102 ibid 1–3, 43–48. 
103 On Stigler’s relation to Olson, see above n 93. 
104 Laws establishing or amending a distribution of rights over or liabilities for various uses of goods among 
various types of parties may, per the Coasean paradigm, promote the efficient allocation of those goods. See 
above, text to nn 82-83. But this is no guarantee, and will in fact seldom imply, that the establishment of 
those laws is in everyone’s interest. Nonetheless, there may be laws that, at least in their first order effects, 
are in everyone’s interest, the archetype being a rule that drivers must use one side of the road and not the 
other. See eg Lon L Fuller, ‘Law as an Instrument of Social Control and Law as a Facilitation of Human 
Interaction’ [1975] BYU L Rev 89. 
105 Note that the conflict is not properly framed in terms of the presence or absence of a rule. The choice 
can only ever be between two states of the law, each of which will distribute rights, resources and benefits 
in a given way. There is a rule, or usually rules, in either case. This was part of the lesson of Hohfeld’s 




Unlike later literature on regulatory capture, which focused on the risk of quasi-
independent agencies such the United States’ Securities Exchange Commission, Federal 
Communications Commission or Environmental Protection Agency being effectively 
captured by regulated industries,106 Stigler’s model was based primarily on the factors 
that shape the behaviour of legislators and their parties.107 Nor did Stigler develop a 
model of legislative law-making in which the relevant conflict played out between two 
producers, such as ranchers and farmers. Rather, he focused on regulations for which the 
benefits to a producer group were outweighed by losses for consumers (equivalent to a 
transfer plus a deadweight loss). Specifically, he directed his attention to industries for 
which the body of consumers was very large, like doctors and lawyers, trucking, and ‘big 
oil.’  
With that setup, his model could be recast as a confrontation between a democratic 
majority with an interest in preventing a regulation, and industry players with an interest 
in attaining it.108 Here, Olson’s toolkit came into play. Even though consumers as a whole 
would benefit if the regulation were avoided, individual consumers would have no 
incentive, either to change their own vote or to try rallying other voters to prevent its 
passage. Even if the aggregate losses were very high, the per-capita benefits of avoiding 
them are very low and, specifically, outweighed by the costs of learning about and acting 
on the issue.109 The distribution of costs and benefits ultimately makes the individual 
voter a bad representative of the consumer class when she acts at the ballot box. By 
contrast, the group with a stake in the benefitted industry has two advantages. Because 
the benefits are relatively concentrated, individual industry stakeholders have much 
more to gain from acting to attain the regulation: voting on the basis of the rule, and 
convincing others to support it, offers them a much higher expected return than doing 
                                                        
106 See eg Laffont and Tirole (n 93). 
107 One attempt at mathematical formalization is attempted in Sam Peltzman, ‘Toward a More General 
Theory of Regulation’ (1976) 19 JLE 211, 213–22. 
108 Strictly speaking, there might not be any democratic majority with a direct interest in preventing the 
promulgation of an inefficient rule. The inefficiency of a rule implies only that there are net losses. Stigler’s 
argument seemed to depend on the idea that everyone would buy some good so that, following the passage 
of an inefficient rule, everyone would now be paying a higher price. Everyone would be worse off, save the 
minority comprising beneficiaries of the regulation. It is possible, however, for consumer losses to be 
concentrated among a minority, perhaps even one smaller than the group of beneficiaries. Some goods 
simply have a small number of consumers. In the absence of transaction costs, however, the majority would 
have an interest in avoiding the inefficient rule, insofar as the group that would lose out from the inefficient 
rule could pay the majority to vote against it, and still come out better off than they otherwise would have. 
cf Stigler (n 53) 10 n 8.  
109 ibid 11–12. 
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the contrary offers to the individual consumer. But industries also have the advantage 
that they are already organized into firms (often, a small number of them), a happy 
circumstance that yields organization costs significantly lower than those available to 
consumers. That makes it easier for the industry both to rally voters and to try to directly 
influence legislators. 110  Here, the distribution of benefits makes the industry well-
represented at the ballot box indeed.  
In terms of outcomes, the model could be constructed in reverse, from the perspective of 
a unitary legislator trying to get a sufficient plurality of votes.111 From the perspective of 
the legislator (or the party activist), the relevant question would be not whether the 
passage of an industry-supported regulation would be good or bad for society, but 
whether its expected effect on the vote count would be positive or negative.  
C. Rent‐Seeking	and	Collective	Action	Problems	in	the	Evolution	of	
Judge‐Made	Law	
Shifting interest-based analysis of the legislative process, away from the distribution of 
interests and onto how those interests are represented, leads to some counterintuitive 
conclusions. Those conclusions warrant similar reservations about interest-based 
analysis of the law-making through the courts as well. It turns out that, among the many 
weaknesses of the early Posnerian accounts of the common law’s efficiency, the most 
critical was the inadequate attention they paid to the relationship between the individual 
parties to a legal dispute and the groups with a stake in the rules at issue. The most lucid 
treatment of this dimension was actually written slightly before law and economics took 
on Posner’s efficiency claim. Marc Galanter’s ‘Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead’112 did 
not come out of the law-and-economics tradition, but was instead one of the classics of 
                                                        
110 ibid 12. Stigler took it for granted that industry was capable of acting together, and left the question of 
why as an unsolved puzzle to be explained. He referred to Olson’s by-product theory, that lobby 
organizations work because they provide direct benefits to members as well as coordination benefits, as 
one possible explanation. ibid 13 n 11. Olson however had also suggested that the organization of industries 
into a small number of firms might allow their relatively large group of beneficiaries to act in concert as if 
they were a much smaller group. Olson (n 93) 142–48. 
111 See also Peltzman (n 107). 
112 Marc Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’ (1974) 9 
Law and Soc Rev 95; on the article’s centrality in the law and society canon, see Joel B Grossman and others, 
‘Do the “Haves” Still Come out Ahead?’ (1999) 33 L & Soc’y Rev 803; Carroll Seron and others, ‘Is There a 
Canon of Law and Society?’ (2013) 9 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 287. 
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the post-Realist American law and society movement.113 Galanter’s conclusions about 
judicial law-making mirrored Stigler’s pessimism about statutes and regulations. This 
parallel comes as little surprise once we observe the deep structural similarities in 
Galanter and Stigler’s arguments, attributable to a largely shared intellectual provenance.  
Galanter’s paper develops numerous arguments about how litigation can unfairly 
distribute advantage over time and about how those dynamics might be addressed 
through legislative and procedural reforms. The part of his analysis that since earned the 
most attention is concerned with the incentives faced by parties choosing between 
settling and litigating an individual dispute, and how their likely choices, given those 
incentives, can gradually shift rules in favour of one group and to the detriment of 
another.114 
Let me put Galanter’s argument in his own terms. His model starts by distinguishing the 
parties to a legal dispute either as one-shotters, who participate in a given type of 
litigation only a small number of times, or as repeat players, who expect to confront the 
same kind of dispute multiple times in the future.115 The core of Galanter’s argument is 
the capacity of the parties to ‘play for rules’ and repeat players’ significantly greater 
incentive to do so. One-shotters, by construction, will be concerned only with how the 
immediate outcome of the dispute would affect their financial position. Repeat players by 
contrast will be interested in the effect of the prevailing rule on their long-run interests, 
and thus will give much greater attention to the impact of a litigated outcome on the 
relevant rules.116 Repeat players will seek to settle disputes where a litigated outcome 
risks creating a rule that would increase future costs and to litigate cases likely to create 
an advantageous precedent (even if the expected direct return of litigating the individual 
case were negative). The one-shotters will have an incentive to take the settlement offers 
and, by construction, an interest in pursuing a litigated outcome if no settlement was on 
offer. 117  The cases actually litigated will thus tend to gradually skew rules to the 
                                                        
113 Galanter was however influenced by Olson’s work, which is generally slotted at the intersection of 
economics and political science, not economics and law. On Olson’s influence, see below text to n 121.  
114 See eg Grossman and others (n 112) 803–05. 
115 Galanter (n 112) 97–98. 
116  While Galanter was cognizant of how the prevailing rule would advantage the groups in their 
interactions more generally, he stressed the impact of the current litigation on the outcome of future 
disputes, rather than on how the rules would structure the cost consequences of their future behaviour 
more broadly. See especially ibid 98, n 5. 
117 Note that the incentives of the parties are not dependent on any differences in their assessed probability 
of success. Even if the one-shotter is more likely than not to lose a case, they may still have an incentive to 
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advantage of the repeat players.118 This dynamic, according to Galanter, is why repeat 
players would ‘come out ahead.’  
Galanter may not have been writing within the law-and-economics tradition, but his 
argument accorded to a high degree with its methods. He generally assumed that parties 
would act in a calculating, self-interested manner;119 he started by thinking through the 
implications of a simple model and only then moved on to consider how additional factors 
complicated the analysis; he drew his key conclusions on the narrow basis of his model 
parameters rather than from empirical data; he was concerned with explaining outcomes 
on the basis of the relative positions of actors rather than by reference to differences in 
their individual characteristics. 120  These resemblances are unlikely to have been a 
coincidence. Galanter had been exposed to Olson’s analysis and clearly understood how 
Olson’s framework could be applied to his own model.121  
These links facilitate a remapping of Galanter’s model using Olson’s coordinates. Though 
the active players in Galanter’s model are the individual parties to the dispute, Galanter’s 
conclusions concern the aggregate impact of their interactions on the positions of 
broader groups, who we might, after Galanter, refer to as ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots.’ Galanter 
did not intend this dichotomy to correspond to two unitary economic classes—as if 
insurance companies, landlords, and the state revenue administration were a single 
group whose stakeholders shared a unified interest universally opposed to injured 
drivers, tenants and taxpayers.122 His point, rather, was that the individual one-shotter 
was part of a larger group (the have-nots) whose interests, when	it	came	to	the	rule	in	
                                                        
pursue litigation, so long as the costs of doing so do not outweigh the expected gains. Even in a dispute that 
would have no effect on precedent if it were litigated, a risk-neutral defendant that has a 70% chance of 
winning in a dispute where $10 million is at stake would be willing to pay out up to $3 million (plus the 
saved litigation costs); by the same token, a risk-neutral plaintiff, in the absence of a settlement offer, would 
be willing to litigate so long so long as their litigation costs were less than $3 million. This accords roughly 
with Posner’s argument for why higher stakes increase the likelihood of litigation. Richard A Posner, ‘An 
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’ (1973) 2 JLS 399, 418–19. 
118 Galanter (n 112) 100–03. 
119 He did not claim other factors were unimportant, however. He even allowed that other factors might 
dominate those he had included in his analysis. His goal was to clarify how structural conditions and self-
interested behaviour could reinforce material advantages, not to produce a definitive conclusion about how 
the balance of all factors would ultimately distribute advantage. ibid 102–03. 
120 See especially the contrast he draws between his own approach and one based on the ‘competence’ of 
the parties. ibid 103–04 n 20. On the desire in the economics tradition to avoid arguments that depend on 
differences in tastes, see George J Stigler and Gary S Becker, ‘De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum’ (1977) 67 
The American Economic Review 76. 
121 Galanter (n 112) 100 n 14, 145 127. 
122  These examples are drawn from Galanter’s typology of configurations of repeat players and one-
shotters. ibid 107–08. 
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dispute, were largely opposed to those of the group (the haves) of which the repeat player 
was a member.123 Implicit in Galanter’s analysis was that, as a group, the have-nots have 
an aggregate, long-term interest in the prevailing rule that roughly mirrors the interest 
of the haves. The interest of the haves would lie in rule changes that created a net gain in 
future interactions with have-nots, regardless of how those changes might impact on the 
have-nots; the interest of the have-nots, conversely, in rules that favourably structured 
their future interactions with the haves.  
Though there were many parallels between their approaches, Galanter diverged from the 
Posnerians most acutely in giving no consideration to efficiency. Yet the efficiency 
implications of his analysis are clear.124 As with the application of the Coasean framework 
to the legislative context, neither group would have any inherent interest in establishing 
an efficient rule. Drawing on the conceit of Coasean bargaining as it appeared above in 
the legislative context, it is possible to imagine a negotiated settlement would, depending 
on the status quo ante, allow the two groups to move from a less to a more efficient 
allocation of rights (or of risk, liability, cost avoidance etc) or to retain a more efficient 
allocation that already exists. 125 As with the ranchers and farmers from Coase’s notorious 
hypothetical, however, the haves and the have-nots would each be chiefly interested in 
moving the law to their advantage. Whether the law shifted to one group’s advantage or 
                                                        
123 Put differently, the analysis is not about classes in the Marxist sense, but about groups with a specific 
‘position of advantage.’ See ibid 103–04. 
124 Rubin eventually noted Galanter’s work on these issues, but dismissed it because Galanter had drawn 
no explicit conclusions concerning the efficiency implications of legal rules. Rubin, ‘Common Law and 
Statute Law’ (n 2) 212. Posner and Landes seem to have been alone among the Coaseans in recognizing the 
implications of Galanter’s model for invisible-hand arguments in favour of efficient common law. William 
M Landes and Richard A Posner, ‘Adjudication as a Private Good’ (1979) 8 J Legal Stud 235, 280. cf the 
treatment of Galanter in Priest and Klein (n 66) 28–29.  
125 Say the current law is inefficient, so that the current allocation of use-rights is suboptimal and the 
benefits of rearranging the allocation are outweighed by the costs of negotiating them, but that the costs of 
bargaining for a legal, global reassignment is low enough to render the reallocation a net gain. Conditional 
on the new rights-holders offering sufficient compensation to the original rights-holders, that change could 
be done in the context of a legal dispute. The implementation of this settlement would involve funding the 
litigation costs of the party advocating against the current rule (alternately, or in addition, bribing the party 
that currently holds the right to do a bad job at litigating) and possibly bribing the plaintiff to continue with 
the litigation, even if it would not otherwise be in their interest to do so. It is unclear, even if a bargained 
agreement of this sort were possible, why the groups would not just pay to have the claim dropped and 
change the law via legislation instead. Though no obvious examples come to mind, it is possible that the 
costs of making the change through litigation might be lower than using the legislative process. In practice, 
moreover, funding arrangements of this sort continue to be barred by rules against champerty and 
maintenance in many jurisdictions. Both of these issues can be integrated into analysis of the broader set 
of factors that condition the power of groups to shape the legal outcomes that implicate their interests.  
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the other’s, or into an efficient settlement that benefited both, would be determined by 
the effective power of the two groups.126  
Galanter’s argument thus becomes readable as an analysis of how the structural 
configuration of the litigation process allocates effective power to the groups whose 
interests it implicates, and what consequences that allocation has for the distribution of 
advantage between them. The structure of the litigation process creates a (potential) 
collective action problem for each group as they seek to establish the collective good 
entailed by a shift in the law (or its maintenance as-is) that would benefit that group’s 
members. Note that, as	a	group, the have-nots would be uninterested in trading a cash 
settlement in return for the maintenance of the disadvantageous rule, no matter how that 
settlement might be distributed among them. As a group, it would be to their mutual 
advantage to share the costs of paying the isolated one-shotter a windfall to reject the 
settlement offer whenever continuing with litigation would be expected to create or 
maintain a rule that favoured them. That transaction would of course be advantageous to 
the isolated one-shotter as well. 
The trouble is that, like individual consumers, individual have-nots face high costs in 
identifying the moments when an interest of theirs is at stake, high costs to become active 
in disputes that affect that interest, and a relatively low per-capita interest in the outcome 
of those disputes.127 And because the group is relatively large, it faces all the problems of 
coordination predicted by Olson’s theory. The costs of acting in concert are too high to 
make doing so worthwhile. The overall result is that the isolated one-shotter, much like 
the individual consumer at the ballot box, cannot help but be a bad representative of the 
broader class when choosing how to act during a legal dispute. Because of the long-term 
interest of the individual repeat player in the outcome of the dispute, by contrast, the 
haves face no effective collective action problem at all. No doubt, in a world without 
                                                        
126 See above, text to nn 88–92. 
127 To drive this point home, consider the group of have-nots composed of future plaintiffs in personal 
injury disputes. The individual members of this group do not and cannot know at the time of the current 
dispute that they will one day have an interest in its outcome, even though their stakes in that outcome may 
eventually be very large. Indeed, because of how tort law structures behaviour, the outcome of tort cases 
can make a difference in whether certain injuries happen at all. The costs of ‘identifying their own interest’ 
is functionally infinite. If the issue is imagined probabilistically, then have-nots must in essence be 
identified with the whole population, but the expected impact of the instant case on each member, that is, 
how the new rule will affect their interest in the event that they encounter a sufficiently similar situation, 
weighted by the likelihood of that event, becomes negligible. In either framework, the balance of costs and 
benefit mean that no individual, acting independently, has reason to keep abreast of personal injury 
disputes in which they are not involved; even less to become involved.  
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transaction costs it would be in the interest of the repeat player to rally the assistance of 
the other haves, whether that meant convincing them to split the expense (or income 
forgone) of taking a settlement with the one-shotter so as to avoid litigation of an 
advantageous rule, or getting them to share in the costs of litigating against a 
disadvantageous one. Yet it would often be in the repeat player’s interest to act to the 
haves’ advantage in any case, even when it was not possible to coordinate with them. In 
terms of Olson’s framework, the repeat player is in the position of the individual who 
finds that the marginal benefits of procuring a collective good outweigh the individual 
costs.128 
Let me close these examinations with a comment on one additional advantage Galanter 
suggested the haves might enjoy. Galanter’s paper explored other factors that might skew 
the legal rules and their application to the advantage of repeat players.129 Many of these 
arguments rest on an assumption about the parties’ relative wealth. Galanter developed 
the one-shotter/repeat-player dichotomy as a Weberian ideal type, combining a variety 
of analytically distinct but empirically correlated characteristics. One-shotters are not 
only small in terms of how often they confront a particular kind of legal dispute but also 
‘small’ in terms of total resources. Not only can repeat players expect to face the same 
kind of legal dispute repeatedly, they are also resource-rich compared to the amount 
directly at stake in the instant dispute.130 As Galanter admitted, these characteristics are 
not perfectly correlated.131 Yet in the majority of configurations in which the interests of 
haves and have-nots conflict, it seems to be a relevant factor.132 Galanter concluded from 
this correlation that a one-shotter might be more conservative than the repeat player in 
evaluating the stakes of the instant dispute. They would be willing to settle for a smaller 
                                                        
128 Galanter did not stress this aspect, but where repeat players are part of an industry with a small number 
of firms, they may also be able to coordinate through industry groups to make, settle, and litigate individual 
legal claims, much as they organize their activity to shape legislated law-making through lobbying. Olson 
suggested that the small number of firms was factor for the success of the interests they represented: Olson 
(n 93) 143. There is a deep literature on group litigation by organized industries. Eg Paul M Collins, ‘Interest 
Group Litigation’ in Friends	of	 the	Supreme	Court:	 Interest	Groups	and	 Judicial	Decision	Making (Oxford 
University Press 2008).  
129 For example, Galanter addressed ways in which the character and stratification of the legal profession 
might exacerbate or abate repeat-player advantage, echoing points made by the Coaseans, he underscored 
that increasing litigation costs favoured existing rules by increasing pressure to settle (Galanter (n 112) 
114–19, 121–22.); and he drew attention to the gaps between rules on the books and what actors could get 
away with, and suggested ways in which repeat players might have the advantage in the degree of 
‘penetration’ of formal rules and in structuring relationships under those rules (ibid 98, 103, 122, 149.) 
130 Galanter (n 112) 97–98. 
131 ibid 98, 103. 
132 For evidence, see the taxonomy in ibid 107–08.  
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amount, and less willing to spend on litigation, than would a richer litigant. 133 This effect 
would combine with another factor favouring repeat-players in litigation: their 
expectation that similar disputes would arise multiple times allows repeat players to 
enjoy economies of scale in litigation costs unavailable to one-shotters.134 Functionally 
speaking, then, the ‘productivity’ of their litigation preparation would likely be greater 
than that available to the one-shotter, even at the same level of expenditure on the 
individual dispute.  
III. Contingency	and	Indeterminacy	in	the	Evolution	of	Laws	
What can be concluded in the aggregate from this comparison of Galanter and Stigler’s 
seminal articles? To summarize, the parallels in the structure of their arguments cut 
directly against the suggestion, made by the early interpreters of Posner and by Stigler, 
that any mode of law-making has an inherent tendency to move toward or away from 
some standard of efficiency. Once the Posnerians turned to the questions Galanter had 
raised, they were quick to reconsider their claims as well.  
The selective litigation models had failed to account for the collective action problem 
entailed by a system where universally applicable laws were determined through 
individual disputes. They had essentially equated the parties’ relative stakes in a dispute 
with the distribution of costs between the classes of economic actors whose interactions 
would be structured by the rule at issue.135 As put by Cooter and Rubinfeld, selective 
                                                        
133 ibid 99–100. To translate the point into economics terminology, Galanter seems to have been getting at 
the idea that risk aversion might be wealth-relative, so that, for a fixed estimate of the direct amount at 
stake, the one-shotter could be treated as risk-averse and the repeat player as risk-neutral. There is some 
empirical evidence that risk attitudes are in fact wealth-relative. Luigi Guiso and Monica Paiella, ‘Risk 
Aversion, Wealth, and Background Risk’ (2008) 6 Journal of the European Economic Association 1109. 
134 Galanter (n 112) 98, 114. 
135  Priest not only assumed that the parties to a dispute faced symmetrical stakes in an adjudicated 
outcome, but also equated the stakes of the dispute for those parties with the joint costs for all actors 
subject to the rule at play in the dispute. Priest (n 63) 66–67. Rubin’s distinction between ‘parties interested 
in precedent’ and ‘parties not interested in precedent’ maps roughly onto Galanter’s typology of one-
shotters and repeat-players. Though he did not emphasize the point in his introduction, his conclusion that 
the common law could tend toward efficiency was limited to his ‘Case A’, that is, to areas dominated by 
disputes between two parties with an interest in precedent. Rubin, ‘Why is the Common Law Efficient’ (n 
65) 53–57. Pace Rubin however, the relevant issue, as made clear by Galanter’s analysis, is how well the 
parties to the dispute represent the groups with an interest in the underlying rule, not just how the rule 
will affect the net costs of the parties themselves. cf Hadfield, who suggested that, beyond these structural 
factors, disputes would actually tend to be triggered by a party who was a bad representative of the broader 
class. Gillian K Hadfield, ‘Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules Symposium: Positive Political Theory and 
Public Law’ (1992) 80 Geo L J 583. Cooter and Kornhauser’s critique and analysis of the first-generation 
‘efficient common law’ arguments likewise addressed the question of whether inefficient rules would be 
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litigation creates a confrontation between distribution and efficiency. Individual litigants 
will ultimately be more concerned with capturing the returns from a favourable ruling 
than with the costs such a ruling might impose on society as a whole.136 The Posnerian 
litigation expenditure models fared no better. They too depended on the existence of a 
neat mapping between the distribution of private costs a court decision would impose on 
the parties to a dispute and the distribution of social losses occasioned by that ruling.137 
much in line with Galanter’s inferences, the structure of their arguments once this 
assumption was relaxed suggested, that the effect of litigation expenditures on rule-
making would again tend to favour the groups whose interests were well-represented in 
litigation, a tendency that could favour efficient allocations of resources—or not.138  
In the law-and-economics community, these and other failures soon reshaped thinking 
not only about judge-made law, but about the trajectory of law more generally. Let me 
deal with these two aspects in turn. First, stuck between a commitment to invisible-hand 
explanations and faith in the efficiency of the common law, backers of Posner’s original 
thesis about the common law’s efficiency split.139 Though Posner ultimately conceded 
that inefficient rules could easily survive the churn of an unguided litigation process,140 
he cleaved to his original thesis by doubling down on the role of reason and insight in 
determining judicial output,141 a position substantively adopted by a number of of his 
colleagues. 142  Other scholars, however, including those who had mooted the earlier 
‘evolutionary’ theories, largely abandoned the hypothesis of the common law’s efficiency, 
though many retained the project of developing invisible-hand, and explicitly 
evolutionary, explanations of trends in precedent.143  
                                                        
more likely to be litigated without distinguishing the parties to the dispute from the actors subject to the 
rule. Cooter and Kornhauser (n 62) 150–56. 
136 Robert D Cooter and Daniel L Rubinfeld, ‘Trial Courts: An Economic Perspective’ (1990) 24 Law & Soc’y 
Rev 533, 1092–93. 
137 Goodman, to his credit, made this limitation on his original argument explicit. Goodman (n 64) 395, 398. 
138 Cooter and Kornhauser (n 62) 156. 
139 See Rubin, ‘Common Law and Statute Law’ (n 2) 205–06. 
140 Using an extension of Rubin’s model, Landes and Posner found that while efficient rules might become 
more so over time, inefficient rules would often ‘lie dormant.’ Landes and Posner (n 124) 272, 279. 
141 See eg Posner, ‘Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law’ (n 55) 294–95; see Hadfield (n 135) 583–
84. 
142 ‘Our view is, so far as common law tends toward efficiency, it must be driven by the ideas of judges, not 
by competitive pressures in the market for litigation.’ Robert D Cooter and Daniel L Rubinfeld, ‘Economic 
Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution’ (1989) 27 Journal of Economic Literature 1067, 1093. 
143 Rubin, who developed the first ‘evolutionary’ model to explain the efficiency hypothesis, has concluded 
that these models ‘failed’ in their explanatory ambition. Paul H Rubin, ‘Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency: 
Supply and Demand’ (2005) 13 Sup Ct Econ Rev 19, 21. One notable holdout, whose conclusions appear to 
be based on an uncritical and selective reading of the earliest literature, is Jeffrey E Stake, ‘Evolution of 
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Second, as for the trajectory of law more broadly, many of the erstwhile Posnerians came 
to acknowledge the parallels between Stigler’s critique of legislation and Galanter’s 
account of how interests shape litigation outcomes.144 Rubin, for example, developed an 
informal model that tied the efficiency of a given body of law (whether produced through 
litigation or legislation) to the ‘costs of organizing interests groups.’145 Patterns in the 
relative efficiency of bodies of law were thus explainable by reference to the time they 
were created, under the assumption of a gradually improving technology of collective 
action. 146  Oddly, however, the premise that efficiency-bias is greater in judicial law-
making than in legislative law-making has demonstrated remarkable staying power,147 
enjoying something of a second life in discussions of the purported advantages of 
common law over civil law systems.148 The law-and-economics community has continued 
to generate literature trying to model the conditions under which judge made law will, in 
fact, be more efficient than legislation.  
So, are the norms produced through litigation more efficient than democratic legislation? 
One way to evaluate the hypothesis might be to line up the literature on each side of the 
debate, eliminate claims based on obvious logical errors, cancel out parameters that 
                                                        
Rules in a Common Law System: Differential Litigation of the Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities’ (2005) 32 Fla 
St U L Rev 25. On continued efforts to account for the content of case law using invisible-hand explanations, 
see R Peter Terrebonne, ‘A Strictly Evolutionary Model of Common Law’ (1981) 10 JLS 397; Rubin, 
‘Common Law and Statute Law’ (n 2); Cooter and Rubinfeld (n 142) 1091–93; Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei 
Shleifer, ‘The Evolution of Common Law’ (2007) 115 Journal of Political Economy 43.  
144 Hirshleifer seems to be the first to make an explicit that the pathologies which attend ‘contests of 
strength’ can occur in any law-making arena: Jack Hirshleifer, ‘Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: 
Cooperation Versus Conflict Strategies’ (1982) 4 Research in Law and Economics 1, 46–49. Rubin had 
hinted at but did not develop these parallels in his first model. Rubin, ‘Why is the Common Law Efficient’ 
(n 65) 61. 
145 Rubin, ‘Common Law and Statute Law’ (n 2). This ‘technology of collective action’ model drew directly 
from Olson, and especially on Hirshleifer (n 144). 
146 Rubin’s high-level conclusions do not quite match his analysis. In the body of the paper, he frames the 
central issue in terms of how well the social interests on each side of an issue are represented in the law-
making process, however conducted. In his introduction and conclusion, he seems to suggest that relative 
inefficiency is a matter of whether law-making activities are dominated by individuals or by groups. Rubin, 
‘Common Law and Statute Law’ (n 2) 222.  
147 Hadfield (n 135). Often, this scholarship has rejected the claim that common law tends toward absolute 
efficiency, instead mooting the position that litigation can shift precedent toward efficiency, and 
specifically, move it ‘closer’ to efficiency than would statutory rule-making. See eg Gennaioli and Shleifer (n 
143); Giacomo AM Ponzetto and Patricio A Fernandez, ‘Case Law versus Statute Law: An Evolutionary 
Comparison’ (2008) 37 JLS 379. For the earliest model of the efficiency-bias of a continually-shifting body 
of law (albeit one expressing scepticism about whether the necessary mechanisms were realized in the real 
world), see Cooter and Kornhauser (n 62). 
148 Eg Paul G Mahoney, ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right’ (2001) 30 J Legal 
Stud 503; Edward L Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Legal Origins’ (2002) 117 The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 1193; Ponzetto and Fernandez (n 147). Debates about the relative superiority of the common 
law over the civil law are an important theme in Chapter 5 below.  
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conflict with real-world behaviours, and grant victory to whatever reasons are left 
standing.  
The very bulk and indeterminacy of the literature, however, provides crucial evidence of 
the correct answer. The diversity of claims does not illustrate which side is most favoured 
in the broader debate but instead shows the degree to which answers turn on the 
specifications of the underlying models. Galanter and Stigler both made visible, in their 
own way, that it is not the type of law-making that determines the direction of legal 
change, nor the identity of the participants, but how well the participants, acting through 
a specific process, represent the broader interests at stake. Nothing since published in 
law and economics has refuted that fundamental observation.149 Instead, the literature 
can best be understood as, first, an exploration of the factors shaping the effective 
representation of interests within various law-making processes and, second, as a 
speculation about the importance of those factors in shaping the trends in particular legal 
regimes or areas of law. Hadfield, for example, addressed the consequences of general 
rules being applied to a diversity of particular situations and interactions. By modelling 
the diverse consequences of a rule on the distribution of costs, and the attendant shifts of 
activity in interactions where the rule is implicated, she predicted that precedent would 
move toward efficiency only by chance, even if judges were trying to maximize aggregate 
welfare.150 Even without strategic behaviour on either side, the particular litigants that 
turned up at court to challenge a rule would always be bad representatives of the larger 
class of actors affected by the rule. 151  Studies modelling the case law system have 
considered the complications introduced by the participation of lawyers152 and by the 
                                                        
149 Admittedly, some scholarship has come to contrary conclusions by ignoring these questions. Ponzetto 
and Fernandez, for example, build a stochastic model of legal change that suggests judicial law-making will 
gradually converge toward whatever rule judges prefer, on average, while legislative norms bounce around 
near the ‘legislature’s preference.’ Placing this stochastic model atop a micro-behavioural model in which 
average judicial rule-preferences and the ‘legislature’s preference’ both centre on the efficient rule, 
however constructed, yields their conclusion that case law tends toward efficiency, while legislation does 
not. Their behavioural premises, however, account neither for the biases that Galanter suggested would be 
introduced by selective litigation, nor for the structural factors that shape the formation of interest groups 
in the legislative process. While they model the effect of interest groups on the legislative process and on 
the selection of judges, they assume that these interest groups, on average, represent an unbiased sample 
from the preferences of the population. Ponzetto and Fernandez (n 147). 
150 The crux of her argument is that the parties who challenge a rule will generally be parties for whom the 
rule works least well. Hadfield (n 135).  
151 Hadfield suggested that the inclusion of strategic behaviour would exacerbate dynamics in her model, 
but not fundamentally alter them. ibid 590, n 29. 
152 See eg Paul H Rubin and Martin J Bailey, ‘The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law’ (1994) 23 JLS 807; 
Frank B Cross, ‘The Role of Lawyers in Positive Theories of Doctrinal Evolution’ (1996) 45 Emory LJ 523. 
Rubin and Bailey developed and empirically test a model of lawyer-driven change in products liability law 
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structure of the courts; 153  they have modified earlier approaches to account for the 
specific incentives faced by judges, 154  and to integrate attention to how precedent 
functions in one type of legal system or another. 155  Crew and Twight analysed the 
possible consequences where government officials can manipulate organization costs 
(transaction costs) that shape the ability of interest groups to pursue their interests.156  
The upshot of this perspective is clear. Beyond any strict distinction between judge-made 
law and statute—or, more brazenly, between common law and civil law traditions—the 
relative efficiency of a particular area of law, or even of a particular doctrine, will turn on 
a combination of factors. The relative size of the groups whose interests are at stake, the 
shifting costs of coordinating in pursuit collective goods both in general and for particular 
interests, the aggregation and weighing of interests by law-making institutions, including 
the institutional incentives of law-makers—each of these factors might make a decisive 
difference to the overall outcome. Small differences in these factors can make the 
difference between the conclusion that doctrines of judge-made contract law will tend 
toward efficiency today and the conclusions that the promotion of efficiency in contract 
law was limited to a mode of precedential reasoning that disappeared in the eighteenth 
century.157 Whether the law-making trends are dominated by efficiency- or rent-seeking 
changes, or by random drift is ultimately contingent on a large number of small factors.158 
The devil is in the details.  
                                                        
in the United States. Cross critiqued their model and offered a larger battery of empirical tests that did not 
accord with their hypothesis.  
153 Lewis A Kornhauser, ‘Modeling Collegial Courts I: Path-Dependence’ (1992) 12 International Review of 
Law and Economics 169; Michael A Crew and Charlotte Twight, ‘On the Efficiency of Law: A Public Choice 
Perspective’ (1990) 66 Public Choice 15, 26. 
154 Landes and Posner (n 56); Todd J Zywicki, ‘The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-
Side Analysis’ (2002–03) 97 Nw U L Rev 1551. See also Georg Von Wangenheim, ‘The Evolution of Judge-
Made Law’ (1993) 13 Int’l Rev L & Econ 381. 
155 Landes and Posner (n 124); Zywicki (n 154). See also Vincy Fon and others, ‘Litigation, Judicial Path-
Dependence, and Legal Change’ (2005) 20 Eur J Law Econ 43. 
156 While they noted that judges could radically restructure the constraints on law-making, especially via 
adjudication on constitutional questions, they studied the incentives for and consequences of ‘transaction-
cost manipulation,’ ie ‘when government officials restructure the transaction costs that constrain the 
revision of government authority.’ Crew and Twight (n 153) 21–22. 
157 Compare ibid 26; Zywicki (n 154) 1566–67. 
158 Rubin concluded that where the population of disputes is dominated by parties with no long-term 
interest in precedent, the result will be unstructured movement between various configurations of a rule. 




The more recent studies in the Posnerian tradition have also foregrounded a key set of 
issues, without which any discussion of legal evolution is an overreach. In particular, these 
studies have closely considered the actual dynamics of change, an issue which Galanter, 
Stigler, and the early Posnerians had all given only passing attention. Only attention to 
the diachronic can distinguish an explanation of law’s nature (or function) from an 
explanation of its past (or prediction of its future) trajectory. More recent studies have 
turned to this dimension in earnest, and come to very different conclusions as a result.  
Though Galanter did not expressly mention evolution, his account sought to develop not 
only an explanation of law, but an explanation of legal change over time that emphasized 
the iterative, gradual unfolding of the law-making process. Because the adjudication of 
individual cases will seldom result in a radical shift in legal norms, his argument 
depended on the repeated litigation of an issue by similarly situated parties. Stigler’s 
account, by contrast, completely ignored time as a salient factor. Rather than a series of 
law-making decisions, Stigler modelled individual regulatory norms as if they were the 
outcome of a single, one-off interaction between policy-makers and powerful interest 
groups. He turned his mind to how pre-existing institutional structures channelled forces 
for change, and characterized the result as an emergent effect of forces acting in that 
context. In accordance with his overarching market metaphor, the result framed 
prevailing law as something like an equilibrium between forces pushing law in 
countervailing directions. 159  It would not take much additional analysis of the 
indeterminacy of legislative coalitions, 160  the interest of political entrepreneurs in 
ensuring funders never have their wishes fully satisfied,161 or the stochastic dimension of 
                                                        
159 Stigler identified a number of second-order effects, and prevailing institutional protections that created 
a drag on industry rent-seeking. More importantly, he suggested that mounting losses for those 
disadvantaged by a policy would eventually shift the cost-benefit calculations for voters to act and organize 
against it. Essentially, industry could only get away with taking so much of the cake. Peltzman offers a clear 
mathematical formalization of this point. Stigler (n 53) 6–7, 12; Peltzman (n 107) 214–17. 
160 Peltzman’s formalization of Stigler’s model showed that Stigler’s outcome depended only on the size of 
the winning and losing groups, not their particular interests or characteristics, but also that a vote-
maximizing legislator would be likely to include compensation for some of the losers. Peltzman (n 107) 
213–21. 




actual political outcomes 162  to transform Stigler’s model into an account of gradual, 
piecemeal movement of legislation away from the public good and toward the benefit of 
special interests. 
Yet Stigler and Galanter represent only two of the possibilities that result when dynamics 
are put front and centre. Galanter modelled a process that would move in one direction 
without limit, regardless of its starting point. Stigler, by contrast, though he did not 
integrate careful attention to time into his account, presented a system stabilized at the 
equilibrium between opposing forces—like a falling object reaching terminal velocity or 
a balance that squares two weights. The unbounded trend (Galanter) and the slide toward 
a prefigured extremum (Stigler) are only two of the shapes that a dynamic system might 
trace. Because they were focused on an individual law-making decision, those other 
possibilities were given no consideration in the early Posnerian accounts of judicial law-
making, either.  
Once the Posnerians began developing models to account for the diachronic dimension, 
they discerned a much larger repertoire of possible forms that could be traced out by 
law’s path of change over time. Cooter and Kornhauser, accepting for the sake of 
argument that inefficient laws would have a higher likelihood of being litigated, showed 
that law could endlessly move between various configurations, settling on no final resting 
point but instead inscribing a long term pattern of intermittent periods spent among 
those possibilities.163 They concluded that the processes depicted by the earlier models 
might produce a legal expectation relatively more efficient than an initial rule, but could 
not permanently fix precedent on the most efficient rule.  
Cooter and Kornhauser’s model still predicted a relatively stable and determinate output, 
just realized at a higher level of abstraction. Even without modelling the details of the 
system’s long-term behaviour, Landes and Posner showed with a rather straightforward 
extension of Rubin’s model that a simple account of precedent’s role in litigation could 
lead case law toward or away from efficiency, depending on the bias in the corpus of 
previously decided cases.164 Priest suggested that the trajectory would depend not on 
                                                        
162 Ponzetto and Fernandez model the long-term state of the law produced through the legislative process 
as an outcome that results from pressure exercised by varied interest groups whose influence in any 
particular period is probabilistic rather than certain. Ponzetto and Fernandez (n 147) 394–97. 
163 Cooter and Kornhauser (n 62). 
164 Landes and Posner (n 124) 273–74, 275–77, 281–84. See also Von Wangenheim (n 154). 
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whether the prior jurisprudence favoured one position or the other, but on the level of 
division and disagreement this jurisprudence expressed. 165  By taking into account 
countervailing judicial interests, in creating innovative precedents on the one hand and 
falling line with their colleagues’ decisions on the other, Wangenheim provided a simple 
model of how case law might not only exhibit cyclical behaviour, but could move 
chaotically in ways not capturable by any deterministic mathematical model.166 It seems 
the invisible hand in law-making belongs not only to a capricious spirit, but to an 
unreliable one as well. It is not just that small differences in structural parameters can 
make a large difference to the outcome; the ‘outcome’ may depend on historical 
circumstances, and be no more than a temporary local orbit in a much larger, 
unpredictable itinerary.  
V. Conclusion	
From the perspective of those who first set out to vindicate Posner’s vision of a common 
law shaped by an invisible hand that would, much like the market, allocate resources to 
their most efficient use, the analysis in this chapter definitively routs their ambition. If 
the underlying vision of law is adequate, however, what can be salvaged from the 
Posnerian tradition is the broad claim that the long-term state of norms emerges from 
the continuous action of diverse forces, rather than from a centralized design or unified 
purpose. That conclusion applies regardless of the form of law-making that contributed 
most to a given rule, regime, or doctrine. 
On the other hand, the critique works toward a reconstruction of a unified, Coasean (or 
Coase–Olsonian) analytic of legal change. This reconstruction tenders an onstensibly 
powerful toolkit to understand the causal factors that shape trends in the law. So long as 
it does not turn out to suffer from some fundamental flaw in its characterization of law 
or of law’s relation to social action, that toolkit promises penetrating insights. Wielded 
prudently, by focusing on particular coordination problems or narrow legal problems, it 
could predict whether legal developments amended through a particular process 
                                                        
165  Priest, having retreated from his identification of the stakes for the parties with the overall cost 
consequences of the dispute (see above, n 135), emphasized that the disputes selected for litigation would 
likely be biased towards situations in which the parties differed significantly in their subjective probability 
judgements about success at trial. George L Priest, ‘Selective Characteristics of Litigation’ (1980) 9 J Legal 
Stud 399.  
166 Von Wangenheim (n 154). 
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involving particular modes of representing relevant interests are likely to promote 
efficiency, favour the narrow interests of one kind of actor, or otherwise. There is more. 
So long as there are no fundamental gaps in the reconstructed vision of law and its 
economic-political context, this reconstruction indicates a pathway to developing a 
normative analysis of the form that law-making should take when confronting an 
adequately defined and delimited legal issue.167  
The model, now afforded its maximum strength, also provides the seed for the analysis in 
the remainder of the dissertation. 
 At least in its ambitions, the Coasean approach meets the criteria of an evolutionary 
theory of legal change set out in Chapter 1. It offers a model of legal change in which 
norms emerge from the iterative interaction of diverse causal factors, attends to the 
mechanisms through which those factors are aggregated, and flows out of a clear 
commitment to positivist theorizing. However, the approach may under closer scrutiny 
turn out to be an inadequate evolutionary theory, especially when it comes to its 
generality and empirical validity. Even in this generalized form, it is hard to see how a 
model based in pecuniary interests could be applied to litigations between individuals 
and the state.168 There is moreover a real possibility that the factors emphasized by the 
model are less than definitive—even relatively unimportant. As Galanter pointed out in 
his classic text, understanding how self-interest and strategic behaviour might impinge 
on legal change is independent of how large those effects are compared to other 
factors.169 It may be that the model requires a richer account of the motivations that drive 
behaviour under law. The Coasean approach draws on a thin, neoclassical approach to 
legal normativity that treats law’s relevance for behaviour as a price or cost.170 In effect, 
it imagines that norms affect behaviour only via the threat or promise that their 
enforcement will increase or decrease the expected return of engaging in a regulated 
activity. As has been emphasized in a now-rich body of literature, norms may also 
                                                        
167 cf Hadfield’s work on legal system design and the institutional determinants of the ‘quality of law.’ Gillian 
K Hadfield, ‘The Levers of Legal Design: Institutional Determinants of the Quality of Law’ (2008) 36 Journal 
of Comparative Economics 43. 
168 Priest (n 165) 404 n 23; Galanter (n 112) 111–12. cf Hadfield, who notes that the Coasean analysis is ill-
suited to litigation under statute. Hadfield (n 135) 586. 
169 Galanter (n 112) 102–03. 
170 Lewis A Kornhauser, ‘The New Economic Analysis of Law: Legal Rules as Incentives’ in Nicholas Mercuro 
(ed), Law	and	Economics (Kluwer Academic 1989) 35. 
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function more directly, as reasons for action. 171  Self-interest may not be quite as 
important as these models make it out to be.172  
Despite these limitations and caveats, my intuition is that, in the absence of a more 
fundamental defect, the Coasean approach could be salvaged through a combination of 
supplements, expansions, and substitutions. More strongly, I doubt it is possible to 
understand the dynamics of change in legal rules in the modern era without giving some 
attention to the kind of selfish material ends that law and economics has traditionally 
turned on. Nonetheless, we might subtly discern, lying behind the Coasean approach, a 
more general account in which normative preferences, institutional constraint, and 
legally-structured behaviour work together to transform laws over time.  
The Coasean approach serves well as a starting point for the explorations in the 
remainder of the dissertation, in part because it serves as a credible proxy for this 
inchoate evolutionary approach to-be, but above all because it presents a powerful 
analytical frame in which knowledge is not a salient factor. It therefore stands as a 
candidate for an evolutionary theory of legal change. Knowledge is of course present in 
multiple elements of the model. The approach assumes that economic actors a) know 
their own preferences and the preferences of others, b) that they have shared opinions 
regarding how political institutions will channel their lobbying or litigation strategies, 
and c) that they have a shared understanding of how law adds or subtracts to the 
advantages of engaging in certain behaviour. But again, there seems to be nothing to gain 
from rephrasing the model’s matters-of-fact in epistemic terms. The actors have interests 
and behaviours, the law shapes their incentives, they act strategically under constraint, 
and changes to the law emerge as a result. It is not obvious what would be gained by also 
saying that the actors know	these things.  
In the next chapter, however, I find that the Coasean approach is dogged by a more 
fundamental defect. Attending to some questions raised by evolutionary theory makes it 
                                                        
171  See e.g. ibid 42–49. McAdams, in offering an alternative account of the relation between law and 
behaviour, roughly divides the preexisting literature on obedience to the law between the approach 
favoured in the economic analysis of law, emphasizing how ‘law coerces,’ and a more sociological approach 
interested in how ‘law persuades.’ Richard McAdams, ‘The Expressive Power of Adjudication’ (2005) 2005 
U Ill L Rev 1043, 1045. 
172  Shavell has considered the possibility that actors choosing how to respond to a norm, might be 
motivated in part by a desire to advance the social good or promote social welfare. Steven Shavell, ‘When 
Is Compliance with the Law Socially Desirable?’ (2012) 41 JLS 1. 
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much harder to ignore the relation between actions, preferences, and laws—and what 





3 — A Problem of Contested Knowledge 






This chapter develops a number of ideas, concepts, and critiques that legal scholars have 
adapted from evolutionary theory, and deploys the resulting theoretical repertoire to 
expose the limits of the Coasean paradigm of legal evolution. The result of those 
investigations will be a clear articulation of the ways that the knowledge claims of 
economic actors enter as a salient factor into the processes that determine the path and 
structure of legal change.  
Many champions of legal evolution are committed to the premise that developing an 
evolutionary account of legal change requires an adaptation of ideas and concepts from 
evolutionary theory writ large. Structurally, this chapter is staged as an investigation into 
what such concepts can add to or reveal about accounts that, in their ambitions, 
otherwise meet the usual criteria of being ‘evolutionary.’ In Part I, I explore a number of 
concepts that have been central to arguments borrowed from evolutionary theory by 
legal scholars: adaptation, the Darwinian algorithm of variation, selection, and 
inheritance, genetic inertia, units of selection, and replicators and interactors. My analysis 
does not simply ‘put these ideas on the table,’ but explores their relationships, reviews 
their prior use in legal scholarship, and generates a typology of theories that are 
distinguished by their explanatory reach and by the elements they must contain. The goal 
is to sand off the rough edges of these concepts, sharpen their critical thrust, and improve 
their capacity to appraise, strengthen, or reveal fatal flaws in existing accounts of legal 
change. 
                                                        
1 RH Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 JL & Econ 1. 
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The chapter’s key contribution to the overall argument of the dissertation, however, lies 
in Part III, which returns to the Coasean approaches to legal change reviewed in the last 
chapter. The upshot of the argument is that the heterogeneity of actors, activities, and 
events to which rules may apply creates a problem of shared knowledge regarding the 
scope and extent of application of any given legal norm. Because actors are self-
interested, however, disagreements over these semantic or epistemic questions will 
require their own mode of dispute resolution. These questions are in fact answered, for 
the most part, through the legal system itself, but they are also necessarily dealt with 
through the legal system. The consequence for models of legal change, however, is to 
throw a cloud of suspicion over any account that fails to attend to the transformation of 
legal form. To formalize this argument, Part II provides a close reading of an exemplary 
contribution to the Coasean paradigm, written by William Landes and Richard Posner.  
As I relate in the conclusions (Part IV), this argument stands on its own. Neither its 
validity, nor its salience for the Coasean paradigm ultimately depend on the evolutionary 
concepts that I elaborate in Part I. Nonetheless, the structure of the chapter clearly 
documents how the argument was developed, and including the conceptual background 
is an important part of showing the intellectual inspirations by which the argument 
developed. More broadly, the arc of the analysis in this chapter demonstrates the critical 
intervention that evolutionary theory can make in efforts to understand legal change. As 
I stress, processes of legal change may not in the end be mappable using the repertoire of 
evolutionary biology. But this chapter shows that evolutionary theory certainly can 
generate critical questions about those processes.  
I. Adaptationism,	 the	 Darwinian	 Algorithm,	 and	 Evolutionary	
Theory:	Some	Conceptual	Groundwork	
Within the broad variety of evolutionary accounts of legal change identifiable by 
arguments rooted in mechanisms and emergence, is a narrower type that specifically 
draws by analogy from modern evolutionary theory. In this part, I compare, contrast, and 
critique a number of concepts that have been deployed by legal scholars who have been 
both supportive and sceptical of the project to assimilate legal change to a perspective 
inspired by Darwinian natural selection.  
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One key conclusion of this part is that efforts to develop evolutionary theories of legal 
change will fall into one of three categories. First, they may model change in accordance 
with a ‘classical view’ of natural selection. If a set of entities which is reproduced over 
time is subject to inter-generational variation, selective reproduction on the basis of 
those variations, and inheritance of those variations between generations, then the 
population will tend to develop in a way that increases the prevalence of those variants. 
An evolutionary account of legal change in this sense will require only a description of 
the mechanisms of variation, selection, and inheritance.  
Second, they may imagine legal change as a Darwinian process that much more closely 
tracks biotic evolution. The key complication of biotic evolution is the self-replication of 
life. This wrinkle adds significant complexity both to the number of entities and processes 
that need to be identified, and whose relationships need accounting for. Yet the more 
complex view offers a possible way to frame the genetic inertia, that is, the relative 
stability, of legal norms.  
The third possibility of course is that an adequate evolutionary account might be 
developed without any substantive parallels to natural selection.  
The other key conclusion of this part concerns adaptation. Critical commentary by Robert 
Gordon and others long ago suggested that any account of legal change that leads to a 
prediction that law is adaptive, or ‘functional,’ will almost certainly be wrong. Certainly, 
one advantage of the biological parallel is its explanation of why adaptation will only ever 
be partial and constrained.  
A. The	Darwinian	Algorithm	
Among those working to develop theories of legal change, the most conspicuous 
borrowing from evolutionary theory is the so-called ‘Darwinian algorithm’ of variation, 
selection, and inheritance.2 The logic of the algorithm is simple. A population of entities 
is reproduced over time. The population is subject to a process that causes variations in 
characteristics of some individuals in that population. Reproduction is selective: not all 
individuals reproduce. The variable characteristics affect the relative reproductive 
success of individuals. Last but not least, the characteristics that affect reproductive 
                                                        
2 For the complexities and challenges of borrowing from evolutionary theory and a short introduction to 
the Darwinian algorithm, see Chapter 1, Part IV.  
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success can be inherited by future individuals in the population. The logic is then that 
success-supporting characteristics will become more prevalent across the population.  
Today, the most well-known interpretation of Darwin’s theory is likely the account in 
Richard Dawkins’ 1977 book, The	Selfish	Gene. Dawkins did not explicitly draw on the 
Darwinian algorithm, but it is not difficult to fit it to his account of evolution. The 
mechanism of retention is the self-replicating power of the DNA molecule;3 variations are 
introduced through various forms of genetic mutation;4 and the mechanism of selection 
operates through competition, or ‘the struggle for existence,’ among alleles, genes with 
similar locations on the genetic code.5 Naturally, the story is more complicated than mere 
competition between DNA molecules.6 Nonetheless, according to Dawkins, ‘[t]he same 
old processes of automatic selection between rival molecules by reason of their longevity, 
fecundity, and copying-fidelity, still go on as blindly and as inevitably as they did in the 
far-off days.’7 
The algorithm is not a magic formula however. There is a tendency to believe having 
located three elements that look like ‘variation,’ ‘selection’ and ‘reproduction’ in an 
ongoing process of transformation, that the explanatory payoff will come about 
automatically. As it turns out, the capacity of the schema to shed light on processes of 
change depends both on its integration into more complex theory and in careful choice 
about how its elements are articulated.  
B. Adaptationism	and	Natural	Selection	
Before saying more about the pitfalls one can fall into when trying to characterize a 
process in terms of the operation of the Darwinian algorithm, I need to address another 
concept. In a now-seminal contribution to legal historiography, Robert Gordon gave 
consideration and extended critique of a concept he called ‘evolutionary functionalism.’8 
Gordon’s paper was an attempt to summarize, validate, and extend a set of critiques that 
had previously been directed at a tacit view of ‘law-in-history’ that was and continues to 
                                                        
3 ‘DNA molecules … replicate, that is to say they make copies of themselves … the DNA molecules are now 
very good at it indeed.’ Richard Dawkins, The	Selfish	Gene (1st edn, Oxford University Press 1976) 24. 
4 ibid 32–33. 
5 ibid 20–21, 25. 
6 The most important addition to this narrative may be sexual reproduction, which not only supplements, 
but also significantly complicates all three mechanisms of variation and selection. ibid 28–32. 
7 ibid 25. 
8 Robert W Gordon, ‘Critical Legal Histories’ (1984) 36 Stan L Rev 57. 
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be preponderant among American legal scholars and jurists more generally.9 In its most 
common incarnation, that view explains prevailing legal forms, or even a society’s entire 
legal system, as a necessary response to the demands of modern society, achieved 
through an adaptive process.10  
Gordon’s concept is a broad tent that offers a vague ideal type rather than precise criteria 
that would clearly distinguish functionalist from non-functionalist accounts of the nature 
of law and legal change. Buried within his article, however, is a more expansive but more 
precisely articulated definition of ‘functionalism:’  
I’m reserving the term ‘functionalism’ for the … type of explanation … that first posits a 
set of ‘primary,’ more-or-less objective needs or dynamic processes and then explains 
‘secondary’ historical phenomena as responses to those needs or processes.11 
The aspect of ‘evolutionary functionalism’ Gordon was most sceptical of was thus not the 
treatment of social needs as explanans, but the much more common relegation of law 
solely to the role of explicandum.12 The broader type of functionalism he was attempting 
to dispel, in other words, encompassed all explanations that framed current legal rules or 
practices as a function of some factor or factors exterior to law, as in the mathematical 
form 𝑦 𝑓 𝑥 , which defines 𝑦 as a function of 𝑥. Gordon specifically identified both 
Stigler’s model of legislation and Posnerian accounts of efficient judge-made law, along 
with at least one strain of Marxist legal historiography, as straight applications of 
functionalism in this broad sense, albeit with interests rather than social needs serving 
as the primary independent variable.13  
The confusions that weigh down even a solitary scholar’s use of ‘functionalism’ vividly 
illustrate the semantic traps of leaning on contested terms. Gordon originally developed 
a critique of this conception of functionalism in an earlier paper, using the term 
adaptationism,14 and for a number of reasons I will adopt Gordon’s initial usage in what 
follows.  
                                                        
9 ibid 57–58. 
10 ibid 63–65.  
11 ibid 61, n 11. 
12 Gordon’s article is more of a historiographical critique than an attempt at analytical philosophy, so it 
leaves it unclear whether this social functionalism, that is to say functionalism driven by the response to 
social needs, is the concept he intends to be identified with ‘evolutionary functionalism.’ 
13 Gordon (n 8) 65, 69, 71–75. 
14 Robert W Gordon, ‘Historicism in Legal Scholarship’ (1981) 90 Yale LJ 1017, 1028–36. 
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In an often-cited article on evolutionary jurisprudence, MBW Sinclair argued that an 
account of legal change does not count as ‘evolutionary’ unless it includes a description 
of each of the three mechanisms in the Darwinian algorithm. The target of his critiques 
was a class of theories that lack an account of retention. He believed that such theories, 
properly called, are ‘not evolutionary, but merely adaptationist,’15 expressly adopting 
Gordon’s sense of adaptationism.  
Sinclair’s effort to identify adaptationism as a failure of proper ‘evolutionary’ analysis is 
not a perfect fit with Gordon’s. Selection and variation acting together may comprise an 
adaptive process, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient elements of one. A rule 
that is deliberately designed to be efficient in a given institutional, economic, or political 
context can be described as adaptive or responsive to that context just as easily as a rule 
produced through a series of fortuitous accidents. Recalling the conceit introduced in 
Chapter 1, of water poured into a cup taking the shape of a cup, it might be said that ‘the 
water has adapted to its environment,’ or ‘the shape of the water is now a function of the 
shape of the cup.’ Yet speaking of that relation in terms of selection and variation would 
needlessly confuse the matter. It likewise stretches the intended meaning too far to 
describe deliberately designed rules as the product of selection and variation. Selection 
and variation mechanisms acting together are not by themselves sufficient to produce an 
adaptive process, either. Selection pressures may not be strong enough to have a 
meaningful impact on the nature of the variants produced over time. The variants 
generated may be deviant from the perspective of prevailing selection pressures. A 
mismatch between the variation mechanism and the selection mechanism could just as 
easily lead to the extermination of a population as a good fit between the two mechanisms 
could lead to a change in the dominant variant. 
Sinclair’s usage nonetheless possesses a certain logic. The continual operation of 
variation and selection mechanisms can produce outputs that are functionally fitted to 
their environment, so long as an adequate number and type of variations are generated, 
and so long as ‘the environment’ is identified with whatever the selection mechanism 
actually selects for.  
                                                        




Under the assumption that law-making in general is an ‘adaptive’ process, or that certain 
types of law-making are,16 it might be expected that conclusions could be drawn from the 
current state of the law about the nature of the factors that were relevant in its formation, 
as if it were as easy as concluding the shape of a cup from the shape of the water filling it. 
Unlike water and cups, however, the same form may be produced by different values of 
the underlying factors.17 Even certain knowledge that a process is adaptive reveals less 
than we might hope about what was at play in bringing law to its present-day form, and 
our tendency to err is heightened once we allow that law might be an adaptation to 
multiple factors.18  
Furthermore, if we assume not only that the law is adaptive but also make assumptions 
about the factors that law adapts to, then the current state of the law might be thought to 
provide empirical evidence of the forms most adapted to those factors. As Gordon has 
argued, however, comparative inquiry shows we are likely to be disappointed in that 
project. Similar socio-economic conditions often give rise to very different legal 
outcomes. 19  Law is not adapted in the sense of being wholly determined by its 
environment. Of course, if we continually expand the factors we consider to be relevant, 
or fail to define those factors with any precision, then it might be possible to salvage the 
adaptive hypothesis. Doing so however forces us either to sacrifice falsifiability, because 
anything will fit into our explanation, or to abandon generality, because our explanations 
will tend toward the idiosyncratic.20 
Sinclair offered a different empirically-based critique of adaptationism, based largely in 
process rather than outcome.21 Sinclair’s key evidence against adaptationist accounts of 
law was what he called the ‘genetic inertia’ of law-making: the tendency of rules to stay 
                                                        
16 Gordon (n 14) 1030–32. 
17 To put it in mathematical terms again: if 𝑦 𝑓 𝑥 , we can only recover the 𝑥 for a relevant value of 𝑦 if 𝑓 
has a well-defined inverse, that is, if every 𝑥 produces a unique 𝑦.  
18 Kennedy articulates one version of this point, which is that once you allow even two explanatory factors, 
you have no way of distinguishing how much each contributed to the current legal form. Duncan Kennedy, 
‘Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation’ (1981) 90 Yale LJ 1275, 1277. Gordon, in addition, points out that 
law is often a mediation of contradictory social needs, rather than a unified response to any one of those 
needs. Gordon (n 14) 1035. 
19 Gordon (n 8) 75–81. 
20 Gordon (n 14) 1031–32; Kennedy (n 18) 1278–79; Sinclair (n 15) 471. 
21 Sinclair argued that adaptationist accounts suffer from ‘the empirical failure to account for the decisional 
inertia apparent in both judicial and legislative branches.’ MBW Sinclair, ‘Evolution in Law: Second 
Thoughts’ (1993) 71 U Det Mercy L Rev 31, 42. 
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the same over time. It was, he argued, hard to maintain a belief in law’s adaptation to 
social needs or to any other factor, given the tendency of law-makers, especially judges, 
to ‘choose the variant already in place,’ no matter how dizzying the array of alternatives 
at their disposal.22  
The solution favoured by Sinclair was to explain the law in the present as a product not 
only of external factors but also of past law.23 Models that accounted for genetic inertia, 
he proposed, would be valid as evolutionary accounts, but would also provide a way to 
overcome the weaknesses of adaptationists accounts. Like others before and since, 
Sinclair drew on the example of the ‘panda’s thumb’ to illustrate a phenomenon that 
clearly distinguishes evolution from design: the prevalence of second-best contraptions 
and the absence of well-designed contrivances.24 In Sinclair’s view, the lesson of the 
panda’s thumb is that, in evolutionary processes, present forms are not only influenced 
by environmental selection but also constrained by past forms.25 
In the application of these concepts, it is important to beware of two potential missteps. 
First, mechanisms of variation, selection, and retention may be necessary features of a 
process if it is to be describable in evolutionary terms, but that does not necessarily make 
their presence sufficient for a process to be evolutionary. Second, the panda’s thumb may 
result in part from the interaction of fitness pressures with genetic inertia, but that does 
not mean that a consideration of genetic inertia will automatically create an evolutionary 
                                                        
22 ibid 38. Note that Sinclair muddles questions at two levels of analysis. Unless we account for genetic 
inertia, it is true, as Sinclair concluded, that we risk both misunderstanding the process of legal change and 
mischaracterizing the outcomes of legal change. Yet Sinclair failed to distinguish between the how 
question—what does genetic inertia tell us about present law and processes of legal change—and the 
(sociological) concern with why law-makers were constrained to small variations. See Sinclair (n 15) 455–
58; Sinclair (n 21) 37–38. 
23  Like simple functionalism, this idea can also be put in mathematical form: 𝑦 𝑓 𝑥 , 𝑦 , with the 
subscripts indexing time.  
24 Discussions of the panda’s thumb and its relevance for how to think about evolution draw on ‘The Panda’s 
Peculiar Thumb,’ an essay by the palaeontologist and evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould, first 
published in 1978 and reproduced in his book The	Panda’s	Thumb:	More	Reflections	 in	Natural	History 
(Norton 1980). The panda depends on its ‘thumb’ to help it grasp bamboo, its primary food source. The gist 
of Gould’s anecdote is that, as the panda is descended from carnivorous bears, its ‘thumb’ is in essence no 
more than an extended wrist bone, significantly less fit to purpose than the human thumb, for example. The 
example is intended to show how the products of evolution differ from the products of design. For other 
uses of the panda’s thumb in law, see Oona A Hathaway, ‘Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and 
Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System’ (2000–01) 86 Iowa L Rev 601, 616; Jeff L Lewin, ‘The 
Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty about Reasonable Medical Certainty’ (1998) 57 Md L Rev 380, 
388; Allan C Hutchinson, Evolution	and	the	Common	Law (Cambridge University Press 2005) 52–53. Gould’s 
distinction between (designed) contrivances and (evolved) contraptions, which he borrowed from Michael 
Ghiselin, was given central place in Adam J Hirsch, ‘Inheritance Law, Legal Contraptions, and the Problem 
of Doctrinal Change’ (2000) 79 Or L Rev 527. 
25 Sinclair (n 15) 455–57; Sinclair (n 21) 38. 
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account of legal change, let alone a satisfactory explanation of legal change, period. More 
pointedly, an account of retention is neither equivalent to nor reducible to an account of 
how new forms are limited to variations on old forms.26 
D. Evolutionary	Entities	and	Varieties	of	Natural	Selection	
‘How does law evolve?’ is a perfect example of a mis-posed question.27 Unless we specify 
the entity or entities whose transformations we are interested in understanding, we are 
bound to breed confusion and provoke avoidable disagreement. As we saw in previous 
chapters, the evolutionary idiom has been applied to legal phenomena in a variety of 
ways. The Coasean tradition has primarily been concerned with the evolution of discrete 
norms, but there are many, sometimes quite striking alternatives. Lewin, for instance, 
used an evolutionary frame to develop a genealogy of the phrase ‘reasonable medical 
certainty’ as applied in American law.28 Luhmann’s primary application of evolutionary 
theory sought to explain the genesis and configuration of modern Western legal 
systems. 29  Hayek, too, concerned himself less with the processes through which 
individual norms and doctrines transform, and much more with what he called the 
‘spontaneous’ origins of the market order and its legal underpinnings. 30  Oliver 
Goodenough has explicitly mooted the possibility that natural selection dynamics operate 
at the level of rule, doctrine, and legal system.31 Clarity about the nature of the object 
whose changes are being studied matters not only for analytical clarity, but because an 
evolutionary perspective may only generate insight at the right level of abstraction.32 
                                                        
26 For an example of this conflation, see Sinclair (n 15) 453. 
27 cf HLA Hart, ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence [1954]’ in Essays	in	Jurisprudence	and	Philosophy 
(Oxford University Press 1983). Hart’s argument was that a great deal of muddle and headache in 
jurisprudential discussions could be avoided if we avoided questions like ‘what is law?’ 
28 Lewin (n 24). 
29 Niklas Luhmann, Law	as	a	 Social	System (Fatima Kastner and others eds, Klaus A Ziegert tr, Oxford 
University Press 2004) ch 6. Luhmann’s theories and his approach to legal evolution are explored in greater 
detail in Chapter 4. 
30 Friedrich A von Hayek, Studies	in	Philosophy,	Politics	and	Economics (Routledge & K Paul 1967) chs 2, 4–
7.; Erik Angner, ‘The History of Hayek’s Theory of Cultural Evolution’ (2002) 33 Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 695. Hayek’s approach is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 1. 
31 Oliver R Goodenough, ‘When Stuff Happens Isn’t Enough: How an Evolutionary Theory of Doctrinal and 
Legal System Development Can Enrich Comparative Legal Studies [Symposium on Evolutionary 
Approaches to (Comparative) Law: Integrating Theoretical Perspectives]’ (2011) 7 Rev L & Econ 805, 813. 
32 Teubner argues that a ‘theory of legal evolution will be able to explain or even predict general structures 
of the law,’ but will generally not be able ‘to explain individual legal acts, court verdicts, laws, and 
administrative acts.’ Gunther Teubner, Law	 as	 an	 Autopoietic	 System (Zenon Bankowski ed, Anne 
Bankowska and Ruth Adler trs, Blackwell 1993) 49. 
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If ‘how does law evolve’ is a mis-posed question, it unfortunately turns out that ‘what is 
evolving?’ may not be the right question either. To see why, it will be helpful to review 
the development of the ‘unit of selection’ debate among philosophers of science since the 
late 1970s.33 At first, this debate may appear to be an arcane episode from the philosophy 
of biology, whose participants have been more concerned with how certain words are to 
be applied than with trying to understand the nature of evolutionary processes. In 
substance, however, those debates were bound up with arguments about what kinds of 
entities could undergo evolution or participate in evolutionary processes, a question with 
consequences in turn for the possibility of group selection and for the role of evolution (if 
any) in the development of altruistic behaviours. Moreover, given that the goal of these 
debates was largely to develop an abstracted account of evolution, the conceptual 
repertoire that they generated turns out to be quite useful in any attempt to think through 
the possible application of evolutionary analogies to understand legal change.  
Dawkins notoriously argued in The Selfish	Gene that the proper unit of natural selection, 
which Dawkins sometimes referred to as the ‘unit of selection,’ was not the organism or 
species, but the gene.34 One line of responses to this position, typified by the contribution 
of Stephen Jay Gould, argued that genes cannot be the unit of selection because selection 
per se does not operate at the level of the gene. Natural selection cannot ‘see’ individual 
genes. Selection processes operate through the relative reproductive success of whole 
organisms, determined primarily by differences in their whole phenotype. Because of 
pleiotropy and polygeny, selection pressures exercised on a population of varied 
phenotypes are not directly translated into selection pressures on genes themselves.35 
The debate made clear that debates over what the object of evolution is were largely 
attributable to disagreements about where stress should be placed in the Darwinian 
‘recipe.’36  
                                                        
33 The account in this paragraph and the next draws heavily from Peter Godfrey-Smith, ‘The Replicator in 
Retrospect’ (2000) 15 Biology & Philosophy 403. 
34 Dawkins (n 3). Dawkins borrowed much of his account from George Williams. Godfrey-Smith (n 33) 404. 
35 Godfrey–Smith identifies Stephen J Gould’s essay ‘Caring Groups and Selfish Genes’ as exemplary of this 
line of argument. The essay was republished in Gould (n 24). 
36 Godfrey-Smith (n 33) 404. 
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David Hull proposed a compromise.37 The problem, he argued, was that Dawkins and 
Gould were both trying to fit too much into a single concept, the 'unit of selection.' To put 
Hull’s diagnosis in terms of the Darwinian algorithm, the problem is that the entities that 
are the primary participant in replication processes, which Hull followed Dawkins in 
calling replicators, have to be distinguished from the entities that interact with the 
environment and thereby cause or mediate differential replication, which Hull called 
interactors.  
Hull’s distinction has achieved broad acceptance among scholars who seek to clarify 
evolutionary processes.38 One should note, however, that his typology did not so much 
solve the ‘unit of selection’ debate as dissolve it. Hull explicitly argued that asking after 
the ‘real’ unit of selection is a fool's errand. In the language I have been using thus far, 
there is no 'object of evolution.' The replicator plays one role, the interactor another. 
Hull’s frame suggests that understanding processes of natural selection entails more than 
identifying the mechanisms of selection, variation, and inheritance operating on a 
previously-distinguished evolutionary object. Instead, he pushes us to search 
simultaneously for mechanisms, the different entities those mechanisms operate 
through, and the interactions between them.  
One final nuance highlights a potential source of error in efforts to think through legal 
evolution, its mechanisms, and its objects. Hull largely followed Dawkins in discussing 
genes as replicators. The concept of the replicator remains bound up with the sense of 
self-replication that Dawkins gave it.39 Genes, however, do not ‘reproduce themselves.’ 
Contra Dawkins, they do not even control the replication process. Rather, the capacity of 
a gene to perpetuate its form through time depends upon the existence and reproduction 
of the context in which that replication can take place. Trying to locate ‘the’ site of 
replication thus leads to a chicken and egg problem.40 Peter Godfrey-Smith argues that 
while there is thus no replicator per se in the sense of an evolutionary object that is 
                                                        
37 David L Hull, ‘Individuality and Selection’ (1980) 11 Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 311. See 
also David Hull, ‘The Units of Evolution: A Metaphysical Essay,’ reprinted in RN Brandon and RM Burianm 
eds, Genes,	Organisms,	Populations:	Controversies	over	the	Units	of	Selection (MIT Press 1984). 
38 Notably, Dawkins soon followed in Hull's footsteps, offering his own distinction between replicators and 
vehicles. For the influence of Hull’s distinction, see e.g. Elisabeth Lloyd, ‘Units and Levels of Selection’ in 
Edward N Zalta (ed), The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy (Summer 2017 edn, Metaphysics Research 
Lab, Stanford University 2017). 
39 Godfrey-Smith (n 33) 411–13. 
40 ibid 407–11. Think of mammal gestation. The genetic code in the zygote would not get very far without 
being implanted in a womb. Both the code and the womb must be replicated.  
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causally responsible for the perpetuation of a given structure, the replicator concept is 
nonetheless useful insofar as it helps to locate the 'heritability of variation.'41 At least in 
biology, it is possible to identify the locus at which, and the mode by which, variations are 
inherited across generations: an organism’s genetic code.  
Finally, Godfrey-Smith and others offer convincing arguments that evolution can occur 
through the operation of the Darwinian algorithm without the need for replicators. 
Though biotic evolution here on Earth operates through a set of entities that have a causal 
role both in reproduction and the inheritance of variation, they are not essential features 
of processes describable by the Darwinian recipe.42 Godfrey-Smith argues that, ‘we can 
see the replicator analysis as picking out a special case of what is covered (or supposed 
to be covered) by the classical view,’ that is to say, a view expressed in terms of the 
Darwinian algorithm alone.43 It is possible, for example, for a population of entities to be 
reproduced over time by a process wholly external to them. So long as there is a 
mechanism that ensures the heritability of variation and selective reproduction on the 
basis of that variation, something like evolution by natural selection will occur.44 
E. Varieties	of	Natural	Selection	in	Theories	of	Legal	Change	
Let me draw out the import of these discussions for inquiries into law and legal change. 
Though Hull’s argument made a big splash, it did not change the paradigm overnight. It 
thus had understandably little uptake in discussions of legal evolution as they underwent 
renewal in the early 1980s.45 Even today, if debates among legal scholars pay attention to 
the Darwinian algorithm, they tend to imagine the three mechanisms each applying to the 
same entity.46 They therefore continue to limit the explanatory task to the identification 
of the causes of variation in a given population of entities, the method by which those 
                                                        
41 ibid 413. 
42 ibid 413–14.  
43 John S Wilkins and Pierrick Bourrat, ‘Replication and Reproduction’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), The	Stanford	
Encyclopedia	 of	 Philosophy (Winter 2018 edn, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University 2018) 
quoting Peter Godfrey-Smith, Darwinian	Populations	and	Natural	Selection (Oxford University Press 2009) 
36. 
44 ibid s 5.2. 
45 Godfrey-Smith argues that broader uptake of Hull’s framework could have cleared up much of the debate 
in biology over the last 30 years. Godfrey-Smith (n 33) 405–06. 
46 In legal literature, Dawkins gets quoted a great deal, and Hull hardly at all. 
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entities reproduce over time, and the process that selects more from less successful types 
of those entities.47  
This approach is not necessarily wrong, but it is based on a facile understanding of 
evolutionary theory, and especially of recent understandings of how evolution functions 
in the biological domain. Any effort to understand legal change through the rubric of 
evolution via natural selection must confront the question of how similar the process is 
supposed to be to evolution as applied to plants, animals, and bacteria. Law may be 
subject to a form of natural selection that is sufficiently captured by what Godfrey-Smith 
calls ‘the classical view.’ If that were the case, then the task of understanding legal change 
would be reducible, first, to the identification of the set of relevant entities, such as legal 
norms and, second, to the description of how variation in those entities is introduced, 
selected for, and passed on.  
If law’s evolution echoes the biological model more closely, however, then the task 
demands attention to a series of distinctions and connections. Among those who have 
drawn on evolutionary theory in an attempt to theorize legal change, Simon Deakin seems 
exceptional in having considered how nuances of evolutionary theory might complicate 
the application of the Darwinian algorithm to legal phenomena. 48  Having immersed 
himself in the recent literature, he has deployed Hull’s ideas (though without taking note 
of their provenance or their specific importance).49 And the analytical payoff from having 
done so is clear. Rather than simply seeking to develop an account of each element of the 
                                                        
47 See e.g. 'a	system which replicates itself over time, but with some faults in the fidelity of transmission, 
will produce variations, and … those variations … if subject to some kind of differential success pressure … 
will lead to the emergence and perseverance of those variations which … do better at the mix of success.’ 
Goodenough (n 31) 810–11. 
48 Deakin’s citations to evolutionary theory in his agenda-setting 2002 article include books and articles by 
Robert Boyd, Peter Richerson, Kevin Laland, Luca Cavalli-Sforza, Marcus Feldman, as well conversations 
with his sometime-collaborator Geoffrey Hodgson. One likely candidate as an inspiration for Deakin’s 
exposure to Hull is Geoffrey Hodgson, ‘Is Social Evolution Lamarckian or Darwinian?’ in John Laurent and 
John Nightingale (eds), Darwinism	and	Evolutionary	Economics (Edward Elgar 2001). 
49 Simon Deakin, ‘Evolution for Our Time: A Theory of Legal Memetics’ (2002) 55 CLP 1, 30–32; Simon 
Deakin and Fabio Carvalho, ‘System and Evolution in Corporate Governance’ in Peer Zumbansen and Gralf-
Peter Calliess (eds), Law,	Economics	and	Evolutionary	Theory (Edward Elgar 2011) 120–23. Deakin has 
spent relatively little space addressing how his theoretical approach differs from earlier attempts at 
evolutionary jurisprudence. He is clear in a number of places about how his conclusions differ from e.g. 
Hayek. Deakin, ‘Evolution for Our Time’ 33–37; Simon Deakin and others, ‘Legal Institutionalism: 
Capitalism and the Constitutive Role of Law’ (2017) 45 Journal of Comparative Economics 188, 190–91. He 
is also clear about the claims that he is borrowing from other theorists of legal change, especially in 
evolutionary institutional economics and systems theory. Simon Deakin, ‘Legal Evolution: Integrating 
Economic and Systemic Approaches’ (2011) 7 Rev L & Econ 659. Nonetheless, he spends little time trying 
to locate or explore the origins of his differences with other scholars, and specifically does not spend any 
time analysing different applications of or appropriations from evolutionary theory. 
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tripartite algorithm, Deakin drew on Hull’s distinction between interactors and 
replicators to develop a schema comprising five elements:  
i. a unit of inheritance,  
ii. a mechanism of inheritance,  
iii. a mechanism of variation,  
iv. a unit of selection,  
v. a mechanism of selection. 50 
The precise structure of Deakin’s schema may not be the only way to work out an account 
of legal change through natural selection. Nonetheless, his schema reflects a number of 
key insights. First, if we understand law to not only be subject to natural selection, but to 
also be self-replicating in some meaningful way, then we need to be cognizant that the 
entities which are selected for (i.e. Hull’s interactor or Deakin’s unit of selection) may not 
be the same as those involved in the reproductions of the successful variants (i.e. Hull’s 
replicator or Deakin’s unit of inheritance). Second, we may need to distinguish the 
mechanisms and entities that ensure the heritability of variation from the processes 
involved in the reproduction of the entities more generally. Finally, we must attend to 
interactions between the mechanism of variation and the broader set of processes that 
are involved in the reproduction of the entity or entities.  
This last point may be particularly relevant in discussions of legal change. The genetic 
code carries variations produced in one generation into future generations, but it also 
participates in the replication process in its own right. 51  Genetic inertia in biotic 
evolution is a by-product of the constraint that the reproductive life-cycle exercises on 
heritable variations. Variations that are too severe will be incompatible with the broader 
reproductive process. Deakin and Luhmann have suggested that the relative stability of 
legal norms may be a result of similar constraints.52 There is by contrast nothing in the 
classical view that places limits on how different future variations can be from old forms. 
Without the parallel to biotic evolution, the genetic inertia of law underscored by Sinclair 
becomes a contingent empirical fact about some legal norms.  
                                                        
50 Deakin, ‘Evolution for Our Time’ (n 49) 30–33. One important note: though this schema includes a ‘unit 
of selection,’ Deakin is not rehashing the ‘unit of selection’ debate. Rather, where his unit of inheritance 
corresponds roughly to Hull’s replicator, the ‘unit of selection’ corresponds to Hull’s interactor, that is, the 
locus at which the selection mechanism operates. 
51 As a result of the Weismann barrier, the genetic code is the only	vehicle for carrying variations between 
generations.  
52 Per Deakin and Carvalho, the ‘legal system must be able to maintain the principle of system congruence 
which is the precondition of its autonomy and self-reproduction.’ Deakin and Carvalho (n 49) 128. 
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When it comes to trying to theorize legal change, we are therefore left with three 
possibilities. A set of legal entities may change in accordance with the ‘classical view’ of 
Darwinian natural selection,53 reducing the epistemic task to the correct identification of 
the evolving entities, and the mechanisms of variation, selection, and inheritance by 
which those entities evolve. Such an account will also depend on clearly developed 
premises about how the entities and process are reproduced over time, but the 
reproduction process may be wholly separate from the evolutionary mechanisms. 
Alternatively, a process of legal change may more closely parallel biotic evolution, in 
which case the explanation will have to account not only for the nature of the relevant 
mechanisms but also for the multiple units which are involved in those mechanisms, and 
the complex interactions between differential reproduction and the inheritance of 
variation. The third option is to accept that the process may not be amenable to 
description by anything resembling the Darwinian algorithm at all, although it might still 
count as ‘evolutionary’ by the criteria set out in Chapter 1.54  
II. Coasean	Approaches	with	and	without	Adaptationism	
Part III explores the salience of some epistemic aspects of law and legal change to draw 
attention to a substantial flaw in the Coasean accounts of legal change. That explanation 
however will require getting under the hood of Coasean approaches, to more closely 
examine the nitty-gritties of how these approaches understand law itself. To put that 
discussion on solid footing, this part works through the details of an early contribution 
made by William Landes and Richard Posner.55 I treat their article as a proxy for the 
broader literature.56 To a significant degree, Landes–Posner supersedes other work on 
legal change in the Coasean mode, by adding conceptual clarity and mathematical rigour 
lacking in earlier contributions but without materially departing from their basic 
structure. 57  Landes and Posner are candid about the assumptions that ground their 
                                                        
53 Above, text to n 43. 
54 There is another alternative. As I explored in Chapter 1, biotic evolution turns out to be mediated by 
much more than just Darwinian natural selection. As such, evolutionary theory is more expansive than the 
theory of how natural selection processes might work in practice. The other possibility is thus that a 
process of legal change operates through a mechanism that has analogies with some other part of 
evolutionary theory: sexual selection, or genetic drift, for example.  
55 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, ‘Adjudication as a Private Good’ (1979) 8 J Legal Stud 235. 
56 Note I use ‘Landes–Posner’ to refer to the model developed in Landes and Posner’s paper.  
57 For example, the model developed by Landes and Posner takes in both Rubin’s and Goodman’s accounts 
as special cases. cf Paul H Rubin, ‘Why is the Common Law Efficient’ (1977) 6 J Legal Stud 51; John C 
Goodman, ‘An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law’ (1978) 7 J Legal Stud 393. 
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conclusions, and admirably circumspect about the context in which those conclusions 
hold.58 Most importantly for my purposes, their analysis considers how the doctrine of 
precedent leads past law to act as a constraint on future legal change, which means that 
their model integrates an account of law’s genetic inertia. In what follows, I lay out the 
basic structure of their model, paying attention to how they characterise law, its effects 
on incentive structures faced by those subjected to it, the behaviour that arises under 
those incentives, and the aggregate impact that behaviour has on legal change through 
the courts.  
A. Landes–Posner:	A	Coasean	Exemplar	
Here is the world that Landes and Posner draw.59 First, two agents are engaged in an 
activity. Participation in the activity by the two agents inevitably gives rise to adverse	
events. Adverse events in the Landes–Posner model are stochastic and, most importantly, 
legally salient. The first term means that, while particular events are unpredictable, their 
occurrence follows a probabilistic pattern. The second indicates that while the 
occurrence of an adverse event generally entails a harm that imposes incidental, 
immediate costs for at least one of the agents, possibly both,60 an occurrence only counts 
as adverse events for the purposes of the model if they give rise to a legal	 dispute 
amenable to possible resolution through adjudication or negotiated settlement.  
Three points of clarification are needed before moving on. The first is that ‘activity’ has a 
somewhat peculiar meaning in Landes–Posner. In some of the situations the model is 
intended to capture, the nature and degree of the two agents will be sufficiently similar 
to make Landes and Posner’s usage line up with common sense understandings of what 
it means for two persons to be mutually engaged in an activity. Consider two drivers on 
the road, for example, or a supplier and purchaser in a commercial contract. The shared 
activity is clear. Often however, our intuition about a situation would lead us to describe 
only one of the agents as active, and the other as a passive bystander. It is not obvious, for 
example, what ‘activity’ Mrs. Palsgraf was engaged in at the train station the day she was 
                                                        
58 Notably, while the bulk of their article is given over to extending and deepening the approach developed 
by Rubin and Goodman, the last few pages are given to an extension of the approach pioneered by Priest 
which reproduces his fundamental logical errors. Landes and Posner (n 55) 280–84. 
59 On the idea of economic modelling as world-building, cf Steven G Medema, ‘“A Magnificent Business 
Prospect . . .” the Coase Theorem, the Extortion Problem, and the Creation of Coase Theorem Worlds’ (2015) 
11 Journal of Institutional Economics 353. 
60 In point of fact, adverse events may give rise not only to costs for one or both parties, but to benefits as 
well. See below n 65.  
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injured.61 Nonetheless, it will generally be possible to frame the presence of both agents 
at a given location or their common exposure to a certain interaction as ‘engagement in a 
shared activity.’ The manufacturer and the final purchaser of a snail-corrupted ginger 
beer could be said to both be engaged in the activity of ‘buying and selling a bottle of 
ginger beer.’ 62  Ranchers and farmers, we might say, are engaged in potentially 
incompatible uses of neighbouring pieces of land.63 Such examples highlight how trying 
to slot the various assemblages of entities, relations, and events which instigate legal 
disputes under the category of engaging in a mutual activity is a fraught exercise, that in 
some cases cannot be earnestly achieved. Despite the semantic violence it does to the 
usual sense of the word, however, the use of ‘activity’ to capture any joint course of action 
that has the possibility of giving rise to a legal dispute between two people is not so odd 
that it compels us to depart from Landes and Posner’s usage.64 
Second: Landes and Posner do not use ‘adverse events’ but rather ‘accidents.’ Like most 
of the contributions to the Coasean tradition to legal change, Landes and Posner drew 
their explicatory examples primarily from negligence cases, where the instigating event 
will often be an accident in its everyday meaning as well. In other areas, however, the 
kind of events that give rise to legal disputes include situations that are not commonly 
brought under that label. For example, the category includes not only situations in which 
a party to a contract becomes unable to fulfil its contractual responsibilities but those 
where it becomes unwilling to do so. My alternative term, ‘adverse events,’ though still 
imperfect, captures a broader collection of mishaps and resonates with the conflict 
implied by the creation of a legal dispute between the two parties.  
                                                        
61 Palsgraf	v	Long	Island	Railroad	Co 162 NE 99 (United States New York Court of Appeals 1928). This case 
is a classic of the doctrine of foreseeability in the common law of negligence, in which, by helping a man 
onto a train, employees of a railroad caused a chain reaction that led to injuries suffered by the plaintiff. 
The court found the defendants did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care because the injuries were not a 
foreseeable consequence of helping a man onto the train.  
62 Donoghue	v	Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL). 
63 Chapter 2. 
64 The strictly bilateral framing of the activity in the Coasean approach is linked to Coase’s view that, when 
it comes to correctly thinking about the legal approach to situations in which one party harms another, it 
takes two to tango. Coase (n 1) 2. Our intuition may be that the pedestrian, walking along a part of suburban 
sidewalk that crosses a driveway, who is run down by a car entering that driveway and suffers grievous 
injury, is clearly the one harmed. Coase would insist however that the proper legal view would not only 
embrace the risk of such injury, but also the amounts actors will take in the future to avoid such accidents 
and any reduction in their quality of life as a result of having to engage in the activity less. It might be for 
example that the pedestrian could have more easily avoided the accident than the driver, and the principles 
of tort law accord with the economic analysis of law that an injured plaintiff’s level of precaution is relevant 
to determining the holding in the case.  
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Moving from language to the substance of the model, I note that, for the purposes of the 
incident dispute, Landes–Posner ignores the direct harms occasioned by an adverse 
event. Though the harms attributable to expected future events enter into their 
reasoning, the harms occasioned in the present are relevant only insofar as they serve to 
mark the triggering of a legal dispute in which one party has a potential legal claim for 
damages against the other. 65 
Having dispensed with these possible sources of confusion, let me engage with the 
remainder of their analysis. The conduct of the activity and the outcome of the legal 
dispute are each disciplined by, but not determined by, law. Inasmuch as Landes-Posner 
take law to be composed of rules, those rules are not analysed as norms that effectively 
require or enjoin an actor from engaging in or refraining from certain actions, activities, 
or forms of performance.66 Instead, in keeping with the tradition of the American legal 
realists, Landes–Posner find law expressed, first, in the probability that the court will 
decide in favour of one party rather than the other if a legal dispute is adjudicated; and, 
second, in the actual and effective power of the court to levy damages against a defendant 
if and when it finds for a plaintiff.67 
                                                        
65 Landes and Posner use ‘damages’ two ways, to refer to the costs imposed on the parties by an adverse 
event, and to refer to the amount demanded in the incident legal dispute. The conflation of the two amounts 
is understandable, given that they develop their analysis using a simplified account of negligence law. A 
fundamental intuition in negligence cases is that, where the plaintiff is found liable, the defendant will be 
required to make ‘full compensation,’ a principle taken to mean that the damages imposed at the end of a 
successful suit will be equivalent to the harms occasioned by the accident.  
Yet the two amounts certainly cannot be treated as equivalent in general. A moment’s contemplation will 
bring to mind legal contexts in which there is a mismatch between the total harms suffered and the damages 
demanded and/or receivable as remedy. For example, even if both parties to an automobile accident are 
harmed, the legal dispute will often only concern the liability attributable to and damages to be imposed 
on the defendant. Or even if the plaintiff is the only one harmed, there may be contributory negligence on 
their part. In either of these situations, the stakes of the case will be less than the combined value of the 
harms occasioned by the accident. If we turn our mind to contract, and to adverse events that entail a 
contractual breach, then, under the usual contract principle that the victim of a breach will be compensated 
for their lost profits, we may have cases of ‘efficient breach.’ As efficient breach by definition occurs in the 
context of a change of circumstances that ultimately allows for a net increase in productive output 
compared to contractual compliance, the damages at stake in such a dispute are a matter of ex post 
redistribution of a net windfall. See Richard A Posner, Economic	Analysis	of	Law (1st edn, Little, Brown 
1972) 55–59. Fortunately, Landes and Posner’s slippage between the two meanings of damages does not 
impact on their conclusions, because their model does not depend on the precise scale of the present or 
future cost consequences directly occasioned by adverse events. For the sake of clarity, I nonetheless 
strictly differentiate ‘damages’ recoverable in a legal dispute from the harms (costs) or windfall (benefits) 
occasioned by the adverse event that gives rise to it.  
66  As put by Kornhauser, in the economic approach, legal rules cannot command behaviour but only 
structure the incentives of engaging in various courses of action. Lewis A Kornhauser, ‘The New Economic 
Analysis of Law: Legal Rules as Incentives’ in Nicholas Mercuro (ed), Law	and	Economics (Kluwer Academic 
1989) 35.  
67  Famous examples of this model from the Realists include Holmes’ claim that law consists of ‘[t]he 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious;’ and Llewellyn’s 
135 
 
Their account of how law changes builds on a model of what litigants do in an individual 
dispute. There are three possible outcomes: the first is a negotiated settlement, and the 
second and third are the two possible holdings if the dispute is litigated. The parties 
therefore decide between a settlement at some mutually-agreeable price and the 
uncertainties of putting the question before the judge, thus engaging in what might be 
called strategic action in the shadow of the law.68  
Per the model, each party decides whether to accept a settlement or proceed to trial on 
the basis of a calculation that compares not only the immediate financial impact of each 
possible outcome, but the long-term financial consequences of the law that will prevail in 
any of them. For that reason, the model of the parties’ decision-making process is built 
atop a complicated model of the relationship between law and behaviour. The idea is that 
each party will adjust their behaviour so as to maximize their own net benefit from the 
regulated activity, engaging to the amount and in such ways so as to equalize their 
marginal costs with their marginal benefits. The benefits are straightforward. In the 
example of a driver and pedestrian, they might include whatever advantage a person 
extracts from driving in their car. A party’s costs of the activity include the direct harms 
they can expect to bear in the event of an adverse event, 69 weighted by the expected 
number of such events, along with spending to prevent adverse events and to mitigate 
their harms. The ‘law’ enters into the picture by reshaping costs. Specifically, the rule 
determines the amount that the defendant expects to have to pay, or that the plaintiff 
expects to receive, when adverse events do occur. The total costs of engaging in the 
activity thus includes the direct costs, abated or aggravated by these expected legal pay-
outs. If a party’s costs make the activity uneconomical at any level of intensity, then the 
party will not engage in it at all.  
                                                        
characterization: ‘What these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.’ Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law [1897]’ (1997) 110 Harv L Rev 991, 994; Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, The	
Bramble	Bush:	The	Classic	Lectures	on	the	Law	and	Law	School (Oxford University Press 1930) 5. 
68 Mnookin and Kornhauser’s classic on ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’ was concerned with the 
relationship between agreements crafted through private ordering and the default rules provided by the 
state, e.g. how divorcing couples might structure their relationship given shared knowledge of determinate 
rules the court would impose if a bargained solution were not found. Robert H Mnookin and Lewis 
Kornhauser, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce’ (1978–79) 88 Yale LJ 950. They 
did not, however, analyse the calculations of the parties concerning the consequences of success or failure 
on specific issues were the dispute were to go to trial, save to note that risk preferences would shape the 
bargained settlement. ibid 969. 
69 … or the benefits they expect to secure, as discussed above, n 65. 
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The nature of the calculations being mooted here are even more complex than they may 
seem at first. That is because the prevalence of adverse events will be a function of 
whether and how much each party engages in the activity, and of how much each spends 
on prevention and mitigation. Since the likelihood depends on the behaviour of both 
parties, each party’s decision about how to act will implicitly rely on full knowledge of 
how the other party will behave under the current state of the law.70 That means not only 
do the parties have common knowledge about the prevalence of adverse events under 
every given combination of activity levels for a given state of the law, but they also agree 
on how a court might respond if an adverse event does occur. 
The motor driving the model is the set of calculations each party makes of the net, risk-
weighted costs and benefits they will face in each scenario.71 For the three possible states 
of the law—the status quo rule if they choose to settle, and the slightly amended 
precedents that would result from a judge’s decision in favour of the plaintiff or vice 
versa—each party will do a prospective calculation, as above, concerning their net benefit 
of engaging in the activity, given the state of the law and reasonable expectations about 
the maximizing behaviour of the other party.  
The loop is closed by the premise that both parties will choose what to do in a specific 
legal dispute so as to maximize their expected net benefit, taking into account both the 
direct payments, or damages, in the instant case, and the net return from the activity 
under the status quo ante legal rule. 72 If the case goes to trial, and the judge finds in 
favour of the defendant, the expected financial impact will comprise the long-term effect 
that the new law has on the party’s interest, supplemented by the pay-out of damages; if 
in favour of the plaintiff, then the interests of the parties will only be affected by the 
content of the amended law.73 The calculation of the expected return from going to trial 
                                                        
70 The reasoning here may seem paradoxical. Each party must choose his or her course of action using a 
maximizing calculation that includes an assessment of the risk of accident. Yet the effective risk of accidents 
will be a function of the activity levels actually chosen by both parties. In actuality, no paradox or circular 
reasoning is involved. Rather, the calculation is a ‘simple’ matter of both parties solving the same pair of 
linked, second order differential equations, based on common knowledge of each party’s preferences, and 
shared confidence that the other party’s choice of action will also be based on a calculated solution to the 
same set of equations. These may be courageous assumptions, but they are not internally contradictory.  
71 The net gains and losses are risk-weighted in the sense of being discounted by the expected frequency of 
future adverse events.  
72 The model also notes that the aggregate impact of the trial includes the costs of litigation for each party.  
73 Rather than understanding the law as an either/or liability, the model assumes that the law changes 
slightly whenever the judge rules on a legal issue, incrementally adding to a body of precedent that 
determines the probability of future decisions under the rule.  
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is a sum of these two amounts, weighted by the probability of the corresponding outcome. 
The benefit of settling, by contrast, is calculated by adding the net returns of engaging in 
the activity under the current state of the law, plus or minus whatever pay-off the parties 
agree to settle for.  
As a result of these calculations, parties will either settle for some mutually agreeable 
amount or put the case to a judge. If the dispute does go to trial, the law will shift slightly 
toward or away from liability, depending on who the judge finds for. If the dispute does 
not go to trial, the law will stay unchanged. The dynamic element, finally, enters as a result 
of this process being repeated over and over, with each episode where the dispute goes 
to litigation adding to an accumulated shift in the likely assignment of future liability.  
There will be more to say about the nature of the accumulation of legal decisions that 
Landes and Posner develop in their model, but it will be convenient to leave the 
exposition of their approach until the next part of the chapter.  
III. A	Deeper	Problem	with	Coasean	Approaches	to	Legal	Change		
Having set out this picture, let me return to the task of evaluation and critique, by 
exposing the Coasean approach to some of the questions raised by the borrowings and 
adaptions from evolutionary theory explored above.  
A. Landes–Posner:	A	Coasean	Model	sans	Adaptationism		
I begin with the question of genetic inertia and the hazards of adaptationism.  
Many early iterations of the Coasean approach to legal change fell afoul of Sinclair’s 
broadside against adaptationism in legal theorizing, and for precisely the reason he had 
forecast. The early contributions to the Coasean tradition of legal change, much as he 
observed, included no account of the genetic inertia of rules.74 Indeed, in their low-level 
details, many of these models characterized legal change like an on-off switch that could 
move only from the worse to the better or like the long-term equilibrium behaviour of 
the spins of a roulette wheel.75 The result is not only an account that ignores the tendency 
of judges to stick with existing rules, but a set of accounts that predict gradual movement 
toward a status quo almost entirely adapted to efficiency.  
                                                        
74 Sinclair (n 21) 34–36. 
75 Chapter 2, Part IV.  
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Sinclair’s critique fails to land its blows on Landes–Posner, however. Even though their 
account of law’s import for individual behaviour matched the earlier accounts, Landes 
and Posner’s model offers a much thicker, more substantive account of law. As noted in 
the conclusions of Chapter 2, the Coasean framework is founded on a thin account of 
normativity that only considers law’s power to coerce by changing economic incentives, 
not its power to persuade through reason.76 
Nevertheless, the peculiarity of Landes–Posner’s model is that it provides an account of 
law that transcends the behavioural-pricing function of norms. For the purposes of 
modelling individual decision-making, Landes and Posner characterize law only in terms 
of how it shapes the expected value of damages to be awarded following the occurrence 
of future adverse events. The dynamic part of their model, however, portrays law as a 
continually growing archive of decisions about similar cases, an archive whose contents 
bulge, buckle, and wither as new cases are decided. Both the size and the normative 
consistency of that archive matter: the number and distribution of holdings in past 
decisions help to determine how much one case can be expected to rebalance the court’s 
behaviour in the future. In their model, law as an archive of past decisions not only shapes 
how big an effect an individual case can have for the pricing aspect of the law, but also 
has a persistent effect on the outcomes of future legal disputes. 
Landes and Posner thus provided precisely the account of retention that Sinclair 
suggested would be required of a truly evolutionary approach to legal change. To a 
significant degree, the way in which this transformed the projections of the Coasean 
model about the long-term behaviour of law and the nature of processes of legal change 
vindicates Sinclair’s argument about the analytical payoff of doing so. Once the Coaseans 
took into account the bias in law-making in favour of old forms, the resulting models of 
the law-making process were transformed in precisely the ways that we would expect 
from a truly ‘evolutionary’ account of law. In particular, Landes and Posner’s predictions 
about the tendency of law is that efficiency would act as a driver of trends in legal 
decisions, but that law would only adapt fully to efficiency for a portion of doctrines and 
rules. 
                                                        
76 Though the Landes–Posner approach treats law as the probability of a cost being imposed by a court in 
response to an uncertain but statistically predictable event, they assume that the amount can be assimilated 
to a single cost through appropriate risk discounting. For the tradition of modelling law as a cost or price 
on behaviour in the neoclassical economic analysis of law, see generally Kornhauser (n 66). 
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There is thus nothing to the Coasean approach that makes it essentially adaptationist. As 
a broad mode of theorizing legal change, it not only can be integrated with rich accounts 
of law’s genetic inertia, it actually has been.  
B. Evolutionary	Units	and	Evolutionary	Mechanisms	in	the	Coasean	
Approach		
Having dispatched this particular line of attack on the Coasean approach to legal change, 
however, this part subjects the Coasean approach to more exacting scrutiny and finds 
some troublingly shaky foundations. 
The discussion of evolutionary concepts in Part I ended with the argument that 
evolutionary theories of legal change might fall into one of three categories. They may be 
elaborated without any meaningful reliance on natural selection or other concepts drawn 
from evolutionary theory. They may be amenable to a simplified, ‘classical view’ of 
evolution, with a single type of entity reproduced by some external process. Or they may 
cleave more closely by analogy to the Darwinian account of biotic evolution through 
natural selection.  
At first glance, the Landes–Posner model seems amenable to the classic view. The unit of 
selection, that is to say the object of evolution, is the legal norm. The norm exists at a given 
point in time as a body of precedent. Variation, such as it is, subsists in the different 
potential states of the law that might prevail following a judge’s decision. Though these 
variants only potentially ‘exist’ as valid norms unless and until one of them is selected by 
a judge’s decision at trial, we can imagine these variants corresponding to the norms 
implicit in the conflicting arguments of the parties. In this interpretation, the mechanism 
of selection operates in a combination of one or two moments: first, the decision of the 
parties to a legal dispute about whether to go to trial and, second, if a trial occurs, the 
judge’s decision regarding whose argument will prevail and, accordingly, what ruling will 
be contributed to the existing body of precedent.  
A simple but critical question puts the classical view in doubt. What is the mechanism of 
inheritance? Put differently, how is the legal norm in this account replicated? How are 
variations inherited? A naive answer would be that selected variations are simply added 
to the body of precedent that is applicable to a given type of dispute.  
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For legal norms to undergo natural selection, there must be some process that 
reproduces ‘precedents applicable to a given type of dispute’ over time. Though it is easy 
to miss, this not only demands some mechanism to reproduce the body of precedents, but 
depends on relatively stable reproduction of the ‘types of dispute’ to which those 
precedents apply, as well.  
At first, putting it this way sounds absurd. One might insist that legal disputes do not need 
to be ‘reproduced’ since they are, in a sense, naturally occurring. The processes that 
generate them are combinations of human self-interest, scarcity, and misfortune. 
Accidents happen, and someone must pay. Rightly so. There is no disagreement there. 
As much as legal disputes themselves need not be reproduced, however, the classification	
of disputes does. And, fatally for the pertinence of the classical view to an evolutionary 
account of changing legal norms, the reproduction of dispute types interacts in complex 
ways with the replication of legal norms. Rather than continuing with evolutionary 
abstractions, however, let me justify this claim by returning to the details of Coasean 
models.  
C. Heterogeneous	Contexts	
To illustrate this, I will again turn to Landes and Posner’s model, prefaced with a point 
about the Coasean tradition originally raised by Gillian Hadfield in a woefully 
underappreciated contribution to the ‘efficiency of common law’ literature.77 Hadfield’s 
intervention turns on a single insight: the contexts to which a rule applies are 
heterogeneous.78 She is making both a narrower point here, and a broader one. Hadfield’s 
emphasis was on the narrower point, that a rule can have divergent cost consequences, 
depending on the particular features of an activity falling under it. A fortiori, a rule may 
be efficient for some actors some of the time, but at least in some cases it will not be.79 
This heterogeneity of cost outcomes arises because contexts are heterogeneous in a 
                                                        
77 Gillian K Hadfield, ‘Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules Symposium: Positive Political Theory and Public 
Law’ (1992) 80 Geo L J 583. 
78 Hadfield talks about rules having ‘precedential effect for a collection of similar, but not identical, cases.’ 
ibid 584–85. She does not however seem to have in mind the understanding of a ‘case’ familiar in legal 
discussions, namely, an episode in which an activity has already given rise to legal dispute under a rule. 
Rather, as made clear by the contrast she draws between the ‘full set of cases’ and ‘a random sample of 
activities,’ she uses the term to capture the whole collection of (potential) activities to which a rule applies. 
ibid 585. She is, however, inconsistent in this usage. Her claim that ‘cases before the court…. will constitute 
a biased sample of all possible cases’ mixes the two concepts. ibid. Given the threats that overused terms 
create of being misunderstood, I have used ‘contexts’ rather than ‘cases.’  
79 Hadfield (n 77) 587. 
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simpler sense. This is the broader point, and the more relevant one in what follows. 
Inasmuch as a rule functions to map from states of affairs to legal outcomes, those 
mappings are not one-to-one but one-to-many. In other words, many different states of 
affairs inevitably come under the same rule.80  
Hadfield’s intention was to inject a small dose of realism into the Coasean approach to 
legal change. Yet her line of critique raises a set of fundamental questions that are 
obscured when law is understood to arise from repeated episodes of the same actors 
interacting in roughly the same set of circumstances. The same law will impinge on a 
multitude of different actors, engaged in different albeit similar activities.  
D. Problems	of	Shared	Knowledge	
With these two points in mind, it becomes easier to see how Landes–Posner smuggled in 
a not-very-believable assumption about law. To see how, I reconstruct a generalized 
version of their model, starting with those portions that do not rely on or refer to law. 
That would entail a population of economic actors who can participate in a 
heterogeneous collection of activities. Any of those activities will generate a collection of 
costs and benefits, both direct and indirect, certain and uncertain. The costs and benefits 
of engaging in those activities depend on how other members of the population choose 
to behave, though how much the activities of others will matter can vary from basically 
not at all to very much indeed.  
We can then add the law back into this model with the goal of working toward a 
generalization of the Landes–Posner model in this enlarged setting. Doing so, we would 
first note that the marginal costs and benefits of engaging in a given activity include not 
only expected gains or losses from occasional, unpredictable mishaps but also any 
expected damages to be received or paid whenever an adverse event leads to the 
imposition of liability under a legal rule. This begs the question of how this affects the 
calculations of the actors.  
Here we arrive at some seemingly innocent but practically disruptive questions. How do 
actors know what activities are subject to any given rule when they make the calculations 
that predict and determine their future courses of action? Put differently, how do they 
differentiate between engaging in an activity that might give rise to a legally-salient 
                                                        
80 ibid 584–85, 586–87. 
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adverse event, versus one that simply hazards an occasional loss-imposing mishap? 
Second, how does a person differentiate between having suffered an adverse event, 
whose costs might be offset by a legally-backed damages award, and mere misfortune, 
whose costs they must bear alone? Third, when an adverse event does occur, how does a 
harmed party know to whom the prevailing rule applies for the purposes of seeking 
damages? And by the same token, when a person is planning their activities, how do they 
identify the counterparties to whom they may be liable under that rule if an adverse event 
does occur?  
Landes–Posner and the collection of models it exemplifies are totally silent on the how 
aspect of these questions. Nevertheless, the assumption that actors have common 
knowledge of the answers to these questions is crucial to their analysis. Though this 
assumption is never made explicit, the calculations imputed to parties in deciding how to 
proceed in a legal dispute, namely whether to litigate or settle and how much to settle for, 
depend on comprehensive, mutual knowledge of each party’s future opportunity set vis-
à-vis the rule. Their model works, in particular, only if they share a clear and 
uncontroversial understanding of the boundary between engaging in an activity subject 
to the rule and abstaining from it. It depends furthermore on a consensus between the 
parties about whether or not an adverse event has occurred, as well as a confidence that 
this judgement will not waver in the future. 
If we wanted to extend the Landes–Posner model to a population of more than two actors, 
the implicit epistemic assumptions would be even more exacting. The calculations 
performed by the parties to the dispute would require that each have a complete 
catalogue of and extensive data about all other actors whose interests will be at stake if 
the relevant activity is pursued. The extended model would also depend on the parties 
being unanimous with this large population of economic actors about the boundaries of 
the activity subject to a rule. Moreover, the math in this extended model would only work 
under the assumption that no controversy could be expected about whether an adverse 
event has or has not occurred. In particular, the capacity of the parties both to choose a 
rational course of action in relation to a particular set of rules, and in many cases within 
the dispute itself, would depend on the whole population having common knowledge of 
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the activity set subject to the rule and of the nature of what would and would not count 
as an adverse event for the purposes of the rule.81 
E. Unrealism	and	the	Positive	Method	in	Economics	
At this point it will be useful to foreground the question of ‘unrealism’ in economic 
models. The extended Posner–Landes model depends on economic actors not only 
enjoying common knowledge of rationality, but having joint knowledge of the preference 
functions of a large, nominally indeterminate population of co-actors, as well. 82  It 
requires a depth and complexity of mathematical calculation that would be hard for 
modern supercomputers, let alone the average legal subject, even if actor preferences 
could be quantified and made publicly available.83 Champions of the Coasean approach 
might respond that the unrealism of this implication is irrelevant. The point of a model, 
after all, is not to capture every last detail of the world.84 In accordance with Milton 
Friedman’s notorious argument defending the use of unrealistic assumptions about the 
micro-structure and micro-motives of economic actors in models aimed at understanding 
macro-systems and macro-behaviour, Coaseans might insist that the measure of a 
model’s success lies in the accuracy of the high-level picture it draws and on the strength 
of the predictions it can make about legal change, not in how precisely it depicts the 
moving parts.85  
                                                        
81 To calculate the optimal course of action under any state of the law, you have to know how other relevant 
actors will act. Knowing that they will act according to the same rationality as you, however, requires 
knowing that they know how you will choose your course of action. If they didn’t, they might act differently, 
and you would have to amend your calculations. But for them to know how you will choose your course of 
action requires them to know that you know. The infinite regress implied here is captured by the concept 
of ‘common knowledge.’  
82 By ‘nominally indeterminate’ I mean that whether an individual’s behaviour has to be included in a 
litigant’s calculation depends on a provisional assessment of whether they are at all likely to participate. 
There are sure to be borderline cases. This is equivalent to saying that the calculation has to integrate the 
possible ‘activity’ levels of the whole population, with the caveat that for some portion of the population 
the only possible activity level is zero.  
83 See above, n 70, on the differential equations underlying the modelled calculation of courses of action. 
With a multiplicity of actors, the complexity of equations and the calculations involved would increase 
exponentially.  
84 In short, the map is not the territory and our maps are only useful insofar as they engage in some amount 
of reductionism. For critical explorations of this point, see Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Law: A Map of 
Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law’ (1987) 14 J L & Soc 279; Brian Langille, ‘Putting 
International Labour Law on the (Right) Map’ in Adelle Blackett and Christian Lévesque (eds), Social	
Regionalism	in	the	Global	Economy (Routledge 2011). 
85 Milton Friedman, ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’ in Essays	in	Positive	Economics (University of 
Chicago Press 1953). 
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Here, I want to bring to bear Herbert Simon’s incisive argument that Friedman’s defence 
of unrealistic assumptions only makes sense where there is sufficient continuity	 of	
approximation.86 Simon’s argument was a response to defenders of Friedman’s position 
who drew a parallel with the reliance on unrealistic assumptions in physics. We know, 
for example, that because of general relativity, Newton’s physical laws describing the 
action of gravity are strictly speaking false. Any model of the movement of the planets 
built atop Newtonian assumptions are sure to be false as well. Nonetheless, scientists and 
engineers often employ a methodological posture that allows them to make a logical jump 
from ideal types to empirical fact. That posture, which Simon named the ‘principle of 
continuity of approximation,’ simply entails the supposition that, where a model’s 
assumptions sufficiently approximate real-world conditions, any claims logically 
derivable from those assumptions will be approximately correct as well.87 Where the 
principle is valid, exploiting it can be an extremely valuable technique. It limits the 
complexity of calculations, reduces the numbers of factors that need to be considered, 
and decreases the necessary precision of measurements.  
Simon’s argument was that this ‘principle’ was a common feature of the modern scientific 
toolkit. He did not say anything about when it could be trusted or relied upon. In practice, 
we can treat continuity of approximation as an empirical relationship, measurable in 
degrees, between a particular phenomenon and a particular model used to capture it: that 
is, a model’s approximation of the reality can be more or less continuous. Notably, 
continuity of approximaxation is not an internal feature of a model, but strongly depends 
on how the model is to be used and especially on the scale and scope of the phenomena 
it is trying to capture. For example, the ideal gas laws provide very accurate descriptions 
of the macro-behaviour of compressed gases. Those laws are deducible from very simple 
premises about the behaviour of and interaction between individual molecules. Thus, for 
the purposes of modelling the behaviour of a gas, this simple model of molecule 
behaviour has very high continuity of approximation. Yet the model is not ‘sufficiently 
                                                        
86 Herbert Simon, ‘Testability and Approximation’ in Daniel M Hausman (ed), The	Philosophy	of	Economics:	
An	Anthology (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2008); the text originally appeared in GC Archibald and 
others, ‘Problems of Methodology—Discussion’ (1963) 53 The American Economic Review 227, 229–31. 
87 Simon named his concept by analogy to the concept of continuity in mathematics. A continuous function 
can be rigorously defined as a function for which input values that are close to one another always produce 
output values that are close to one another as well, so long as the inputs are sufficiently close. What Simon 
had in mind is that a model has continuity of approximation so long as ‘good’ approximations at the micro 
level (inputs) produce ‘good’ approximations at the macro level (outputs).  
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approximate’ to come even close to correctness in predictions about the behaviour of 
individual molecules. 
Much can be said about the factors that determine continuity of approximation between 
a system and some model of it. For one, as with the ideal gas laws, a great deal of leverage 
can be exercised by the statistical law of averages. Where a model aggregates over a large 
number of individual bodies, small differences between the actual behaviour of the 
individuals and model’s assumptions about their behaviour will not matter so long as the 
differences are randomly and symmetrically distributed. More generally, we can surmise 
that continuity of approximation will be stronger when the gaps between assumptions 
and reality are small, non-systematic, or non-cumulative. This idea that gaps and 
inaccuracies between assumptions and reality, even very significant ones, will in a sense 
‘come out in the wash’ was the basis of early defences of the efficient financial markets 
hypothesis. 88  Gary Becker, too, provided a compelling explanation of how market 
rationality, defined in terms of negatively inclined demand curves, could arise just as 
easily from wholly irrational choices on the part of individual consumers as from rational 
ones, using an argument he explicitly compared to the ideal gas example.89 
F. Strategic	Action	and	the	Instability	of	Legal	Form	
When it comes to some of the assumptions underpinning the Landes–Posner model, there 
is a plausible argument that continuity of approximation is satisfied. I offer four examples. 
Though common knowledge of rationality does not hold, neither can anyone expect 
others to conduct themselves in completely altruistic ways. Individuals do not solve 
multi-variable differential equations when they choose how to proceed in a legal dispute, 
but when the stakes are relatively small for a party, the outputs of those calculations may 
not have any functional consequence for their behaviour anyway.90 When the stakes are 
large, by contrast, the outputs of the kinds of calculations suggested by the Landes–
Posner models may map rather well onto simple intuitions. People do not have full 
                                                        
88 Eugene F Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’ (1970) 25 Journal of 
Finance 383; Andrew W Lo, ‘Efficient Markets Hypothesis’ in Steven N Durlauf and Lawrence E Blume (eds), 
The	New	Palgrave	Dictionary	of	Economics (2nd edn, Nature Publishing Group 2008). 
89 Gary S Becker, ‘Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory’ (1962) 70 Journal of Political Economy 1; see 
Cosma Shalizi, ‘Of Microfoundations (In Memoriam Gary Becker)’ (Three‐Toed	Sloth, 7 September 2018) 
<bactra.org/weblog/1155.html> accessed 1 November 2018. 
90 If the future stakes of a case for a litigant are small, then they need not consider the future activity of 
others under the law when choosing how to proceed in a legal dispute. The differential equation they are 
imagined to be solving is mostly zeros.  
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knowledge of each other’s preferences, but if litigants all have a rough sense of how 
others will respond to new laws, it may be sufficient for the high-level structure of the 
model to fit the real-world dynamics. The goal of the Landes–Posner model is to map out 
the rough shape of the curve that legal change follows under various scenarios, not to 
develop a technique that is precise enough for numerical prediction.  
Unfortunately, our fuller picture of the assumptions and presuppositions underlying the 
Landes–Posner model does point to one way in which continuity of approximation fails 
catastrophically. In the actual world regulated by law there is significant and persistent 
controversy about what counts as an activity for the purposes of a rule, and about 
whether an adverse event has occurred.91 Parties to a legal dispute often disagree about 
whether they were engaged in an activity to which a rule applies, and about whether a 
legally salient adverse event has occurred. In negligence cases, for example, there may be 
a disagreement over whether the defendant actually owed a duty of care—that is, about 
whether the plaintiff and the defendant were engaged in a shared activity—or over 
whether the relevant standard of care has been breached. It is the determination of the 
answer to these questions which conditions whether or not, respectively, the parties 
were engaged in an activity, or an adverse event has occurred, for the purposes of Landes 
and Posner’s model. Similarly, in contract, parties may disagree about whether they 
established a contract at all (shared activity?), or whether or not an agreement was 
breached (adverse event?). As a result, litigants trying to calculate the prospective cost 
consequences of some status quo ante legal rule cannot be confident that the population 
of potential future co-actors will agree with them about what rules are applicable to a 
given activity. Nor, vice versa, can they rely on agreement about what activities will fall 
under the rule. They cannot trust an agreement about whether an adverse event has 
occurred. Put more sharply, parties to a putative legal dispute may not even agree about 
whether there is a legal dispute.  
Critically, such disagreements about the application of a rule are not random. The gap 
between model and reality is not small, unpredictable, or unsystematic. Given the 
economic consequences of the legal dispute, the rationality assumptions that underlie 
                                                        
91 A common claim about the legal system is that agreement about the application of a norm to a situation 
is much more common than disagreement. Looking only at legal disputes biases the picture. My claim that 




Landes–Posner, and the Coasean approach more broadly, instead imply that 
disagreement will be systematic, substantial, and endemic. Defendants have a strong 
incentive to say ‘I am not the kind of party to which this rule applies,’ ‘They are not the 
kind of party that can avail themselves of this kind of claim,’ ‘The relevant kind of event 
never occurred,’ and the like. The alternative to doing so is exposure to potential 
economic loss. And without some way to stabilize the scope and application of a rule, the 
same sort of strategic behaviour will be available to potential plaintiffs as well. In the 
absence of some systemic constraint, actors will always have an incentive to claim that 
some event impinging on their interests has occurred and that they have not only 
endured a loss but suffered some wrong for which some other actor(s) should 
compensate them.  
Such incentives are not immediately fatal to the validity of the Posner–Landes model. 
Recuperating the model in the presence of such disagreement, however, requires the 
identification of some factor, process, or actor that is capable of resolving disagreements 
of this sort for the purposes of an individual dispute. More seriously, it will require a 
factor that can provide a relatively stable and moderately consistent marker of how such 
disagreements would be resolved were a dispute to be mooted by parties of one type or 
another. Put differently, the kinds of calculations that are central to the Landes–Posner 
model of decision-making in legal disputes and in the economy more generally depend 
on processes that work to mark off the boundaries of rule-relevant activities and adverse 
events in a relatively stable, foreseeable way.  
We can hypothesize a number of ways in which such potential disagreements might be 
subjected to stable resolution. We can contemplate a system in which rules would be 
delimited by common-sense understandings of familiar categories. There would be one 
rule applicable when a car collides with a pedestrian, another for when someone vows 
that she will do something, and another applicable to the personal business transactions 
of the director of a corporation. Or we could envision a system in which the boundaries 
of the activity were themselves delimited through scientific and/or social scientific 
authority, based in turn either on inductive or instrumentalist reasoning.92  
                                                        
92 I do not have in mind here a practice like the familiar economic analysis of law, which makes normative 
arguments and offers functionalist explanations regarding the desirable/actual allocation of rights, duties, 
and liabilities. Instead, I have in mind a practice that would use non-legal expertise to define the extension 
and intension of legally-salient categories, an instrumental application of the kind of functional explanation 
that Miceli gives for the boundaries that demarcate tort from property and contract, and contract from 
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I offer these hypotheticals only to avoid rushing into a conclusion that stable resolutions 
to such disagreements must be achieved through law. I severely doubt that trying to deal 
with them wholly outside the legal system would be possible.93 My intuition is that an 
appeal to common sense would transform the problem of self-interested knowledge in 
name, but not in substance.94 In practice, of course, such disagreements are generally 
resolved through the legal process itself and the actuality is that law itself provides the 
stable markers of the activities, actors, and events to which rules are applicable.  
The legal system provides these categories with institutional stability, but it does not 
provide them with permanence. Law may stabilize and disseminate its understanding of 
the contexts to which legal norms are applicable, but that does not take meaning out of 
play—quite the opposite in fact. In some negligence cases, for example, the parties may 
each advance an argument before the judge which is expressed in terms of whether a 
norm should be applicable or in terms of who should bear the cost. But more often, the 
arguments are phrased in terms of whether the defendant actually owed a duty of care 
(shared activity) or in terms of whether the relevant standard of care has been breached 
(adverse event).95 Hart and Fuller’s famous debate over what counts as a vehicle for the 
purposes of regulating a public park may have seemed to be a debate with very little at 
                                                        
property. Miceli’s account proceeds by imagining that ‘property rules’ or ‘liability rules,’ as defined by 
Calabresi and Melamed, end up being applied to goods, resources, assets, and relations on the basis of an 
efficiency benchmark. Thomas J Miceli, ‘The Color of Law: An Economic Theory of Legal Boundaries’ (2014) 
38 Eur J Law Econ 185; Guido Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1971–72) 85 Harv L Rev 1089.  
93 There is certainly some division of labour in such tasks. Elizabeth Mertz (ed), The	Role	of	Social	Science	
in	Law (Ashgate 2008); Lawrence Solan, ‘Can the Legal System Use Experts on Meaning?’ (1999) 66 Tenn L 
Rev 1166. 
94 cf Schlag:  
Suppose you are a judge. And suppose in that capacity you are asking, ‘What does the term “vehicle” 
really mean?’ Now again, you can ask what the word means to most people. (But you are not taking 
a poll.) You can ask what expert linguists believe the word means. (But you are not asking to follow 
the best expertise.) You can ask who among the litigants has the best argument about what the 
word means. (But you are not judging a debate round.) You can ask the city council members what 
they meant by the term ‘vehicle.’ (But they are not deities and you are not an oracle.)  
Pierre Schlag, ‘No Vehicles in the Park’ (1999–2000) 23 Seattle U L Rev 381, 386. 
95 In the American context, the Hand rule or Hand formula, expressed by Judge Learned Hand in Carroll	
Towing, is often taken by law-and-economics scholars as evidence of the centrality of instrumental, 
economistic reasoning in American private law. United	States	v	Carroll	Towing	Co 159 F2d 169 (United 
States Second Circuit 1947). Feldman and Kim say the rule has been ‘canonized’ by law and economics. 
Allan M Feldman and Jeonghyun Kim, ‘The Hand Rule and United	States	v.	Carroll	Towing	Co. Reconsidered’ 
(2005) 7 Am Law Econ Rev 523, 523. The actual state of negligence law across the United States, however, 
at least as reflected in instructions to juries, is at best consistent with the Hand rule, not dictated by it. In 
particular, actual decisions generally depart from economic interpretations of the rule. Mark A Geistfeld, 
‘The Principle of Misalignment: Duty, Damages, and the Nature of Tort Liability’ (2011) 121 Yale LJ 142, 
151–52. It is hard to imagine that the normative, instrumental standard of adjudication does better in areas 
of law that are not ‘canonical’ for the economic view.  
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stake, 96  yet the majority of legal cases are determined precisely by these sorts of 
questions: not ‘should vehicles be prohibited?’ or ‘who should bear the costs?’ and the 
like, but a type that looks like ‘Is this a vehicle?’ and ‘Is this the type of person who is 
subject to such liability?’ 
The difference this makes for the Coasean approach is not immediately obvious, but it is 
profound. Why does it matter whether a case is decided on the basis of ‘should this person 
be liable?’ or ‘did this person violate the standard of care?’ The direct gains and losses for 
the parties are determined by a judge’s holding, not the content of her reasoning. That 
may be true, as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. It does not remember what is 
at stake for the parties beyond the payoffs in the instant dispute, nor for actors beyond 
the dispute, namely, how the case weighs on the overlapping network of rules that cover 
the field of economic activity. This issue forces a confrontation with the reality that a body 
of precedent is not just a weighted collection of prior statements about whether a norm 
should be applied in a given context, that judges apply according to some abstract 
probability function. Rather, the body of law germane to a legal dispute is a body of 
overlapping, inexact, and often conflicting statements about the nature of the contexts—
the actors, the activities and the events—to which one or more norms might apply. And 
legal change thus entails not only small, marginal changes in the probability of an adverse 
event being subject to a given quantum of liability, but small changes to the map between 
the body of norms and the contexts to which they apply. Any account of legal change 
rooted in positivism and emergent processes must include not only an account of the 
transformation of norms, but the transformation of legal form as well.  
IV. Conclusion	
I end with a number of comments. Let me start by momentarily returning to the 
evolutionary idiom, restating the conclusion of Part III in terms of mechanism and unit.  
I suggested at the end of Chapter 2 that the Coasean framework might provide a 
serviceable proxy for an as-yet unconstructed evolutionary account of legal change, 
which would integrate a sufficient number of factors and a rich enough account of 
                                                        
96 HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harv L Rev 593, 607; Lon L Fuller, 




mechanisms to be applicable across a wide variety of contexts. I suggested, in particular, 
that the framework might be made to stand in for a more general account that would still 
be constructed on the basis of countervailing preferences, institutional structure, and 
legally-constrained behaviour. If there were particular problems with the details of the 
Coasean account of behaviour, preferences, institutional constraint, or legal form my 
operating premise was that they could be patched up with sufficient improvement to the 
account of motivations, behaviours, institutions or normativity.  
The problem which appears in this chapter is that being interested in the evolution of 
norms forces us to confront the interaction between their reproduction over time and the 
reproduction of the contexts to which they apply. Taking that relation into account, 
however, further requires acknowledgement that both types of entities must be under 
what a Darwinian perspective would call selection pressures. A robust account must not 
only integrate an account of how both kinds of entity change, but an account of how they 
are kept relatively stable over time.  
In Chapter 4, I will explore one strategy, elaborated in the work of Simon Deakin, who 
addresses these rather profound difficulties with interest-based accounts of legal change. 
Deakin’s strategy involves going beyond the vague, instrumental references to evolution 
that were discussed in the last chapter. He combs evolutionary theory for insights, guided 
by an intuition that the interplay of continuity and change in the domain of life might 
reveal something about similar dialectics in the dynamics of law.  
Second, I should acknowledge that the argument I developed in Part III of this chapter 
can likely be made without having to draw on evolutionary theory. Having discovered 
these concerns through a careful application of evolutionary theory, however, my 
investigations have clearly pointed to the role that evolutionary models can play in 
elucidating aspects of legal (and social) change that other approaches take as givens, and 
whose stability is taken for granted. On the other hand, it may well be that the criteria for 
an evolutionary account of legal change, as I laid out in Chapter 1, can be met without 
drawing on evolutionary theory in the ways that Deakin does, or even at all.  
The final point emphasized by this chapter is that drawing on evolutionary theory alone 
cannot be expected to be sufficient to develop believable models of legal change. There is 
no codex to tell researchers which elements of evolutionary theory may be relevant or 
apt, or what uses might be productive. We can map legal change onto evolutionary theory, 
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but we have to come up with our own legend. We must also be aware that Darwin’s 





4 — Legal Change between Systemic 








Through a series of books, articles, and chapters published since the turn of the century, 
Simon Deakin and his collaborators have developed an account of legal change that is 
evolutionary in its methodological aspirations, in its theoretical inspirations and, often, 
in its principal motif.3 This chapter synthesises and critiques that account. While the 
focus is on Deakin’s work, this chapter serves as more than an isolated episode in the 
recent history of legal theorizing. I take Deakin’s scholarship as exemplary—
paradigmatic—along a number of dimensions that are relevant to the larger arc of my 
argument.  
Though the last chapter was largely staged in terms of the pitfalls and promises of 
evolutionary theory for evolutionary accounts of legal change, the product of that 
discussion was a clear insight into how legal knowledge matters for legal change. 
Investment in the complexities of evolutionary theory generates questions that expand 
our attentions beyond norms, and toward the broader significance of a legal rule. The 
chapter’s findings implied that an empirically sound, nomothetic theory of legal change 
                                                        
1  Niklas Luhmann, Law	 as	 a	 Social	 System (Fatima Kastner and others eds, Klaus A Ziegert tr, Oxford 
University Press 2004) 340. 
2 Gunther Teubner, Law	as	an	Autopoietic	System (Zenon Bankowski ed, Anne Bankowska and Ruth Adler 
trs, Blackwell 1993) 77. 
3 Notable collaborators include Frank Wilkinson, John Armour, Priya Lele, Matthias Siems, Katharina Pistor 
and Geoffrey Hodgson. For ease of reference, however, the relevant sources are cited when their content is 
first addressed or drawn from. See the bibliography for further details. 
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would have to extend consideration beyond the law’s entanglement with norms, 
behaviour, interests, and institutions, to comprehend the role of law and the legal system 
in the maintenance of the semantic order to which norms apply. More explicitly, the 
conclusions showed that a (scientific) evolutionary account of legal change must 
integrate appreciation both of how norms change and of the shifting, contested beliefs 
about the contexts to which those norms apply. The argument did not however provide 
any indication of what such an account would look like.  
In a sense, Deakin’s research on legal evolution over the last twenty years has provided 
an answer to the questions raised by the last chapter. He aspired to develop a general 
account of legal change that appreciates both the pressure that interests place on norms, 
and the pressure that the legal system places on the legal forms through which those 
norms are necessarily administered.  
The key, borrowed by Deakin from systems theory, is that neither individual norms nor 
even the legal classification of contexts that stabilize the application of those norms can 
be treated atomistically. His approach instead insists that norms and the concepts	 to 
which those norms are linked must be characterized as part of a holistic, ‘operatively 
closed’ legal system. The implication is that accounts of legal change cannot be limited to 
explaining the transformation of individual norms. They must instead track 
transformation of a linked complex of norms, concepts, and a broader legal discourse.  
Part I is intended to provide a richer explication of Deakin’s arguments. As his theory has 
been elaborated in texts written over the course of twenty years, there are unsurprisingly 
some tensions and contradictions between its versions. Nonetheless, my method in this 
part is one of synthesis and reconstruction, with the aim of placing Deakin’s account on 
as strong a footing as possible. In particular, some significant portion of the argument is 
dedicated to clearing up common misconceptions about systems theory. 
In Part III, I draw on empirical historical work Deakin has done in collaboration with 
Frank Wilkinson to raise a number of doubts about Deakin’s approach to the 
‘environment’ in which law evolves. In service of those arguments, Part II develops a 
partial critique of Deakin’s theory.4 The output is clarification about Deakin’s relationship 
                                                        
4 Critique here is used not in the sense of evaluating negatively, but of bringing to the surface what is 
otherwise opaque.  
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to functionalism (or adaptationism) discussed in Chapters 1 and 3 and illumination of a 
tension in Deakin’s account of the role of ‘politics’ in processes of legal evolution.  
I. A	 Reconstruction	 of	 Deakin’s	 Legal	 Evolution:	 Institutional	
Economics,	Systems	Theory	and	the	Darwinian	Algorithm	
The elemental claim of Deakin’s approach to legal change is the following: ‘… an 
evolutionary study of law requires … a dual approach: on the one hand, an internal 
understanding of internal juridical modes of thought and conceptualization; and on the 
other, an external perspective on the law as a social institution or mechanism.’5 In rough 
outline, he draws on ‘autopoietic’ systems theory in the tradition of Niklas Luhmann and 
Gunther Teubner to provide the former, and on a robust institutional economics to 
furnish the latter.6 However, underlying these borrowings, and working to knit them 
together, is a commitment to the idea that a robust understanding socio-legal change will 
be aided by reference to, and integration into, evolutionary theory.  
Before I move into the details, I need to say a word about the strategy I adopt in this 
chapter and how it relates to the problem of knowledge, and to make a crucial 
clarification about uses of the ‘internal/external’ dichotomy when it comes to law.  
A. Taking	Knowledge	Seriously	
At the highest level of generality, Deakin describes his theory as an account of co-
evolution between the legal system, the economy, and the political system.7 Co-evolution 
means that law’s development is quasi-autonomous, with the economy serving only as 
one, albeit important element of the environment in which that development occurs.8 
Law, as experienced and expressed through the legal rules communicated and enforced 
by legal institutions, determines neither the structure of social relations nor more 
abstract ‘outcomes.’ Nor, vice versa, is the path of legal change determined by changes to 
economic context. The influences are multi-linear.9 Law is shaped by the social context it 
                                                        
5 Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, The	Law	of	the	Labour	Market:	Industrialization,	Employment,	and	
Legal	Evolution (Oxford University Press 2005) 28–29.  
6 Simon Deakin, ‘Legal Evolution: Integrating Economic and Systemic Approaches’ (2011) 7 Rev L & Econ 
659, 673. 
7 John Armour and others, ‘Law and Financial Development: What We Are Learning from Time-Series 
Evidence’ [2009] BYU L Rev 1435, 1449–50. 
8 ibid. 
9 Deakin and Wilkinson (n 5) 28–30. 
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operates within even as it shapes and guides relations and dynamics in that context.10 
Though the legal system, the political system, and the economy each develop 
endogenously, each also acts as an important element of the external environment that 
shapes the (internal) evolution of the other two.11 (see figure 1 below) 
 
Figure	1:	Deakin’s	macro‐model	of	co‐evolution	between	law	and	society12	
In a sense, the whole thesis of this dissertation might be grasped by noting the absence, 
in this diagram, of knowledge. The initial impulse might be to characterize the project as 
something like supplementing the picture with a box labelled ‘knowledge,’ along with a 
complementary bevy of causal arrows. 13  Analytically, that formula might have been 
worked out through a supplement to Deakin’s account. It would have meant taking 
Deakin’s account more or less for granted, analysing the nature of the ‘knowledge 
system,’ then providing an account of its coevolution, respectively, with the legal system 
and the economy.14  
For a number of reasons, this analytical strategy is unlikely to bear fruit. Fundamentally, 
integrating new factors into a model is not like adding a new wing onto an existing house. 
Considering additional factors, or modelling a system with more elements, will often 
                                                        
10 ibid 28. 
11 Armour and others (n 7) 1450. 
12 ibid. 
13 I presented early versions of my work using such a four-part diagram as an illustrative heuristic. 
14 The resulting account would be prelude to an account that integrated attention to all four systems; as I 
note below, Deakin does not give robust attention to the complexities introduced by the political system, 
but focuses primarily on the interaction between legal norms and economic institutions.  
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completely supersede or annul the prior analysis. If you add a variable to a system of 
equations, the solutions developed for the simpler model will sometimes still work in a 
small, possibly redundant, set of cases. Sometimes, but seldom. The gravitational two 
body problem has an easy, closed-form solution; the generalized three body problem has 
none.  
Luckily, we are not searching for a closed-form, universal model than can be used to 
predict the path of future legal change. The goal, as articulated in Chapter 1, is only a clear 
sense of the relevant mechanisms. In looking for a credible account of legal evolution, we 
are not looking for something like a closed-form solution to the gravitational force 
equations, but only for something akin to the equations themselves. Yet as much as our 
epistemological ambition may limit demands on the model, the details of Deakin’s 
account introduce much knottier issues.  
We are not simply looking, as with the ‘three body’ problem, to capture the interaction 
between discrete elements subject to a field of mutually-acting, high-level forces. In its 
details, Deakin’s model comprises not only an account of how these systems relate to one 
another, but both i. how lower-level elements of each system are inter-related; and ii. how 
those elements are related to elements in the other systems.15 If I were to follow the line 
of inquiry suggested by the four-box figure, theory reconstruction would entail a robust 
accounting for a system of knowledge, simultaneously addressing relations between 
elements of that system—scientific facts? models? theories? paradigms? —and the 
relation of those elements to elements from the other systems.  
The more fundamental complication is that, once you drill down to the level of the 
elements that compose the systems, it becomes clear that some forms of knowledge are 
already present in Deakin’s model. He is clear that epistemic phenomena—meaning, 
communication and information—play a central role both in the internal development of 
the individual systems, and in the interactions between them. In Deakin’s account of how 
legal rules impinge on economic behaviour, he puts the informational content of those 
rules in the foreground. The key function of legal norms, he proposes, is to signal to 
                                                        
15 A full account would not be limited to inter- and intra-system relations between elements. Lying in the 
background of Deakin’s analysis, and occluded by the system-theoretic view, is that the legal system only 
serves its economic and political functions because it is embedded in a legal order, that is, an effective state 
apparatus that gives legal norms ‘bite.’ The ‘signals’ it sends are a credible indicator of state behaviour. 
Economic institutions depend not only on the particular information (norms, rulings) communicated by 
the legal system, but on the bare existence of the system as well. 
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economic actors about the ‘state of the game,’ and thereby facilitate (mutually 
advantageous) action in the presence of strategic uncertainty. In the opposite direction, 
he posits that legal forms, more than just reflecting a balance or admixture of economic 
interests, represent an archive of systemic learning about economic life. Finally, at least 
when it comes to the legal system, Deakin’s account sees knowledge—or at least 
meaning—as constitutive of the system and its elements.16 
My intervention can thus not proceed by trying to make knowledge (belief, frames, 
expertise, etc) into an additional, previously un-examined set of elements in the 
environment in which law(s) develop. Instead, I proceed by providing a robust depiction 
of how knowledge enters into Deakin’s account of the economy, the legal system, and the 
relations between them. My contribution has to function as a corrective to those accounts, 
not just as a supplement to it.  
B. On	the	Internal	/	External	Distinction	
As noted above, Deakin roughly divides his analysis into an internal account, 
comprehensible through systems theory, and an external view best understood using the 
tools of institutional economics. Yet there is a risk of confusion here given some 
conflicting uses of internal and external when it comes to law.  
Describing systems theory as an ‘internal view’ of law would not pass uncontroversially 
with most jurists. To the great majority of jurists, Luhmann and Teubner’s accounts of 
law are unfamiliar, alien, or even outlandish. 17  Deakin suggests that systems theory 
combines ‘external points of reference’—metaphors and concepts from outside of legal 
discourse broadly conceived—with an interpretive frame ‘which views legal phenomena 
from within the system itself, that is to say, through the internal processes, symbols and 
linguistic structures of law.’18 It is clearly this latter aspect, that systems theory takes 
seriously law’s own discourse, including law’s account of itself, which ultimately makes 
                                                        
16 Beyond their approach to the legal system, Luhmann and Teubner also understand the economy and the 
political order as communicative systems. Deakin has never been explicit about the degree to which he 
agrees with these views. Notably, he does not draw from Luhmann’s own economic sociology but instead 
combines system-theoretical approaches to law with institutional and epistemic evolutionary economics. 
His account of economic relations has an undeniable epistemic dimension but, in accordance with game-
theoretical tools, he tends to treat interests, incentives, and behaviours as real in a more material sense—
as determined and readable without intermediation. 
17 Anthony Beck, ‘Is Law an Autopoietic System? Review of Law as an Autopoietic System’ (1994) 14 OJLS 
401; MBW Sinclair, ‘Autopoiesis: Who Needs It’ (1992–93) 16 Legal Stud F 81.  
18 Deakin, ‘Legal Evolution’ (n 6) 674. 
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it appropriate as the foundation of a ‘social ontology of law.’19 Deakin does not mean that 
systems theory is an internal account of law, only that it is a perspective which 
understands law to have an interior, and thus does not reduce law to (an effect or 
epiphenomenon of) some other social reality.20  
Luhmann’s elaboration of his own views on this tension is more explicit about the 
distinction between ontology and epistemology. He is unequivocal that, per the contrast 
between internal and external or, alternatively, between juristic and sociological modes 
of ‘observing’ law, his theory lies squarely in the latter.21 He takes it for granted that the 
elementary task of any sociological account of law must necessarily be a clear definition 
or description (he uses the term ‘constitution’) of the object ‘law.’ Though law may lack a 
‘nature’ or ‘essence,’ the ability to clearly distinguish the boundary between law and non-
law, Luhmann suggests, is a precondition of any scientific theory of law.22 No matter how 
grounded his account may be in constructivist, hermeneutic social theory, he is resolute 
that the boundaries of the object called law are determined by the object itself and are 
not a product or effect of the analytical grid used to observe it.23 At least, this is true for 
what he calls the ‘second order’ observer—the scientist like him. 24 Yet he simultaneously 
understands that law, as an epistemic phenomenon, is wholly constituted out of ‘first 
order’ self-observations and self-descriptions, that is to say, by what the legal system or 
its participants take to be law. We might say that the second order observer has to 
understand law as an object that is ontologically constituted out of the epistemic practices 
of participants in the system.25 As such, he emphasizes that an adequate external view—
any theory of law that seeks to describe not only law but its social effects, functions, etc—
would necessarily have to account not only for the ways in which valid law produces 
itself, but also for the effects of law’s accounts of itself.26  
                                                        
19 Simon Deakin, ‘Evolution for Our Time: A Theory of Legal Memetics’ (2002) 55 CLP 1, 33–34. 
20 ibid 33. 
21 Luhmann (n 1) 59. 
22 ibid 57. 
23 ibid 57–58. 
24 ibid 58. 
25 Luhmann would no doubt insist on an account that speaks only of communications within the system, 
rather than the actions of participants. 
26 Luhmann (n 1) 59–60. 
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C. Internal	Dimension	of	 Legal	Evolution:	 Insights	 from	 Systems	
Theory	
Having dispensed with those preliminaries, I now turn in earnest to the meat of Deakin’s 
account of legal evolution. I begin with a review of the systems theory on which he bases 
his account of law’s internal dynamics, then turn to his account of evolutionary forces, 
and conclude with his model of the economic ‘environment’ that exercises evolutionary 
pressure on the legal system.  
1. Socio‐Legal	Evolution	as	Co	‐Evolution	of	‘Closed’	Systems		
When Luhmann and Teubner speak of ‘the legal system,’ they use that term (like many 
others) in a sociologically precise sense. Deakin nominally subscribes to Luhmann’s 
account of society as an operatively	 closed or autopoietic system, with a variety of 
subsystems.27 Where biological systems (individual bacteria, or trees, or dogs) are made 
up of physical matter, the basic constituents of social systems are ‘communications.’28 
Communications differ from the human behaviours that are at the foundation of many 
social scientific projects in two ways. First, the term is intended to capture the 
fundamentally semantic dimension of human action. Unlike a model of behaviour that is 
limited to (individual) preferences, beliefs, and strategic decisions, the systems theory 
approach understands social practices as intrinsically informed by, and expressive of, 
meaning. Second, this attention to communication rather than behaviours stresses the 
social agency of various non-human actors. The social world is rife with artefacts—a term 
used here to comprise both physical objects like traffic lights, and texts that can persist 
and exist across a variety of physical forms. Those artefacts serve to coordinate (or 
choreograph) practices by expressing a meaning that will be (roughly) shared within a 
discursive community. 29  
                                                        
27  Earlier versions of Deakin’s theory depended only on Teubner, who has clear intellectual debts to 
Luhmann, but whose approach is distinct in a number of ways. Notably, Luhmann’s Law	as	a	Social	System 
was not published in English translation until 2004. There is no cited reference to Luhmann in Deakin’s 
first major contribution to evolutionary accounts of legal change, Deakin, ‘Evolution for Our Time’ (n 19). 
There are only three references to Luhmann’s work in Deakin and Wilkinson (n 5). Deakin’s later work has 
relied more directly on Luhmann’s approach, eg Deakin, ‘Legal Evolution’ (n 6); Simon Deakin, ‘Juridical 
Ontology: The Evolution of Legal Form’ (2015) 40 Historical Social Research 170. 
28 Deakin, ‘Juridical Ontology’ (n 27) 175. 
29 ibid. This emphasis on the agency of non-human actors, and especially of texts, creates some important 
and generally unacknowledged overlaps between Luhmann’s systems theory and actor-network theory. 
See for example, Latour and Callon’s argument that macro-actors such as states or corporations are 
possible among humans but not baboons precisely because of their reliance on various ‘materials’ with 
durability that exceeds the relationships between individuals—texts, walls, ranks, titles and uniforms, 
weapons, as well as on professionals trained to use them. Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, ‘Unscrewing the 
161 
 
The legal system is one of many subsystems of the social system. To say that the legal 
system is a subsystem of the social system is to claim, first, that the constituent elements 
of the legal system are a subset of the elements of the social system, namely, meaningful 
communications.30 Second, it means that the legal system is itself a social system, with a 
clear distinction between its own inside and outside.  
Casting communications as the constitutive elements of social systems creates a number 
of traps for the unwary reader. Part of the difficulty likely lies in the specialized use of 
familiar terminology. Quotidian uses of communication have an instantaneous—or 
contemporaneous— temporal structure: it implies a sender, receiver, and a message with 
a determinate content, all present at the same moment.31 It is impossible to imagine 
communications in this sense being organized into a system. The image instead might be 
the notorious brain in a vat, babbling to itself without end, or a boiling pot of words and 
phrases. These images are erroneous, because they ignore the capacity of elements to be 
organized into structures. A single-celled organism is composed of molecules, but 
nonetheless contains structures that facilitate its reproduction over time.32 Likewise, a 
legal system may be said to have communications as its constitutive elements but 
nonetheless contain internal structures. In contrast to the physical elements of living 
creatures, we are unused to thinking of communications as durable or persistent. The 
legal system has structure(s)—norms, concepts—that help to perpetuate the distinction 
between legal communications and non-legal communications.33 
Systems theory seeks to account for the fact that legal institutions are less than fully 
accommodating (not fully responsive, not fully sympathetic) to social adversity, 
economic conflict, or political action. Though their account is ‘functionalist’ at the level of 
systems, it does not fall into the traps of functionalism, or adaptationism, discussed in 
Chapter 3.34 The existence of the legal system, according to their account, may be the 
                                                        
Big Leviathan: How Actors Macrostructure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them to Do So’ in AV Cicourel 
and K (Karin) Knorr-Cetina (eds), Advances	 in	Social	Theory	and	Methodology:	Toward	an	 Integration	of	
Micro‐	and	Macro‐Sociologies (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1981).  
30 Luhmann (n 1) 73–74. 
31 Beck (n 17) 409–10. 
32 By reproduction here I mean continuing to exist by taking in nutrients and exuding waste, not producing 
descendants. 
33 Luhmann (n 1) 78–79. 




result of a process of social evolution that has led to structural differentiation.35 But 
beyond that general systemic function, they resist the idea that the content of law is 
determined by or reflective of specific social needs, and reject the idea that law’s content 
can be explained by reference to any distinctively non-legal factor.36  
Luhmann and Teubner are clearly right that insofar as we are trying to identify ‘where 
the action is’ in the practice of law, we would do best to address ourselves to the conduct 
of a distinctive way of thinking, writing, speaking and looking at the world. What seems 
most important in Deakin’s borrowing from systems theory is its portrayal of modern, 
Western law as a professional, quasi-official practice characterized by a distinctive 
discourse and a particular mode of interpretation.37 I will say more about these two terms 
below. Let it suffice for the time being to note that lawyers qua the highly 
institutionalized, professional class who exercise a dominant role in the conduct of short-
term conflict resolution, in the facilitation of long-term cooperation and in the design and 
application of regulatory instruments, arrange their practice as much around maintaining 
semantic contact with a distinctive body of interconnected meanings as with ‘resolving 
problems.’ Lawyers are defined not by any particular roles but by their capacity and 
commitment to fulfil those roles using legal materials and legal practices. Consider the 
degree to which preexisting law necessarily informs the drafting of any new legislation, 
how the negotiated resolution of disputes takes place in the shadow of adjudication 
through the courts, or how the administration of regulation takes place, too, in the 
shadow of past and future administrative and constitutional review. Consider as well how 
often these tasks are either performed or at least assisted by legal professionals who are 
steeped in the values of procedural regularity, trained to treat the law as a bounded, 
determinate thing, and committed to a principle of legality that demands similar norms 
be applied to similar situations.38 Where Luhmann and Teubner (and thus Deakin) are 
certainly correct is in their emphasis on the importance of concepts and discourse in the 
life of law, and in the insistence that norms (rules, rights, and duties) are the least 
interesting part of law.39  
                                                        
35 See Luhmann (n 1) ch 6 (‘The Evolution of Law’). 
36 Deakin, ‘Legal Evolution’ (n 6) 674. 
37 ibid. 
38 Deakin and Wilkinson (n 5) 4–6. 
39 Luhmann (n 1) 339. 
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Law, understood in this way, exists. That is, law as a form of conduct persists over time, 
even though the details of the conduct may vary and, in particular, despite continual 
turnover in the population of individuals participating in that practice (plus lawyers 
becoming judges, plaintiffs etc).  
2. Some	Limits	and	Weaknesses		
I believe it is possible, and have tried below, to translate the claims Deakin makes about 
legal practice, legal concepts, and legal discourse into terms that minimize his reliance on 
the systems-theoretical apparatus. The risk of translating Deakin’s claims into 
terminology less informed by systems theory is that it will necessarily do some violence 
to his own account. The advantage is that translating in this way allows me to present my 
own findings as corrective of his theory rather than a refutation of it. My sense, based on 
his work with Wilkinson, is that my account actually accords better with his own sense of 
things.  
Embracing systems theory means taking on board more than just a particular account of 
law’s mode of existence. Luhmann and Teubner’s account extensively develops a set of 
metaphors borrowed heavily from the study of biological systems and of self-regulating 
systems more generally. Law in their account is not just a self-perpetuating form of 
practice, but is more precisely a self-contained system—an entity. Their claim is not 
simply that the semantic, interpretative and cultural practices of law are distinctive	and	
discernable as (more or less) legal, but also that law is distinct, as in separate. Like other 
distinct entities, law (the legal system) thus has an inside and an outside.40 As an entity 
with an inside, the system is constituted not by practices but by communications; that 
system, too, is self-perpetuating. Luhmann speaks not in terms of practices but in terms 
of operations. In Luhmann and Teubner’s account, the people engaged in these practices 
fully disappear: there is only a system of operations producing operations. ‘The system’ 
can learn about its environment. ‘Operational closure’ means that there is a clear and 
determinate distinction between internal operations and external ones.  
My intuition is that Deakin’s theory of legal evolution works just as well if we jettison 
some of the more extravagant claims of (social) systems theory. I focus instead on the 
                                                        
40 We might admit that a decision, or a description or an expression, can be more or less legal, much as a 
light can be more or less yellow. But that does not mean that law has an inside and outside, any more than 
‘yellowness’ does.  
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implications of law’s existence as a self-perpetuating practice engaged in by people, for 
law’s relationship between various transformations and agendas outside of it. That is a 
different task than trying to render everything in terms of communicative systems that, 
despite being ‘cognitively open,’ occasionally seem closed to observation by humans.  
Is a legal system truly a system, in the sense of Luhmann and Teubner? Is it a ‘cognitive 
order’41 that thinks for itself?42 My goal in this thesis is to mount a very narrow critique 
of Deakin’s account, not to tackle the sociological validity of systems theory. My sense is 
that systems theory is the kind of totalizing epistemological frame that necessarily evades 
falsification. For every point I want to make, my intuition is that it might be possible to 
translate it back into systemic terms.  
Nonethless, relying on an account that frames legal change in terms of an ‘operationally 
closed’ legal system composed of ‘internal operations’ that are wholly self-referential, 
makes it harder to express the doubts at the heart of my thesis.43 
Let me identify two examples where drawing this distinction has analytical stakes. 
Borrowing from Luhmann and Teubner, Deakin suggests that the legal system receives 
information about its social context through familiar ‘points of contact:’ litigation and 
adjudication on the one hand, the legislative process on the other.44 But the legal system, 
that is, the practices engaged in by individuals steeped in and committed to the historical 
corpus of legal meanings, is also shaped by the broader forms of knowledge those legal 
actors have. Deakin’s account of the rise of the employment contract in the United 
Kingdom portrays a more porous boundary. One way of putting my claim might be to 
insist on a much more expansive idea of what counts as an input into the system. 
3. Internal	Aspects	of	Legal	Evolution—Concepts,	Discourse	and	
Interpretation	
With those preliminaries out of the way, let me now return to the distinctive discourse 
and associated mode of interpretation that work to constitute law as a stable (though 
obviously not immutable) practice (i.e. as a social system). As will be seen, most of my 
time will be spent with concepts. I start, however, with interpretation. 
                                                        
41 Deakin, ‘Legal Evolution’ (n 6) 673. 
42 Gunther Teubner, ‘How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law’ (1989) 23 Law & 
Soc’y Rev 727. 
43 See Deakin, ‘Legal Evolution’ (n 6) 674. 




A car colliding with a pedestrian. A love affair—and the messiness of its end. The ruins of 
a house, collapsed during an earthquake. A rise in the cost of an input that means a 
company can no longer profitably deliver goods to a customer at the promised price. 
These are not legal entities or legal events. The systems view does not deny that these 
events have existence outside of law. It does not even suggest that these events only exist 
as communications in the social system. It is a starting point of the systemic view 
however, that, until events such as these are put into contact with the legal system, they 
have no legal existence, no legal meaning. 
Interpretation, or translation, is a matter of making the world meaningful to the legal 
system. It is not enough for someone to write to a judge to tell them about their 
misfortune. To receive information from the environment, information has to be ‘coded’ 
into a form that is meaningful within the system.45  
b) Concepts		
Interpretation is performed via legal concepts—although, as we shall see, the significance 
of legal concepts is not limited by their role in interpretation.  
Some legal concepts correspond to terms that appear almost exclusively in legal 
discourse: res ipsa loquitur, estoppel, remand, and the like. Although some legal concepts 
are expressed using otherwise-antiquated words or phrases borrowed from a foreign 
language, many use words with a prominent and largely associated everyday significance. 
What distinguishes legal concepts (or juridical concepts), even when they appear under 
terms with vernacular meanings, or with usages specific to other specialized settings, is 
their idiosyncratic significance, and distinctive existence, within the operation of the 
law.46 To say that juridical concepts have distinctive legal meanings is not to deny that a 
concept’s legal significance has important, second order social salience. 47  I also 
emphasize below that we need to attend to an inverse effect, the imprint of the vernacular 
on legal meanings. But it is certainly the case that a lawyer is doing something different 
when he mentions a ‘corporation,’ whether arguing in court, giving advice to a board of 
directors, or proposing amendments to draft legislation, than what an activist is doing 
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when she speaks to a reporter regarding the reasons for a planned protest against a 
‘corporation’ that ‘puts profits before people.’  
For the purposes of the legal system, concepts condense information.48 Deakin’s use of 
condense combines two meanings, one that connects the present to the future and is 
connected to what legal concepts are, the other rooted in the link between the present 
and the past, and linked to what concepts can be used to do.49 I start with the latter. 
In their link to interpretation, concepts provide the schema by which information about 
the world is represented in the legal system.50 Concepts function as heuristics. They are, 
in Luhmann’s words, ‘auxiliary	tools for … dealing with legal cases.’51 On the one hand, 
concepts provide the language, or discourse, through which states of affairs become 
represented in the legal system. This characterization is too passive however. What 
Deakin has in mind is that concepts work to filter out legally-irrelevant details, while 
picking out relevant features of state of affairs. They provide a filter, ‘the gateway for 
empirical data to enter the legal system.’52 
Concepts condense information, second, in the sense that they work as a repository of 
information about past states of affairs in which certain norms have been applicable. 
Concepts, according to this understanding, are not just a label that has been attached to a 
cluster of past contexts, but the repository itself, which ‘form[s] an informational store or 
cognitive	resource’ for future use.53 Concepts are not just an index—they do not just point 
to past states of affairs. They are, more specifically, a set of descriptions of past contexts. 
Legal concepts, in this sense, condense relevant information about past / preexisting 
applications of the law. 
D. The	Evolutionary	Mechanism	
When it comes to Deakin’s account of the evolutionary mechanism, care is called for. His 
approach is best illuminated by working through a long excerpt which addresses the 
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49 On the one hand, Deakin speaks to how concepts serve to shape information flowing into the legal system; 
on the other, he seems to mean that concepts allow empirical data to shape legal rules 
50 In reference to their role in interpretation, Deakin has used ’represent’ and ‘condense’ as synonyms. 
Deakin, ‘Juridical Ontology’ (n 27) 171–72. 
51 Luhmann (n 1) 340–41 (emphasis added). 
52 Deakin, ‘Juridical Ontology’ (n 27) 176. 
53 Deakin, ‘Legal Evolution’ (n 6) 675. 
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implications of the systems-theoretical perspective for accounts of law’s evolutionary 
character. 
[Law’s] evolutionary properties are the combined result of the closure or autonomy of the 
system, on the one hand, and the possibility of its structural coupling with related social 
systems, including the economy, on the other. Through its operational closure, the legal 
system internalizes the mechanisms of inheritance, variation, and selection. Legal 
reasoning, which is guided by the principle of internal consistency, supplies a basis upon 
which normative phenomena are stabilized (inheritance), while also providing for the 
adjustment of rules in the light of changing external circumstances. A legal device such as 
the doctrine of precedent, which is aimed at achieving consistency, simultaneously 
contains the basis for the modification of rules when new cases arise (variation). 
Precedent implies that like cases will be treated alike, and unalike cases differently from 
each other. Under these circumstances, ‘evolutionary selection achieves a very specific 
form,’ one in which new rules emerge from the matching of rules to cases and the scope 
for the modification of rules which arises when two cases are not alike. … variations are 
channeled by the twin pressures on legal interpretation: to maintain the internal order of 
the system, on the one hand, while finding a way to process and translate the information 
received from the environment, for example through litigation over individual cases, on 
the other.54 
One apparent implication of this excerpt, that Deakin sees evolution as wholly internal to 
the legal system, is not corroborated by other parts of his argument. Teubner, who Deakin 
references here, does explicitly claim that an operatively closed legal system entirely 
subsumes the evolutionary mechanism: ‘[a]fter the emergence of autopoiesis, internal 
mechanisms take	over the evolutionary functions.’55 Teubner portrays a process in which 
new variants on existing legal norms may be ‘triggered’ by social conflicts or economic 
disputes (or by legislative process, or by innovation in doctrinal scholarship). He suggests 
that the key mechanism for the selection of valid norms from among these variants also 
lies within the legal system. It is not just that the forms of variation limited by the nature 
of the legal system (variations, to even be considered, must constitute [legal] 
‘communications’…); but the ‘main criteria for selection,’ too, are ‘whether the innovation 
fits in with the existing normative structures and whether it is compatible with legal 
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autopoiesis (the legal code).’ 56  Lastly, the reproduction and retention of norms is 
performed through various practices that perpetuate ‘legal culture.’57 Teubner is not 
lucid on this point, but his account includes both selection among (potential) variant 
norms within the trial process and subsequent selective retention of the communications 
produced through trials via the cultural outputs of jurists (doctrinal research, textbooks, 
etc).58 
Deakin’s approach is not quite compatible with Teubner’s: his account of legal evolution 
is not entirely internal.59 Like Teubner, he casts the individual legal dispute as the critical 
moment of the evolutionary mechanism; he, too, sees it as a locus of contact between the 
legal system and the world, a moment in which the legal system is set up to find the fit 
between a given state of affairs and the corpus of previously decided cases. And in 
evolutionary terms, Deakin sees this moment, like Teubner, participating both in 
variation and in reproduction. On the one hand, a doctrine of precedent, interpreted not 
only as courts being bound by earlier decisions, but specifically as an embodiment of the 
principle that equal cases are to be judged equally and unequal cases unequally, 
participates in the reproduction of the ‘rule,’ in the sense that it adds to a chain of cases 
to which the rule is applicable.60 
The effort to bring a given state of affairs under some rule replicates the rule, while 
confirming the reasons on which it is founded.61 To put it in terms that depart from the 
systemic view, subsuming a state of affairs to a rule reproduces the epistemic practice of 
reading or coding states of affairs as equal for the purposes of the rule. Rules, concepts, 
and interpretations are thereby reproduced.  
On the other hand, the effort to subsume a particular state of affairs under an existing 
rule—say simple negligence—also works as an engine of variation. 62  ‘It would be 
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57 ibid 56–61. 
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misleading … to think of variation as the random result of, for example, errors in the 
copying or replication of rules.’63 The states of affairs that give rise to legal disputes are 
infinite in their variety: at minimum, events happen at different times and, generally, 
involve different combinations of parties. Even the legal context that the Posnerians 
ostensibly chose for its relative simplicity, where what is at stake is the allocation of 
liability for an accident involving a driver and pedestrian, involves a long list of factors 
whose relevance, while not obvious, is not absolutely excludable, either—the specific 
location of the accident, the presence of third parties, the general location of the accident, 
or even what the driver had for breakfast that day. Variation in the legal system arises 
from the process of fitting a given complex of facts into the map of legal discourse, as the 
systemic demands for a stable discourse and a consistent practice of interpretation come 
into tension with the unavoidable differences between factual contexts. Even in the case 
that a state of affairs is found to fall under negligence, the result produces variation by 
adding a case with a slightly different complex of factors to the archive of prior cases, by 
adding to the collection of exempla that constitute the operative concepts, and, as a 
corollary, by shifting the practices of interpretation that fix the scope and domain of the 
rule.  
When it comes to selection, however, Deakin suggests that the social and economic 
environment is the key factor. Legal rules are experienced by the economic system (or, 
Deakin might say, by economic actors) as indicators of the state of play in economic 
relations. Those rules will be challenged, whether through litigation or various forms of 
action directed to the legislative-political system, by actors who have an incentive to 
switch to a different state of play. 64  And, as with the models developed by the 
Posnerians, 65  the repeated challenge through litigation or intercession of legislation 
exercise selective pressures, ultimately determining the relative reproductive success of 
the resulting rules.66  
                                                        
63 Deakin, ‘Legal Evolution’ (n 6) 676; contra Michael S Fried, ‘The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic 
Perspective’ (1998–99) 39 Jurimetrics 291, 302–03, 306–08. 
64 As explored below in Parts II and III, Deakin’s characterization of the relevant selective pressures in his 
more applied work are not limited to those rooted in the self-interest of actors with a stake in legal rules, 
but sometimes encompass activities driven by policy goals as well.  
65 Deakin directly cites Rubin and Priest’s seminal papers.  
66 Deakin, ‘Legal Evolution’ (n 6) 676, 678. 
170 
 
E. External	 Aspects	 of	 Legal	 Evolution:	 Institutional	 Forms	 as	
Mechanisms	of	Selection	
When it comes to thinking about the selection pressures that law’s environment exercises 
on the legal system, Deakin begins by trying to think about the development of economic 
relations independently of law.67 
1. From	Game	Theory	to	Epistemic	Game	Theory	
Deakin’s primary reference point starts with economic actors attempting to engage in 
coordinated behaviour, under the assumption that each is motivated significantly or 
primarily by personal preferences rather than joint benefits. Trying to understand 
behaviour as an emergent outcome of this kind of interaction has been the bread and 
butter of (non-cooperative) game theory. For many situations, the dominant strategy for 
each participant, though individually rational, leads to a joint outcome that is inferior 
compared to the result of different strategy for all players. The most famous model of 
such non-cooperative games is the prisoner’s dilemma. Even for repeated interactions, 
the Nash equilibrium of the prisoner’s dilemma is dominated by the outcome that would 
be produced if each player pursued a different, individually ‘irrational’ strategy. 
The starting point of Deakin’s approach is that institutions can ‘change the game.’ From 
one perspective, institutions can be viewed as an external intervention that adjusts the 
incentives each player has to engage in each available strategy. In effect, this is equivalent 
to changing the parameters of the game. If we assume rational players, this change in 
parameters will influence each player’s dominant strategy, thus transforming the Nash 
equilibrium of repeated play. Essentially, institutions can convert a game with an 
inefficient equilibrium into a game where both players have an incentive to choose the 
mutually beneficial strategy.  
These models find their relevance for investigations of legal evolution once we raise the 
question of how such institutions arise, and how they are maintained. It is all well and 
good that different games generate different strategies, and that institutions can function 
to de facto replace one game with a preferable alternative. But without an account of the 
social origins and/or functioning of institutions, this claim amounts to no more than a 
reiteration of the desirability of cooperative solutions.  
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One strategy is found in models in evolutionary game theory, in which norms arise 
spontaneously from continued interaction over time. In a now well-known result, players 
with knowledge of past practice and an indeterminate horizon for repeated cooperation 
can fall into mutually-beneficial habits, even without a change in the formal payouts for 
the individual interactions. With a fixed number of interactions, the assumptions of 
hyper-rationality of both players mean that the advantages of being first to defect dooms 
any move toward by collaboration from the start. With indeterminate play, a strategy set 
becomes available that will maximize each player’s capitalized earnings in the long term, 
even though it does not maximize their payoff for a given iteration of the game.68 Using 
such models, ‘institutions’ could be understood as an emergent, endogenous state of play, 
with knowledge of prior strategies and the risks of future retaliation functioning 
indirectly as a mutual constraint on present behaviour.  
Where does knowledge come in? Notably, for evolutionary game theory models, players 
not only have common knowledge of the payoff matrix, but also of the past strategies 
chosen by other players. Early models in evolutionary game theory turned out to be 
problematically fragile. These models, typical of modern economics, are built atop 
assumptions concerning both the rationality of the participants and their degree of 
shared knowledge, assumptions that cannot generally be expected to prevail in the real 
world. And it is not simply that the models fall short of realism about human motivations 
and decision-making; the models are sensitive to those assumptions, so that wherever 
those assumptions are not satisfied, their predicted outcomes simply do not hold.69  
A partial solution to these shortcomings is found in epistemic game theory. 70  What 
distinguishes epistemic game theory from both classical game theory and its evolutionary 
extensions, is not that its conclusions depend on assumptions about the knowledge of the 
players. Indeed, as ably shown in the work of Herbert Gintis, the reasoning in classical 
game theory has always depended on exacting assumptions about what each participant 
knows about the motives, interests, and rationality of the others; those assumptions have, 
however, been tacit rather than being stated outright. Rather, epistemic game theory is 
marked by the effort to explicitly integrate accounts of what and how individuals know 
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about the preferences, predispositions and knowledge of other actors into models of 
strategic decision making.71 
2. Law	as	a	Correlating	Device	
Though it is not obvious from its usual formulation, classical game theory depends not 
only on shared knowledge, but on common knowledge. Key results, in particular, not only 
depend on the rationality of each player, but on each player knowing that the other is 
rational, knowing that the other player knows that they know, and so on. Research in 
epistemic games theory has shown that coordination between players can occur with 
much less stringent epistemic conditions. All it requires is a relative concordance of 
beliefs based on some shared environmental cue.72 
In some cases, those environmental cues simply reflect past practice organized around 
an originally arbitrary choice: in a country where cars drive on the right, the original 
choice may have been arbitrary, and the practice is self-reinforcing based on reasonable 
inferences that other actors will continue doing what they have done in the past.73  
Formal modelling of such environmental cues has developed the idea of the correlating 
device. A typical example of the correlating device is that of traffic lights. We do not need 
know very much about other drivers, beyond their desire not to get in a collision and their 
access to the same information the traffic light is providing us. A green light does not 
provide certain information about what cross-traffic will do. But following its instructions 
has become a stable, optimal strategy in the presence of always partial, probabilistic 
information about what other drivers will do.  
Deakin emphasises that law and other norms can function in the same way.  
II. A	Partial	Critique:	Deakin	on	Functionalism	and	Politics		
A. Adaptationism,	 Equivalence	 Functionalism	 and	 Qualified	
Functionalism	
Before getting to the meat of my intervention, it will be useful to do some groundwork, 
extending and categorizing some types of functionalism. We have already been exposed 
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to Gordon’s two concepts of functionalism.74 The first tradition, drawing on function’s 
connotations of use, value or purpose, is associated with an epistemological stance that 
explains and understands social institutions in terms of their capacity to address or solve 
social problems. Though the use of ‘functionalism’ to describe this posture stretches at 
least as far back as the structural functionalism of Parsons, the notion that legal 
institutions exist because they serve some socially valuable purpose was already well-
established decades earlier, as reflected in the work of American jurist Oliver Wendell 
Holmes.75 Beyond the legal realists, however, the idea that law exists because of what it 
achieves (rather than expressing some moral truth) can be found in Blackstone and even 
his precursors. On the side of sociology, Weber was at least to some degree a legal 
functionalist avant	la	lettre.  
Gordon also introduced a more expansive concept of functionalism, however, one 
distinguished solely by the effort to explain law or other historical phenomena as 
responsive to, that is to say a	function	of, some other, primary processes or factors. Again, 
following Sinclair, I refer to this latter concept as adaptationism. Note that, as echoed in 
Sinclair's argument, to say that an institution or practice is adaptive does not exclude the 
possibility of it being deliberately designed to fit its circumstances, only that the 
(primary) circumstances in some sense determine its form or content. 
Let me stick with functionalism in the more familiar sense. One of Gordon’s key criticisms 
of functional explanations of law was the preponderance of evidence ‘showing that social 
and economic conditions that are apparently similar in relevant respects have produced 
radically different legal responses.’76 The thrust of Gordon's critique is that the existence 
of a multiplicity of legal responses to the same apparent conditions belies any claim that 
social conditions and the social problems they engender determine the form or content 
of legal rules.  
Teubner argued that Gordon's critique was misplaced. Functionalism, he argued, does not 
need to be expressed in terms of bijective—one to one—determinism. Teubner’s own 
position was what he called ‘equivalence functionalism.’ Under this approach, individual 
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legal institutions or doctrines are seen not as the unique option available to meet some 
social need, but only as one alternative among an array of possible responses. What is 
necessary is only that law offer some response. Which response, Teubner argued, was 
attributable to historical contingency. Solutions to social problems are ‘functionally 
equivalent’ and the conceptual apparatus of Teubner's equivalence functionalism 
involves ‘comparison and evaluation of various alternative solutions to historical 
problems.’77 
Deakin has explicitly disavowed the adaptationist position. Indeed, in deriding the ‘neo-
functionalism’ of the law-and-economics approaches to legal change examined in Chapter 
2, he is specifically concerned with their embrace of the idea that laws are adapted to—
as he put it, ‘dictated by’—economic requirements.78 It is clear, however, that Deakin is 
willing to countenance some variant of functionalism, so long as it does not fall into the 
adaptationist trap. His book with Frank Wilkinson on the genealogy of the employment 
relationship in the UK, describes the analysis as a combination of functional and historical 
perspectives.79 The result appears in the form of what he occasionally calls ‘qualified 
functionalism,’ ‘functionalism with an important qualification’ or, when the function in 
question is the efficiency of economic relations, ‘qualified efficiency.’80  
Among the potential qualifications of the strict functionalist position identified by Deakin 
are lag, suboptimality and context.  
Contrary to positions which understand existing economic institutions as functional 
responses to present conditions, Deakin emphasises that institutional form, including 
legal rules, may be adapted to past environments rather than to present ones.81 As he 
puts it, ‘lag between conceptual evolution and changes in social values means that 
concepts often appear to be ill-suited to contemporary circumstances.’82 
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Second, the autonomy of law makes it too hard for the system to get to what might 
otherwise be an optimal solution to a given problem. In discussing this issue, Deakin 
borrows the concepts of path dependency from economics, ‘bricolage’ from the social 
anthropologist Levi-Strauss, and ‘exaptation’ from evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay 
Gould. The basic premise here is that processes which generate new forms are unlikely 
to travel too far away from what already exists. If in product markets network effects and 
switching costs tend to lock in choices that may turn out not to be most efficient, in the 
assemblage of legal doctrines or regimes, processes must make do with existing legal 
materials and may end up short of what might, in an objective analysis, offer the best 
solution.83  
The third way in which the functionality of law has to be understood as qualified, 
according to Deakin, is that it depends on context. What counts as the optimal (or easiest 
or most obvious) solution to a social or economic problem may depend on the 
surrounding complex of institutions. There may be feedback, so that institutions or rules 
count as solutions to problems, but only conditional on the presence of other institutions 
that may themselves be contingent.84 A key reference point for these ideas, at least when 
it comes to economic law, is the idea, commonly identified with the varieties of capitalism 
literature, that economic institutions are complementary. 85  Rather than the relative 
efficiency of individual rules or institutions being determinative, institutions are 
understood to work together to achieve the tasks necessary for a capitalist economy to 
function.86  
B. What	Role	for	Politics?		
Across the numerous texts in which Deakin has tackled historical transformations and 
socio-legal evolution, it is possible to pick out two distinct threads. There is the more 
prominent approach, explicitly articulated through his theoretical contributions and 
explored in depth in Part I above. That approach is exclusively focused on the interaction 
of legal norms and concepts with institutional forms subject to implied efficiency 
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pressures.87 As suggested by Figure 1, above, Deakin does identify the political system as 
an important site of co-evolution with the legal system and the economy. His analyses 
occasionally refer to the potential effects of political action on legal change as well.88 Yet 
his more theoretical pieces give no extended consideration to the nature of politics, to the 
operation of the political system, or to how the interactions of the legal system with 
political processes differ from its interactions with economic institutions. And when it 
comes to historical and empirical explorations of the origin and transformation of 
corporate law, tort, and contract doctrines, the relevance of politics is mentioned but 
ultimately goes unexamined.89 In each of these cases of private law doctrine, the analysis 
not only counts as an example of qualified functionalism, but fits squarely under a concept 
of qualified efficiency in particular.  
The ambiguities on this front are well demonstrated by a section in Deakin and 
Wilkinson’s book90 dealing the rise of limited liability and the modern corporate form in 
the United Kingdom during the nineteenth century.91 The section is intended to show the 
inadequacy of institutional economics as an analytical toolkit. They emphasize that 
institutions are more than just ‘the equilibrium outcome of a game,’ because public, 
formal institutions of the state, and law above all, do not only regulate or reflect 
institutions and economic relations, but constitute them. In their short account of the rise 
of the modern limited liability corporation the efficient solution, initially blocked by a 
complex of ‘legal obstacles’ was eventually vindicated. Though they insist that ‘there is no 
set of economic forces to which the law must conform,’ and conclude ‘it is difficult to see 
the enactment of corporate laws underpinning the business enterprise as an efficient 
response to economic needs’ what this seems to mean in the final analysis, is that the 
autonomous evolution of law leads to solutions with that are pseudo-efficient, albeit with 
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lag. They emphasize that the process is ‘asynchronic’ and ‘far from … smooth,’ so that 
adaptation is gradual rather than a straight ‘response.’ They ultimately suggest however 
that ‘a qualified use of functional logic,’ with efficiency tacitly taken to be the relevant 
input variable, is the appropriate frame to explain the persistence of the modern 
corporate form.92  
Where Deakin addresses labour law doctrines, on the other hand, his treatment 
repeatedly touches on dynamics and interactions that might be described as political, 
though they are not always cast in those terms. In one pointed intervention, Deakin draws 
attention to the apparently central role played by the distribution of political power, as 
mediated by the extent of democratic franchise, in the evolution of labour laws. He takes 
those dynamics to be an especially illuminating factor in efforts to understand divergent 
trajectories of labour law in the European metropole and its colonial territories. 93 
Largely, however, he does not discuss transformations in the legal structure of and 
regulatory approach to working relationships in expressly distributional terms. Instead, 
politics enters into his accounts of labour law’s evolution in ways that also end up 
embracing the structure of qualified functionalism. (I elaborate on this claim below).  
In sum, Deakin’s approach to private law or economic law can be described as an exercise 
in qualified functionalism, with economic efficiency as the key functional determinant of 
the evolutionary process. In his approach to labour law, the accounts still cleave to a 
variety of qualified functionalism, but one in which politics plays a more central role. 
When it comes to trying to pick out and critique Deakin’s approach to non-legal 
knowledge, it will be fruitful to treat these two cases separately. I begin with the latter, 
for which a more intensive analysis is needed before a meaningful critique is possible. 
The question of how courts alone may be affected by ideas is left for an example in 
Chapter 6.  
III. The	Role	of	Expertise	in	Legislation:	The	Case	of	the	Contract	of	
Employment	
Deakin and Wilkinson’s 2005 book provides a rich chronicle of labour market regulation 
in the United Kingdom, generally covering 1800 to the present and in many parts 
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addressing historical precedents from as far back as the sixteenth century.94 The book is 
an impressive exercise in legal history, with findings on the shifting and complex linkages 
tying dominant forms of wage-dependent labour95 to structures of production and to the 
schema of juridical forms, network of norms, and systems of enforcement which together 
structure official governance practices. The narrative is explicitly framed as an example 
of the socio-legal co-evolution explored in Deakin’s other work, with systems theory used 
as the primary frame to understand legal evolution, and institutional economics as the 
primary mode for explaining economics relations and interactions.96 Here I want to draw 
on the details of their genealogy of the contract of employment in the United Kingdom to 
explore how politics modifies and complements accounts based on these two theoretical 
frames alone.  
A. A	Genealogy	of	the	Contract	of	Employment	
Today, the employee / independent contractor binary works as the summa	divisio of the 
‘cognitive schema’ used both to order the allocation of social insurance entitlements, and 
to structure rights and obligations between wage-dependent workers and those they 
work for. In rough outline, working relationships on one side of that divide are managed 
through general doctrines of contract and an assumption of self-insurance and personal 
savings; the other side is the province of labour and poverty law. Though a number of 
broad trends have recently challenged the adequacy of the employee model, the contract 
of employment still provides the dominant platform for both regulatory regimes. That 
conceptual matrix both helps to maintain a practical distinction between employees and 
the self-employed, and permeates the normative content of each form. Responding to 
previous historical narratives characterizing the contract of employment as the result of 
welfare-state values and regulations being inserted into a laissez-faire, contractual 
approach to the regulation of working relationship that prevailed during the nineteenth 
century, Deakin and Wilkinson provide ample evidence that today’s model of working 
relationships, bound up with contractual tropes and premises—especially with the idea 
of mutuality of obligations—was only generalized, consolidated and made applicable to 
                                                        
94 Deakin and Wilkinson (n 5). 
95 It is important when speaking of the modes of conceiving and governing wage‐dependent	 labour to 
remember that the intended obverse is not modern self-employment or aristocratic exploitation, but 
subsistence labour, as done by peasants that primarily produce their own means of subsistence.  
96 Deakin and Wilkinson (n 5) ch 1. 
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the majority of wage-dependent work after 1946, and for reasons bound up with the rise 
of the welfare state, not in spite of it.97  
 
Figure	2‐	Legal	Classifications	of	Work	Relationships	from	the	Eighteenth	to	the	mid‐Twentieth	Century98	
Before getting to the pith of my intervention, I need to provide greater detail about the 
nature of the conceptual transformation chronicled by Deakin and Wilkinson. To clarify 
the interplay between the schema of categories applied to the management of work 
relations, the complex of factual presumptions connected to those categories, and the 
normative apparatus they carry, Deakin and Wilkinson reach back to the Statute of 
                                                        
97 ibid ch 2. 
98 Taken from ibid 106. 
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Artificers and the Poor Relief Act, passed, respectively, in 1563 and 1601. My points can 
be made, however, by focusing on the nature of the transformations that took place 
between 1875 and 1950.  
As indicated at a high level in Figure 2 (above), the majority of wage-dependent work in 
the late nineteenth and early nineteenth centuries was subject to the regulatory scheme 
set out in the 1875 Employers and Workmen Act. Despite being characterized as a regime 
of formal legal equality,99 the structure of obligations and rights as administered under 
the Act largely dovetailed with the ‘hierarchical, disciplinary model of service’100 that had 
prevailed under the eighteenth-century Master and Servant Acts. Though the new regime 
retreated from a criminal model, taking away the direct power of magistrates and courts 
to jail workers for abandoning their work, it still functioned to fully subordinate ‘servants’ 
to the authority of their masters, with the full and robust backing of the coercive power 
of the state. 101  Contractual premises and principles did emerge as a central theme, 
however, in the regulation of a growing class of higher-income, higher-class salaried 
workers (already labelled as ‘employees’). Though much of the content of these 
‘contracts’ was filled in by reference to custom rather than explicit agreement, the courts 
attributed to these relationships a substantial mutuality of obligation, so that employees 
were often able to e.g. use the courts to win payment of wages due, or to evade duties not 
entailed by the position for which they were hired.102 To the degree that a contractual 
model also started to become more relevant in construing the rights and duties of 
‘workmen’ in the early twentieth century, the relevance of that approach soon lapsed as 
hiring practices moved functionally toward a regime of contract at will—a bare exchange 
of work performed for pay, with little admission of permanence on either side. Outside of 
industrial contexts subject to wide-scale collective bargaining, jurisprudence was left 
somewhat incoherent.103 
                                                        
99 The sitting Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli, praised the new legislation by claiming that ‘[f] or the first 
time in the history of this country the employer and the employed sit under equal laws.’ ibid 75. 
100 ibid 74. 
101  The courts had powers that have never been part of the regulation of contract before or since: a 
discretionary and extraordinary power to dissolve the contract and apportion damages and wages; a power 
to order specific performance under penalty of forfeiture of a security; a power to imprison workers who 
did not pay damages assessed for breach of contract. Despite the nominal detachment of the regime from 
the criminal law, damage awards often amounted to disciplinary fines rather than being based on any 
contract law principle. Servants could not demand specific performance. ibid 75–78.  
102 ibid 78–80. 
103 ibid 85–86. 
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The incipient social protection regimes, moreover, did not see the same loosening of the 
distinction between the two groups. If the statutory regime governing ‘workmen’ 
persisted in the hierarchical, disciplinary model inherited from the eighteenth century, 
the use of the same category in early legislation introducing employer liability for 
workplace injuries was interpreted so as to gradually shrink the set of workers to which 
that concept would apply. 104  A second generation of legislation, expanding workers’ 
compensation and creating regimes of national health insurance and unemployment 
insurance, were made applicable to the new category of ‘contracts of service’ (though 
with numerous exclusions on the basis of income level, income dependency on an 
individual employer, and industry).105 The ‘control’ test, adapted by the courts to delimit 
the boundaries of this new category, led to the exclusion from these schemes for large 
swaths of workers who the courts found to be insufficiently bound to—or bound to 
obey—an employer.106  
Obviously, these were years of great transition, and it would do Deakin and Wilkinson’s 
analysis a disservice (as well as my own) to attribute to the period more stability and 
coherence than it had. What I nonetheless want to draw out from this period was the 
nature of the conceptual schema that distinguished ‘workmen’ from ‘employees,’ and 
which subsequently informed the control test used to delineate the bounds of the 
‘contract of service.’ The table in figure 2 gives the impression that the labour market 
post-1875 was governed under a conceptual scheme with a clear tripartite structure. But 
there was no unified code intended to govern the whole of the labour market, neatly 
marking off parts of the workforce according to two strictly delineated internal margins. 
Rather, the category of ‘workman,’ and then of the ‘contract of service,’ created a space 
within which certain rights and obligations were to be implemented, with those falling 
outside nominally subject to a less orderly, more generally-applicable collection of 
norms. Nonetheless, it is feasible to point to two key distinctions used to divide the 
workforce, distinctions muddled but not totally displaced by the applications of the 
‘control’ test. 
On the one hand, the application of both disciplinary rules and social protections were 
attenuated where work relationships came closer to the transitory, arms-length, 
                                                        
104 ibid 86–89. 
105 ibid 89–90. 
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intermittent or the autonomous. ‘Independent contractors’ were thought to be just that: 
moving from one contract to another (independence), being paid for services rendered 
rather than for subjection to employer authority (output rather than input), possibly 
exercising some authority over others. But, as with the shrinking applicability of the 
Workmen and Employers Act, those markers could also be used to exclude casuals, those 
engaged in piecework, or workers selected by an intermediary.107 
Working alongside this logic, however, was reasoning rooted in the hierarchical logic of 
class. Some decisions about the applicability of labour discipline and social protection 
were based on distinctions we might identify with independence—varieties of relational 
remoteness between the worker and the person for whom the work was ultimately 
performed. But those decisions were often also guided by a worldview in which an 
implicit status hierarchy worked to rank, in a single schema, the inherent character of 
individuals, their skill level, the kind of jobs they were engaged in, the level of respect 
they were due, and the level of income and job security they could expect.108 Nearer to 
the top of the hierarchy, bourgeois ideology made it appropriate to apply contractual 
principles—mutuality of obligation, market autonomy, contractual freedom. Only nearer 
to the bottom of that hierarchy did the courts find it appropriate to apply a regime rooted 
in disciplinary subjection to the employer, or which might (as with social insurance) 
imply an incapacity to prudently plan for the future. 
As with most legal concepts, the logic of the scheme did not work like an input-output 
system, with the appropriate concept first determined by reference to a precise list of 
factual predicates, and then used to draw normative predicates. The category of 
workman, and then of contract of service, was not applied (or eschewed) by measuring 
the level of responsibility an employer had actually reposed in a worker, or discovering 
what level of autonomy they had actually enjoyed in their work—certainly, judges did not 
look to the presence or absence of a written, negotiated contract, let alone to its terms! 
Rather, judges drew its boundaries according to a ranking of kinds of work which took 
for granted the correlation of higher prestige jobs, superiority of character, degree of 
trustworthiness, higher income, greater job security, along with the capacity for 
judgment in market relations. Thus, what was relevant, in a case where a widow sued 
                                                        
107 ibid 70, 91, 93–95. 
108 ibid 79–80, 86, 88–89. 
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under a compensation scheme for workplace accidents, was not whether her husband 
had in	 fact made provisions for his family in the event of his death, but the idea that 
managers and others ‘earning good salaries’ should not, unlike those in ‘a position of 
dependence’ be thought of as lacking the capacity to make such provision.109 A governess 
was found to be owed a long notice period not because of any explicit agreement she had 
made with her employer, but because of her ‘station … and the manner in which such a 
person is usually treated’—namely, as better than a domestic servant, and certainly 
better than a labourer. 110  A bus conductor could not be a workman, a court found, 
because his job depended primarily on ‘confidence in his honesty.’111  
The conceptual schema that has since emerged in the United Kingdom—one which 
echoes in the approach to labour market regulation taken by countries across the globe—
is in some sense a hybrid of the forms and reasoning that informed the law prevailing 
from the end of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth: ‘a curious 
overlapping of contract and status.’112 They locate the crux of that transformation in the 
1942 Beveridge report, which introduced a binary scheme, and social legislation passed 
in 1946, that implemented that binary by defining eligibility for benefits in terms of a 
single distinction between ‘employed earners’—those ‘gainfully occupied in employment 
… under a contract of service’—and those employed on their own account.113 This unified 
schema was further inscribed by decisions of the courts in the 1950s that confirmed that 
employee and contract of service were to be considered synonymous for the purposes of 
this social legislation, and by legislated employment protections in the 1960s and 1970s 
whose scope of application was delimited by a ‘contract of employment’ that merged the 
concepts of contract of service and employment.114 In social insurance, self-employment 
works as a distinct category, part of a larger classification that sorts and orders benefit 
eligibility and contribution liability; in employment protection legislation, the self-
employment (or sometimes, independent contractor) goes unmentioned, but is used by 
                                                        
109 ibid 88–89, citing Simpson	v.	Ebbw	Vale	Steel,	Iron	&	Coal	Co.	[1905] 1 KB 453 (UK) 
110 ibid 79–80, citing Todd	v.	Kerrich (1852) 8 Exch 215. 
111 ibid 88, citing Morgan	v.	London	General	Omnibus	Company, Court of Appeal ([1884] LR 13 QBD 832. 834 
[Brett MR]). 
112 ibid 108. 
113  ibid 94. Income tax categories and collection practices had already eliminated status distinction 
between employed persons by 1943. ibid 94–95, n 285. 
114 Deakin and Wilkinson (n 5) 94–95, 101. 
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the courts as a catchall residual that shapes reasoning about the boundary of the contract 
of employment.  
Though it faced some controversy, and criticism from those who thought it would 
undermine legislative intentions, the legal system’s regulation of work relationships 
ultimately became organized through two conceptions of contract. For independent 
contractors—the self-employed—the vision of contract that now governs has become 
one of arms-length exchange: temporary, functionally anonymous, limited in content, 
explicit in terms. For employees, the courts have ultimately adopted a more peculiar 
form, drawing not only from a relational conception of contract marked by good faith, 
mutuality of obligation, and reciprocity, but from a decidedly non-contractual 
assumption of hierarchy of employer over employee.115 
B. A	Litany	of	Forces	
In line with their book’s ambition to construct an account of socio-legal co-evolution, 
Deakin and Wilkinson provide a compelling record of how the conceptual 
transformations detailed above contributed to, drew from, were stymied by and 
supported changes happening both in the institutional organization of work and 
production, and in shifting distributions of political power.  
At a high level of generality, they describe those processes as follows: 
Pressures and opportunities for legal change were derived from outside the legal system 
in the form of political mobilization, changes in the predominant form of economic 
organization, and shifts in the structure of the family and the composition of the labour 
force.116  
In other discussions of the same historical episode, Deakin has suggested that these 
‘[m]utations in legal forms were … the result of a complex interplay of social, economic 
and political forces.’117 This language of ‘forces’ conjures a wholly material interaction, 
one that clashes with an active role for interpretation or for differences in perspective, 
frame or presupposition.  
Let me give a longer summary of Deakin and Wilkinson’s account of the processes that 
interacted with the rise of the contract of employment. Its emergence depended, first, on 
                                                        
115 ibid 101–04, 108. 
116 ibid 18. 
117 Deakin, ‘Evolution for Our Time’ (n 19) 18. 
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the gradual expansion of wage-dependent, market-hired labour, a process which had 
unfolded over centuries.118 Through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a complex 
interplay of legal structures, industrial realities and institutional settlements inflected 
upon and shaped one another.119 Collective bargaining, changes in company law, and 
technological change worked together to affect economies of scale within the firm, 
contributing to the emergence of the ‘modern, integrated form of corporate organization.’ 
On the one hand, capital market development, backed by the legislative introduction of 
limited liability protection, allowed enterprise size to increase. Taking advantage of these 
economies of scale depended on internal reorganization of firm structure, and led in 
particular to the growth of a much larger managerial class.120 The rising power of unions, 
acting at first in spite of legal barriers and eventually backed up by legislative protection, 
extended organizing into the lowest rungs of manual work, which gradually decreased 
employer incentives to rely on internal contracting. Those changes reflected both 
technical capacities and the interests of employers. Collective bargaining also led to 
increased security of work and decreased reliance on casual hiring practices; the 
presumption of indeterminate, long-term hiring was eventually codified in statute.121 On 
the other hand, the incipient welfare state institutions threatened the viability of smaller 
firms, by introducing costs and liabilities that changed economies of scale. As much as 
welfare state protections relied on the prevalence of fixed employment and vertical 
integration of production, the liabilities it imposed on firms also encouraged those 
trends.122 The effort to limit liability under both workplace injury and social protection 
schemes created an economic pressure, underwritten by employer interests, to narrowly 
interpret the scope of the ‘contract of service.’123 
This paragraph-long summary obviously cannot capture all the nuances of the account 
which Deakin and Wilkinson weave together across multiple chapters of their book. [I do 
think it gives a clear idea of the factors they include and how they act on law] Let me give 
a word to how this narrative should be structurally interpreted. One could imagine from 
                                                        
118  They provide evidence that by the seventeenth century, wage labour served as a widespread 
complement to, though seldom a full substitute for, income from subsistence farming. Deakin and 
Wilkinson (n 5) 45–46. 
119 ibid 43. 
120 ibid 96–98. 
121 ibid 98–100. 
122 ibid 87–88. 
123 ibid 91–92. 
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this language that Deakin has in mind a strict binary division, where law transforms 
internally as a learning process, as the existing semantic structures bend and stretch in 
response to a continual drip feed of knowledge about institutional compromises and 
interest group desires, while in the material world outside law, institutional practices and 
political strategies are shaped by the force of law, experienced exclusively as a social fact 
(coercion plus signalling). 
At least for the factors that they give attention to—not just those within the frame, but 
which get the spotlight—they seem to have captured the relevant flows of influence.124 
In the section that follows, I want to linger on a factor which, though it repeatedly walks 
onto the stage in their narrative, is never given its own lines.  
C. Politics	as	a	Conduit	for	Ideas?		
The goals and plans of the state, and the policies of the government make a continual 
appearance in their history of labour market governance, including during the 
consolidation of the contract of employment. Even if you pass over or ignore examples 
where legislation is loosely discussed in terms of its intent, purpose or aim, and focus 
exclusively on cases where the state is explicitly discussed as an actor in its own right, 
you find the story rife with occasions in which the state’s intent, purposes or aims are 
attributed an important role. 125  ‘Government’ hangs over the narrative (indeed, 
continually intervenes in it) as an autonomous agent, sometimes as a vehicle for the goals 
of other groups, but sometimes attributed with its own preferences and agenda.126 My 
goal in highlighting the importance of the state in their account is not to suggest that we 
should ‘bring state the back in,’ by making more explicit how variations in the power, 
reason and techniques of state might help to shed light on the processes they 
document.127 Rather, I draw attention to the state because of the way that it consistently 
                                                        
124  Knowledge is not the only factor excluded from their frame. For example, they give only glancing 
reference to the way in which the structure of international competition served as a but-for factor for the 
particular way in which the contract of employment was constitute. Deakin and Wilkinson (n 5) 17–18. The 
relationship of Britain’s national economy to that of the broader British empire is a notable exclusion, 
though it is possible the relevant transformations were not strongly impacted by changes in e.g. terms of 
trade with the colonies. They also mention automation, but not the complex of technologies—and techno-
scientific knowledge!—that made automation possible.  
125 See e.g. Deakin and Wilkinson (n 5) 2, 17–18, 27, 39, 40, 47, 49, 61, 107.  
126 ibid 43. 
127 It strikes me as difficult to reconcile a theory that imagines society wholly as an interaction between and 




functions, in their account, as a vehicle for conflicting ways of thinking about the 
organization of the economy, work and production.128  
As I read it, this manifestation of modes of thinking, and especially of conflicting or 
changing modes of thinking, threatens to disrupt Deakin’s whole theoretical schema.129  
One way that these references to the state and its policy orientation might be assimilated 
into Deakin’s broader approach might be to frame these ways of thinking as a matter of 
pure politics. Deakin and Wilkinson are not clear about what they mean by politics or by 
‘political forces;’ the dynamics of the political system are not a central preoccupation of 
any of Deakin’s analyses. 130  Whatever politics might be intended to cover in their 
framework, it certainly does not boil down to interests, the distribution of those interests 
among the population, the factors that determine the representation of those interests in 
legislation or the courts, or how particular institutions integrate the resulting claims and 
positions. As such, this approach seems to accord with their usage of the term.  
D. The	Origins	and	Significance	of	the	Beveridge	Report	
I want to try and test this model by attending to a key moment in genealogy of the contract 
of employment, as laid out in their own account of it: the 1942 publication of the 
Beveridge report, and its subsequent adoption in social insurance legislation.131  
The Beveridge report has had wide influence on the design and conception of social policy 
schemes worldwide in the 75 years since its publication. 132  My interest is in its 
consequences for UK labour law, and specifically, in whatever role it played in 
introducing and consolidating the sharp binary schema between employees and the self-
employed. Broadly, then, this section is about the process involved in the production of 
                                                        
128  They describe labour law as a ‘political project of social reform’ encoding values based both on 
democratic emancipation, and on managerialist discipline; they indicate, though they do not elaborate, that 
their goal is to account for how law co-evolves not only with political movements, but also political 
ideologies. Deakin and Wilkinson (n 5) 1, 3, 35.  
129 How disruptive it might be would depend on whether ‘ways of thinking’ could be incorporated as an 
additional force sitting alongside politics, economics and the social (see above, nn 117 and associated text) 
or if ‘ways of thinking’ had the capacity to traverse the barrier between the legal system and other social 
systems.  
130 cf the discussion above, text to nn 87-89.  
131 Above, text to n 113–115.  
132  Speaking in the UK context, Glennerster and Evans assert: ‘No historical document is cited more 
frequently in postwar social policy debate’ Howard Glennerster and Martin Evans, ‘Beveridge and His 
Assumptive Worlds: The Incompatibilities of a Flawed Design’ in John Hills and others (eds), Beveridge	and	
Social	Security (Oxford University Press 1994) 56; see also Noel Whiteside, ‘The Beveridge Report and Its 
Implementation: A Revolutionary Project?’ [2014] Histoire@Politique 24; John Hills and others (eds), 
Beveridge	and	Social	Security (Oxford University Press 1994). 
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the Beveridge report. More narrowly, I am interested in what went into the production of 
its central classification scheme. 
Deakin and Wilkinson make some effort to frame the reception of the report in law 
through the frame of Deakin’s socio-legal evolution theory:  
conceptual innovation was triggered by an external event, that is, by a political process 
set within a wider pattern of far-reaching economic and social changes; on the other 
[hand], the change occurred through an act of legal interpretation, using procedures 
specific to the juridical and legal-administrative process. These two sets of explanations 
are not mutually incompatible. The new rule resulted from the interaction of the legal 
system with the wider political and economic environment. This interaction can be 
understood in terms of a particular evolutionary dynamic. Pressures for selection came 
from the external economic and political environment, while the particular stock of 
precedents available to the draftsman and the courts of the time provided the source of 
variation in the options from which they could choose. The procedures of ‘internal’ 
validation within the legal system, in particular the relevant conventions of statutory 
drafting and rules of precedent for judicial decision-making, constituted the mechanisms 
of inheritance by which the continuity of the new rule (its consistency with existing 
practice and its binding force for the future) was ensured. The result was a ‘new career’ 
for the juridical form of the contract of service, which was in the process of being renamed 
the contract of employment.133  
What I want to emphasize in this quote, and draw out a bit more, is the confluence of 
activity that squeezed into that first clause, the ‘conceptual innovation triggered by an 
external political process.’ By the third sentence, the external pressure has been reduced 
to ‘the wider political and economic environment.’ Yet there is much in Deakin and 
Wilkinson’s account of the genesis of the Beveridge Report, and much more elsewhere, 
that is hard to match up with a story that is reducible to pure politics or pure economics. 
Let me here just provide a hint of the dynamics and factors at play in the report’s 
production and widespread success.  
1. There was, first, a broad revolution in thinking about the problems of work and 
poverty, from a model of pauperism that understood poverty as a result of failings 
in an individual’s character, to a model of unemployment that was attributed to 
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structural features of market economies and poor management by government: a 
transformation that was telegraphed by the early twentieth century.134 
2. The report drew from a concept of employment-based social citizenship which 
was of course not simply a way of managing economic problems, but a way of 
imaging the polity and the relation of members to it.135  
3. The report was founded on a principle of horizontal redistribution, in the sense of 
pooling risk among wage earners, but not vertical redistribution; adoption of 
scheme that defined classes (or categories) in terms of contribution to 
production.136 As put by Whiteside, ‘[t]he rationale for universal coverage [was] 
economic, allowing middle class contributors (with a lower risk of job loss) to 
subsidise working class claims. This subsidy [was] arguably reversed in old age as 
the upper classes receive state pensions for more years than their working-class 
counterparts, thanks to their higher life expectancy.’137 This arrangement could be 
reconciled with a Coasean bargain between particular social groupings, as per the 
discussion in Chapter 2. Nonetheless, this bargain was not in fact negotiated, but 
mediated by experts who had to come up with a model to reconcile political 
feasibility and socially-desirable goals.  
4. Many of these ways of thinking in turn had strong links to Keynes and 
Keynesianism.138  
IV. Conclusion	
Simon Deakin has made a commendable effort to reconcile a sociological understanding 
of law, which takes seriously the interior dynamics of the legal system, with an external 
view that appreciates the important role of interests in shaping law-making through both 
legislature and courts. Yet, in his attempts to apply his model to real historical examples, 
he has brought to the surface factors that are hard to slot into any of his basic 
classifications of law, politics, and economics.  
There are a number of ways of imagining how ideas might be integrated into evolutionary 
accounts of legal change. The most obvious from the Beveridge report example is that 
reason, planning and vision contribute to the assemblage of legal variants which are 
ultimately selected by the interaction between the legal system and the effective complex 
of economic interests. Yet when it comes to court decisions, it is hard to accept that non-
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135 ibid 164. 
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Exchequer’s Pension Liability, 1942–59’ (2006) 17 20 Century Br Hist 1, 5–6. 
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legal concepts, ideals, presuppositions, and various other epistemic objects do not enter 
into the reasoning of judges, and therefore play an active role in the selection process 
itself as well.  
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The close of the last chapter presented a case that knowledge may sometimes play an 
important role in legal evolution that is not reducible to or determined by politics, 
economics, or some other factor. In short, knowledge matters. My critiques of Deakin’s 
own case studies leave open a margin of interpretation. They articulate how knowledge 
practices and non-legal expertise might	matter, rather than definitively proving their 
influence. This chapter provides substantive empirical backing to the thesis that 
knowledge and non-legal expertise definitively	matter in some cases.  
In contrast to the last three chapters, this chapter is not organized around the question 
‘what drives legal change?’ Rather, the chapter asks ‘what drives the uptake and adoption 
of ideas in a given context, or by certain kinds of actors?’ It addresses the Law & Finance 
paradigm, the World Bank’s Doing	Business project, and the consequences of the latter for 
law reform in large parts of the global South. Some attention is devoted to the connections 
holding these three phenomena together. I survey the shared intellectual origins and 
                                                        
1 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Essay on the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation’ in John Bowring (ed), 
The	Works	of	Jeremy	Bentham, vol 1 (William Tait 1843).  
2  Versions of the argument in this chapter were presented at the 2014 & 2015 Private Law Doctoral 
workshops organized by Hans Micklitz and Stefan Grundmann, at the 2015 Conference of the Institute for 
Global Law and Policy (Harvard Law School) and at a January 2017 writing workshop on critical and 
heterodox approaches to law and development, hosted by Mark Toufayan and Siobhan Airey at the 
University of Ottawa. I thank participants in those workshops, and especially Przemysław Pałka, Sofie 
Møller, Genevieve Painter, Umut Özsu and Yane Svetiev for feedback on earlier drafts. All errors are mine. 
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methodological concerns that connect Law & Finance with Doing	Business	and review the 
expanding evidence that countries have amended laws and policies in line with Doing	
Business criteria.  
The core of the analysis is an attempt to understand what made the Law & Finance 
paradigm so attractive to the World Bank. My rationale is as follows. The affinities that 
link an intellectual project, such as Law & Finance, to legal reforms in numerous countries 
are not as determinative for the ‘knowledge matters’ hypothesis as they may seem at first. 
Many models of legal evolution presume that the state’s legal system is autonomous. That 
presumption is disrupted by the suggestion that the World Bank and international 
institutions may have had a causal influence on national legal choices. It might 
nonetheless be possible to integrate international institutions into our picture of the 
national environment in which legal (co-)evolution occurs. At that point, the question 
becomes, ‘does this count as mere politics or as something else?’ A compelling strand of 
literature has interpreted the World Bank’s actions and its global influence in terms of 
the political interests of particular groups of global actors. The influence of World Bank 
programs may complicate models of law co-evolving with political and economic 
systems, but it does not necessarily unsettle their basic coordinates.  
That places us in the next step in the chain of effects. At play in the interactions between 
Doing	Business and national governments was not just a broad vision of economic order 
or a particular set of interests. The World Bank endorsed, and countries adopted, a 
specific, narrow set of reforms. It is possible that the particular agenda adopted by the 
World Bank (and by the principals of the Doing	 Business project) resulted from a 
confluence of political interests, intellectual networks, and the Bank’s own political and 
institutional constraints. The particular ideas that were adopted and promoted would be 
broadly determined by this confluence of factors, with the specifics shaped by small 
contingencies, as in whatever ideas happened to be at hand at any given moment.  
This possibility is essentially the null hypothesis of this chapter. I show, instead, that the 
technicalities of the ideas at the foundation of the Doing	Business project, their political 
or economic content, and the way in which they framed history, agency, problems, and 
193 
 
solutions were critical to making them appropriate as the basis for particular World Bank 
projects as well as a more general project of international governance.3  
A. The	Puzzle	of	the	Law	&	Finance	Project		
Let me begin with a story familiar to private law scholars and development experts and 
then use that story to frame a puzzle. With the publication in 1996 and 1997 of two now-
notorious articles, namely ‘Law and Finance’ and	 ‘Legal Determinants of External 
Finance,’	Andrei	Shleifer and a network of collaborators altered the dominant frames 
through which economists, legal scholars, and international institutions thought about 
the interplay between legal rules, financial institutions, and economic outcomes. 4 
Shleifer’s key claim was that targeted legal protections for shareholders and creditors in 
large, publicly listed corporations would lead to economically beneficial changes in the 
macro-structure of the economy. In the next part of this chapter, I set out the fundamental 
structure of Law & Finance studies, interrogating the arc of the argument that was set out 
in those original two articles  
The methodology used by these two papers was subsequently broadened and applied to 
many other aspects of institutional and regulatory design. Shleifer and his collaborators 
created aggregate, rule-based measures of how ‘burdensome’ labour laws were and 
causally linked those measures to unemployment and labour informality.5 They extended 
and applied methods first developed by Hernando de Soto to construct a measure of how 
much it cost and how long it took to register a business.6 They developed an innovative 
way of measuring ‘procedural formalism’ in a given country’s courts7 and found that 
procedures that affect recovery for secured creditors during bankruptcy were associated 
                                                        
3 I take the idea of technicalities from Annelise Riles, ‘A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking 
on the Technicalities’ (2005) 53 Buff L Rev 973. The level of analysis I am concerned with also resonates 
with Foucault’s concept of governmentality. Michel Foucault, ‘Governmentality’ in Graham Burchell and 
others (eds), The	Foucault	Effect:	Studies	in	Governmentality,	with	Two	Lectures	by	and	an	Interview	with	
Michel	Foucault (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1991); Nikolas Rose and others, ‘Governmentality’ (2006) 2 Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science 83. 
4 Rafael La Porta and others, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) 52 Journal of Finance 1131; 
Rafael La Porta and others, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113. ‘Law and 
Finance’ first appeared as a National Bureau for Economic Research working paper in 1996. 
5 Juan C Botero and others, ‘The Regulation of Labor’ (2004) 119 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1339. 
6 Simeon Djankov and others, ‘The Regulation of Entry’ (2002) 117 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1; 
Hernando de Soto, The	Other	Path:	The	 Invisible	Revolution	 in	 the	Third	World (June Abbott tr, 1st edn, 
Harper & Row 1989). 
7 Simeon Djankov and others, ‘Courts’ (2003) 118 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 453. 
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with the quantity of private debt.8 More importantly, they found that reduced formalism, 
lighter labour regulation, easier business registration, and expedient bankruptcy 
proceedings were associated with: reduced corruption, lower informality, better public 
opinions of the courts, and greater access to finance. The papers founded a cottage 
industry of related research among finance scholars, including further elaborations of 
Shleifer’s data to explore the effect of ‘investor protection’ on economic and financial 
variables, as well as new kinds of quantified legal measurements. 9  
The scholarship Shleifer produced with his collaborators has been the subject of 
seemingly endless elaboration, extension, and critique. ‘Law and Finance’ is one of the 
most-cited economics articles ever written. 10  The literature spawned by ‘Law and 
Finance’ and ‘Legal Determinants’ was capacious enough for the authors to publish a 
comprehensive consolidation of theory and empirics in 2008.11 In 2009, critiques of that 
corpus filled symposium issues of three North American law reviews.12 Debates inspired 
by this work were condensed in an edited collection published in 2012.13 Part IV of this 
chapter explores the consequences of the Law & Finance project through a case study of 
its influence through the Doing	Business project. The authors are ‘quite simply, academic 
rock stars.’14 
Shleifer’s scholarship quickly came under fire, however. Some of the criticisms were 
straightforward methodological concerns, questioning the coding criteria used to 
measure legal structures, the fit between variables and investor protection, and the 
methods that linked cause and effect. Substantively, the central point of contention was 
not about whether investors needed special protections, but rather about the nature of 
the causal relationships that link legal systems, legal rules, and economic outcomes. Part 
                                                        
8  Simeon Djankov and others, ‘Debt Enforcement around the World’ (2008) 116 Journal of Political 
Economy 1105. 
9 Curtis J Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor (eds), Law	and	Capitalism:	What	Corporate	Crises	Reveal	about	
Legal	Systems	and	Economic	Development	Around	the	World (University of Chicago Press 2008) 20.  
10 For impact, see Simon Deakin and Katharina Pistor, ‘Introduction’ in Simon Deakin and Katharina Pistor 
(eds), Legal	Origin	Theory (Edward Elgar 2012) ix–x. 
11 Rafael La Porta and others, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (2008) 46 Journal of Economic 
Literature 285. 
12  See e.g. Ruth V Aguilera and Cynthia A Williams, ‘Law and Finance: Inaccurate, Incomplete, and 
Important’ [2009] BYU L Rev 1413; Catherine Valcke, ‘Introduction [Focus: Economics and Comparative 
Law]’ (2009) 59 U Toronto LJ 179; ‘Symposium on Legal Origins’ (2009) 57 Am J Comp L 765. 
13 Simon Deakin and Katharina Pistor (eds), Legal	Origin	Theory (Edward Elgar 2012). 
14 Aguilera and Williams (n 12) 1424–33.  
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III explores some of these critiques, emphasizing the fundamental theoretical weaknesses 
of Law & Finance and a collection of arguments that followed in its stead.  
That is the familiar story. The puzzle animating this chapter, though, is why Law & Finance 
was so successful. I tackle one aspect of this puzzle in Part V of this chapter, which 
examines the possible factors contributing to the integration of the Law & Finance 
paradigm into the Doing	 Business project. I argue that, paradoxically, the theoretical 
weaknesses in Shleifer’s research may be what made it so attractive both to national 
policymakers and to the players at the Bank.  
Part VI concludes with reflections on the implications of this chapter for questions of law, 
knowledge, and socio-legal change.  
B. Sources,	Methods	and	Key	Terms	
Before moving to the substance of my argument, I will clarify a few choices I made in 
choosing, characterizing, and labelling my research objects.  
The body of scholarship informing this chapter has been aggregated by earlier scholars 
in a variety of ways. 15  Although the sources assembled by synthetic reviewers and 
strident critics have varied, they have universally hailed as key the two Shleifer papers 
from 1996 and 1997. Much of the literature proceeds tacitly on the basis that a single 
story about the aftermath of these studies is possible. The two papers become, 
alternately, the keystones of the field of Law & Finance, the precursor of Legal Origins 
Theory, or a watershed in comparative corporate governance.16 Others have taken these 
two articles as artefacts of a unified body of thought about international development or 
corporate governance, identifiable using the initials of their authors (LLSV) or as ‘La Porta 
et al.’17 
                                                        
15 For contrasting attempts at synthesis, see Deakin and Pistor (n 13); La Porta and others, ‘The Economic 
Consequences of Legal Origins’ (n 11). 
16 Luigi Zingales and Steven N Kaplan, ‘How “Law and Finance” Transformed Scholarship, Debate’, Chicago	
Booth	 Review (5 March 2014) <http://review.chicagobooth.edu/magazine/spring-2014/how-law-and-
finance-transformed-scholarship-debate> accessed 8 July 2015; Deakin and Pistor (n 13); Klaus J Hopt, 
‘Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation’ (2011) 59 Am J 
Comp L 1. 
17 For examples of ‘La Porta et al:’ Milhaupt and Pistor (n 9); of ‘LLSV’: Mathias Siems and Simon Deakin, 
‘Comparative Law and Finance: Past, Present, and Future Research’ (2010) 166 Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 120; John W Cioffi, ‘Legal 
Regimes and Political Particularism: An Assessment of the Legal Families Theory from the Perspectives of 
Comparative Law and Political Economy’ [2009] BYU L Rev 1501; Claude Ménard and Bertrand du Marais, 
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The considerable literature inspired by these two articles advanced in multiple 
directions, often toward incompatible conclusions. Some authors have tried to extend 
and elaborate on Shleifer’s original empirical findings, drawing upon and adding to the 
archive of novel data to answer an array of questions about law’s causes and effects. 
Others have sought to recuperate and refine the theoretical underpinnings of his 
empirical findings in the face of a flood of criticism from various sources. Nonetheless, 
much of this critical literature adopted the underlying edifice of the original articles, even 
when scholars criticized some particular premise, argument, or conclusion Shleifer had 
made. When labels are applied loosely and contributions collected together carelessly, it 
is easy to lose track of the literature, claims, questions, and concerns under discussion.  
I have organized my sampling from this literature using two linked criteria. Firstly, I have 
limited myself to claims, arguments, and ideas that can be identified with a single person, 
Andrei Shleifer. There are a variety of reasons for this choice. Shleifer may not be a 
household name, but he is ‘the most-cited economist ever’ and arguably one of the world’s 
leading legal experts.18 He is the uniting thread tying together a great body of research. 
He was co-author on the original two contributions and on the paper that framed their 
underlying microeconomic theory.19 In 2008, he helped write an influential restatement 
of theory and findings.20 He was co-author on various influential attempts to refurbish 
the theoretical underpinnings of the original findings.21 In 2012, he published an edited 
collection of some of the field’s touchstone works, strongly embracing the basic dilemma 
of policy-making that is implied in portions of that literature.22 As shown in Part IV, he 
was heavily involved not only in the academic foundations of the Doing	 Business 
indicators but directly in the construction of the Doing	Business project itself.23 
                                                        
‘Can We Rank Legal Systems According to Their Economic Efficiency?’ (2008) 26 Washington University 
Journal of Law & Policy 55. 
18 See eg the evidence reviewed in the introduction of Jonathan Klick, ‘Shleifer’s Failure (Review of Failure	
of	Judges	and	the	Rise	of	Regulators)’ (2013) 91 Tex L Rev 899. 
19 La Porta and others, ‘Law and Finance’ (n 4); La Porta and others, ‘Legal Determinants of External 
Finance’ (n 4); Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 Journal 
of Finance 737. 
20 La Porta and others, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (n 11). 
21 Edward L Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Legal Origins’ (2002) 117 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
1193; Simeon Djankov and others, ‘The New Comparative Economics’ (2003) 31 Journal of Comparative 
Economics 595; La Porta and others, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (n 11). 
22 Andrei Shleifer, The	Failure	of	Judges	and	the	Rise	of	Regulators (MIT Press 2012). 
23 I have also been informed by a highly respected American expert on securities, corporate governance, 
and finance that a large portion of Shleifer’s collaborators refer to him as ‘the boss.’ 
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Focusing on Shleifer’s contributions is also a matter of intellectual fairness. I eschew the 
all-too-common practice of viewing an individual’s publications as the result of a 
continuous effort to express a single coherent theory.24 Nevertheless, as unreasonable as 
it is to expect scholars to maintain total consistency over time, it would be unfair to 
attempt to both synthesize and criticize claims written by multiple authors as if they were 
all necessarily engaged in the same endeavour or traversing the same theoretical terrain.  
Rejecting the idea that an author’s oeuvre embodies a single, uniform, stable, and 
coherent conceptual project has been particularly helpful in the development of this 
chapter. Between 2000 and 2008, Shleifer and his collaborators produced a series of 
articles that sought to use Shleifer’s findings in a more robust and credible account of the 
relationship between legal change, economic transformation, and political dynamics in 
individual countries.25 Shleifer’s critics have often read his theoretical work together 
with his empirical work, taking for granted that the former enriches and buttresses the 
latter. 26  One key finding of my research is that, when taken at face value and 
reconstructed in a generous way, his overarching model of legal change and its 
consequences flatly contradicts the theoretical underpinnings of the empirical studies 
that commenced with ‘Law and Finance’ and ‘Legal Determinants.’ Beyond a difference in 
the respective focus that each places on law’s causal determinants and its economic 
consequences, the bodies of work often referred to as Law & Finance and Legal Origin 
Theory are also distinguished by quite pronounced theoretical disparities.27  
Finally, Law & Finance is itself a fraught label. On the one hand, it is now used to describe 
a subfield of finance scholarship that consolidated in the mid-1990s with the help of 
Shleifer’s work and that is concerned with how the allocation of legal rights shapes 
financial structures, practices, and macro-outcomes.28 On the other hand, in line with 
                                                        
24 Michel Foucault, Archaeology	of	Knowledge (Routledge 2002) 23–24; Mariana Valverde, ‘Specters of 
Foucault in Law and Society Scholarship’ (2010) 6 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 45. 
25 Glaeser and Shleifer (n 21); Edward L Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State’ 
(2003) 412 Journal of Economic Literature 401; Djankov and others, ‘The New Comparative Economics’ (n 
21); La Porta and others, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (n 11). 
26 Pistor and Milhaupt, in characterizing Shleifer’s approach as the ‘prevailing view’ on the relationship 
between law and capitalism, do not distinguish between the earlier empirical contributions and the later 
theoretical work. Milhaupt and Pistor (n 9) ch 1. 
27 For an investigation into the conceptual structure of Shleifer’s latter-day theorizing and a comparison 
and contrast with the theoretical underpinnings of the empirical studies, see Liam McHugh-Russell, ‘A 
Critique of Legal Origins Theory’ [unpublished manuscript]. 
28 Zingales and Kaplan (n 16). Setting aside nearly a century of legal work on these questions, precursors 
of Shleifer’s work on the economics side include Oliver D Hart, ‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the 
Firm’ (1988) 4 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 119; Sanford J Grossman and Oliver D Hart, ‘An 
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trends in Shleifer’s own empirical work, numerous scholars have used ‘Law & Finance’ to 
group together studies that use a methodology inspired by the ‘Law and Finance’ and 
‘Legal Determinants’ articles and to shed light on the economic consequences of 
particular rules and rule-sets. 29  Pistor, in particular, suggests that these studies are 
united by a ‘Law and Finance paradigm.’30 This chapter is interested solely in the works 
captured by the second meaning, since it is this literature, especially as developed by 
Shleifer himself, which helped to shape the Doing	Business project.31 The label ‘Law & 
Finance’ is an awkward fit for this latter line of inquiry, though. While some relevant 
contributions have a loose connection to finance, such as those dealing with debt 
enforcement or corporate taxes, others have little to no connection, being concerned 
instead with labour law, the enforcement of contracts, or starting a business. Though I 
have retained the term ‘Law & Finance’ when I refer to the details of the model developed 
in the original two contributions, for the broader tradition of research I have chosen to 
use the label ‘Legal Determinants’ and refer to its theoretical aspects as the ‘Legal 
Determinants paradigm.’ 
II. Theory	 and	 Temporality	 in	 the	 ‘Legal	 Determinants’	
Paradigm:	One	Size	Fits	All		
As mentioned in my introduction to this chapter, the techniques and tools that Shleifer 
developed between 1995 and 2010 were applied to a wide variety of policy questions.32 
Despite this broad applicability, it is useful to build up a picture of the overarching 
theoretical apparatus within which it all worked, taking the Law & Finance paradigm as 
a starting point.  
Each model consists of economic actors concerned with the protection and promotion of 
their own fiscal interests. The model set out in the ‘Law and Finance’ and ‘Legal 
Determinants’ articles was specifically concerned with corporate governance and, in 
                                                        
Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem’ (1983) 51 Econometrica 7; SJ Grossman and OD Hart, ‘Disclosure 
Laws and Takeover Bids’ (1980) 35 Journal of Finance 323. 
29 Siems and Deakin (n 17); Mathias M Siems, ‘Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative 
Law’ (2007) 52 McGill LJ 55; Katharina Pistor, ‘Rethinking the Law and Finance Paradigm’ [2009] BYU L 
Rev 1647. 
30 Pistor, ‘Rethinking the Law and Finance Paradigm’ (n 29) 1648. 
31 See Part IV, below.  
32 See notes 6–9 and associated text. 
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accordance with a paper Shleifer authored with Robert Vishny, framed in terms of the 
relations between managers of individual firms and investors who have to choose how 
much to invest in those firms.33 Shleifer and Vishny’s premise was the reasonable claim 
that the more confident an investor can be about the realization of promised returns and 
safety of their initial investment, the greater the amount they will be willing to invest. 
Investors have to entrust their money to firm managers whose interests will align 
imperfectly (or not at all) with their own. Investors and managers face a collective action 
problem: investors will invest less than they would if they were confident that they would 
be repaid and fairly compensated; managers seeking investment may attract less than the 
optimal amount because investors lack confidence that their interests will be adequately 
protected or promoted.  
So far, this all accords with Jensen and Meckling’s seminal contribution to the corporate 
governance literature.34 Yet Shleifer’s next steps represented a serious departure from, 
first, the tendency in the finance literature to ignore or denounce the legal regulation of 
financial relations 35 and, second, from trends in (American) corporate law literature 
favouring a contractual view of the firm that largely disavowed mandatory regulation.36  
First, where Jensen and Meckling had considered only contractual solutions to corporate 
governance problems and offered a vision that treated securities as cash flows, Shleifer 
and his team followed the pioneering work by Oliver Hart and others in attending to how 
securities and the relationships between investors and controlling players allocated 
rights.37 Second, Shleifer and his team supposed that these relationships were forged in 
a world composed of discrete national economies, each governed by a distinct corpus of 
national law. The availability of comparative data allowed Shleifer to take a step that had 
been ignored by the financial literature, which was to imagine the relationship between 
the parties as disciplined not only by market pressures and property and contract 
relations, but also by (mandatory) law. In his model, each country’s law is composed of 
                                                        
33 Shleifer and Vishny (n 19). 
34 Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
35 Zingales and Kaplan (n 16). 
36 As put colourfully by Coffee, Shleifer’s research helped to reveal a spectre that American approaches to 
corporate governance had once thought exorcised: ‘the spectre that law matters.’ John C Coffee Jr., 
‘Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure’ (1999–2000) 25 J 
Corp L 1. 
37 La Porta and others, ‘Law and Finance’ (n 4) 1113–14. 
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formal, peremptory rules imposed by the state to govern the structure and conduct of 
individual relationships. Firms, managers, and investors are located within one of these 
national economies and are thus subject to the domestic law of that country.  
The key premise from the model of corporate governance adopted in the Law & Finance 
paradigm is that where an investor has an enforceable right that gives them the power to 
prevent, foresee, or respond to firm decisions that will negatively affect their interests, 
their confidence and expectations about returns will be higher, as will, pari passu, the 
amounts they are willing to invest. The final idea is that national legal systems can make 
such rights mandatory, which directs attention to how these rights vary among countries 
and across time. The central hypothesis is that a country whose laws provide more 
mandatory protections for investors will, ceteris paribus, see greater levels of investment 
than a country whose laws offer fewer such rights. Moreover, when a country passes laws 
that increase investor protections, such a change will increase levels of investment in 
firms. The change will also, it is hoped, nourish economic growth.38  
National economies can be understood both as a stock, i.e. the totality of all ownership 
claims, contractual relationships, assets, and liabilities, and as a flow, measured in terms 
of the value of transactions in a country over some benchmark period. Information about 
these claims and relationships can be aggregated to generate measurements that provide 
relevant comparisons between countries. The lynchpin of the Legal Determinants 
paradigm was a set of assumptions about the determinants of these national accounts. 
The first assumption is that moving between micro-institutional premises (investor 
confidence) and macro conclusions (market liquidity) requires no additional analytical 
work. In the Law & Finance studies, Shleifer seemed to suggest that the aggregate effect 
on investment would be roughly additive regardless of the differential effects that law 
could be expected to have on different groups of investors. An increasing quality of 
investment opportunities not only increases demand but generates a corresponding 
                                                        
38  A previous collection of studies drawing from similar comparative methods had shown a positive 
correlation between financial market depth and per capita GDP growth rates. Robert G King and Ross 
Levine, ‘Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right’ (1993) 108 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
717; RG Rajan and L Zingales, ‘Financial Dependence and Growth’ (1998) 88 Am Econ Rev 559; see 
generally Ross Levine, ‘Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda’ (1997) 35 Journal 
of Economic Literature 688. 
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supply of savings whose origins or displacement from other uses need not be explicitly 
accounted for.39 
The novelty of Law & Finance studies did not lie in the substance of their arguments, but 
in their methodology and particularly their disruption of prior disciplinary traditions. 
The use of laws to encourage the deepening of capital markets informed development 
discussions and development policy.40 Law & Finance offered a significant innovation to 
legal scholarship, in the form of what Holger Spamann has labelled ‘large-sample, 
quantitative comparative law.’41 They were, of course, not the first empirical studies of 
law. Quantitative empirical approaches to legal inquiry have a long pedigree.42 The Law 
& Finance studies also drew on earlier economics scholarship using comparative 
quantitative data from a large cross section of countries. 43  The novelty of Shleifer’s 
approach lay in the construction of precise numerical indicators that quantified legal 
rules, a step that held value insofar as those coding methods were used to construct data 
points for a large number of countries.44 Though non-governmental organizations and 
private business had already begun by the 1970s to compile international cross-sectional 
data measuring national ‘governance’ factors, their synthetic measures were based on 
high-level, subjective judgments about the quality of legal and administrative systems 
made either by experts or by members of the public. 45  The ‘objective’ measures 
                                                        
39 Pistor describes the tendency to draw conclusions about an entire market, as if ‘a market is equivalent to 
the sum of all contracts or can be fully explained by multiplying stakeholder relations at a single firm by 
the number of firms in the market’ as ‘the extrapolation fallacy.’ Pistor, ‘Rethinking the Law and Finance 
Paradigm’ (n 29) 1648–56. 
40 See eg David M Trubek, ‘Law, Planning and the Development of the Brazilian Capital Market’ Yale Studies 
in Law and Modernization No 3 (1971). 
41 Holger Spamann, ‘Large-Sample, Quantitative Research Designs for Comparative Law’ (2009) 57 Am J 
Comp L 797. 
42 Quantitative studies of law in action date as far back as the work of the American legal realists in the 
1920s. See generally John Henry Schlegel, ‘American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the 
Yale Experience’ (1978–79) 28 Buff L Rev 459. For an example of the use of statistical methods and 
comparative data to measure the effects of individual legal rules, see the research on deterrent effects of 
the death penalty discussed inter alia in David Baldus, ‘The Death Penalty Dialogue Between Law and Social 
Science (Symposium Keynote Address)’ (1995) 70 Ind LJ 1033. In the early 1980s, event studies were 
introduced by financial economists as a way to measure how markets had responded to particular legal 
reforms and, by dint of that response, to judge the advisability of those and similar reforms. The pioneer 
here was G William Schwert, ‘Using Financial Data to Measure Effects of Regulation’ (1981) 24 Journal of 
Law and Economics 121; see generally A Craig MacKinlay, ‘Event Studies in Economics and Finance’ (1997) 
35 Journal of Economic Literature 13. 
43 Deakin and Pistor (n 13); See e.g. Robert J Barro, ‘Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries’ 
(1991) 106 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 407; and especially King and Levine (n 38). 
44 Spamann, ‘Large-Sample, Quantitative Research Designs for Comparative Law’ (n 41) 798. 
45 Deakin and Pistor (n 10) x. For information about these ‘subjective’ measures see Daniel Kaufmann and 
others, Governance	Matters (World Bank 1999). 
202 
 
developed by Shleifer and his collaborators based on state-level law had few 
precursors.46  
The key indicator introduced in the Law & Finance studies was a synthetic measure of 
state-level investor protection, the ‘Antidirector Rights Index’ or ADRI. 47  The 
construction of the data was conceptually simple, albeit resource-intensive, with each 
country being assigned a score between zero and six based on the number of a set of 
rights for corporate investors secured in sources of domestic law.  
Shleifer’s findings seemed not only to vindicate his theoretical intuitions but also to 
achieve a methodological coup. Regressions run on the data showed that the ADRI 
correlated with several measures of financial development, including the relative amount 
of equity held by ‘outside’ shareholders and the number of firms listed in a country’s key 
stock exchange.48  
Correlation is not causation, however. Even if the bare associations in their cross-
sectional freeze-frame were to be believed, those results were compatible with numerous 
alternative explanations beyond the claim that granting shareholders additional rights 
would bolster financial development. 49  For instance, it might be that a high level of 
financial development in a country fosters or creates a demand for more protective 
corporate laws. Or it might be that some other unidentified factor determines national 
trends in both corporate law and financial development.  
The arguable masterstroke of the Law & Finance project that became the catalyst for the 
controversial ‘legal origins theory’ arose from the search for a method that could justify 
a claim about the direction of causality. Shleifer’s strategy was to seek out an 
‘instrumental variable’ that could be plausibly claimed to have an exogenous effect on the 
law and that could be linked to financial development only through its effect on law. To 
                                                        
46 Deakin and Pistor, for example, point to comparative labour law indicators for the European Community 
developed by the OECD in the early 1990s. Deakin and Pistor (n 10) x. 
47 Shleifer and his team eventually abandoned the ADRI in favour of the alternative ‘Anti Self-Dealing Index.’ 
Simeon Djankov and others, ‘The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing’ (2008) 88 Journal of Financial 
Economics 430. The Doing	Business project only ever used the latter, starting in 2005. It is notable that in 
the first decade following LSSV 1997 and 1998, well over a hundred studies were published relying on the 
ADRI as originally calculated. Holger Spamann, ‘The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited’ (2010) 23 The 
Review of Financial Studies 467, 468. 
48 A hypothesized correlation between investor protection and the availability of debt financing did not 
materialize.  
49 Note that, according to some critics ‘…some of the…key results were artifacts of measurement error.’ 
Spamann, ‘Large-Sample, Quantitative Research Designs for Comparative Law’ (n 41) 798, and the sources 
noted therein; below, text to nn 59–61.  
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this end, they grouped countries into a ‘legal family’ classification, based primarily on the 
civil law/common law divide familiar to comparative lawyers, but also differentiating 
between ‘French origin,’ ‘German origin,’ and ‘Scandinavian origin’ legal systems.50 To the 
degree that legal origin could be characterized as exogenous, the argument being that it 
lay in a past dead to influence from either current financial markets or modern-day 
corporate law,51 they argued legal origin could be used as an instrumental variable for 
this purpose.52 
The basic structure of the Legal Determinants paradigm relied on the availability of legal 
origin as an instrumental variable to draw very straightforward conclusions about the 
relationship between a country’s legal system and its economy: in brief, better 
institutions and better laws lead to better economic results. Milhaupt and Pistor have 
described this as the ‘prevailing view’ of the relationship between law and economic 
development, and they place Shleifer and his collaborators at the forefront of promoting 
it.53 The basic premise of Legal Determinants is:  
good	laws	+	good	enforcement	=	good	economic	outcomes54 
In large part, the Legal Determinants studies concluded that bad economic outcomes 
were caused by bad laws or bad legal institutions, and that good outcomes flowed out of 
good laws and legal institutions.  
Their claim is not that specific economic outcomes can be pursued in a particular country 
if that country implements specific laws to govern relationships of a given kind. Rather, 
it is that any country can implement the same laws to achieve the same ends. This is why, 
for many scholars and especially for policymakers, Legal Determinants came to mean, 
and continues to mean, precisely what the Doing	Business project recommends: not only 
                                                        
50 The original legal families indicators were based on Thomas H Reynolds & Arturo A Flores. Foreign	Law:	
Current	Sources	of	Codes	and	Basic	Legislation	in	Jurisdictions	of	the	World (Rothman 1989). 
51  This premise depended on the historical reality that state law had been imposed by conquest or 
colonization in a great number of countries. As pointed out inter alia by Deakin and Pistor, however, the 
historical independence of a country’s legal family was a questionable assumption both for the parent 
country of each of legal family (ie the United Kingdom, France and Germany) and for voluntary adopters 
like Japan. Deakin and Pistor (n 10) xi.  
52 La Porta and others, ‘Law and Finance’ (n 4) 1126; La Porta and others, ‘The Economic Consequences of 
Legal Origins’ (n 11) 286; Deakin and Pistor (n 10) xi. 
53 Milhaupt and Pistor (n 9) ch 1. 
54 ibid 5. 
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that good law is essential to good economic outcomes, but that when it comes to good 
law, ‘one size fits all.’55  
III. Shleifer’s	Failures56	
The introduction of this chapter hinted at the breadth and depth of criticisms that have 
been levelled over the years against Legal Determinants and its cognates. In this part, I 
offer a closer reading of strands of that criticism. I do not think that by doing so I will put 
a final nail in the coffin of Shleifer’s methods. After all, the text and subtext of this chapter 
are that theoretically credible methods and empirically valid findings only partly 
determine the success of a social scientific paradigm. It is nonetheless worth coming to 
terms with some of the fundamental critiques that have been levelled at Legal 
Determinants as a project of inquiry. By ‘fundamental,’ I refer to a set of critiques that 
went beyond the validity of Shleifer’s particular data or the execution of his research 
design and critiqued instead the structure and tacit theory underlying that design. The 
broad constellation of literature that has affinities with Law & Finance cannot be neatly 
filed into the execution-sceptical or theory-sceptical boxes. I have, for example, given 
little attention in this chapter to a chain of studies that drew on entirely different data 
sets to advance a substantially different theory for the content of modern corporate law.57 
That being said, the distinction serves my purposes well enough in what follows. To 
succeed in my point about the consequences of Shleifer’s studies, I need to draw out 
weaknesses that were not gratuitous features of the original Law & Finance studies and 
focus instead on issues raised by the shared theoretical concerns in the research they 
inspired.  
Before getting into those theoretical weaknesses, I offer a summary of some other 
criticisms for contrast. Many of the critiques levelled against various aspects of the Law 
& Finance project amounted to reproofs of the validity or reliability of Shleifer’s data.58 
                                                        
55 Below, text to n 116–120. 
56 cf Klick’s conclusion that ‘Shleifer’s written a lot of good theory, just not here.’ Klick (n 18) 902. 
57 See especially Raghuram G Rajan and Luigi Zingales, ‘The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial 
Development in the Twentieth Century’ (2003) 69 Journal of Financial Economics 5; Mark J Roe, ‘Legal 
Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets’ (2006–07) 120 Harv L Rev 462; Mark J Roe and Jordan I Siegel, 
‘Finance and Politics: A Review Essay Based on Kenneth Dam’s Analysis of Legal Traditions in “The Law-
Growth Nexus”’ (2009) 47 Journal of Economic Literature 781. 
58 Davis summarizes these two concepts as applied to legal indicators in general as follows:  
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The analyses of legal effects in the initial Law & Finance studies were based on each 
country’s ADRI, assigned on the basis of coding applied by a group of international 
lawyers. One strain of critique argued that the resulting data were unreliable: the coders, 
it seemed, had done a markedly bad job of applying the criteria underlying the variables.59 
With a set of corrected values, produced by a global team of lawyers each drawn from the 
bar of the country being coded, the correlations of the ADRI with both legal origins and 
financial development disappeared.60 Similar concerns were raised about the accuracy of 
Shleifer’s method to classify countries into legal families.61  
Other criticisms pushed deeper, questioning not only the accuracy of the measurements 
in Shleifer’s data, but the validity of what was being measured. Some argued that the Law 
& Finance literature was based on ‘cherry-picked’ doctrines.62 In particular, the ADRI and 
the securities law indices published in 200663 were castigated for ‘hidden benchmarking’ 
using a US model.64 In some cases, criticisms were tied to key insights of comparative law. 
Critics worried that the original data accounted inadequately for functional equivalents, 
                                                        
First, there is disagreement about whether the indicators measure the concepts their names 
suggest they measure, or at least versions of those concepts that are useful for either testing 
theories or guiding policy. In other words, there are debates about legal indicators’ validity. 
Second, whatever the indicators are supposed to measure, there is disagreement about the extent 
to which those measurements contain errors. That is to say, there are debates about legal 
indicators’ reliability.  
Kevin E Davis, ‘Legal Indicators: The Power of Quantitative Measures of Law’ (2014) 10 Annual Review of 
Law and Social Science 37, 41. 
59 See e.g. Udo C Braendle, ‘Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany - Law and Finance Revisited’ 
(2006) 7 German LJ 257; and additional sources listed in Sofie Cools, ‘The Real Difference in Corporate Law 
between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers’ (2005) 30 Del J Corp L 697, 701. 
As noted by Siems and Deakin, these were not just problems of reliable or accurate data: the vagueness of 
the original variable definitions made consistent coding impossible. Their definition did not even make 
clear how to deal with the difference between mandatory rules, default rules, and permissible practices. 
Siems and Deakin (n 17) 125–26; Priya P Lele and Mathias M Siems, ‘Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric 
Approach’ (2007) 7 J Corp L Stud 17, 21. Spamann, backed up by a large team of international lawyers, used 
a much more rigorous definition of the variables to essentially run a replication of Shleifer’s original study. 
He found a very low correlation between the original and corrected values, with corrections required in 33 
of the original 46 countries. Spamann, ‘The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited’ (n 47).  
60 Spamann, ‘The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited’ (n 47). Spamann also published research showing 
that key correlations in Shleifer’s work on contract enforcement disappeared once errors were corrected. 
Holger Spamann, ‘Legal Origin, Civil Procedure, and the Quality of Contract Enforcement’ (2010) 166 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE 149. Notably, the data were in part corrected by the 
Doing	Business project itself, whose indicators had been based on the data first collected by Shleifer (n 100, 
below).  
61 Siems (n 29). 
62 Nuno Garoupa and Carlos Gomez Liguerre, ‘The Syndrome of the Efficiency of the Common Law’ (2011) 
29 BU Int’l LJ 287. 
63 Notably, Shleifer’s work on securities law has not been integrated into the Doing	Business project. Rafael 
La Porta and others, ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’ (2006) 61 Journal of Finance 1.  
64 Siems and Deakin (n 17) 125; Mathias M Siems, ‘What Does Not Work in Comparing Securities Laws: A 
Critique on La Porta et Al.’s Methodology’ [2005] ICCLR 300, s 3.1; Lele and Siems (n 59) 19–20. 
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both legal65 and non-legal.66 More problematically, some pointed out that individual rules 
could have differential effects depending on the context in which they were applied, 
raising questions about the weighting of the aggregate index.67 The macro-context in 
which individual rules are applied means that formally equivalent rules may have 
divergent effects, and vice versa. 68  For instance, formal exposure to liability for 
negligence will matter to a greater or lesser degree depending on the standard of care 
implied by the local understanding of negligence. 69  Similarly, flexibility to dismiss 
workers depends not only on the formal law but on norms regulated through collective 
bargaining.70  
The validity of quantitative methods does not depend on their descriptive perfection in 
each case, as Spamann observes. There is a necessary trade-off between detail and 
accuracy for particular cases and the sizes of the overall samples. The magic of statistics 
is that, so long as samples are big enough and measurement errors are unbiased, 
inaccuracies in individual cases will not undermine the general validity of overall 
conclusions.71  
However, although unbiased measurement errors do not undermine the validity of 
findings, the conclusions we can draw from the resulting data nevertheless depend on a 
set of assumptions about the structure of the systems from which those data are 
supposedly sampled and how they develop over time. If the systems are modeled in the 
wrong way, or if errors are made about the relationship between the data and the systems 
they are used to represent, then it is not enough to simply correct the data. Entirely 
different methods are needed. 
                                                        
65 Ralf Michaels, ‘Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the 
Silence of Traditional Comparative Law’ (2009) 57 Am J Comp L 765, 777–79; Siems (n 64) s 3.3. 
66 Siems (n 64) s 3.3; Lele and Siems (n 59) 23–24; Michaels (n 65) 778. 
67 Beth Ahlering and Simon Deakin, ‘Labor Regulation, Corporate Governance, and Legal Origin: A Case of 
Institutional Complementarity’ (2007) 41 Law & Soc’y Rev 865, 867, 884–85. 
68 Milhaupt and Pistor (n 9) 20–21; cf Siems (n 64) s 3.2. Others expressed a similar concern by invoking 
the distinction between ‘law in the books’ and ‘law in action.’ See Michaels (n 65) 776–77. 
69 Siems (n 64) s 3.2. 
70 Ahlering and Deakin (n 67) 883–84. 
71 Spamann, ‘Large-Sample, Quantitative Research Designs for Comparative Law’ (n 41). cf Ahlering and 
Deakin, who make the related point that failure to account for case law as well as legislation only matters 




I need to take a further step back and look at the Legal Determinants paradigm at an even 
more fundamental level. By drawing from a shared strain of positivist, quantitative 
method, namely applying linear regression to cross-sectional data and chasing causation 
using an instrumental variable, each Legal Determinants study contributed to an 
overarching mode of thinking about the object of study. The contribution of those 
methodological as much as, if not more than, the particular ways in which Shleifer’s data 
were collated and combined.  
Statistics can be used in a variety of ways. We might want to understand the structure of 
variation in certain characteristics of a population. We can use statistics to show, quite 
reliably, that human males weigh more on average than human females or that there is a 
positive link between weight and height. Note that there is real variation in the measured 
variables, and thus in the relation between them. Knowing someone's height means that 
we can guess their weight better than we could without that information, but any 
‘correlation’ between height and weight is a population-level characteristic. That 
correlation has no meaning for the individual person. The individual simply has the 
combination of features that they have.  
We can also use statistics to study the nature and behaviour of a self-contained system.72 
The state of a self-contained system at any given moment can be thought of as a set of 
factors or characteristics, some of which are representable by a collection of measurable 
variables. A system is self‐contained insofar as the values of those variables at a given 
point in time is determined by, or at least strongly dependent on, their values in the past. 
The linear pendulum is a useful archetype. Taking the pendulum as a self-contained 
system, we could use statistical methods to help us overcome ignorance about the 
structure of the relationship between its characteristics and to mitigate the consequences 
of measurement error. While a great number of forces and interactions at a variety of 
levels contribute to a pendulum’s locus of movement, 73  there is, within some small 
margin of error, a determinate relationship between the pendulum’s position, velocity, 
                                                        
72 I have deliberately avoided using ‘closed’ system, in large part because I want to avoid any implication 
that Shleifer’s models share any sensibility with Luhmannian systems theory.  
73 For example, the weak and strong nuclear forces are acting between the atoms of the ball and of the 
string, and gravitational forces, though we may think of it as acting on the pendulum per se, is actually 
acting on every atom of the pendulum and the string.  
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and the sum of the forces acting to accelerate it. There may not be a one-to-one 
correspondence between the variables (a pendulum at a given height may be at one of 
two horizontal locations), but the relationships between the variables are still highly 
structured and can be captured using closed-form mathematical formulae.  
Treating each country as a self-contained system was a central feature of the Legal 
Determinants studies. The investigation of causation in their model was based on the 
notion that the system’s characteristics, like the pendulum, had a discernible temporal 
structure. The models fundamentally depend on the idea that values of a set of variables 
at some arbitrary point in time would have a meaningful and substantial effect on those 
characteristics and variables at a later point in time.  
Describing a system as self-contained does not mean it must be treated as hermetically 
sealed. Shleifer’s intervention turned entirely on the possibility that the system could be 
perturbed by some outside impetus, or ‘shocks.’ Factors external to the system could 
intervene and exceptionally change the state of one or more factors. Or an exogenous 
factor could provide a continuous impetus to those factors. Thus, modelling a pendulum 
as a dynamic system does not logically require assuming that its path of motion can never 
be changed. To be able to say how the pendulum will respond if certain variables are 
externally manipulated, it must also be possible to manipulate those variables.  
Finally, statistics can be used to understand the nature, structure, and behaviour of a 
whole category of things, including dynamic systems. So long as instances of a category 
possess a sufficiently similar structure, statistical techniques can sample from that 
population to tell us a great deal about the internal structure of individual cases. Imagine 
we wanted to understand the behaviour and characteristics of pendulums in general. We 
can do so much better using statistics than we could by just drawing out correlations 
between characteristics in the population as a whole. With enough data points, and some 
good mathematical intuition, we can use measurements taken from a collection of 
pendulums to model the relationship between key characteristics of any particular 
pendulum. If we do so however, it will be useful to distinguish between parameters, 
which are static for a particular instance, and state variables, which track internal 
changes to a single system over time.  
This, above all, was the analytical aspiration of Legal Determinants. In order to take 
variable data from multiple countries and draw general conclusions about how a set of 
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variables will evolve together over time in any one country, one must assume that the 
countries are approximately equivalent except	 for differences in the measured factors. 
There must no system-relevant factor that differs significantly between countries other 
than those included in the model. Put another way, there must be no factor that makes 
the structure of the dynamic relationship between the variables differ from one country 
to another. Just think of how misleading our results would be if we tried to draw 
conclusions about the behaviour of one-weight pendulums from a population that 
included double pendulums. In other words, drawing such conclusions requires that all 
relevant factors be captured in measured variables.  
B. Narrow	National	Frame	
Legal Determinants placed a narrow focus on the national context. These studies did not 
address how the interaction between countries, the structure of the international system, 
or changes in these factors over time might affect their findings.  
A number of related points are to be made here. One issue, concerning only the original 
Law & Finance papers, is the treatment of money and finance as national phenomena, and 
thus of financial aggregates in each country as independent of those aggregates in others. 
On some questions, such independence is more than plausible. For example, there is no 
good reason to believe, and good reason not to believe, that the time it takes to resolve a 
bankruptcy in one country has any systemic link with the time it takes in others.74 
Yet, many measures of financial development are logically linked to supply-side factors. 
In the early papers, Shleifer’s focus was on the amount of financing that investors make 
available. Important questions exist about what factors determine the hard limits to the 
amount of financing available to investors. ‘Investment’ is not a static quantity of stuff 
that can simply either be allocated in the form of bonds and equity to firms or left within 
the household. There are intrinsic limits to the amount that investors can and will entrust 
to the corporate sector, regardless of how well investors are protected. Shleifer et al tried 
to account for these limits by including results scaled by local GDP levels, on the 
assumption that lower incomes in a country would intrinsically reduce the amount 
available for investment. Since the late 1970s, however, the global financial regime has 
been biased against any kind of capital controls. Without making the strong claim that 
                                                        
74 Djankov and others, ‘Debt Enforcement around the World’ (n 8). 
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international financial flows actually affected the validity of their results, it is at least 
worth asking how the de facto internationalization of finance might have shaped their 
findings, especially in how it has made it much easier for local investors to take their 
money elsewhere.75  
This is linked to a broader point. The Legal Determinants paradigm modelled the 
economic and legal conditions in an individual country as a particular point in the 
variable space that can be used to represent the prevailing conditions in any state. 
Different countries at different points in time are, per the model, simply at different 
points in that variable space. But the potential role of foreign investment in shaping global 
distributions of financial development suggests that understanding dynamics within one 
country depends on the value of variables in other countries. What drives financial 
practices in one country may be not only its own laws, GDP or other local factors, but 
financially-relevant conditions prevailing in other countries as well.  
In that context, a model based on the internal dynamics of a closed system that is subject 
to occasional shocks does not suffice. Understanding what is happening locally means 
either developing a model of how law, economic practice, and financial development 
proceed together on a global scale or amending the model for individual countries to 
include a set of variables capturing key features of the international system over time.76 
The same point can be applied in a narrower way, one that is closer to routine legal 
concerns. The significantly greater level of international financial flows and foreign direct 
investment during the 1980s and 1990s as compared to the immediate post-war period 
is not simply an artefact of changing proclivities of global investors. Rather, it reflects a 
significant transformation in the international regime governing financial flows over a 
comparable period.77 
When legal and economic conditions in each country are modelled as a sampling of 
parameters and state variables from a single type of self-contained system, the necessary 
corollary is that the poorer countries today will be placed near to the past conditions of 
today's richer countries. Setting aside the internal factors that differentiate the present 
                                                        
75 cf John C Coffee Jr, ‘Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance 
and Its Implications’ (1998–99) 93 Nw U L Rev 641. 
76 Of course, this would be impossible to integrate into the cross-sectional data from the original studies. 
77 See eg Rawi Abdelal, Capital	Rules:	The	Construction	of	Global	Finance (Harvard University Press 2007); 
Eric Helleiner, States	and	the	Reemergence	of	Global	Finance:	From	Bretton	Woods	to	the	1990s (Cornell 
University Press 1994). 
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of today's poor countries from the past of today's richer ones, the most obvious difference 
is that today's poor countries exist in the present rather than the past. In particular, they 
exist in a present that is shaped not only by conditions in today's richer countries, which 
no past country had to contend with, but also by all the changes in the international order 
and its rules and regimes, even for those countries with smaller or less financially 
developed economies.  
The final irony of ignoring international dimensions in trying to understand the dynamics 
of legal and economic change at the local level arises from the keystone of Law & Finance, 
namely the use of ‘legal origins’ as an instrumental variable. Legal origins was only 
valuable to Shleifer and his collaborators because the legal orders of most countries 
around the world have been significantly shaped by conquest, colonialism, and the 
intense borrowing of laws and legal traditions from elsewhere. The explanatory strength 
of Legal Determinants, in other words, depended on the notion that laws and legal values 
can flow across borders, just as money can. Yet, in its details, their model also depended 
on ignoring the borrowing, imposition, and transplantation that had happened in the 
interim, since otherwise their causal model would be too corrupted to be credible. 
C. Oversimplification	of	Legal	Effects	
Jurists are renowned for insisting that the effects and significance of law are complicated. 
Law's baroque and occasionally arcane structures are the consequence of efforts to 
balance interests, weigh countervailing principles at various levels of specificity, and 
respond to side effects and unintended consequences of higher-level settlements.78 
Many of the criticisms levelled against the Legal Determinants project were informed by 
indignation at the idea of reducing law to a single aspect or effect. Law, these critics 
insisted, has a rich fabric, with each provision and rule having a constellation of meanings. 
Law has not only causal consequence, they said, but expressive value. Legal provisions 
can only be properly understood against the background of the legal culture within which 
they operate. The approach to law in Legal Determinants, it was said, is ultimately 
reductive.79  
                                                        
78 Robert W Gordon, ‘Historicism in Legal Scholarship’ (1981) 90 Yale LJ 1017, 1034–35. 
79 Pierre Legrand, ‘Econocentrism’ (2009) 59 U Toronto LJ 215; Vivian Grosswald Curran, ‘Comparative 
Law and the Legal Origins Thesis: [N]on	Scholae	Sed	Vitae	Discimus’ (2009) 57 Am J Comp L 863. 
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If, however, our interest is limited to the causal effect of legal change on economic 
practice and economic macro-variables, then these criticisms may be beside the point. 80 
There is an argument to be had about whether law should be crafted instrumentally to 
improve economic macro-variables, but the claim that law has other functions, richer 
meanings, or a more complicated existence is irrelevant when the question is whether 
certain legal provisions or practices can be expected to have a given economic effect.  
That being said, it is nevertheless valid to argue that legal changes will tend to have a 
multiplicity of effects and to treat such questions as the basis for scepticism about the 
practical conclusions of Shleifer’s findings. As explored in Chapter 2, most legal changes 
can be expected to have an immediate effect both on allocative outcomes—the size of the 
pie, as it is sometimes described—and on distributive outcomes—how big a slice 
everyone gets. Many of Shleifer's studies explored the effect of legal changes on numerous 
dependent variables. He was aware that laws could have numerous effects, but 
nevertheless chose not to evaluate the degree to which legal changes might involve trade-
offs, increasing some development-relevant variables while decreasing others.  
Shleifer and his team ignored that it is possible to have too much of a good thing. The 
linear model driving their studies structurally implied that a higher (or lower) value of a 
legal indicator would always correspond to an increase or decrease in the relevant 
dependent variables. Underlying the original Law & Finance articles is a fundamentally 
relational vision of law. He portrayed law not simply as a matter of command or 
instruction, but as a norm that governs the relationship between two parties, shaping 
both their expectations and their behaviour. The operative theme is balance. The ideal of 
corporate governance underlying their model is not one that empowers external 
investors to interfere in every management decision, or to wholly expropriate the returns 
of other stakeholders, but rather one in which every stakeholder can reasonably trust 
that they will get a fair portion of the surplus. Thus, if we could imagine shareholder 
protections being ranked or measured by the degree to which they empower or provide 
rights to investors, under this model we would expect the optimum value of any relevant 
variable to be struck at some happy medium, and not at the extremes.  
                                                        
80 Michaels (n 65) 789.  
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In statistical terms, the linear model by construction fails to take into account non-
linearities in the regressors. Setting aside the additional complications identified below, 
it might be that for most countries, an ADRI score of four out of six would be the best level 
for the ADRI. Yet in a world in which most countries were already at four, a linear model 
which by design could not distinguish between a movement from one to two and a 
movement from five to six would happily recommend that all countries amend their laws 
to grant investors ever more protection, far past the optimal level.	
D. Neglect	of	Context		
Thus, even if we assume that all countries can be captured by the same variable space—
the same collection of linked random variables—the use of linear models to capture those 
links can get us into various kinds of trouble. Non-linearities are only part of the problem.  
Think of the pendulum again. As it moves through space, it also draws a curve through a 
variable space that might include, for example, the weight of the pendulum and the length 
of the string holding it; the forces it is subject to (gravity plus the pull of the string); its 
location (vertical and horizontal), velocity (speed and direction) and acceleration (rate 
and direction); and the period or frequency of its swing. Very few of the relations between 
these variables can be described by linear equations. Within a very small neighbourhood 
of a given point, it is possible to approximate the change in one or more variables as a 
linear function of changes in the others. A slight change in the horizontal location, for 
example, will correspond to a proportional change in the vertical. However, the validity 
of the resulting linear relation between the two quickly diminishes as you move away 
from that point. If you nonetheless take the approximation to be a universal truth about 
the whole system, your predictions will be simply wrong, and sometimes disastrously so. 
For example, during half of the pendulum's swing, an increase in the vertical location 
corresponds to a move to the right; in the other half, it corresponds to a move to the left. 
If you were to take a random sampling of measurements and use a linear model to 
estimate the relationship between these two variables, the correlation you would expect 
to find between the two variables would be zero, since that is the average relationship 
between them. How changes in vertical and horizontal positions relate to each other, in 
other words, depends on context, that is, the value of other variables. In statistical terms, 
the concern here is that there may be interactions between the regressors, such that the 
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effect of one regressor on any dependent variable cannot be disentangled from the effect 
of the others.  
No doubt, Shleifer’s early results attempted to integrate some of these interactions by 
using intuitive assumptions to weigh key variables. Many of the variables were scaled by 
population, or by current GDP, essentially including a multiplicative term rather than a 
simple linear combination. The intention was to compare apples to apples, and to thus 
put the focus on the same ‘neighbourhood’ so that linear models would make sense. These 
models did not however think in terms of the interaction between legal variables—or 
between institutions. This is a problem because there are important reasons to think that 
the effects of legal variables on economic practices and, indirectly, on economic outcomes 
are not self-sufficient; that these effects are not, in statistical terms, independent. To the 
contrary, there is quite a strong case that successful policy under capitalism may depend 
on how institutional factors are combined, rather than just their presence or intensity.81 
It is intuitive that giving investors more power and, by the same token, a larger portion 
of the pie would increase measures of finance’s presence and importance in an economy. 
But the choice not to account for interactions between institutional variables (or the 
inability to do so given their chosen tools and methods) may explain why Shleifer et al 
could not causally link any of their legal indicators to GDP growth.82 What works, legally 
speaking, may be a function not only of international context but of a broader collection 
of national conditions—institutional, legal, and political—as well.83  
Finally, we can imagine that we are trying to understand the behaviour of pendulums in 
general—pendulums of different weights, with strings of different length—rather than 
just a single pendulum. If we sample relevant variables from a large collection of 
pendulums without accounting for variations in their weight and string length but instead 
imagine all the measurements are taken from the same 'system,' then we might, for 
example, end up with conclusions that are dominated by the pendulums with longer 
strings.  
                                                        
81 In recent years, the locus	classicus of this claim has been Peter A Hall and David W Soskice (eds), Varieties	
of	Capitalism:	The	Institutional	Foundations	of	Comparative	Advantage (Oxford University Press 2001). 
82 La Porta and others, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (n 11) 301–02. 




Though a pendulum in motion is a system that changes over time, a pendulum with 
specified parameters embodies a statistical and mathematical relationship between the 
state variables. In particular, save for the intervention of external or exogenous forces 
and within a margin of approximation, all future values of those variables are determined 
by their present values, so long as the conditions constituting the system do not change.84 
Given enough information about the present value of those variables, their future value 
can be reliability predicted. In mathematical terms, a pendulum is both ergodic and 
stationary. In some sense, the behaviour of the system can be fully captured in a time-
independent way.  
However, there are many dynamic systems, even basic ones, where the relationships 
between the variables cannot be easily captured, or captured at all, in stable, time-
independent, or ergodic terms. The models popularized under the heading of ‘chaos 
theory,’ the most famous being the ‘Mandelbrot set,’ have incredibly simple specifications 
but nonetheless exhibit long-term or aggregate behaviour that cannot be usefully 
captured in any simple statistical terms or mathematical formulae. 85  This contrast 
between the simple characteristics of some systems and the complexity of their 
behaviour is not unique to models carefully chosen by theoreticians but is a very common 
feature of real-world systems. In fact, even simple double pendulums are non-ergodic in 
this sense.  
There are good reasons to believe that the interplay between law, institutions, economic 
practice, and political action are also non-ergodic. Changing a law dealing with corporate 
finance might have knock-on effects on the political coalitions that ultimately lead to 
worse investment conditions. A government that makes it easier to collect on debts may 
lose important members of its voting coalition, bringing to power a populist, protectionist 
government. Changing local labour laws might affect macroeconomic demand, so that 
short-term increase in formal hiring is followed by structural increase in informality. 
                                                        
84 We have to assume that the string does not stretch, that the connection between the string and the 
pendulum does not decay, that there is no change to the gravitational forces acting on the system as a whole, 
etc.  
85 Mark J Roe, ‘Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics’ (1995–96) 109 Harv L Rev 641, 642. 
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The point is not just that a change in laws or administrative practices will have side 
effects. The point is that the interaction between these complexities may be subject to 
feedback loops and critical junctures in ways that make the medium-term effects of any 
imposed changes on variables of interest contingent on, or highly sensitive to, initial 
conditions. 
Some systems, conversely, exhibit a high degree of coupling in the development of key 
variables, which makes them resistant to exogenous change. In such systems, while an 
exogenous change to one variable can change variables of interest in the short term, any 
effect will be dominated in the long-term by an overall trend. The idea of legal-economic 
co-evolution stressed by Deakin partly accords with this premise where, absent any 
parallel changes in an economic and political environment, legal changes can be swamped 
and neutralized. Legal reform can fail to ‘take.’86  
There is a long list of concepts from statistics and dynamical systems theory that seem 
likely to be relevant to national economies and the law and politics that govern them: lag, 
hysteresis, path dependency, feedback and, above all, endogeneity. I will not enter into 
the details of these concepts here. What these ideas point to, much like the discussion of 
coupling and non-ergodicity above, is that time may be a relevant variable in the 
development of a dynamic system, and may have significant impact on what causal effect 
an exogenous change in one variable might have. 	
F. Inadequate	Accounting	for	Agency	
There is an interesting metaphysical two-step analytical process that, while fundamental 
to modern social science research, becomes problematic when applied in the context of 
Legal Determinants. Speaking from the position of a neutral observer, data is wrangled 
together in an attempt to discern a pattern in the characteristics and behaviours of some 
putative system. Once deductions about a pattern are made on the basis of the data, the 
implicit epistemological posture of both scholar and audience changes. We no longer 
stand in the position of disengaged observer, interested in the autonomous behaviour of 
a system, but turn instead to affirmative statements about what will happen if some, often 
underspecified, actor intervenes in the system to change some variable or introduce some 
new factor. 
                                                        
86 This phrasing follows a medical usage of a graft or vaccine being successful, see Trubek (n 40) 54. 
217 
 
This switch in perspective is entirely unproblematic in many contexts. Once we know 
enough about how a pendulum works, we can absolutely draw conclusions about how it 
will behave if we set variables directly (dropping it from a certain horizontal and vertical 
position) or if we nudge it in one direction or another. Even stochastic systems, where 
behaviour follows probabilistic rather than deterministic paths, might have predictable 
if not determinate responses to small changes to variables.  
One reason this works is because a pendulum’s behaviour has a time-invariant 
nomothetic structure. That is, while the relationship between variables may change 
through time, the structure of their relationship does not. I have already pointed above 
to some of the ways in which this assumption may be unseated when it comes to national 
economies existing in an international system that is itself in flux. It assumes that the 
nomothetic structure of relationships between past and present variables will necessary 
continue to structure the relationship between present variables and future variables. 
Put in systemic terms, this depends on time not being a relevant factor other than as a 
parameter that links the causal relationship between the variables.  
However, the passage from a set of stylized facts about what has apparently followed in 
‘countries where X has occurred’ (in the past) to general claims about what happens in 
‘countries that do X’ in general to what will happen in the future ‘if countries do X’ in 
particular, engages in an under-theorized crossing of the boundary between autonomous 
historical process and active political agency.  
There are two possible ways of thinking about what is going on here. In one perspective, 
political actors and political dynamics are wholly endogenous to the system. This was 
largely the perspective that Shleifer later adopted in his attempt to elaborate a more 
robust theoretical underpinning for the connections he found between legal and 
economic variables, which came to be called Legal Origins Theory.87 Roughly speaking, 
this approach is based on an appreciation of the continual interaction between systemic 
factors. Political interests and legislators may exercise some agency, but those effects are 
ultimately subsumed within larger socio-legal dynamics that produce the state of the law 
at a given point in time. An alternate perspective would be that political action works as 
an exogenous factor that can override or counteract the forces that shaped past trends. 
                                                        
87 Text to n 25–27. 
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In this view, political actors exercise agency largely independent of historical constraints, 
with those changes capable of acting as a driver of relevant economic change. The 
problem with the second perspective is that it belies the basic structure of Shleifer’s 
model. The entire basis of the argument that underlies most Legal Origins, across all but 
one of the studies, is that a legal tradition imposed or imported between 100 and 400 
years ago can act as a significant constraint on the law-making powers of political actors 
and the legislature.88 
The paradox is this: either legislators have the power to create salutary laws, regardless 
of context or the state of local political economies, in which case the causal argument has 
no logical basis; or legislators are significantly constrained by local political economies, 
including local legal traditions, which renders moot the question of what would result if 
they had acted differently. 
There are straightforward ways out of this impasse. For instance, local political actors 
may enter into coalitions with international organizations to achieve political ends that 
they could not win on the basis of local dynamics alone.89 This is where the real problem 
lies. The presence of international actors that were, per assumption, not present in the 
prior dynamics disrupts the conclusions that can be drawn about how the system will 
respond. This is quite different from giving the pendulum a little nudge. No matter the 
validity of the causal reasoning about a past relationship between legal order, local 
politics, and economic structure, such reasoning will be irrelevant to understanding the 
dynamics that will result if there is a change in the origins and identity of the actors 
exercising a ‘demand for law.’90  
IV. How	Shleifer	Matters	
This part explores how Law & Finance has shaped real world policy practice. Though 
scholars have often made strong claims about the real-world relevance of Law & Finance, 
                                                        
88 Notably, Shleifer’s article on corporate taxation, which became the background paper for the Doing	
Business ‘Paying Taxes’ indicator (below, n 100), did not find any meaningful correlations between tax rules 
and legal origins. Its causal claims were apparently based on no more than an a priori intuition. Simeon 
Djankov and others, ‘The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment and Entrepreneurship’ (2010) 2 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 31. 
89  cf John Ohnesorge, ‘Legal Origins and the Tasks of Corporate Law in Economic Development: A 
Preliminary Exploration’ [2009] BYU L Rev 1619, 1622–23. 
90 Katharina Pistor, ‘The Demand for Constitutional Law’ (2002) 13 Constitutional Political Economy 73; 
Daniel Berkowitz and others, ‘The Transplant Effect’ (2003) 51 Am J Comp L 163. 
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vindicating those claims requires qualitative, empirical research that has so far not been 
done by scholars. One exception shows clear evidence of Law & Finance’s intellectual 
pedigree: the World Bank’s Doing	Business project. While the real-world consequences of 
Law & Finance via Doing	Business await robust investigation, a preliminary review of 
some intriguing episodes provides the strongest case that Law & Finance had an effect 
that went beyond purely speculative policy discussions. 
A. Legal	 Determinants	 at	 the	World	 Bank:	 The	 Doing	 Business	
project	
The clearest evidence of Shleifer’s ideas escaping the confines of the ivory tower is the 
way in which the Legal Determinants paradigm came to shape the design and 
implementation of the World Bank’s Doing	Business project.91 The Doing	Business project 
is one of the Bank’s ‘flagship’ programs.92 In basic structure, the project collates data on 
eleven legal indicators for over 180 countries.93 Since the second report in 2005, those 
indicators have been aggregated into an annual Doing	Business	 Index (DBI), creating a 
running ‘league table’ on business climate that allows comparison, functionally, between 
all countries in the world.94 
Beyond a noted ‘intellectual affinity’ between Doing	Business and the Legal Determinants 
paradigms, the former is more properly seen as a collaboration between Shleifer’s 
research team and World Bank staff. 95 It is true that the methods underlying many of the 
Doing	Business indicators borrow from de Soto’s work in the late 1990s to quantify the 
cost and time burden of particular areas of economic regulation.96 Yet, Shleifer’s influence 
goes much deeper than the wholesale adoption, highlighted by some, of a quantified 
comparative ‘investor protection’ measure. 97  Shleifer and his co-authors have 
                                                        
91  The project has an extensive and informative website: <www.doingbusiness.org>. Its most recent 
published report is World Bank, Training	for	Reform:	Doing	Business	2019 (World Bank 2018). 
92 The cover of the annual report describes it as ‘A World Bank Group Flagship Report.’ ibid. At least at one 
point, it was the Bank’s highest-circulation publication. Michaels (n 65) 765. 
93 The 2004 report included only five indicators, and covered only 145 countries. Over the years, the Bank 
has created new indicators and made numerous amendments to indicator definitions. 
94 Ohnesorge (n 89) 1625. The Employing Workers indicator is no longer used as part of the calculation of 
the DBI, but is still calculated for all countries. ibid 1626–27; Michaels (n 65) 773.  
95 For ‘intellectual affinity,’ see Aguilera and Williams (n 12) 1426. 
96 de Soto (n 6); Ohnesorge (n 89) 1625. 
97 Ohnesorge (n 89) 1624–27. As noted above (n 47), the Doing	Business project’s Protecting Investors 
indicator was not based on the ADRI developed in ‘Law and Finance.’ It was, however, based in part on 
work developed by Shleifer, as discussed below (n 100). 
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characterized the Doing	Business project as an extension or application of the data project 
they launched. 98  Shleifer provided the original intellectual reference points for the 
project and continued to provide academic advice to the Doing	Business team until at least 
2011. 99  He is also the co-author of eight articles that together largely define the 
methodology for seven of the eleven Doing	Business indicators.100  
Shleifer’s involvement has seldom attracted attention in the extensive critiques and 
reviews of the content, genesis, and legacy of the Doing	Business project. The bare fact 
that the research projects shared personnel among one another is less relevant than the 
nature of their deep intellectual connections.101 Though the linkage between the Legal 
Determinants paradigm and the Doing	Business project are well-known,102 attention to 
the nature of the linkages has been slight.103 John Ohnesorge, for instance, stressed a 
shared policy agenda, noting that ‘[s]tripped	of	its	technical	overlay, the Legal Origins [sic] 
                                                        
98 La Porta and others, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (n 11) 325. 
99 See World Bank, Understanding	Regulation (World Bank & Oxford University Press 2004) vii; World 
Bank, Making	a	Difference	for	Entrepreneurs (World Bank & International Finance Corporation 2011) 206.  
100 The ‘Starting a Business’, ‘Enforcing a Contract’ and ‘Employing Workers’ indicators, all in use since 
2004, are based respectively on Djankov and others, ‘The Regulation of Entry’ (n 6); Djankov and others, 
‘Courts’ (n 7); Botero and others (n 5). The ‘Resolving Insolvency’ Indicator (originally the ‘Closing a 
Business’ indicator) is based on methods published in Djankov and others, ‘Debt Enforcement around the 
World’ (n 8). The ‘Getting Credit’ indicator was originally based in part on the methods in La Porta and 
others, ‘Law and Finance’ (n 4) but was later amended to integrate the methods published in Simeon 
Djankov and others, ‘Private Credit in 129 Countries’ (2007) 84 Journal of Financial Economics 299. The 
‘Protecting Investors’ indicator, introduced in 2005 and changed to ‘Protecting Minority Investors’ in 2015, 
is based on Djankov and others, ‘The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing’ (n 47). The ‘Paying Taxes’ 
indicator, introduced in 2006, is based on Djankov and others, ‘The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment 
and Entrepreneurship’ (n 88). Of the four other indicators, one is based on research published by one of 
the principals of the Doing	Business and Shleifer’s frequent co-author, Simeon Djankov: Simeon Djankov 
and others, ‘Trading on Time’ (2010) 92 The Review of Economics and Statistics 166. The ‘Registering 
Property’ indicator is not directly based on any published work, but has clear links with De Soto’s work on 
registering property (above, n 96). The other two indicators, ‘Getting Electricity’ and ‘Dealing with 
Construction Permits’, are also not based on published research, though the method for the former has 
been published as a World Bank working paper. See generally ‘Data Notes’ in World Bank, Doing	Business	
2004 (n 99) 107–14; World Bank, Doing	 Business	 2019 (n 91) 73–125. See also Methodology 
<www.doingbusiness.org/en/methodology> and Changes to Methodology 
<www.doingbusiness.org/en/methodology/changes-to-the-methodology> on the Doing	Business project 
website.  
101 Some studies have noted that the projects have shared personnel, though none has noticed Shleifer as 
the golden thread. Alvaro Santos, ‘Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform, and Economic Development’ (2009–10) 
50 Va J Int’l L 43, 56; Michaels (n 65) 771; Milhaupt and Pistor (n 9) 20. 
102 Aguilera and Williams (n 12) 1425–28; Deakin and Pistor (n 10) x; John Armour and others, ‘Law and 
Financial Development: What We Are Learning from Time-Series Evidence’ [2009] BYU L Rev 1435, 1436, 
1438, 1447–48, 1498; Siems and Deakin (n 17) 122. Most of these observations seem based on Shleifer’s 
claiming of credit for the consequences that Legal Determinants (qua ‘Legal Origins’) has had via the Doing	
Business project, in La Porta and others, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (n 11) 325. 
103 Ménard and du Marais give an extended treatment to how the correlations investigated by the Legal 
Determinants studies were given a ‘normative gloss’ by the Doing	Business	project, but their review fails to 
account for important conceptual distinctions, undermining the validity of their conclusions. Ménard and 
Marais (n 17).  
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message on corporate law and economic development, propagated via Doing	Business’ 
champions development through private investment, allocated through financial 
markets, which in turn is dependent on ‘vigorous protections for minority 
shareholders.’ 104  Aguilera and Williams suggested that Shleifer’s research ‘provided 
intellectual support for a complex of policy prescriptions … considered important in 
allowing financial markets to flourish, [including] … clear property rights … freedom of 
contract … protections for outside investors and outside senior creditors.’ 105  Santos 
characterizes Doing	 Business as the ‘translation into policy of a theoretical claim 
generated by … the “legal origins” literature … that regulation in common law countries 
is more efficient … than in civil law countries.’ 106  Michaels emphasizes the Bank’s 
adoption of the premise that ‘the common law is more conducive to economic growth’ 
than the civil law, and suggests that the Doing	Business reports gave the ‘legal origins 
thesis a distribution forum.’107 In France, the country’s low initial ranking on the DBI, and 
the framing of many arguments in the 2004 report in terms of differences between legal 
families, got the country, and especially its legal community, up in arms over the unique 
value of the French legal tradition.108 
There is an old joke about a guard hired to watch a construction site experiencing a rash 
of thefts. Every night, the guard stops a worker exiting the site with a wheelbarrow full of 
refuse. Despite a thorough search, the guard always finds the man isn’t carting anything 
of value. After a few days of this, the guard gets a call from his boss, who is livid. 'Are you 
completely blind?' his boss yells. 'You've been here less than two weeks and somehow 
we've had ten wheelbarrows stolen!' My argument is that to ignore the contribution of 
the ‘technical overlay’ of Shleifer’s studies to the Doing	Business project is, in essence, to 
miss the wheelbarrows. While it is true that in the 2004 Doing	Business report, differences 
in legal origin were a key theme, 109  after 2004, differences between legal traditions 
disappeared as a relevant factor in the reports.110  
                                                        
104 Ohnesorge (n 89) 1625 (emphasis added). 
105 ibid 1625–26; Aguilera and Williams (n 12) 1425.  
106 Santos (n 101) 54–56. 
107 Michaels (n 65) 771–72. 
108 Benedicte Favuarque-Cosson and Anne-Julie Kerhuel, ‘Is Law an Economic Contest? French Reactions to 
the Doing	Business World Bank Reports and Economic Analysis of the Law’ (2009) 57 Am J Comp L 811; 
Catherine Valcke, ‘The French Response to the World Bank’s “Doing	Business” Reports’ (2010) 60 U Toronto 
LJ 197. 
109 ‘Legal origin’ appears 152 times in the 2004 report. World Bank, Doing	Business	2004 (n 99).  
110 There have been occasional sightings of the distinction between legal systems. The difference between 
common law and civil law systems was mentioned as the reason for certain procedural choices in reports 
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Let me draw out the key connection taken for granted by these other critiques. Shleifer’s 
paper is distinctive not due to his conclusions but the methodology he used to support 
them. Aguilera and Williams mention it but only in passing: Doing	Business was ‘based in 
significant part on [Shleifer’s] methodology for quantifying law.’ 111  It is true that 
Shleifer’s studies accorded with views previously espoused by the World Bank,112 and his 
findings not only concurred with the emphasis that the Bank had been placing on private-
led (foreign) investment as an engine of growth, but they also reflected more broadly the 
Washington Consensus fixation with getting markets to operate correctly.113 But so	did	a	
great	deal	of	other	 research at the time. Shleifer’s findings may have reinforced some 
themes about the proper forms for regulatory apparatuses in developing states, but the 
Bank did not get these conclusions solely from the Legal Determinants studies.114  
Rather, what the Doing	Business project got from Shleifer, which the Bank could not get 
anywhere else, was a set of measurable benchmarks tied to specific legal norms. This is 
patent in the introduction of the first Doing	Business report published in 2003. Prior 
projects that attempted to link regulatory practice to development outcomes failed to 
convince because they were founded on subjective judgements rather than objective 
                                                        
between 2008 to 2013. The common law / civil law distinction was mentioned offhand in relation to 
Rwandan legal reforms in 2013. ‘Common law’ was used as a synonym of judge-made law in 2011, and in 
2005 and in 2015 the common law tradition was distinguished as the source of a particular approach to, 
respectively, contract enforcement and property registration. Legal origin was mentioned twice in 2014 in 
reference to studies still relying on DB as an instrumental variable. ‘Common law,’ ‘civil law,’ ‘legal family’ 
and ‘legal origin’ appeared in other cases in the reports for these years, and none at all in the reports for 
2006, 2007, and 2017–2019.  
111 Aguilera and Williams (n 12) 1426. 
112 Milhaupt and Pistor (n 9) 20. 
113 Kerry Rittich, ‘Core Labor Rights and Labor Market Flexibility: Two Paths Entwined?’ in Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (ed), Labor	Law	beyond	Borders:	ADR	and	 the	 Internationalization	of	Labor	Dispute	
Settlement (Kluwer Law International 2003); David Kennedy, ‘The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices and 
Development Common Sense’ in David M Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The	New	Law	and	Economic	
Development:	A	Critical	Appraisal (Cambridge University Press 2006); John Williamson, ‘A Short History of 
the Washington Consensus’ in Narcís Serra and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), The	 Washington	 Consensus	
Reconsidered:	Towards	a	New	Global	Governance (Oxford University Press 2008). 
114 There is one exception here. As I have discussed above (text to nn 34–37), Shleifer’s embrace and 
promotion of active regulatory intervention to the benefit of shareholders was a departure from the 
economic orthodoxy of the time. On the other hand, in accordance with the turn toward institutions and 
the institutional foundations of markets entailed in a moment of ‘chastened neoliberalism’ in development 
orthodoxy, the Bank had already in a very significant way taken up projects aimed at improving the legal 
underpinnings of markets. Kennedy (n 113); Kerry Rittich, ‘The Future of Law and Development: Second-
Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social’ in David M Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The	
New	Law	 and	Economic	Development:	A	Critical	Appraisal (Cambridge University Press 2006); Chantal 
Thomas, ‘Law and Neoclassical Economic Development in Theory and Practice: Toward an Institutionalist 
Critique of Institutionalism’ (2010–11) 96 Cornell L Rev 967. Research remains to be done to determine to 
what degree, if any, the timing of the international development community’s embrace of positive, pro-
investor legal regulation would have been different without Shleifer’s contributions.  
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assessments. As a result, they were fuzzy and imprecise about the rules and practices 
being assessed, and ‘reformers [were] left in the dark.’115  
The preface to the 2004 Doing	Business report was informed above all by the message 
that, when it comes to business regulation, ‘one size can fit all.’116 There are some slight 
deviations from that theme over the years, and the phrase itself may have disappeared 
from subsequent reports, but the sentiment has endured.117 As noted above, Shleifer’s 
later, more theoretical work diverged sharply from the conclusion that institutional 
forms should or could take any one shape.118 While it is no surprise that Shleifer and his 
colleagues have not ‘openly endorsed’ the one-dimensional technical-instrumental 
application of their ideas by the World Bank, that is beside the point. 119  The Legal 
Determinants studies used statistical methods to empirically tie specific legal reforms to 
desirable economic outcomes. By reverse engineering those results, the Bank was able to 
endorse those specific legal reforms in service of those economic ends. One theme 
explored further in Part V below is that the Legal Determinants approach lent the Doing	
Business outputs credibility, a certain ‘scientific patina.’120 However, it is important to 
emphasize that this appearance of scientific neutrality, objectivity, and technicality to 
specific reforms applied to any and all countries. The causal inference of the Legal 
Determinants paradigm allowed the Doing	Business to claim it had something valid to say 
about all countries. In other words, it was the quantification of legal rules and 
administrative practice that allowed Doing	Business	to be quite specific about what the 
universal ‘one size’ regulatory model should be. 
B. Has	Doing	Business	mattered	for	Legal	Reform?	
The affinities between Legal Determinants and the Doing	Business project matter because 
the Doing	Business project shaped law and practice in individual countries in real and 
substantial ways. Along with another set of 'governance' indicators adopted by the World 
                                                        
115 World Bank, Doing	Business	2004 (n 99) 1; Kevin E Davis and Michael B Kruse, ‘Taking the Measure of 
Law: The Case of the Doing Business Project’ (2007) 32 Law & Soc Inquiry 1095, 1098–99. 
116 World Bank, Doing	Business	2004 (n 99) xvi.  
117 The authors hedge on this point occasionally, such as when they admit ‘reform options are not the same 
across rich and poor countries.’ Yet, when push comes to shove, the report emphasizes that, ‘when it comes 
to the manner of regulation, one size often fits all (in many cases there really is one best practice).’ ibid xviii, 
xvi.  
118 Text to n 27. 
119 cf Milhaupt and Pistor (n 9) 226, n 6. 
120 Santos (n 101) 56; Milhaupt and Pistor (n 9) 20. 
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Bank, the Doing	Business project might count as the 'original sin' that shifted a large body 
of scholarly interest toward the study of (legal) indicators as a form of (global) 
governance.121 This scholarship suggests that the Doing	Business project has an implicit 
logic of governance, manifest in three modes. 
In the first mode, Doing	Business has been characterized as just the latest iteration of 
international development work in a tutelary register. Though the primary output of the 
Doing	Business project is a comparative set of quantitative indicators regarding legal 
regulations, the extensive information concerning the calculations underneath the 
individual indices allows the output to be reverse-engineered, thereby allowing the 
indicators to function as a detailed form of reform advice. Whatever practice would 
produce a high score on any of the indicators was identified as a 'best practice.' In this 
way, Doing	Business works as a form of governance as it allows duly informed local 
policymakers to pursue strategies identified as most likely to achieve desirable ends. 
Even without explicit efforts to motivate the index-improving reforms that were offered 
in each annual report, the implicit advice baked into the indicators works as governance 
in the high-modern mode, whereby enlightened experts tell policymakers how to achieve 
their development goals.122 
In the second mode, other observers focus on the impact of the rankings in the Doing	
Business Index, not the individual indicators.123 The rankings hold the interest of scholars 
concerned with the degree to which the Doing	Business project allows countries to be 
compared.124 Because the ranking permits a direct comparison between countries, it 
foments competition between countries and local policymakers. 125  Such competition 
could be imagined as a matter of relative prestige and reputation of countries and of 
policymakers themselves. But a more instrumental logic exists, because the rankings 
provide a World-Bank accredited signal to the international investment community. This 
                                                        
121 See below, text to nn 165–173. 
122  Nils Gilman, Mandarins	 of	 the	 Future:	Modernization	 Theory	 in	 Cold	War	 America (Johns Hopkins 
University Press 2003); James C Scott, Seeing	Like	a	State:	How	Certain	Schemes	to	 Improve	 the	Human	
Condition	Have	Failed (Yale University Press 1998). 
123  Bjørn Høyland and others, ‘The Tyranny of International Index Rankings’ (2012) 97 Journal of 
Development Economics 1. 
124 Dimitri Van Den Meerssche, ‘International Organizations and the Performativity of Measuring States’ 
(2018) 15 International Organizations Law Review 168. 
125 Sam Schueth, ‘Winning the Rankings Game: The Republic of Georgia, USAID, and the Doing Business 
Project’ in Alexander Cooley and Jack L Snyder (eds), Ranking	the	World:	Grading	States	as	a	Tool	of	Global	
Governance (Cambridge University Press 2015) 151. 
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is quite different from pursuing administrative practices or legal rules thought to be best 
for local economic development, regardless of what other countries do. Rather, the 
rankings foster an international race to the top in a competition for implicitly scarce 
international investment capital. The substance of any legal reform matters only insofar 
as it influences the outcome of that race. Economic development, understood this way, 
becomes above all a function of international investment levels. Doing	Business governs 
by encouraging countries to change their policies and practices in order to communicate 
their attractiveness to investors. 
A third, more coercive mode lurking in the Doing	Business project is one in which the 
Index is made part of the calculus that determines the terms and eligibility of developing 
countries for international development aid, including from the World Bank itself.126 As 
much has been written about how Doing	Business works as a strategy, site, or channel of 
governance, such arguments have rested on a thin account of how much Doing	Business 
actually matters. Nominally speaking, local policymakers have access to a plethora of 
sources about international best practices. 127  They also have access to a variety of 
alternative strategies to attract international investment, including other international 
rankings of their investment climate, both private and public. Governance that works 'at 
a distance' rather than through threat or force has a distinct disadvantage. Subjects of 
that governance have to believe that there are consequences to participation, albeit 
indirect. Governance based on the provision of expert advice depends on the authority 
and credibility of its authors, on its relative availability compared to other advice, on the 
degree to which it meets the needs and priorities of its audience. There are good reasons 
to doubt that no matter the sums spent on Doing	Business, we cannot guess from its design 
or its logic that it would convince local policymakers to change any practices that may 
impact on Doing	Business	indicators or on an individual country's ranking. 
Rather, knowing whether Doing	 Business	 matters requires closely scrutinizing the 
empirical evidence. Extant evidence generates difficulties of both confounding 
                                                        
126 There is some statistical correlation between reforms captured by the Doing	Business reports and the 
subsequent lending decisions of the World Bank and other multilateral lenders, but no significant 
correlation between DBI ranking and aid. Jason Webb Yackee, ‘Foreign Aid, Law Reform, and the World 
Bank’s Doing	Business Project’ (2016) 9 The Law and Development Review 177. On the other hand, as of 
2016, the Bank may have formally banned the use of Doing	Business data in lending decisions. ibid 194. 
127  There is, by contrast, wide variation in the actual access policymakers have to information on 
international policy, due in part to resource constraints.  
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interpretation and complex causation.128 The Doing	Business project has trumpeted its 
successes in the form of hundreds of changes across dozens of countries that it claims 
were ‘informed or inspired by’ the project, though the meaning of ‘informed or inspired’ 
is not defined. Despite claims that the impact of Doing	Business has been ‘remarkable,129 
any independent and in-depth studies of the effects over its first decade and a half were 
‘scant.’ 130  The gold standard might be a quantitative study of whether legal and 
administrative changes across countries have tracked the kinds of rules and practices 
measured by the Doing	Business indicators. With so many confounding factors to account 
for, doing so would be daunting, to put it mildly. 
A small number of case studies address both the reasons given by policymakers for 
changes in policy and administrative practice that they pursue, as well as the actual 
changes undertaken. Here, the evidence is striking. In a cross-section of countries studied, 
policymakers from the highest officials down have, in official discourse and internal 
discussions, named the Doing	Business indicators and a country's ranking on the DBI, as 
a motivation for a swath of policy actions. Academic literature and journalistic accounts 
offer some rich and highly informative cases of this influence. Country officials explicitly 
state their intentions to pursue courses of action that will improve their DBI, and 
government bodies have been established with mandates to pursue reforms inspired by 
Doing	Business. 131 There have been multiple cases of countries pursuing business law and 
public administration reforms making at least a rhetorical connection to the Doing	
Business project.132 Singapore, which has topped the DBI for most of the fifteen years of 
                                                        
128 Riegner, for example, points out that reforms pursued in Georgia (discussed below, text to nn 134–136), 
had ramifications not only on the country’s Doing	Business scores, but also for the World Bank’s Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment, which is used in the Bank’s aid allocation decisions. Michael Riegner, 
‘Governance Indicators in the Law of Development Finance: A Legal Analysis of the World Bank’s “Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment”’ (2016) 19 Journal of International Economic Law 1, 5–6. 
129  Luca Enriques and Matteo Gargantini, ‘Form and Function in Doing	Business Rankings: Is Investor 
Protection in Italy Still So Bad’ (2016) 1 U Bologna L Rev 1, 6–7. As evidence of the influence of DB, Enriques 
and Garagantini cite a report authored by one of the Doing	Business project leads, and the Doing	Business 
Independent Review Panel report.  
130 Lin Lin and Michael Ewing-Chow, ‘The Doing	Business Index on Minority Investor Protection: The Case 
of Singapore’ (2016) 2016 Sing J Legal Stud 46, 47. 
131 For the case of Sri Lanka, see Clare Fisher Williams, ‘What Can ESL Offer to the Data Collector: Describing, 
Defining, Designing and Deploying an Alternative ESL Approach Special Issue: Continuing towards an 
Economic Sociology of Law’ (2014) 65 N Ir Legal Q [i], 65–66. 
132 For Tanzania and Bulgaria, see Michal Lyons and Colman Titus Msoka, ‘The World Bank and the Street: 
(How) Do “Doing Business” Reforms Affect Tanzania’s Micro-Traders?’ (2010) 47 Urban Studies 1079, 
1084–85; Michal Lyons and others, ‘Do Micro Enterprises Benefit from the “Doing Business” Reforms? The 
Case of Street-Vending in Tanzania’ (2014) 51 Urban Studies 1593, 1597; Benito Arruñada, ‘How Doing 




the project’s existence, is notable for the breadth of coordination and the depth of 
resources that have been poured into maintaining its ranking.133 The most telling case, 
however, is Georgia. In the first Doing	Business	report, published in 2004, Georgia was 
ranked 100 (out of 155 countries); by 2010, it had moved up to 11 (out of 183). Its rank 
in 2018 is 6.134 As documented by Sam Schueth, this jump in rank was no coincidence. 
Rather, since 2004, the country's leaders have chased reforms that, as much as possible, 
used the DB indicators to guide reforms.135 Once those efforts had successfully driven up 
their ranking, millions were spent advertising the high score in print in the Wall Street 
Journal, Economist, and the Financial Times, as well as with televised ads on CNBC.136  
Despite these cases, though, the evidence of direct effect is not overwhelming. There are 
multiple confounding factors, and there has been no sober reckoning of whether changes 
pursued in the name of Doing	Business have actually 'stuck' and ‘taken’ in the sense of 
formally persisting in the medium term and actually shaping business practice and 
administration. Any causal argument is harder still. One can ask to what degree Doing	
Business has served as a political alibi for changes that would have occurred anyway? 
There are widespread worries that countries have gamed the system, pursuing reforms 
that make little difference in practice while making big dents in DBI scores. 137 
Nevertheless, it is becoming hard to argue that Doing	Business has not mattered at all.  
V. Explaining	Shleifer’s	Influence	at	the	World	Bank	
By now it should be possible to see an outline of the puzzle motivating this chapter. 
Despite its theoretical weaknesses and the wide-ranging methodological drubbing, the 
Legal Determinants paradigm has seen levels of theoretical uptake and a degree of 
practical application seldom dreamed of by most legal scholars.  
What makes ideas successful? How do models of the world end up being integrated into 
law’s economic imaginary? Why is one set of models and methodologies taken up as a 
                                                        
133  Lin and Ewing-Chow show that policymakers in Singapore have continually reshaped law and 
administrative practice as part of conscious and deliberate efforts to maintain top ranking on the DBI. Lin 
and Ewing-Chow (n 130).  
134 Schueth (n 125) 183; World Bank, Doing	Business	2019 (n 91). 
135 Schueth (n 125) 152–53, 163–67, 167–78. 
136 ibid 172–73. 
137  ‘How the Big Emerging Economies Climbed the World Bank Business Ranking’, The	 Economist (3 
November 2018) <www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/11/03/how-the-big-emerging-
economies-climbed-the-world-bank-business-ranking> accessed 27 February 2019. 
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standard, while others wither? More pointedly, why do bad ideas—incoherent, 
inaccurate, and incomplete—succeed? What factors led the World Bank, or at least 
particular formations within the Bank, to adopt Shleifer’s data, methods, overarching 
claims, and intellectual leadership? I turn now to these questions. 
I begin with four sections addressing the potential role played by four factors, each of 
which would inevitably have to be integrated into any robust reconstruction of the 
episode: ideology; epistemic communities, professions, and the sociology of intellectual 
networks; the geopolitical constraints on the World Bank as a policy actor; and the 
seductive power of quantification in policy matters. My overall point in this this chapter 
is not that these non-epistemic factors were irrelevant. Quite to the contrary, in the final 
section of this part, my arguments for the causal relevance of the methodological 
technicalities of Legal Determinants point to the ways in which that relevance depends in 
many places on the presence of these other factors.  
A. Politics	and	the	Spectre	of	Ideology	
A great deal of ink has been spilled criticizing the details of the proposals espoused by the 
Doing	Business project.138 Many people have objected to its vision of the world, the policy 
repertoire, the standards of evaluation, the ordering of priorities, and the implied 
distributive consequences promoted by the Doing	Business project. It is possible (with 
some effort) to convert some of these critiques into causal arguments that could, if proven 
correct, shed light on why the World Bank adopted Shleifer’s ideas rather than others.  
One explanation might be that particular individuals inside the World Bank had a 
preference for a type of policy reforms, sharing a particular vision of how societies should 
be organized. In this view, what made Shleifer’s early work attractive was how well his 
conclusions accorded with these policy priors. Shleifer’s conclusions furnished 
consequentialist justification for labour market deregulation, reduced regulatory 
oversight, and measures to increase financial market power and lower taxes. 139  The 
explanatory factor here might be described as the power and preferences of neoliberals 
at the Bank.140  
                                                        
138 See especially the discussion of the ‘Employing Workers’ indicator, above, Introduction, n 14. 
139 Botero and others (n 5); Djankov and others, ‘The Regulation of Entry’ (n 6); Djankov and others, ‘The 
Law and Economics of Self-Dealing’ (n 47); Djankov and others, ‘The Effect of Corporate Taxes on 
Investment and Entrepreneurship’ (n 88). 
140 Schueth (n 125) 152. 
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A more common, subtler version of this argument skirts individual motives and indeed 
avoids referring to individuals entirely. The explanatory factor here is development 
common sense. 141  Such analyses recognise that individuals have preferences for 
particular kinds of policies, but they place their explanatory emphasis on the perspectives 
viewed by a community as neutral and the solutions that can appear to be technical rather 
than political.142 Marxist strains of this argument go further, arguing that perspectives 
take hold because they are in the interests of economic elites.143 Viewed through this lens, 
the World Bank appears to be little more than a vehicle of a political project, the 
institutional embodiment of prevailing development ideology. Viewed this way, Shleifer’s 
work is arguably attractive not because it fulfils any group’s self-conscious political 
project, but because it matches a prevailing worldview. Thus, it is not neoliberals who are 
to be credited with making Shleifer at home in the World Bank, but (legal) 
neoliberalism.144  
Clearly, ideology matters. Shleifer’s theory is highly compatible with the global 
reproduction of American institutional settlements and the use of the American present 
as the presumptive standard for global best practices. The assumptions underlying his 
methods are neoclassical, and his prescriptions are neoliberal. In both their earlier and 
later incarnations, Shleifer’s recommendations accorded with a preference for market-
supporting rather than policy-implementing reforms in developing countries. However, 
this observation does little to explain why Shleifer’s model, techniques, and data were 
placed front and centre in the Doing	 Business project. There were plenty of other 
economists to choose from who were saying that markets were good and needed to be 
institutionally supported. Why Shleifer? 
B. Networks,	Narrow	Self	Interest,	and	Force	of	Habit		
Another factor in diagnosing Shleifer’s influence is the role of professional networks, 
communities of interest, and social formations like disciplines and sub-disciplines. The 
                                                        
141 Kennedy (n 113). 
142 Tor Krever, ‘Quantifying Law: Legal Indicator Projects and the Reproduction of Neoliberal Common 
Sense’ (2013) 34 Third World Quarterly 131, 132. The importance of the technical-political divide is also 
addressed below, text to nn 158–161.  
143 ibid 133. 
144 Krever (n 142). 
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points here bridge what was traditionally labelled as the sociology of knowledge and 
what is today described as international knowledge politics or the politics of expertise.145 
Lawyers may be leery about accounts that attribute causal relevance to the actions and 
identity of individuals, but it is worth confronting the ways in which important economic, 
political, and even legal outcomes may relate to the identities and communities of key 
players.146 
One version of this approach is 'great man' historiography, which ascribes historical 
salience to the virtues and visions of individual leaders, emphasizing the force of internal 
individual characteristics. However, the salience of individuals in historical processes 
also has a more sociological hue, where the analytical canvas encompasses the 
relationship between the individual and the context.147  
Sometimes if we want to understand behaviour in a certain setting, it helps to ask who 
knows who. It could be that Shleifer was influential at the World Bank because he was 
already integrated into global networks of power and influence, including some of the 
most powerful figures in American politics, academia, and international development.148 
However, it is not necessary to invoke conspiratorial old-boys’ networks or corrupt 
practices of ‘favours for favours’ to make this point. No matter Shleifer's intrinsic 
competence, his success with the Doing	 Business project was probably partially 
attributable to the operation of something like the Matthew effect.149 Having already been 
granted a leadership role in a multi-million dollar project to oversee the creation of 
                                                        
145 David Kennedy, A	World	of	Struggle:	How	Power,	Law,	and	Expertise	Shape	Global	Political	Economy 
(Princeton University Press 2016); Annabelle Littoz-Monnet (ed), The	Politics	of	Expertise	in	International	
Organizations:	How	International	Bureaucracies	Produce	and	Mobilize	Knowledge (Routledge 2017). 
146 In saying that lawyers are not fond of accounts that attribute cause to individual actors, I only have in 
mind that there is a conflict between the ideal in liberal legalism of a neutral, anonymous law, or an 
instrumentally functional law, and the premise that law exists only because of a narrow, parochial interests.  
147 One good example would be Weber's account of charismatic power.  
148 Sara Ivry, ‘Did an Exposé Help Sink Harvard’s President?’, The	New	York	Times (27 February 2006) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/27/business/media/did-an-expose-help-sink-harvards-
president.html> accessed 4 December 2018; David McClintick, ‘How Harvard Lost Russia’, Institutional	
Investor (13 January 2006) <https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b150npp3q49x7w/how-
harvard-lost-russia> accessed 4 December 2018. 
149 The Matthew effect, coined by sociologist Robert Merton, identifies the tendency in some social systems 
for growth factors to be more effective in elements that are larger; for example, people who are already 
famous are more likely to get opportunities which maintain or increase their fame. It refers to the Bible, 
Matthew 25:29, roughly: ‘For to every one who has will more be given, and he will have abundance; but 
from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away.’ Merton’s particular hypothesis was that 
rewards would be allocated to scientists based on their existing prestige, and that this would materially 
affect what knowledge got produced and how it was distributed. Robert K Merton, ‘The Matthew Effect in 
Science: The Reward and Communication Systems of Science Are Considered’ (1968) 159 Sci 56.  
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securities markets in Russia, Shleifer’s attachment and integration into another large 
project may have had at least something to do with who knew him or knew about him, 
rather than the details of what he believed or what he claimed he could show.150  
Inquiry into the relationship between the causal and constitutive aspects of group 
membership can be addressed at higher levels of abstraction and track broader social 
networks. Explanatory techniques move in both directions here. Individual motivations 
can be explained by reference to membership in the group, and the group's continuing 
existence can be explained in part through actions of members that reproduce the group 
and maintain its boundaries. One of the most striking aspects of Shleifer’s success is that 
although the Legal Determinants paradigm and Legal Origins theory together 
represented a disciplinary breakthrough for comparative law and for other legal 
subfields, credit for the breakthrough is due not to jurists but to a group of economists.151 
The economist’s methodological tools (namely, comparative statistics, linear regressions, 
formal modelling) were precisely what made the Legal Determinants project so 
attractive. Lawyers and economists, however, are distinguished not only by their 
methodological tools but also by their professional networks, by culture, and by what 
Bourdieu called habitus.152 Battles have been fought over what ideas get implemented 
and what approaches to problem-solving are adopted, manifesting as conflicts over who 
gets a say in policy-making.153 A growing line of research seeks to explain policy agendas 
at the international level as reflective of power conflicts between competing national 
traditions, epistemic communities, bureaucratic groupings, and other groups of ‘people 
with projects.’154 A less sophisticated version of this line of inquiry would posit that 
                                                        
150 For details regarding Shleifer's role in Russia, see Maxim Boycko and others, Privatizing	Russia (MIT 
Press 1995); McClintick (n 148). 
151  Michaels (n 65) 765; Christopher A Whytock, ‘Legal Origins, Functionalism, and the Future of 
Comparative Law’ [2009] BYU L Rev 1879, 1880. 
152 Karin Knorr Cetina, ‘Epistemic Cultures: Forms of Reason in Science’ (1991) 23 History of Political 
Economy 105; Susan S Silbey, ‘Legal Culture and Legal Consciousness’ in Paul B Baltes (ed), International	
Encyclopedia	of	the	Social	&	Behavioral	Sciences (Pergamon 2001); James Boyd White, ‘Economics and Law: 
Two Cultures in Tension’ (1986–87) 54 Tenn L Rev 161; Pierre Bourdieu, Outline	of	a	Theory	of	Practice 
(Richard Nice tr, Cambridge University Press 1977). 
153 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field’ (1986–87) 38 Hastings LJ 
814. 
154 See, for interactions with national practices Nikolas M Rajkovic and others (eds), The	Power	of	Legality:	
Practices	of	 International	Law	and	Their	Politics (Cambridge University Press 2016); with bureaucratic 
groupings: Alvaro Santos, ‘The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development’ 
in David M Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The	New	Law	and	Economic	Development:	A	Critical	Appraisal 
(Cambridge University Press 2006); with disciplinary formations: Galit A Sarfaty, Values	 in	Translation:	
Human	Rights	and	the	Culture	of	the	World	Bank (Stanford University Press 2012) 75–105; Yves Dezalay 
and Bryant G Garth, The	 Internationalization	 of	 Palace	Wars:	 Lawyers,	 Economists,	 and	 the	 Contest	 to	
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battles over policy frames and their corresponding reform agendas are reducible to 
power conflicts between expert communities. What existing research indicates instead is 
that, at minimum, the politics of legal reform, especially as it interacts with the 
international system, is not reducible to the mediation of interests of those whose rights 
will be directly implicated by the laws and policies that are implicated. Rather, 
understanding legal reform depends on paying attention both to the foibles and 
limitations of bottom-up law-making and to the politics of expertise, not to mention the 
economics involved in trying to implement ‘efficient’ divisions of intellectual labour.155 
C. Geopolitical	Context	and	the	Governance	Agenda	
In the previous section, I mentioned bureaucratic groupings as a possibly salient locus of 
the politics and economics of reform agendas. We should not focus on such bureaucratic 
groupings at the expense of institutions themselves as both sites and actors. Given that 
my inquiry is not about influence in the abstract, but about the influence of the World 
Bank in particular, I should address one aspect of the conditions of possibility that 
allowed the World Bank to embrace specific advice about substantive legal reform in the 
first place.  
Those less versed in the history of development orthodoxies or the practice of the World 
Bank may miss how big a change it was for the World Bank to be giving advice about legal 
systems at all. The Cold War significantly circumscribed the practices of the World Bank 
until the 1990s. During most of its first 45 years, the Bank’s effective capacity to push any 
reforms in recipient countries was limited by the presence of the USSR as an alternative 
funding source. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the emboldened funders of the 
World Bank urged the tying of funding to political reforms, in line with a broader retreat 
in the international sphere from the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs 
of sovereign states.156 These pressures increased the importance of internal constraints 
                                                        
Transform	Latin	American	States (University of Chicago Press 2002); between ‘academics’ and ‘activists:’ 
Annelise Riles, ‘[Deadlines]: Removing the Brackets on Politics in Bureaucratic and Anthropological 
Analysis’ in Annelise Riles (ed), Documents:	Artifacts	of	Modern	Knowledge (University of Michigan Press 
2006); see generally Kennedy (n 145) for the role of ‘people with projects’ in constituting global order. 
155 cf the broad literatures on the comparative advantages of organizing dispute resolution under the 
auspices of judges or regulators, and whether laws are better designed in terms of hard-line rules or 
discretionary standards, eg Edward Glaeser and others, ‘Coase Versus the Coasians’ (2001) 116 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 853; Louis Kaplow, ‘Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis’ (1992) 
42 Duke LJ 557. 
156 Van Den Meerssche (n 124) 176–77. 
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on the Bank’s reform activities. Its reputation and authority depended largely on its 
ability to credibly abide by the constitutional prohibition in its founding treaty against 
interfering in the ‘political affairs’ of its members.157 As a matter of institutional sociology, 
actors at the Bank faced a deadlock of international and institutional politics, with top 
management strongly supporting reform facing a Board resistant to any entrée into the 
domestic political affairs of members.  
In a coup of legal innovation, the Bank radically redrew the boundary around ‘the 
political’ as a category relevant for dispensing loans or the development of policy 
advice.158 Rejecting anything like a constitutional division of powers based on areas of 
legitimate competence, the Bank adopted a doctrine that expanded the boundaries of the 
non-political to include any issue that could be described as ‘technical.’ What became 
relevant to the legitimacy of Bank activities was not whether they involved questions of 
policy per se, nor whether they addressed decisions traditionally made by domestic 
authorities, nor whether they impinged on politically sensitive or controversial topics, 
but only whether they were based on expert judgment.159 In the place of a concept of 
‘economic considerations’ that were constrained and delimited by the possibility of local 
controversy, disagreement, or a clash of values, the resulting doctrine shrunk the 
proscribed area of political activity to include only those questions that could not be 
answered by reference to established expertise concerning its economic effects.160 The 
presence of conflicting considerations was not relevant.161  
                                                        
157 ibid 177–78. International Bank for Reconstruction & Development, Articles of Agreement, art. IV, § 10 
(1989) states ‘The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member … Only 
economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions;’ see also ibid, art. III, § 5(b), which states ‘The 
Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used … with due attention to 
considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other non-economic influences 
or considerations.’ 
158 ibid 178–79. 
159 The key document was a legal memorandum authored by the Bank’s General Counsel, Ibrahim Shihata, 
largely reproduced in Ibrahim FI Shihata, ‘The World Bank and “Governance” Issues in Its Borrowing 
Members’ in Franziska Tschofen and others (eds), The	World	 Bank	 in	 a	 Changing	World (M Nijhoff 
Publishers 2000). 
160 As Van Den Meerssche emphasizes, what is most striking about the Shihata doctrine was not its content, 
but that it was so effective. Van Den Meerssche (n 124) 179. 
161 It is common in the critical literature on the Bank to argue that the Shihata doctrine characterized 
economic expertise as neutral, and therefore was not ‘political.’ ibid 177, 179, 180; Tor Krever, ‘The Legal 
Turn in Late Development Theory: The Rule of Law and the World Bank’s Development Model’ (2011) 52 
Harv Int’l LJ 287, 318. Neutrality, however, appears nowhere in Shihata’s opinion. It might be more accurate 
to say that Shihata shifted the definition of ‘non-political’ for the purposes of evaluating Bank actions away 
from neutrality and toward ‘technicality.’ 
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The result was that the Bank could promote any kind of legal or institutional reform, 
provide funding for such reforms, tie funding to the pursuit of such reforms, and turn a 
significant portion of its research toward such reforms. Of course, the Bank still had to 
worry about criticisms concerning the content of the proposed reforms or its research 
findings. But provided the reforms or investigations were presented as technical 
expertise and objective knowledge about economics, it no longer had to worry that 
pursuing a governance agenda would trigger internal political drama or constitutional 
crises.  
D. The	Seductions	of	Quantification		
In short, it was the technical objectivity of Shleifer’s methods that made them 
instrumentally attractive to the World Bank. Yet many would argue that Shleifer’s 
methods —not just empirical, but both quantitative and objective—also made them 
intrinsically attractive. Here, we enter the realm of the sociology of knowledge and its 
interactions with institutional sociology, where such questions cannot be reduced to 
conflicts of interest or logics of resource optimization.  
On the one hand, the practical success of Shleifer’s methods may have much to do with 
the intellectual success of the Legal Origins project. Davis long ago suggested that the 
intellectual success of a theory turns on the leveraging of the counter-intuitive: the theory 
must in some way generate the frisson that comes with contradicting one or more of the 
baseline assumptions of its intended audience. 162  Intellectual dynamics are in part 
mediated by aesthetics not reducible to epistemic values.163 The Legal Determinants 
paradigm seemed to hit both notes at once, offering elegance in its underlying argument 
and novelty in its fundamental claims.164 
                                                        
162  Murray S Davis, ‘That’s Interesting!: Towards a Phenomenology of Sociology and a Sociology of 
Phenomenology’ (1971) 1 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 309. 
163 On the role of aesthetic values, especially ‘elegance’ in scientific conduct, see e.g. Hilary Putnam, The	
Collapse	of	the	Fact/Value	Dichotomy	and	Other	Essays (Harvard University Press 2002) 135–46; Cassey Lee 
and Peter L Lloyd, ‘Beauty and the Economist: The Role of Aesthetics in Economic Theory’ (2005) 58 Kyklos 
65. 
164 This claim needs a small word of motivation. As already noted (text to nn 111–114), Shleifer’s support 
for markets and market institutions was hardly novel. Yet the attempt to distinguish the efficiency of 
national laws on the basis of their legal traditions was a clear innovation, as can be discerned in how much 
those results bothered both national legal communities and comparative law scholars.  
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Another point that needs making is that quantification is seductive. 165  The recent 
fascination among legal scholars with indicators as a mode of (global) governance has 
spurred research on what makes indicators attractive. 166  Indicators simplify, 
commensurate, clarify, and provide a basis of comparison between otherwise quite 
different contexts.167 They ‘reduce uncertainty by collecting, organizing and classifying 
information in accordance with pre-established frameworks.’168  
The power of numbers lies in the impression of objectivity. Quantified measurements 
ideally appear rule-bound, rigorous, uniform, and explicit. 169  Because, by some 
definitions, the objective is precisely identifiable with the non-controversial170—it is 
observable, prior to interpretation, and beyond disagreement—quantified measures are 
also implicitly taken to be not only technical but also, to a significant degree, apolitical. 
Nonetheless, there is an economics to quantified measures, as formal methods provide 
economies of scale to information production.171 But there is also a politics to them.172 
They facilitate forms of governance that disclaim political content, presenting 
interpretation as fact because the form of interpretation that is employed is consistent.173  
                                                        
165 Sally Engle Merry, The	Seductions	of	Quantification:	Measuring	Human	Rights,	Gender	Violence,	and	Sex	
Trafficking (The University of Chicago Press 2016). 
166 Indicators have received increased attention from legal scholars over the last ten years. Kevin E Davis 
and others, ‘Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance’ (2012) 46 Law & Soc’y Rev 71; Kevin E Davis 
and others (eds), Governance	by	 Indicators:	Global	Power	Through	Quantification	and	Rankings (Oxford 
University Press 2012); Sally Engle Merry and others (eds), The	Quiet	Power	 of	 Indicators:	Measuring	
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Handbook	of	Indicators	in	Global	Governance (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham 2018). 
167 Tim Büthe, ‘Beyond Supply and Demand: A Political-Economic Conceptual Model’ in Kevin E Davis and 
others (eds), Governance	by	Indicators:	Global	Power	Through	Quantification	and	Rankings (Law and global 
governance series, Oxford University Press 2012) 29; Wendy Nelson Espeland and Mitchell L Stevens, 
‘Commensuration as a Social Process’ (1998) 24 Annual Review of Sociology 313. 
168 Katharina Pistor, ‘Re-Construction of Private Indicators for Public Purposes’ in Kevin E Davis and others 
(eds), Governance	 by	 Indicators:	 Global	 Power	 Through	 Quantification	 and	 Rankings (Law and global 
governance series, Oxford University Press 2012) 165. 
169 Theodore M Porter, Trust	 in	Numbers:	The	Pursuit	of	Objectivity	 in	Science	and	Public	Life (Princeton 
University Press 1995) 5–6. 
170 Porter points to an idea of objectivity as consensus ibid 3–4. 
171 Pistor, ‘Re-Construction of Private Indicators for Public Purposes’ (n 168) 166. 
172 Büthe (n 167). 
173 Pistor argues that quantified measures obstruct critique and the investigation of claims by presenting 
them as ‘“facts” that speak for themselves.’ Bhuta, Malito and Umbach point out that while quantification 
may displace and transform the politics of governance, mechanical objectivity cannot eliminate it. Pistor, 
‘Re-Construction of Private Indicators for Public Purposes’ (n 168) 166; Bhuta and others (n 166) 1–5. 
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The intrinsic objectivity of quantitative measures made Shleifer’s methods attractive, but 
his methods also offered a mechanical objectivity that surpassed an earlier generation of 
measures.174 During the 1990s, the World Bank Institute developed synthetic measures 
of ‘institutional quality’ that were then linked to economic outcomes.175 However, the 
Bank’s judicial reform projects were generally based on thin ‘conventional wisdom’ 
rather than thick understandings of the relationship between courts and economic 
practice or local needs,176 and they ended with few measurable successes.177 Meanwhile, 
the Bank’s ‘governance indicators,’ based on survey data and numerical questionnaires 
filled out by experts, were criticized for their alleged biases, subjectivity, and 
unreliability,178 and, crucially, for failing to provide a reference point or standard for 
reform.179 Shleifer’s studies, by contrast, offered a precisely-specified mechanism for 
measuring, one that seemed to escape the lingering accusations of subjectivity that had 
shadowed these earlier measurement projects.180 
E. The	 Causal	 Contributions	 of	 Theory:	 Attending	 to	 the	
Technicalities		
Notwithstanding the importance of these institutional, political, and sociological factors, 
this chapter insists that effectively explaining the fortunes of knowledge practices—their 
development, diffusion, adoption, and abandonment—requires paying attention to the 
nature, structure, and content of the ideas themselves. Following leads that join science 
and technology studies to sociology of knowledge and critical legal methods, there is 
much to be learned from attending to the technicalities, in the words of Annelise Riles.181 
My claim is that the most obvious, often presumed features of Legal Determinants played 
a causal role in their adoption by the World Bank and, by proxy, in the adoption of reforms 
that were based on their findings in a number of developing countries.  
                                                        
174 ‘Mechanical objectivity…means following the rules…rigorous method, enforced by disciplinary peers, 
cancelling the biases of the knower…valid conclusions.’ Porter (n 169) 4. In introducing this concept, Porter 
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175 Santos (n 154) 281; Deakin and Pistor (n 10) ix; see e.g. Kaufmann and others (n 45). 
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Compared to earlier touchstones of market-valorising policy reform, ideas about how 
time unfolds and the actors and structures which relate cause to effect are central to Legal 
Determinants as an intellectual project. Yet it is the structure of the temporal claims and 
the mode of causal inference that marked out the fundamental weaknesses discussed 
above. It is precisely the features that made Shleifer’s project weak as a matter of 
historiography that made it so powerful as an intervention in policy-making. For the sake 
of convenient exposition, I have addressed the practical value-added of the five 
weaknesses in the reverse of the order they appear above.  
1. Making	Room	for	Salutary	Political	Agency	
A leap in logic may have been needed to conclude from certain legal changes inducing 
economic changes in the past to an affirmative statement that a country can affect those 
economic variables by implementing those same legal changes. What mattered for the 
Doing	Business project was not whether the logical jump was sound, but where it landed. 
Although the metaphysical move in Shleifer’s analysis (from a historical interpretation of 
the relationship between elements of a system to a predictive schema about the results 
of certain outcomes performed by indeterminate actors) may have been intellectually 
suspect, that move had a critical advantage. 
The World Bank implicitly imagines development as a concatenation of distinct national 
projects. The tacit audience is individual countries. The Bank pursues its ‘development’ 
project through two activities: granting loans and producing research. The research is 
intended to be practical in particular ways. For instance, the Bank does not produce 
research that speaks to what unions should do or how corporations should conduct 
themselves. Its implicit audience is not political actors vying for power or economic 
actors deciding how to invest. Rather, the tacit audience of World Bank research is 
presumptively potent policymakers representing countries that are understood as 
unitary sovereigns. The Bank’s research addresses ‘the nation’ only in the guise of a 
policymaker empowered to act on that research.  
A theory of socio-legal change that frames economic outcomes as products of an 
autonomous co-evolutionary process between local legal, political, and institutional 
factors might have the advantage of capturing much more of the richness and complexity 
of actual legal change. The theoretical work in Chapters 2-4 gives a taste of the richness 
that such an approach can offer. It would, unfortunately, also be wholly worthless to a 
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tacit audience of policymakers. What use would it serve the Bank to inform someone 
charged with improving politically salient outcomes that their actions will ultimately be 
constrained by history and embedded in local institutional ecologies, legal tradition, and 
political equilibria? 
Absolutely fundamental to Shleifer’s attractiveness to the Bank was how easy it was to 
switch from the historical (X led to Y) to the normative (X leads to Y) to the advisory (if 
you do X …). Putting Shleifer’s work into practice did not, it turns out, require the Bank to 
tell countries what to do. It was enough that its research was presented in a way that was 
primarily of interest to national policymakers contemplating their own economic 
strategies.  
2. Naïve	 Causation	 and	 Legal	 Simplification	 as	 Radio	 Dial	
Economics	
If creating conceptual space for policy actors who were able to independently and 
successfully change variables was essential to meet the genre conventions of World Bank 
research, taking a simple approach to causation and legal effects allowed the Bank to 
promote a straightforward and uncomplicated vision of what would result from specific 
legal interventions.  
This was important in two ways. First, given the foundation of World Bank authority and 
its constitutional validity, Shleifer’s study pointed to specific, measurable economic 
outcomes. 
By ignoring the multiplicity of law’s effects, Legal Determinants enrolled law in a kind of 
radio-dial economics. 
In general, the studies suggested simple changes in norms would have predictable effects 
on economic practices and, more importantly, on salient economic macro-variables.  
Radio-dial economics relies on a linear, additive combination of variables and is based on 
a notion that one need not worry about institutional complementarities: you can pretend 
that a particular policy or rule will have the same positive or negative influence 





Shleifer’s conclusions did much more, however, than say what linked legal and economic 
variables in a country. Like other international development institutions, the World Bank 
has published hundreds of reports applying a particular analytical frame to the economic 
situation in a given country and using the results of that analysis to propose agendas for 
reform.  
It was not just that a country or some country could take the advice on offer about how 
to apply law to economic ends, but that any country could apply basically the same 
instrument to achieve the same ends, or could at least move any country in the same 
direction, with some margin for the scale of the change. The silver bullet removed any 
need to worry about context, history, or path dependency! 
4. Narrow	National	Frame	as	Avoidance	of	(International)	Politics		
Sidestepping questions about international investment flows did not advance Shleifer’s 
cause. International investors became the primary protagonists of development 
narratives in World Bank reports and documents through the 1990s. While the focus on 
private investment in LSSV 1997 and LSSV 1998 may have been welcomed, I have no 
reason to believe that treating financial development as a bottom up abstraction—as if 
relatively secure investment opportunities could generate their own demand—made 
Shleifer's early work more or less attractive.182  
That being said, what was a sine qua non for uptake by World Bank staff and management 
was a framing of development questions solely in terms of governance within a bounded, 
discrete national context. Especially poignant were the ways that it avoided engagement 
with questions of the justice, efficiency, or effectiveness of the international legal-
economic order. Arguably, this bias was built into the constitutional DNA of the World 
Bank. Its bread and butter had long been one-off loans to individual countries. The 
balance of political forces between its funders and recipients made it unthinkable that it 
would provide funding for more internationally-structured reform projects.183 In the 
1990s, the Bank may have entered into issues previously regarded as off-limits for being 
too ‘political.’ The Bank’s discussions of global political economy, however, were still 
                                                        
182 A more conspiratorial view would point out that, in ignoring international investment flows, the Bank 
did not risk challenging the prevailing orthodoxy about capital account liberalization, either. 
183 UNCTAD provides an interesting comparator here. 
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limited to encouraging individual countries to accept what that structure required, 
leaving unquestioned how particular iterations of the global order shaped what was 
possible at the local level, ignoring how that order had changed over time, and 
scrupulously avoiding any changes to that order as part of its policy research or advice. 
The disregard of factors relating to the structure of the international system may have 
made Shleifer's analyses suspect from the perspective of reliable or robust social science. 
Yet, in following a long line of research in international development that framed local 
economic growth and social progress solely in terms of choosing from a limited 
repertoire of local policy options, Shleifer's techniques fell within the parameters that 
made it eligible to inform World Bank activities.	
5. Summary	and	Consequences		
These five characteristics of Legal Determinants conditioned its success with the World 
Bank and with domestic law-makers: its attribution of extraordinary power to local 
political actors; its flattening of the dimensions of policy analysis; its articulation of an 
abstracted non-place that purported to serve as a map for any country; a temporal 
framing in which legal change flowed unidirectionally into institutional changes; and 
wilful blindness about the international dimension of these processes. Each is connected 
to the partiality, inadequacy, and incoherence of the paradigm, yet, paradoxically, each 
also contributed to its success. 
What do these characteristics offer? They allow an organization to provide the leaders of 
any country with a list of reforms that will have measurable and distinct salutary 
economic effects, regardless of local or historical context. From the organization’s 
viewpoint, the success of a program that prioritized this kind of advice could be, and soon 
was, measured not on the basis of the promised economic gains but, more simply, in 
terms of how often local reforms 'inspired or informed' by the advice on offer were 
actually adopted.  
VI. Conclusions	
Gauged by the extent of its direct and identifiable effects, the Doing	Business project is one 
of the most successful projects ever undertaken by the World Bank. This is not to suggest 
that the Doing	Business project has contributed to development more than other Bank 
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projects. However, under the principles of project evaluation informed by the field of New 
Public Management, Doing	Business is unparalleled. Dozens of countries have changed 
their laws, regulations, administrative practices, and civil procedures in explicit efforts to 
improve their Doing	Business rankings.  
Closer scrutiny reveals that the causal reasoning underlying the Doing	Business measures 
are very flimsy. It is not simply that the data underlying the rankings are biased, 
unreliable, or invalid, though each of these may also be the case.184 Nevertheless, it is hard 
to gauge how close to home those critiques hit, due to the continuous adaptations and 
amendments that have been made to the methodologies underlying the Doing	Business 
indicators over the last fifteen years. Ironically, these methodological changes have 
disconnected the Doing	Business measures from the only foundation in causal inference 
they ever had, namely Shleifer’s Legal Determinants studies. The problem of causal 
inference would have existed even if the methodologies had endured over the years. For 
one, the tools of causal inference in the Legal Determinants studies were always quite 
weak and they depended on indefensible assumptions about countries and their legal 
systems. Worse, however, the strong involvement of the Doing	Business project in legal 
reform processes creates a form of variable endogeneity that Shleifer’s studies simply 
could not account for.  
 
                                                        
184 No matter how valid or reliable the individual indicators may be, one thing is certain: the rankings 
produced by	Doing	Business rankings are, statistically speaking, completely unreliable. Simple statistical 
tests suggest that summarizing estimated scores through lexical rankings magnifies the impact of 
measurement error, combining superficial precision with high inaccuracy. For example: the probability 
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This concluding chapter offers some rumination on the various issues raised by the 
dissertation. Before addressing some of the questions that the preceding investigations 
have raised, I want to provide a window into a case study that bears on the dissertation’s 
themes, and that offers an even clearer picture of how ideas can influence law, unmuddied 
with questions of institutional politics and international development policy.  
I. Ideas	have	Consequences	
Over the last forty years, the United States has run something of a natural experiment on 
whether and how much expert knowledge—the ideas, techniques and conceptual tools 
of expert communities beyond the boundaries of the legal community proper—can shape 
the development of law. The preliminary results are rather remarkable.  
Between 1976 and 1999, the Economics Institute for Federal Judges offered two-week 
long seminars to introduce federal judges to economic principles and the economic 
analysis of law. 3  Henry Manne, one of the champions of the law-and-economics 
                                                        
1 Simon Deakin, ‘Evolution for Our Time: A Theory of Legal Memetics’ (2002) 55 CLP 1, 40. 
2 Michael Schmid, ‘Habermas’s Theory of Social Evolution’ in John B Thompson and David Held (eds), 
Habermas:	Critical	Debates (Macmillan 1982) 180. 
3 The Economics Institute for Judges, initially hosted by the University of Miami, ran once or twice annually 
between 1976 and 1999. The George Mason University’s Judicial Education program now holds six-ten 
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movement, developed and designed the programs as part of his leadership of the Law and 
Economics Centre hosted, initially, at Miami, then at Emory, and finally at Georgetown 
universities.4 In some respects at least the success of the program was impressive. In 
1990, nearly forty percent of sitting federal judges had participated in the Institute.5 As 
of 1999, well over half of decided cases in the federal circuit courts included a judge who 
had attended.6 Given this level of exposure, Henry Butler, who helped run what he called 
‘the Manne programs’ between 1989 and 1991, took it for granted that these courses had 
‘influenced the thinking of a generation of federal judges.’7  
A. Consequences	of	Training	on	Legal	Outcomes	
In a recent study, Ash, Chen and Naidu set out to test whether exposure actually 
translated into influence, tracing some of the pathways through which the ideas 
presented at the Institute might have affected those judge’s decisions. Unlike the case 
studies in this dissertation, their methods were entirely statistical. They constructed a 
collection of linear models that predicted some high-level feature of each judge’s 
behaviour as a combined function of the judge’s personal characteristics, general trends 
in the circuit or district they sat on—and whether they had attended the Manne 
programs. Using this model, they estimated the (average) effect that attendance had had 
on the case outcomes of individual judges.8 
                                                        
events annually, with the Institute supplemented by a variety of courses each limited to twenty judges, 
including three to four-day workshops on particular legal topics (antitrust, labour markets and 
employment, pensions) and four-day symposia in which judges discuss the applicability of economics 
principles to particular cases. As of 2018, the Institute seems to have been replaced with introductory and 
advanced week-long short courses on economics for judges. Elliott Ash and others, ‘Ideas Have 
Consequences: The Impact of Law and Economics on American Justice’ (2017) Working Paper 
<https://ssrn.com/abstractid=2992782>, accessed October 18 2018. For an overview of the history and 
design of the program, see Henry N Butler, ‘The Manne Programs in Economics for Federal Judges’ (1999) 
50 Case W Res L Rev 351.For recent developments, see online <masonlec.org/divisions/mason-judicial-
education-program/>. 
4 Manne coined the idea of a ‘market for corporate control,’ and was an early, ardent critic of insider trading, 
based on the argument market actors were best-placed to judge whether insider trading should be allowed. 
Henry G Manne, ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’ (1965) 73 Journal of Political Economy 
110; Henry G Manne, Insider	Trading	and	the	Stock	Market (Free Press 1966). Nonetheless, it is likely that 
his renown and reputation is founded not on his singular (albeit important) contribution to the law and 
economics literature, but precisely on the kind of leadership and advocacy of law and economics typified 
by the Manne programs. On Manne’s contributions to the Institute, see Butler (n 3) 351, 354–56. 
5 Butler (n 3) 352. 
6 Ash and others (n 3) 13–15. Given that attendance rates in the flagship Institute declined after 1990, and 
given the diversification of the training programs for judges now offered (see above, n 3), tracking the LEC’s 
influence in the future will prove a much harder task. On declining attendance, see Butler (n 3) 360–61. 
7 Butler (n 3) 352. 
8 The basic structure of their models is laid out in Ash and others (n 3) 21–22. 
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The findings of their study are striking. Ash, Chen and Naidu looked first at outcomes in 
cases where a government regulatory agency was a party to the litigation.9 Drawing on 
the outcomes of 20 000 cases, and under the presumption that any holding against the 
government party would count as anti-regulatory, they find that attendance at the 
Institute increased the chance of a judge ruling against environmental and labour 
regulations by approximately 5%. 10  A second set of results drew on a previously-
constructed sample of Circuit court decisions which had been hand-coded as 
‘conservative/liberal/hard-to-say.’ Previous analyses of that sample has shown that the 
aggregate political trend of decisions moved from slightly liberal to rather conservative 
between the 1970s and 2000. 11  Ash, Chen and Naidu’s analysis of a large subset 
(approximately 30%) of that sample, those characterized as labour or ‘regulation’ cases, 
‘indicates the Manne program accounts for 28-42% of the rise in judicial conservatism’ 
during that period.12 Third, for a subset of criminal cases that resulted in the imposition 
of a prison sentence of determinate length, they focused on the length of the sentences 
imposed by judges. 13  They found that, following attendance at the Manne program, 
judges increased the length of the sentences they handed down by 7%, and that they were 
2% more likely to impose any sentence.14 More strikingly, when the analysis was limited 
to decisions made after federal sentencing guidelines were loosened in 2004, they found 
that the sentencing behaviour of judges who had attended the Manne program were 13% 
longer than those imposed by judges who had not—working out, approximately, to an 
increase of more than six months.15  
Are their findings credible? Given the extent of the critiques levelled against linear 
regressions in Chapter 4, it is worth giving a word to the strengths and weaknesses of the 
approach. It should be noted, first and foremost, that the structure of their research 
design corresponds well with the effect they are actually trying to measure. They are 
interested in the average (presumptively-constant) effect of Manne attendance on the 
                                                        
9 The category excludes criminal trials.  
10 Ash and others (n 3) 22–23. 
11 The measure moved from approximately –0.1 to approximately +0.4 on a scale with ‘all liberal’ at -1 and 
‘all conservative’ at +1. See ibid 18–19. 
12 ibid 18, 23–25. 
13 ibid 19–20. 
14 ibid 26–27. 
15 To give a sense of the scale of this effect compared to the effect of other case characteristics on outcomes, 
Ash, Chen and Naidu point out that similar analyses found a 10% discrepancy between the sentences 
imposed on white and black defendants, respectively. ibid 26–30. 
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behaviour of individual judges, and their analysis is generated by comparing the 
behaviour of individual judges across time, not comparing judges who had attended to 
those who had not.16 One alternative explanation for the observed effects could be that 
attendance in the program and bias in decision-making both reflect the preexisting 
predilections of individual judges and general trends in the court’s jurisprudence. Yet 
their results showed a significant effect of Manne attendance, even in models that 
controlled for average trends (court fixed effects) and for a variety individual 
characteristics (judge fixed effects) found to be correlated with the outcome variable.17 
Despite these precautions, constant factors like judicial career history cannot be used to 
control for changes over time, and one final possibility was that judges who attended 
Manne also happened to be those who were already becoming more conservative over 
time. Ash Chen and Naidu took this possibility into account, too, by using ‘event studies’ 
to check for a jump in the relevant outcome variables after Manne attendance. For all of 
their published results, they found just such a jump.18  
How might these results be interpreted? Paradoxically, they actually reveal nothing about 
how attendance at the Manne program may have influenced any individual judge, or 
about the factors that may have conditioned ‘susceptibility’ to its content. Because they 
focus on capturing an average effect across judges, their models are incapable of 
distinguishing between those whom attendance may have affected very little, those who 
it made more conservative / less sympathetic to regulation, and those for whom it may 
have had the opposite effect. And, much like the linear models critiqued in Chapter 4, their 
design did not provide any way to capture how individual characteristics may have 
interacted with the ‘treatment.’ Yet inasmuch as we are interested in the aggregate effect 
on judicial outcomes, the data seems incontrovertible. The Manne Institute changed the 
outcome of cases heard by judges who had attended.  
B. Consequences	of	Ideas	for	Law?		
In a sense, evidence of a link between judicial training and patterns in the holdings of 
individual cases leave open some of the hardest questions—though, as will be seen, Ash, 
                                                        
16 See above, n 8. 
17 Ash and others (n 3) 12–15, 21–30. Another confounding factor—judicial choice of cases—was avoided 
by a court policy of randomly assigning cases to judges that appears to have been observed in practice. ibid 
15–16, 50–51. 
18 Ash and others (n 3) 21, 22, 24, 27. 
247 
 
Chen and Naidu did not stop once they had established a link. The correlations, on their 
own, suggest the presence of a what but leave open important questions about the whys: 
the relationship between law and the domain of knowledge, ideas and expertise.  
Let me say more. There is, first of all, the possibility that the channel of influence runs 
neither through ideas, nor even through law, properly speaking. In its early years, the 
Manne program involved a two-week, all-expenses paid trip to Miami.19 Early critiques 
of the program raised concerns that judges might be induced by their attendance at an 
all-expenses paid trip to Miami, funded for by a ‘who’s who’ of corporate America, to 
favour those corporations should they appear before them at litigation. 20  Without 
denying that warm feelings for benefactors might influence judicial behaviour, the 
premise that the change in judicial behaviour was straightforward interest-based bias is 
belied by the effect of Manne attendance on criminal law outcomes. Moreover, funding 
for the programs came solely from private foundations (and not from corporations) from 
1980 onward.21  
What made these results truly relevant for thinking about is that their findings are not 
limited to outcome, but also ties outcomes to the presence of economic keywords.22 In 
addition to rating decisions by the relative frequency of these keywords, they used a more 
complex algorithm that ranked decisions on the basis of a clustering method that sought 
to measure semantic ‘distance’ from these keywords. 23  While the frequency of the 
keywords has seen at best a slow upward trend, federal cases have moved noticeably 
closer to those key words, semantically speaking, since the 1940s.24  
                                                        
19 ‘Manne was a zealous proponent of over-consumption of fine food.’ Butler (n 3) 358. After the LEC left 
Miami, the seminars were still held in lavish locations. Nan Aron and others, ‘Judicial Seminars: Economics, 
Academia, and Corporate Money in America’ (1994) 25 Antitrust L & Econ Rev 33, 37–38. 
20 Ash and others (n 3) 9; Aron and others (n 19) 33–34, 38–39. 
21 The LEC itself was still largely supported by corporate funders. Aron and others (n 19) 36, ibid 40. Butler 
takes it for granted that the shift from direct corporate sponsorship to private foundation sponsorship 
removes the hint of bias from the programs. Butler (n 3) 365–66. Aron Moulton and Owens point out that 
the ideology of foundations, many of them funded in part by corporate donation, should not be considered 
free from ideological bias.  
22 The keywords (key phrases) they use to measure proximity were externalit*, transaction_costs, efficien*, 
deterr*, cost_benefit, capital, game_theo, chicago_school, marketplace, law1economic, law2economic.  
23  Ash and others (n 3) 16–17. The details of the algorithm are complicated, but in rough terms, the 
algorithm is trained not just to find the relevant keywords, but to recognize words and phrases that appear 
in similar semantic contexts to those keywords and to grade texts (whole decisions) for how much they 
look ‘like’ those contexts. For details, Quoc Le and Tomas Mikolov, ‘Distributed Representations of 
Sentences and Documents’ (2014) 32 Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 1188. 




To a significant degree, this dissertation was inspired by a ‘cute’ observation. Shleifer’s 
Law & Finance studies, critiqued in Chapter 5, offer a functionalist, instrumentalist 
account of law and its effects, of the kind that is often used to ground arguments for legal 
reform. Yet unlike much of the research in the economic analysis of the law that stretches 
back to the early days of Chicago school law and economics in the 1970s, and even earlier 
to the American legal realists, Shleifer’s arguments are implicitly grounded in a theory of 
(socio-) legal change. Because his arguments about the probable effects of legal change 
are empirical rather than analytical, their validity depends on a broader model of the 
dynamics of change among legal forms, institutional practice and economic outcomes. 
The theory underlying the claimed causal links, very thin in its initial incarnations, was 
eventually spun out across a series of articles into a more complex, explicit vision of legal 
systems, political action, legal reform and economic variables. The development of the 
theory unfortunately worked, not to validate the original claims, but to demonstrate how 
tautological, circular—or contradictory—its theoretical underpinnings were. The earlier 
papers had used legal tradition to ground claims about law’s universal effect on economic 
variables; what the flushed-out theory showed, by contrast, was that the effects of legal 
reforms depended significantly on local context, including local political context. 25 
Whether you focused on the anaemic version laid out in the earlier case studies, or on the 
richer version developed over the subsequent decade, the theory attached to Law & 
Finance portrayed a world in which there were essentially three causal factors acting on 
legal rules: macroeconomic development as measured by various quantities, the flux and 
play of political interests, and the legal system itself, understood as a repository of a 
longstanding legal tradition.  
The irony of that theory was that, if one looked to what Law & Finance did in the world 
rather than what it said about the world, it offered a case in which paradigms, models, 
claims, or tools—in a word, ideas like Law & Finance—seemed to represent a fourth 
causal factor.  
This kind of internal irony, or performative contradiction, has long been the fascination 
of ‘postmodern’ theories concerned with self-reference, reflexivity and paradox. Yet I was 
                                                        
25 The relationship between the theoretical underpinnings of Law & Finance and Legal Origins Theory 
proper is explored in Liam McHugh-Russell, ‘Causal Inference and the World Bank’s Doing	Business project,’ 
under review with the Canadian Journal of Development Studies 
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not content to rest easy with the conclusion that Law & Finance ‘proves itself wrong.’ 
There is certainly a tradition, in social theory and in legal scholarship, which revels in the 
ability to catch other scholarship ‘with its pants down.’ But, for one, proving a theory 
wrong does not actually tell us that much about the world. As statistician Andrew Gelman 
has long emphasized, ‘all models are wrong.’ What should concern us is how much they 
are wrong, and whether it is possible to build models that are less wrong.26 Especially 
among legal scholars, it is impossible to shake awareness of the practical consequences 
of the models and concepts used by various actors—judges and legislators, certainly, but 
general counsels and administrative agents, too. One of the central arguments made 
against critical legal studies in the late 1970s and early 1980s was that their scholarship 
had no obvious or direct practical consequences. 27 One key defence, offered by Richard 
Fischl, was that it would be a dereliction of duty for legal scholars to ignore what law 
actually does or how law actually works in the name of producing work that had direct 
or obvious ‘practical consequence.’28 Implicit in Fischl’s defence was the premise that the 
trade-off between practical consequence and being wrong would only be partial or short-
term—that ultimately, pursuing a ‘less wrong’ image of law (its operation, its rules, its 
effects) would inform action within, or at least with regard to, the legal system. There has 
admittedly been a great deal of work in the critical legal studies tradition aimed at no 
more than trashing the paradigm of others.29 But I for one am interested in more than the 
internal coherence of a theory or body of scholarship; I want to do more than identify 
gaps between a given account and reality. Exploring how a theory ‘proves itself untrue,’ 
however knotty it may seem as a matter of formal logic, whatever the intellectual frisson 
that such knottiness may generate, and no matter how interesting	it may be,30 does not in 
the end provide an escape from the negative mode. I admit that it is no more than a 
                                                        
26 Andrew Gelman, ‘Some Thoughts on the Saying, “All Models Are Wrong, but Some Are Useful”’ (Statistical	
Modeling,	 Causal	 Inference,	 and	 Social	 Science, 12–June 2008) 
<https://andrewgelman.com/2008/06/12/all_models_are/> accessed 13 December 2018. The 
formulation, ‘All models are wrong but some are useful’ is attributable to George Box. Robert L Launer and 
Graham N Wilkinson (eds), ‘Robustness in the Strategy of Scientific Model Building’ in Robustness	 in	
Statistics (Academic Press 1979) 203–04; George EP Box, ‘Science and Statistics’ (1976) 71 Journal of the 
American Statistical Association 791. 
27 Richard Michael Fischl, ‘The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies’ (1992) 17 Law & Social Inquiry 
779. 
28 ibid	783. 
29 Mark G Kelman, ‘Trashing’ (1984) 36 Stan L Rev 293. 
30  Murray S Davis, ‘That’s Interesting!: Towards a Phenomenology of Sociology and a Sociology of 
Phenomenology’ (1971) 1 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 309. 
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personal wont, but I aim to do work that say something affirmative about the world 
outside the theory. I want to reach outside the text.  
III. How	Might	Knowledge	Matter	for	Law	and	Legal	Change?		
My goal has been to contribute to, or at least to gesture toward, an approach that builds 
understanding of law and its relation to the world. If my approach is critical, it is not 
entirely negative. In its ambitions, the project is at least partially positive, or affirmative.  
I thus pursued the project constructively rather than deconstructively. That involved, 
most fundamentally, a strategy of building atop well-developed theory, rather than trying 
to reach from weak theory toward better. Chapter 5 went some way toward showcasing 
the extents and number of dimensions along which the theoretical weaknesses and 
failures of Law & Finance run. There was little promise in trying to graft an account of 
epistemological salience onto that body of thought. 
The research design of this project was an exercise in suspending preconceptions. The 
Doing	Business project, as I hope I have demonstrated, offers a fertile starting point for 
reflection on positivist theories of legal change. I could have started elsewhere, with an 
examination of the episode as a case study in the relation between law and various forms 
of knowledge. I could have started by linking up my analysis with the rich body of work 
that has studied how law uses and draws from other forms of expertise,31 with a broader 
literature that engages with action in the legal field as a knowledge practice (law as 
knowledge),32 or above all with research, rooted in actor network theory, which seeks to 
uncover how events and objects emerge out of the interaction between a catalogue of the 
‘actors’—including human choosers and other familiar economic agents, but also 
materials, texts, words and concepts—with which they are entangled.33 Actor network 
theory grew out a tradition of science and technology studies identified with Bruno 
Latour, and thus has origins that frame knowledge as an emergent outcome of 
                                                        
31 Elizabeth Mertz (ed), The	Role	of	Social	Science	in	Law (Ashgate 2008); Mariana Valverde, Law’s	Dream	
of	a	Common	Knowledge (Princeton University Press 2003). 
32 Annelise Riles, ‘Legal Knowledge’ in David S Clark (ed), Encyclopedia	of	Law	and	Society:	American	and	
Global	Perspectives (Sage 2007); Sally Falk Moore, ‘Treating Law as Knowledge: Telling Colonial Officers 
What to Say to Africans about Running “Their Own” Native Courts’ (1992) 26 Law & Society Review 11. 
33 For a recent survey, see Emilie Cloatre, ‘Law and ANT (and Its Kin): Possibilities, Challenges, and Ways 
Forward’ (2018) 45 Journal of Law and Society 646. 
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interactions. Some but not all ANT-inspired work on law specifically addresses law-
making as a form of knowledge production or veridiction.34  
My goal however was not to develop theory on the epistemic lives of law and society, or 
even on the epistemic dimensions of law-making. Whatever my baseline scepticism about 
the theoretical foundations of evolutionary accounts of law, they are staged under the 
commendable goal of providing policy makers with credible information about 
opportunities and constraints on the use of law to achieve instrumental ends. My intent 
was not to prove that aim impossible, but to attempt to vindicate it in the face of some 
perturbing questions about the apparent relevance of knowledge, including research, in 
the processes that such research intends to describe. I was not sure that it was possible 
to get to the kind of positive (general, naturalistic, etc) explanation aimed at by the Law 
& Finance studies and evolutionary approaches more generally, if I started with findings 
primarily addressed to law’s relation to knowledge. Standpoints are not always mutually 
reconcilable. Accounts, even scientific accounts, operate at different levels and for 
different purposes. You do not need to think about chemistry to understand the evolution 
of species. It is enough to know what DNA does at a genetic level.  
My strategy was to reconstruct a positive, largely economistic account from the ground 
up, confronting the accounts with questions about the relationship between (socio-legal) 
epistemology and (socio-legal) ontology. I was sharply cognizant that, if I treated these 
approaches fairly, my analyses might show the answers to my questions to be irrelevant 
to the project those approaches were trying to pursue.  
I do two things in what follows. First, I will draw on the example of the United States 
federal courts, along with those illuminated in chapters 4 and 5, to provide a preliminary 
catalogue of some of the channels or dynamics in which knowledge of various forms 
might come to matter. 
A. The	Role	of	the	Reasoning	Mind	
The first point I want to make is about imagination, or creativity.  
Parties to a litigation have competing interests. They have competing claims. They have 
to compose those claims in the discourse of law. The form of the claim is arguably 
                                                        
34 Bruno Latour, The	Making	of	Law:	An	Ethnography	of	the	Conseil	D’État (Marina Brilman and Alain Pottage 
trs, Polity Press 2010). 
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indeterminate. That is, there may be many ways of framing the ex post relationship 
between the parties in ways that are compelling to the judge, and these ways of framing, 
as much as they have to draw on a corpus of prevailing legal concepts, may involve some 
imagination. There are sometimes, in the crafting of the brief and the presentation of the 
argument, moments for creativity that exceed the piecing together of already-legal 
materials. There is (in systems theoretical terms) structural coupling between the legal 
system and the individual psychic system; and, if an argument is to be adopted by a judge, 
a borrowing from a shared culture as well.  
Of course, as with the example of the Beveridge report discussed in Chapter 4, such use 
of imagination and creativity may be more common in the legislative milieu. Hayek's 
hostility toward legislation was ostensibly rooted not in its structure or in its participants, 
but precisely because he understood legislation to be the domain of the design, planning 
and active reason that he believed to be such a threat to the spontaneous order of the 
market and its law. And as much as legislation may be mediated by political compromise, 
constrained by the need to integrate into the existing legal order, and mitigated in actual 
effects by the action of the courts and future regulatory action, he was right about 
legislation's content, if not its consequences. The legislative process often does involve 
constructing a picture of how things will work—a regulatory logic, a field of action, the 
form of a relationship. It may also involve the construction of novel legal concepts.35  
Where Hayek may have gone wrong is in ignoring the role of such planning in judge-made 
law as well. Much of the political stakes of individual legal decisions may be hidden, but 
even its explicit discourse, legal decisions are filled with visions of (proper) order, and 
with ideas of how things 'shall' work. 
Judges, in their decisions, might draw these visions or notions from arguments presented 
by parties and their lawyers. But they may also get them from their experiences prior to 
becoming judges including, while they were themselves lawyers (in common law 
settings), and while they were law students. 
B. Law’s	Constitutive	Function	and	the	Salience	of	the	Vernacular	
Let me foreground the relationship between legal discourse and the vernacular. 
                                                        
35 One recent example of such novelty was litigation in Ontario (Canada), under novel consumer finance 
regulations, that required the court to develop a working conception of a ‘payday loan.’ The	Director	v	The	
Cash	Store No. CV-13–482242 (Canada Ontario Superior Court of Justice 12 February 2014). 
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The easiest way to get my point about the relationship between law and the vernacular 
might be to go the long way around, through a critical engagement with law’s constitutive 
role; or at least, it is the easiest way I know to get there.36  
One of the contributions of the first generation of critical legal scholars was the attention 
they drew to a previously overlooked aspect of law’s relationship with social relations.37 
Law not only regulates in the public benefit, as emphasized by the twentieth-century 
liberal-meliorist mainstream; it not only facilitates social relations, as Fuller once put it; 
nor does it simply distribute power, as the first generation of American legal realists 
emphasized.38 It does all these, and is also part of the stratum through which those 
relations are materialized, understood, and circulated. As history lurches forward, law is 
one place where the rubber meets the road.  
In the rush to seize a moment of relevance for law, however, legal scholarship has 
occasionally overreached, inverting earlier fallacies and advancing a reading of law’s 
constitutive function that overestimates the work law does. The error involves an illogical 
jump, from the observation that many salient categories of social life are also legal 
concepts, to a conclusion that those categories are ‘fundamentally’ legal. 
Such overreach is unfortunately common in scholarship that seeks to critically examine 
the substantive relationship between legal discourse and the world. Take Gordon’s classic 
Critical	 Legal	Histories,	 addressed in Chapters 3 and 4. Against an array of scholarly 
traditions that treat law as ancillary to a real world made up of basic elements that exist 
independently of law, Gordon argued that:  
 … in practice, it is just about impossible to describe any set of ‘basic’ social practices 
without describing the legal relations among the people involved—legal relations that 
don’t simply condition how the people relate to each other but to an important extent 
define the constitutive terms of the relationship, relations such as lord and peasant, 
master and slave, employer and employee, ratepayer and utility, and taxpayer and 
                                                        
36 Parts of this section are adapted from Liam McHugh-Russell, ‘Getting the Constitutive Power of Law 
Wrong’ (Legal	 Form, 31 March 2018) <https://legalform.blog/2018/03/31/getting-the-constitutive-
power-of-law-wrong-liam-mchugh-russell/> accessed 28 November 2018. 
37 Karl Klare, ‘Law-Making as Praxis’ [1979] Telos 123; EP Thompson, Whigs	and	Hunters:	The	Origin	of	the	
Black	Act (Penguin Books 1990); Morton J Horwitz, The	Transformation	of	American	Law,	1870‐1960:	The	
Crisis	of	Legal	Orthodoxy (Oxford University Press 1992). 
38 Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law [1897]’ (1997) 110 Harv L Rev 991; Lon L Fuller, ‘Law as 
an Instrument of Social Control and Law as a Facilitation of Human Interaction’ [1975] BYU L Rev 89; Morris 
Cohen, ‘Property and Sovereignty’ (1927) 13 Cornell L Rev 8; Robert L Hale, ‘Coercion and Distribution in 
a Supposedly Non-Coercive State’ (1923) 38 Political Science Quarterly 470. 
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municipality. For instance, among the first words one might use to identify the various 
people in an office would likely be words connoting legal status: ‘That’s the owner over 
there.’ ‘She’s a partner; he’s a senior associate; that means an associate with tenure.’ 
‘That’s a contractor who’s come in to do repairs.’ ‘That’s a temp they sent over from 
Manpower.’ This seems an obvious point, but if it’s correct how can one square it with the 
standard view of law as peripheral to ‘real’ social relations? Could one, for example, 
seriously assert that ‘the law of slavery has tended to play only a marginal role in the 
administration of slave societies?’ Slavery is a legal relationship: It is precisely the slave’s 
bundle of jural rights (or rather lack of them) and duties vis-à-vis others (he can’t leave, 
he can’t inherit, he has restricted rights of ownership, he can’t insist on his family being 
together as a unit, etc.) that makes him a slave. Change the bundle significantly and you 
have to call him something else. And how could one say something like ‘medieval law 
bolstered (or undermined) the structure of feudal society’? Again, a particular (though 
concededly in this case very hazily defined) set of legal relations composes what we tend 
to call feudal society. If those relations change (commutation of in-kind service to money 
rents, ousting of seignorial jurisdiction to punish offenses, etc.) we speak not simply of 
changes in ‘the legal rules regulating feudal institutions,’ but of the decline of feudalism 
itself.39 
Law had a role in establishing the boundaries and limits of the mays, musts and mustn’ts 
of relationships between slaves and other social classes; in continually reproducing 
‘slave’ as a socially understandable and politically legitimate category; in policing the 
cognitive content of slave and non-slave, and thus in maintaining the distinction between 
them; through all these effects, in perpetuating a slave society. But it is a step too far to 
say that ‘slavery is a legal relationship’ as if it were only	a legal relationship. Though law 
may have made slavery possible as an institution, necessary causes are not sufficient 
conditions. They are certainly not essences. Gordon wanted us to be careful about 
hypostasizing a strict separation of law and society; in practice, he offered a vision of 
society in which law occupies the entire field.  
He was probably not the first, and he has certainly not been the last. Consider an 
articulation of an argument concerning law’s constitutive role in recent contribution by a 
collection of scholars, including Simon Deakin, who have been at the forefront of debate 
on socio-legal evolution: 
                                                        
39 Robert W Gordon, ‘Critical Legal Histories’ (1984) 36 Stan L Rev 57, 103–04. 
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In the first sentence of the opening chapter of the Communist Manifesto of 1848, Marx 
and Engels declared: ‘The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class 
struggles.’ But after forty years had elapsed, Engels felt obliged to define the two main 
classes of modern capitalism, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. To the 1888 English 
edition he added a note:  
By bourgeoisie is meant the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means of 
social production and employers of wage labour. By proletariat, the class of 
modern wage labourers who, having no means of production of their own, are 
reduced to selling their labour power in order to live. 
When it came to defining these crucial classes, Engels was obliged to refer to concepts 
such as ownership, employment of waged laborers, and the selling of labor power. None 
of these terms can be defined adequately without reference to law and legal ideas. 
Ownership–in the fullest sense–implies legal rights, enforced by recognized contract and 
the legal powers of the state. The employment contract is a specific legal form, differing 
from a contract for sales or services. Selling implies the legal transfer of property rights, 
on a temporary or permanent basis. The selling of labor power involves the legal transfer 
of limited rights of authority over the laborer and the use of her capacities toward 
contracted purposes. Law appears in the definitions of social classes which are regarded 
as fundamental. So, law too must be at the foundation.40  
It is surely correct that the legal life of ownership—or of contract, employment, marriage 
or really any of the myriad concepts that exist both in law and in the vernacular—
contributes to and helps to shape the materialized reality of that concept as a socially-
experienced category. Here, Deakin and his collaborators say ownership implies legal 
rights; that selling implies a legal transfer; that selling of labour power involves the legal 
transfer of authority.  
But there is a far wider gap than they seem to allow between the claim that these concepts 
are implicated and entangled with law, and the claim that law is ‘at their foundation.’ 
Legal scholars too often say ‘these words have a legal definition’ and take that as proof 
positive that their meaning and significance is legal; that is, legal all the way down.41 We 
cannot understand how ‘capital’ or ‘profit’ work as part of the apparatus that orders our 
                                                        
40 Simon Deakin and others, ‘Legal Institutionalism: Capitalism and the Constitutive Role of Law’ (2017) 45 
Journal of Comparative Economics 188, 191. 
41 Part of the confusion may arise from a folk epistemology that supposes the significance of a concept can 
be captured by a definition. 
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economic life without attending to how they are used in legal texts, and by legal 
institutions and legal actors. Granted. But it is a grave error to think that the existence of 
legal usages nullifies the existence of other meanings; even more grave to think a legal 
definition might exhaust the social significance of those concepts.  
Father, profit, employee, corporation, capital, wife: there are important questions about 
the role of law (qua institutionalized, rationalized form of state power) in giving such 
categories and concepts social substance. There are important and even more difficult 
questions about the relationship that obtains among the ‘meaning’ of these categories in 
the discourse of the legal system, the understandings people rely on in everyday usage, 
and how practices organized around those concepts actually function. But these issues 
cannot be investigated—the question cannot even be asked—if we cling to the narcissism 
that the use of concepts by lawyers and judges is rubber, road and the turn of the wheel, 
entire. 
The employee who undertakes a harmful, wasteful, or humiliating task because her boss 
tells her to may only feel coerced because she lives in a society where the apparatus of 
the state vindicates the right of bosses to give orders. But the boss’s instruction, his 
expectation that it will be obeyed, her sense that she should obey, her fear if she refuses, 
the consequences if she does—these are incidents of a subordinate relationship that 
exists as more than law, and through more than legal means. Like other categories 
claimed as legal, what an employee is ‘in the fullest sense’ lives in the variety of 
understandings that the relevant individuals have of that concept, in the practices 
informed by those understandings, and in what emerges from interactions and conflicts 
between those practices. Those understandings and practices may be informed by law 
(as well as by other rationalized, institutionalized intellectual practices) but they are also 
produced and reproduced by popular culture, familiar anecdote, everyday interaction, 
and public debate.  
But here I need to turn the point around. What I am trying to make visible is not the 
limited power of law's constitutive functions to make (assemble) social reality, even 
when it comes to categories which lawyers are wont to cast as 'fundamentally' legal. I am 
trying to recapture a place for the autonomy of the social beyond law. These categories 
have a form of existence that transcends the network of meanings, expectations, and 
enforceable norms that they are granted through law. And, more emphatically for my 
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purposes, their actuality is experienced in ways that go beyond their representation 
through the conceptual frame of the legal system. They are also represented through the 
vernacular experience already mentioned above popular culture, familiar anecdote, 
everyday interaction and public debate.  
Once we come to understand that there is a space between the legal conceptualization of 
key categories and the vernacular representation of those categories; once we become 
willing to admit, precisely through an understanding of the complexity of ‘social 
constructivism’ that the relative correctness of these representations is of less pith than 
their shared participation in the shared materialization and experience of those 
categories, then we might become interested, as well, in how those representations shape 
each other. And, to make the point very explicit, it may mean that vernacular 
understandings inform legal meanings.  
There is a reason lawyers use the concept of the ‘corporation’ rather than a concept 
named, e.g. by a numerical index. The link between vernacular experience and legal 
discourse is key to the function of law. By linking to everyday categories, we increase 
analytical complexity, but we increase legal predictability. Law’s use of concepts with 
everyday relevance means that people can grasp a sense of where they stand, in terms of 
enforceable norms, making use of a familiar shorthand. It would be a surprising result 
indeed, however, if lawyers and judges could seal themselves within a closed system of 
legal communications.  
IV. What	is	Evolutionary	Jurisprudence	For?		
A. The	Uses	of	Research	
The conceit lying beneath a great preponderance of social science research, and which 
inflects much of the scholarship on law inspired or informed by the appeal to scientific—
and implicitly, social scientific—validity, is that its goal should be a form of explicit (overt, 
formal) knowledge. The ideal here is a kind of knowledge that can be taught through the 
banking model of education: tellable, transferable, and discrete.42 Though it may fall into 
the quantitative register that has come to dominate the social sciences, rooted in a fetish 
                                                        
42 Credit for the ‘banking model of education’ is due to the Brazilian theorist Paulo Freire, Pedagogy	of	the	
Oppressed (Myra Bergman Ramos tr, Penguin Books: Sheed & Ward 1970). 
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for (causal) explanations whose characteristic aim is to provide an account of one set of 
things in terms of another,43 or pursue a task of description	 that	amounts	 to	an open-
minded inquiry into the diversity and complexity of relations between elements in a 
field,44 the	account	itself is taken to be the end of the inquiry. Constructed correctly, the 
account can don the cloak of truth. Properly done, inquiry expands the borders of 
knowledge, with the individual scholar, like a soldier in a conquering army, contributing 
to the territory possessed by the commonwealth. Science—or, for those who may feel 
excluded from the ambit of that term, scholarship—increases what we know by adding 
to the sum of knowledge we already possess. Republican voters are shorter than 
Democrats. Liberal democracies do not go to war with each other. A labour rights regime 
that excludes a particular group of workers from a method to effectively collectively 
bargain with their employer is contrary to the rights protected by the Canadian Charter	
of	Rights	and	Freedoms.45 Like the distance from Mars to the sun, the freezing point of 
ammonia, or how a bee flies, the ambition of such research is imagined to be the continual 
accumulation of true claims, like individual grains on a mountain of sand.46  
I am not going to pursue the claim here that social science research belies this ambition 
per se. There are no doubt a large number of scholars motivated by no more than a desire 
to unlock puzzles implied by social behaviours which contradict their intuition, or by a 
genuine, wholly innocent curiosity about parts of the human experience with which they 
are unfamiliar.47 There is a great deal of work, moreover, especially at the boundaries of 
the humanities, informed primarily by intrinsic and in some sense expressive ends, 
whether they be aesthetic or some variety of ethical/political. Some historians just want 
to tell a good yarn. Many ethnographers have been motivated by a desire to give voice, 
                                                        
43 For the nature of the ‘quantitative register’ in the social sciences, appreciation of its dominance, and 
critiques of its shortcomings see Gary King and others, Designing	 Social	 Inquiry:	Scientific	 Inference	 in	
Qualitative	Research (Princeton University Press 1994); Henry E Brady and David Collier (eds), Rethinking	
Social	Inquiry:	Diverse	Tools,	Shared	Standards (2nd edn, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2010). 
44 On description as a necessary mode of social inquiry, see Anne Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’ (2012) 
25 Leiden Journal of International Law 609; Clifford Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive 
Theory of Culture’ in The	Interpretation	of	Cultures:	Selected	Essays (Basic Books 1973). 
45 Ontario	(Attorney	General)	v	Fraser, [2011] 2 SCR 3, 2011 SCC 20 (Canada). 
46 The reference to sand may be unnecessarily harsh. I used to study pure mathematics, a field I view view 
as enaged is something akin to the building a permanently-expanding castle in the sky, a crystalline 
structure constructed of pure reason, whose nooks and crannies remain in permanent equilibrium. I do not 
mean to suggest by my metaphor that all human knowledge is equally fragile, equally contingent, or 
discrete.  
47 Davis suggested that an important factor in the success of social theory was that it promoted a premise 
which contradicted the intuitions of the public. Davis (n 30). 
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place, weight, or depth to forms of life beyond or peripheral to their own societies. I do 
nonetheless want to suggest that a large portion, perhaps the majority, of scholars who 
write in a ‘social scientific’ register (broadly understood) are hiding, or distracting from, 
or misconstruing the actual instrumental ends and motives that underlie their research 
output. Whether consciously or unconsciously, they are not saying what they are actually 
up to.  
In a lucid, well-researched book on the methodology of the social sciences, John Gerring 
compiles a bried list of the criteria that scholars might use in the choosing the concepts 
and conceptualizations at the foundation of their research.48 And slipped in among a list 
of uncontroversial factors—some based on the desire to be understandable both among 
a research community and to ordinary users of a language, others constitutive of 
objectivity, accuracy and validity of the research outputs—is another factor that does not 
fit into either of these categories: relevance.  
The question of relevance, however, leads us away from the paradigm of explicit 
knowledge. For this reference to relevance raises a pointed question: relevant to whom? 
If we imagine the archetype of the university knowledge system, with departments of 
political science and of philosophy, we will discern a mode of inquiry that searches for 
final answers to universal, strictly distinguishable questions: ‘what is?’ on the one hand 
and on the other, ‘what should be?’ 
It may be in the business schools, and ironically so given their hegemony, that we find 
perhaps the least concern with the conceit of universal knowledge about humanity's 
nature, disposition, destiny, or vocation. Scholars in business schools are aware that the 
knowledge being produced is meant to be useful, and useful to particular groups of people 
engaged in particular tasks. A great deal of marketing research is concerned with the 
pathologies, limitations and peculiarities of human decision-making under modern 
capitalism, but its publication in the marketing journals belies any suggestion that the 
purpose is some kind of pure knowledge. Marketing journals make overt what is 
elsewhere left unstated, which is the practical function that drives the nature, focus, and 
content of work in the human sciences 
                                                        




Here, I want to suggest another path, inspired by the work of Raymond Geuss.49 In his 
concise critique of contemporary political philosophy, Geuss makes two key moves. The 
first is to situate the problem of politics, not just in a single collective choice about 
institutional form, but in the judgements that individuals and groups have to make about 
what sorts of action to take and reasons to give, in particular historical contexts, and 
under the constraints of uncertainty, limited resources, and the passage of time. The 
second is that political thought, in such a context, is not limited to furnishing a unified 
vision of just social institutions, or even to articulating a repertoire of institutional 
choices. He argues, instead, that political theory can be useful in at least five ways. The 
first is what he calls understanding forms of collective action, a task which includes but 
is not exhausted by the tasks of explanation and description;50 The second is evaluation 
of such forms collective actions, in terms of justice and legitimacy, certainly, but also in 
terms of efficiency, comprehensibility, beauty—this is implicitly comparative; The third 
is guidance or orientation—giving people an understanding of their place in the world, 
and ways of framing, justifying, reasoning about their own actions; The fourth is 
conceptual innovation—Geuss’s example is Hobbes’s conceptualization of the state. 
Another would be Hayek’s vision of the market; The fifth is the critique of ideology. This 
typology can easily be understood to apply to political science more broadly and to 
political economy in particular  
Geuss’s approach disturbs the clear distinction between the task of the legislator—
economic policy—and the project of trying to seize (or at least influence the exercise of) 
the powers of the legislator (political science). Thought or knowledge is intended to not 
only serve an enlightened ruler, or to inform those trying to win competitions to control 
levers of the state, but to orient and inform those participating in various forms of micro-
politics and in conflicts determined outside of the most obvious sites of law-making; 
political thought in this sense has a fuzzy border with ‘strategy.’ Understanding and 
orientation in this sense works to inform unions and social movements, activists and 
citizens, and experts of all stripes trying to practice a situated political ethics. The ideal of 
positivist political science is faulty not only because research is ‘always informed by 
                                                        
49 Raymond Geuss, Philosophy	and	Real	Politics (Princeton University Press 2008). 
50 cf Orford (n 44). 
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norms,’ (because the fact/value dichotomy cannot be sustained) but because argument, 
evidence, and thought inevitably appeal to certain priorities, rate the relative salience of 
categories, invites audiences to attend to some sites rather than others, implies what 
vectors of approach might be fruitful; treats some parts of the social world as stable, and 
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